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SUMMARY
The focus of this study is on South Africa’s transition to democracy. It is argued in this
thesis, that an analysis of the transition to democracy in South Africa and the transformation
of the conﬂict that prevailed in this divided society could generate new avenues for theorising
about transitions to democracy in divided societies amidst conﬂict. The aim with this thesis
is to contribute towards a more comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of
the process of transition to democracy, and the relevant theory involved, particularly with
regard to transitions in divided societies. One consequence of the deep divisions within
South African society has been the increase in violence, which followed liberalisation. The
transition to democracy in South Africa, as a result, was characterised by continuing and
escalating violence. In South Africa, the authoritarian regime deteriorated mainly because
of internal factors, but external factors also played an important role.
The analysis of the transition has been guided by the hypothesis that the democratisation
of South Africa was accomplished through a compromise that was negotiated between the
major political actors and which reﬂected the intra-, as well as the inter-dynamics in the
domains of, state - political society - civil society.
Thus, the main theme of this thesis is, that in the analysis of the dynamics of the tran-
sition to democracy in South Africa, a basic framework in which the domains of, state -
political society - civil society, are the domains where structural variables (such as culture,
economic development, class structures, increased education and the international environ-
ment) and behavioural variables (such as major political actors, elite factions, organisations
from civil society) interact. Thus, in the diachronic analysis of South Africa’s transition, an
interactive approach, that seeks to relate structural constraints to the shaping of contingent
choice, is followed. At the same time, the institutional substitution of a new democratic
political dispensation is examined.
In conclusion, democracies are complex phenomena, and they are caused by many diﬀer-
ent forces and synthesizing the relevant theoretical approaches to political change provides
a more cogent and comprehensive explanation of democratic transition in South Africa.
KEY WORDS
democracy, South Africa, democratic transition, political actors, macro-structural approach,
interactive approach, micro-behavioural approach, political society, civil society, power-
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INTRODUCTION TO A STUDY OF
DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
1.1 INTRODUCTION
President FW de Klerk’s speech at the opening of the South African parliament in Cape Town
on 2 February 1990 signalled a turning point in the struggle for democracy in South Africa.
On this day, President De Klerk lifted the ban on the major anti-apartheid organisations,
undertook to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and declared the door
to negotiations open (Arnold, 1992:1; Sisk, 1995:56). South Africa subsequently embarked
on a process of liberalisation and democratisation after years of political conﬂict between
the government and the politically empowered whites on the one hand, and the challengers,
which usually referred to this conﬂict as “the struggle”, on the other hand.1
South Africa’s political history was traditionally characterised by chronic conﬂict be-
tween, on the one hand, a sub-society composed of whites that enjoyed political participa-
tion and competition and, on the other hand, another sub-society composed of non-whites
(blacks, coloureds and Asians/Indians),2 that had only limited political rights. South African
1In this regard the term “challengers” refers to those who sought a regime change and which included
mostly those excluded from political participation through prescription and proscription since the establish-
ment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, for example the African National Congress (ANC), the South
African Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). See chapter 2 for an explanation
of the various concepts in this regard.
2The words used to designate these categories of the population are controversial, often pejorative, not
consistently used and have changed during the years. The term, “whites”, usually refers to those that
have retained their European identity and heritage. Hence, the term, “Europeans”, is often used as a
synonym. The terms “so-called coloureds” and “Bruinmense” (Brown people) are often used as alternatives
for “coloureds.” The terms “African”, “Native” and “Bantu” are often used to refer to a black person. The
1
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society, as a result, was characterised by divisive factors like race, including ethnicity and
language, class, ideology and political rights. In this sense, South Africa was a plural society
in the extreme. The people of South Africa were also historically segregated in terms of race,
namely as whites, blacks, coloureds and Asians/Indians. Successive governments prescribed
and proscribed political rights based on race during the period 1910 to 1994. The ruling
white elite systematically excluded and deprived the non-white people of a national position.
The adoption of the apartheid policy, after the National Party (NP) came to power in 1948,
was in particular instrumental in this regard. The term, apartheid implied an exclusionary
franchise and other rights (for example with regard to opportunities for employment).3 This
implied that mainly white people could vote and be elected to the South African Parliament.4
Non-whites, therefore, did not enjoy the same political rights as whites (see Thompson and
Prior 1982).
Blacks were, in terms of the policy of apartheid, further divided according to ethnicity.
They were allowed some political rights based on their ethnicity and mainly in ethnically
deﬁned geographical areas called “homelands.” Language diﬀerences often coincided with
ethnic diﬀerences. Societal divisions of race, ideology and class, coincided and were, there-
fore, reinforced by divisions in political rights.
The ruling NP later attempted to accommodate the political aspirations of blacks through
its policy of homelands; by providing “independence” to some of these homelands, namely
Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1978) and the Ciskei (1981); and by the
implementation of local government structures for blacks (see chapters 3 and 4). With the
adoption of a new constitution in 1983 (Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 100
term “Asian” is sometimes used to refer to Malays and Chinese. The denigrated and pejorative colloquial
terms “hottentotte (hotnots)”, “coolies” and “kaﬃrs” for coloureds, Indians and blacks respectively. The
terms “non-whites”, “people of colour” and “non-Europeans” are often used to refer collectively to those
that are not white. Currently, the term “blacks” is used for this purpose. For purposes of this study, unless
otherwise indicated the following main categories and their labels will be used: whites, coloureds, blacks
and Indians (see Du Toit, B M 1983:365-395: Horowitz 1991:23-27). Collectively the latter three will be
referred to as non-whites. On occasion the designator Asian/Indian would be used to refer to a broader
Asian category.
3Examples in this regard are the Representation of Natives Act No. 16 of 1936 and the Separate
Representation of Voters Act No. 46 of 1951 that were passed in South Africa, further limiting the black
franchise. In the Cape Province, blacks could vote but not run for oﬃce. In 1956, Cape coloureds were
removed from the common roll and accorded representation by whites in parliament. These limited rights
were abolished in 1960 and 1968 respectively (see Thompson and Prior 1982:78).




of 1983), the government tried, through a tri-cameral constitutional dispensation (see chap-
ter 4), to co-opt coloureds and Indians in Parliament. Coloureds and Indians were given
representation in separate parliamentary chambers, but with limited powers. This was an
attempt to introduce “consociational democracy”, as some members of the NP mislabeled
their experiment in co-optation. Blacks were not included in the new parliamentary ar-
rangements. Even though some coloureds and Indians participated in the new dispensation,
they were not necessarily convinced of its merits and voter turnout among coloureds and
Indians was low (Botha, 1996:107-108). These attempts to accommodate and co-opt non-
whites failed. South Africa became, as a result of the policy of apartheid, further segmented,
polarised and isolated from the international community.
The South African government was, thus, often referred to as a “racial oligarchy” that is
a form of regime where political power was eﬀectively vested in a small segment of society,
and in the case of South Africa, a white minority. The political dispensation based on race
and discrimination in general, became increasingly untenable domestically, as well as in the
eyes of the international community.
Those opposed to the ruling elite formed a variety of resistance organisations such as the
ANC in 1912, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which split from the ANC in 1959 and later
the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 (see Thompson and Prior 1982:136-137; Marx,
1992:7-39).
It is against this background that South Africa embarked on a path of transition to
democracy after 2 February 1990. However, establishing a democratic system in South
Africa looked diﬃcult (see Sisk, 1995; Giliomee, 1995). A transition to democracy meant
not only the unbanning of anti-apartheid organisations, but also the possibility of whites
losing their political and economic privileges. Political elites diﬀered over the negotiation
process, the writing of a constitution, what democracy in South Africa is supposed to be and
there were, for example, disagreements over issues such as power-sharing, the form of state,
the extent of media freedom, and the rights and obligations of the opposition (see Horowitz,
1991; Lijphart, 1985:24). The ﬁrst non-racial election, held during 26-29 April 1994, was
a historic event that signalled the beginning of an “inclusionary democracy” and an end
3
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to “racial oligarchy”. South Africa’s experience of a peaceful transition to democracy was,
and still is regarded as a miracle. It stimulated interest, among academics and in particular
political scientists, in acquiring knowledge about the possibility of democratising “deeply
divided societies”.
South Africa is therefore important to scholars that study transitions to democracy in
deeply divided societies and for this reason, the process of the transition to democracy, in
South Africa, is the focus of this thesis.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
As implied, studying the process of democratic transition within the South African context
is important to political scientists. However, the problem addressed in this thesis is: what
was the nature of the dynamics of the process that made a peaceful transition to democracy
possible? Furthermore, the problem includes the parameters of a more integrative theoretical
approach as a tool towards a better understanding of the processes of liberalisation and
transition to democracy in general, and with regard to South Africa in particular.
As indicated, South Africa has since February 1990 been involved in a rapid process of
liberalisation to democracy, following protracted political conﬂicts between the regime and
anti-regime forces. Several questions remain with regard to the process of peaceful transi-
tion in South Africa and in particular, within a context of societal divisions and conﬂict.
Of particular importance, are questions pertaining to the factors that contributed towards a
transition to democracy in South Africa, as well as how the process has developed. Questions
like these are the inspiration behind the analysis, made in this thesis, on South Africa’s liber-
alisation and transition during the period 1978-1994 under the general theoretical framework
of a “transition to democracy”.
A reconsideration of democratisation in a deeply divided society and the institutional
capability for consolidation is thus important in the study of transitions to democracy. At-
tention needs to be paid to the macro-structural factors, the micro-behavioural processes,5
5According to particular theories that form part of the macro-structural approach (see Bratton and Van
de Walle, 1997:20-23), there is a high degree of correlation between various economic, social, and international
factors, on the one hand and political liberalisation and democratic transition on the other hand. In the
4
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the substantial “institutional substitution” of a new democratic system, as well as the dy-
namics of the process of democratic transition in general and in particular in the case of
South Africa (1978-1994). In this study an analysis is, therefore, made of the processes of
compromise through negotiation and strategic reciprocal action among the main political
actors that took place during the process of transition.
1.3 PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Following from the problem statement, the objectives of this thesis are: ﬁrstly, to analyse
the dynamics of the democratic transition of South Africa that took place during the period
1978-1994 and secondly, based on this analysis, to establish a more integrative theoretical
approach that could provide a basic framework for a better understanding of the liberalisation
processes and the transition to democracy.
The aim of this study is therefore to develop, on the basis of the analysis of the dynamics
of the transition in South Africa, a theoretical framework where structural and behavioural
variables are combined eclectically for analytical purposes. For analytical purposes, the do-
mains of, state - political society - civil society are the areas where structural variables (such
as culture, economic development, transformation of class structures, increased education
and the international environment) and behavioural variables (such as major political ac-
tors, elite factions, social movements and trade unions) interact. At the same time, the
institutioning of a new democratic system will be examined.
This thesis will therefore establish that, state - political society - civil society are the
domains in which structural and behavioural theories are integrated for analytical purposes
in order to explain the democratic transition in South Africa. Each of these three domains is
characterised by complex interactions between structural and behavioural variables. Because
of these complex interactions, each domain expands and contracts at diﬀerent speeds, but
also inﬂuences change in the other domains, continuously. At the same time, each domain
is being inﬂuenced by the changes in the other domains (Stepan, 1988; Cohen and Arato,
1992; Kim, 1997).
micro-behavioural approach the focus is on political actors and their strategies in the transition process.
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Thus, the hypothesis that guides this study is: Firstly, transitions to democracy would
be better understood if the various theories pertaining to the dominant approaches, in the
study of transitions to democracy, are integrated into a single theoretical framework that
could be used as an analytical tool in the study of transitions to democracy. Secondly, the
domains of, state - political society - civil society, are the areas where the following variables
interact: 1) structural variables, such as culture, economic development, societal structures,
increased education and the international environment; and 2) behavioural variables, such as
major political actors, elite factions, social movements and trade unions. The institutioning
of a new democratic system, as well as the institutional alternatives in this regard, can be
examined within this context. Thirdly, the democratisation of South Africa was established
through a compromise that was negotiated between the major political actors and which
reﬂected the inner dynamics, as well as the mutual dynamic relations in the domains of,
state - political society - civil society.
1.4 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
At this stage in the research, several concepts need clariﬁcation, consequently, working deﬁ-
nitions are provided for the following concepts:
DEMOCRACY
Democracy remains a contested concept in the political sciences (see Sartori, 1987), but for
the purpose of this thesis, the deﬁnition of Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989:xvi) is used.
According to them democracy, or what Robert Dahl terms “polyarchy”, is a system of
government that meets three essential conditions. Firstly, meaningful and extensive compe-
tition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all eﬀective
positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force. Secondly,
highly inclusive levels of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least
through regular and fair elections, such that no major social group is excluded. Thirdly, it
is characterised by a level of civil and political liberties such as freedom of expression, free-
dom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations suﬃcient to ensure the integrity of
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political competition and participation.
AUTHORITARIANISM
Linz (1970:255; 1975:264) deﬁnes authoritarian regimes as:
political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elab-
orate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive
nor extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development);
and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within for-
mally ill-deﬁned limits but actually quite predictable ones.
Thus, as a political system, authoritarianism is undemocratic, in that political power is
concentrated in a leader or small elite not constitutionally responsible to those governed. It
diﬀers from totalitarianism in that authoritarian governments usually lack a guiding ideol-
ogy, tolerate some pluralism in social organisations, lack the power to mobilise the whole
population in pursuit of national goals, and exercise their power within relatively predictable
limits.
Within the South African context and for purposes of this research, the concept authori-
tarianism would imply “government without the consent of the majority”.6 Authoritarianism
is therefore the opposite of democracy.
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
The concept of transition to democracy (democratisation) is usually deﬁned as a change from
an authoritarian (sometimes totalitarian) political dispensation to a democratic political
dispensation.
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA
In the case of South Africa, democratic elements were to be found in white politics and
some of the limited political rights that non-whites had. However, South Africa in general
lacked inclusive political rights, a culture of human rights and political freedom. For this
6There were a number of democratic characteristics within the South African political dispensation, but
the majority of the people were excluded from these.
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reason, it could be regarded as an authoritarian regime. Because of the political rights and
other privileges, that whites enjoyed, it was, as said, often referred to as a racial oligarchy.
Thus, within the South African context a transition to democracy implied a change from
the “racial oligarchy” to an inclusive, participatory and competitive political dispensation
based on universal franchise.
South Africa’s transition to democracy involved three concurrent dimensions.7 Firstly,
it involved a political transition from a racial oligarchy (apartheid) to liberal democracy,
which also required the de-racialisation of South African society. Secondly, it involved an
economic transition from a closed, white-dominated, albeit racially integrated, economy to
a gradually globalising, more open economy which included increasing black participation.
Thirdly, it involved a transition from resistance (and quasi-civil war in some parts of the
country such as KwaZulu/Natal and the East Rand) and armed struggle, to peace and order
under majority rule.
These three dimensions of the democratisation process can be described as South Africa’s
triple transition.
STATE
In this regard, the concept of state refers to the behavioural relationship between rulers
and the ruled, which take place within institutional structures. It thus, implies a political
association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction over a people within a deﬁned territory
(Heywood, 1997:413).
CIVIL SOCIETY
Cohen and Arato (1992:ix) distinguishes between civil society, political society and economic
society, though political society and economic society both rise from civil society. They there-
fore deﬁne the concept of civil society as “a sphere of social interaction between economy
and state, composed above all of the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associa-
7For a more elaborate discussion of the triple transition, see Michael Bratton and Chris Landsberg, 1999.
“From Promise to Delivery: Oﬃcial Development Assistance to South Africa, 1994-98”. Johannesburg:
Centre for Policy Studies. Research Report no. 68.
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tions), social movements, and forms of public communication” (see also Bratton, 1994:2-4).
For analytical purposes a distinction will be made in this study between civil society and
political society only, and therefore civil society will be regarded as: “the realm of organ-
ised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting and autonomous
from the state”, but which excludes the private dimensions of individual and family life
(Diamond, 1994:55). It includes economic, cultural, informational, educational, interest and
developmental organisations, as well as civic groups (Diamond, 1994:55).
Michael Bratton (1994:56) also posits that civil society is distinguishable from political
society, as it is a public realm between the state and the family. He holds that civil society
is a theoretical rather than an empirical construct; and that although civil society and the
state are conceptually distinct, they are best considered together.
POLITICAL SOCIETY
The concept of political society refers to the institutions through which social actors seek
to win and exercise state power. The institutions of political society - which are located
in society and not in the state - specialise in partisan political contestation and in the
construction of governing coalitions. The concept of “political society”, therefore, refers to
the buﬀer zone between the domains of state and civil society and includes parties, political
organisations and political publics such as parliaments (Bratton, 1994:2-4; Cohen and Arato
1992:ix).
1.5 IMPORTANCE OF STUDY AND LITERATURE BACKGROUND
This study is important because the political changes made in a multi-ethnic and racially
divided South Africa, during the period 1978-1994, have implications for theories about the
democratisation of “deeply divided societies”, and in particular in the presence of conﬂict.
Multi-ethnic states are often left to themselves to either negotiate an end to the struggles
and conﬂicts they are involved in or to continue ﬁghting. Multi-party democracy and free
elections are often regarded as good in their own right and important in establishing a
functioning democracy. Theories of comparative politics, however, often view conﬂicts in
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such societies as primarily the manifestation of irrational passions (Sisk, 1995:xi). According
to some of these theories, there is, thus, little hope for the resolution of conﬂict and even
less hope for democracy. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:11), for example, mention that
even though protests and demonstrations are quite common during transitions, widespread
violence may drastically reduce the prospects for democracy. In South Africa, the conﬂict,
at the time of transition was, according to authors like Kim (1997:15) and Sisk (1992:57)
primarily about race, class and ideology. In this regard, racial discrimination and exclusion
reinforced and exacerbated class divisions, which in turn, led to ideological dissension. The
transition beyond apartheid (and the conﬂict it inspired), towards a set of conﬂict reducing
democratic institutions was as alluded to in section 1.4 a multi-faceted enterprise.
The explanatory value of the existing theories on democratisation, in particular within
the context of South Africa’s transition, as well as ways in which these theories can be
integrated, need to be researched (see also Sisk, 1995:xi). New theorising is necessary to
explain the conditions under which the divisions of divided societies can be reconciled and
conﬂict managed through negotiated political transitions during a process of democratisation
(Sisk, 1995:xi).
A number of theories focus on the possibilities and problems of democratic transitions,
often with diverse outcomes. Some of these focus on, for example, the various stages in
the process of democratisation. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:6-14), for the
process of democratic transition to be complete, it has to go through the stages of liberal-
isation, democratisation, socialisation and democratic consolidation. Other theories again
focus on the nature of political institutions best suited to democracy in divided societies.
There are, for example, two similar, but distinct versions of possible democratic success in
divided societies, namely the power-sharing or consociational model mostly associated with
Arend Lijphart (1977; 1985) and the more integrative incentives-based approach of David
Horowitz (1985), which Sisk (1995:31) refers to as centripetalism.
Lijphart (1977; 1985), for example, argues that deeply divided societies should deal with
their plural nature by adopting consensus-oriented consociational, rather than majoritarian
political systems. He argues that consensus-oriented systems encourage elite co-operation,
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joint policy-making, power-sharing at the cabinet level, proportional representation, minority
veto rights, and federalism. These systems enable minority groups to gain access to political
power and resources. The argument is that if minority groups are politically empowered, they
are less likely to become disaﬀected. Lijphart’s (1985) suggestions implied, for example, that
federalism, if properly introduced in South Africa, might alleviate the violent black-on-black
conﬂict that prevailed in KwaZulu/Natal at the time. In addition, a form of power-sharing
might convince Afrikaners (a white Afrikaans-speaking group of mainly European ancestry)
and members of other groups that might feel disaﬀected and excluded, of a place in South
African society.
Then there are those who argue against the idea that consensus-oriented systems may
be more suitable than majoritarian ones, for deeply divided societies such as South Africa.
Some are even of the opinion that South Africa is not a deeply divided society, because the
black population is not naturally divided into competing ethnic groups as the apartheid state
used to insist (see Horowitz, 1991:2-9). They suggest that apartheid divided the nation into
racial and ethnic “enclaves”. The issue of deep societal cleavages is, therefore, a political
issue (see Lijphart, 1977:37, 238).
Horowitz (1985; 1991) who is of opinion that political institutions should preferably
promote integration across societal divisions, proposes ﬁve political mechanisms, in contrast
to the arguments of the consociationalists, that may reduce conﬂict in divided societies.
Firstly, the dispersion of power in such a way that it would proliferate points of power and
thus would “take the heat oﬀ a single focal point”. Secondly, the devolution of power and
the reservation of oﬃces on an ethnic basis are required for the promotion of inter-ethnic
competition and co-operation at the local level. Thirdly, there should be inducements for
inter-ethnic co-operation, such as electoral systems (for example single transferable vote)
that eﬀectively require multi-ethnic electoral co-operation and coalition. Fourthly, policies
should be adopted that would encourage alternative social alignments, such as social class
or territorial diﬀerences. Fifthly, inequalities should be reduced (Horowitz, 1985:597-600;
1992:137-145; 163-226; Sisk, 1995:34-38).
There has been an implicit assumption by scholars of comparative politics, as demon-
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strated by the theorising of Lijphart and Horowitz (who specialise in divided societies), that
such political conﬂict can potentially be ameliorated only if such societies adopt certain types
of democratic institutions, that is, through “political engineering” (Sisk, 1995:5; Sartori,
1987). There was much debate in South Africa on the political institutions that best suited
South African conditions. It may appear as if there is little diﬀerence between the prescrip-
tions of Horowitz and those of the consociationalists. Both, for example, cautioned against
majoritarianism and adversarial politics. Horowitz’s prescriptions for conﬂict-regulating in-
stitutions for divided societies (and for South Africa) also overlap those of Lijphart - both
advocate, federalism for example - but they diﬀer in important ways (see Lijphart, 1985:7-8;
Horowitz, 1991:214-226; Sisk, 1995:35). Horowitz (1985:568-76; 1991:141-144; 1992:137-145;
Sisk, 1992:20) criticises the consociational model on two important grounds. Firstly, he ar-
gues that the consociational approach emphasises the ability of segmental elites to contain
underlying communal conﬂict. Secondly, consociational institutions maintain, legitimise, and
strengthen communal claims against the state. Too much autonomy (for example, through a
mutual veto) can lead to further claims beyond the intention of the original agreement (see
Duchacek 1973:9; Sisk, 1992:21; Sisk, 1995:35).
According to Sisk (1995:15), the right mix of precipitating events can turn an intractable
stalemate into the right moment for successful negotiations. He, however, warns that the
commencement of negotiations could usher in an uncertain interregnum, which could become
turbulent and potentially fatal. Even though violence initially did escalate and in particular,
in KwaZulu-Natal, this fear did not materialise. Agreements on interim sets of rules also
play, in his opinion, a critical role in turning the uncertainty of transition from a liability
into a potential asset. History, ideology, and leadership are all important components of the
process, both as detracting and contributing factors (Sisk, 1995:15).
Two important approaches to the study of democratisation need to be mentioned as well,
namely the macro-structural and the micro-behavioural approach. Both the macro-structural
and the micro-behavioural approaches make a signiﬁcant contribution to the general under-
standing of the transition to democracy from authoritarian regimes. However, each approach
contains certain limitations as will be discussed in chapter two. Considering the limitations




According to particular theories that form part of the macro-structural approach (see
Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:20-23), such as the political culture theory and the wealth
theory of democracy, there is a high degree of correlation between various economic, social,
and international factors, on the one hand and political liberalisation and democratic transi-
tion on the other hand. Consequently, external factors, such as economic sanctions, pressures
from the United Nations (UN) and the United States of America (USA), and international
trends towards democratisation since the 1970s, are regarded as important. In this thesis,
it is therefore, argued that the South African case supports the evident correlation between
structural conditions and political liberalisation. At the same time, however, eﬀective lead-
ership by political leaders, and strategic choices made by the elite groups and their dynamic
interactions, as well as the actions of social movements in civil society, were central to this
process. Thus, in the micro-behavioural approach the focus is on the political actors and
their strategies in the transition process.
South Africa managed to democratise peacefully in spite of the fact that it was re-
garded, by some (see Sisk,1995 and Giliomee, 1995:83, for example), as a least likely case
for democratisation. Because of its successful transition, it is important to analyse the
transition to democracy in South Africa in detail in order to improve our understanding
of transitions to democracy in other divided and conﬂict-ridden societies (see McClintock,
1989:127-148). An analysis of the transition in South Africa that uses a number of theories
is, therefore, important if political scientists wish to address some of the other unlikely cases
for democratisation.
1.6 METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Several aspects regarding the analysis in this thesis of South Africa’s transition to democracy
are important. As mentioned, the aim of this thesis is to describe and analyse the process
and dynamics of political transition, making use of South Africa as a case study. This
interpretative case study seeks to explain the possibility of democratisation in a “deeply
divided society.” South Africa is in the words of Sisk (1995:7):
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an ideal case with which to investigate these broader concerns because it is one
that can best test a wide range of hypotheses about the possibilities and limits
of democratization under conditions not thought conducive to democracy - [for
example] deep cleavages along ascriptive lines, a dearth of tolerance, low levels
of economic development, [and] high[levels] of socioeconomic inequality.
South Africa, thus, is used as a typical case in this regard. It will be argued in the thesis
that the analysis of the South African transition to democracy by scholars, such as Van
Zyl Slabbert and Steven Friedman, amounts to a compromise that was negotiated between
the major political actors. This compromise reﬂected the inner dynamics, as well as the
mutual dynamic relations in the domains of state - political society - civil society. For
the purpose of this study, some of the most prominent theories on democratisation, most
notably by American scholars, have been selected. This study, therefore, does not represent
an exhaustive study of all theories in the ﬁeld.
Furthermore, this thesis is based on a literature study of mainly secondary sources.
The literature study was undertaken in order to construct an integrated framework that
will enable researchers to explain negotiated transitions to democracy, in general, but in
particular, with regard to South Africa. For this purpose, it was necessary to analyse and
compare the applicability of a variety of theories and approaches within the context of the
South African scenario as would become evident in the chapters to follow.
For the purpose of this study, South Africa is, as already mentioned, regarded as a deeply
divided society. Two factors are important with reference to the nature of the divisions in
South Africa. Firstly, until the repeal of the Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950
(and amendments), South African law stipulated that every member of the society should
be registered by race. Secondly, the overlap of racial and class divisions is important. Sisk
(1995:8-10) for example argued that the state was systematically used as the instrument
of the white minority to further both the aims of racial exclusion and economic inequality.
Furthermore, the divisions were compounded by the disenfranchisement of some on the
basis of race and by distributive policies that directly and indirectly protected the material
interests of whites, in particular during the apartheid era. As a result, the unenfranchised
majority adopted revolutionary strategies to counter white minority rule and privilege. This
14
Chapter 1
deep-seated conﬂict involving race and class centred on the fundamental nature and control
of the state (Kim, 1997:13).
The abovementioned divisions in race supported the structure of the conﬂict. These
again coincided with the division between the sub-societies that were incorporated into the
political system and those that were excluded. Conﬂict between the white and non-white
sub-societies reﬂected this racial divide, which in turn, formed the main pivot in the conﬂict.
Furthermore, class and ideological conﬂict was secondary to racial conﬂict, but ideological
and class divisions largely coincided with racial divisions and thus reinforced the racial
division. These in turn were integral to the ongoing conﬂict.
Existing paradigms of political change, for example the macro-structural approach and
the micro-behavioural approach, have limited applicability when trying to explain South
Africa’s transition, especially when only one of these is applied to the transition in South
Africa. This thesis is in particular, concerned with the fact that the speed and direction
of the democratic transition were determined by a combination of factors that underlie
a number of theories, consisting, inter alia, of both structural and behavioural variables,
operating reciprocally within the domains of, the state - political society - civil society. For
this reason, there is in the investigation of the problem, a search for unity in the combination
of the various theories used in studies of transitions to democracy.
In the analysis of the relevance of the macro-structural and micro-behavioural theories of
transition in the South African context, two aspects are important. Firstly, how the internal
dynamics and reciprocal relationships are reﬂected in the strategic interactions of the main
political actors and, secondly, how compromises have been reached during the process of
negotiation in the domains of, the state - political society - civil society. Political society
arises from civil society, but for purposes of the analysis in this study, political society is,
as said distinguished, from civil society. The actors of political society are directly involved
with the power of the state which they seek to control and to manage (Cohen and Arato,
1992:ix). The democratic political system that resulted from the choices made from possible




At the same time, there is in this thesis an analysis of the process of compromise, strategic
interactions and negotiations between the major political actors who reﬂect the inner (intra-)
dynamics and mutual (inter-) dynamic relations of the abovementioned three domains on
the micro-level of transition. A ﬁnal focus is on the practical “institutional alternative”
produced by the new political system as a result of the process where political change in
South Africa replaced the authoritarian, racially based system, with a new democratic system
of multiracial power-sharing.
As already mentioned, various stages may be identiﬁed in a transition to democracy.
In this study, South Africa’s transition to democracy is analysed according to the follow-
ing stages of democratic transition, namely liberalisation→democratisation→consolidation
(Giliomee, 1995; see also O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). However, this study concentrates
speciﬁcally on the stages of liberalisation and democratisation. Consequently, the study of
various phases identiﬁed in the process of transition, will end prior to the stage of consoli-
dation.
Furthermore, three distinct chronological phases can be identiﬁed in the history of the
transition to democracy in South Africa (see Kim, 1997:3). These are the “initial phase of
transition” (1978-1989), the “crucial phase of transition” (1989-1991),8 and the “maturity
phase of transition” (1991-1994). The multifaceted nature of the process of transition to
democracy will, therefore, be dealt with chronologically using these three phases. Changes
in the three domains, as explained above, formed important interactions during each of these
phases.
THE INITIAL PHASE OF TRANSITION (1978-1989)
During the initial phase of transition, Mr PW Botha tried to impose a transition to democ-
racy from “above”. This period was characterised by reforms that followed after the student
uprising in 1976 and Botha’s assumption of power. It can be said that serious attempts at
political change began in 1978 when PW Botha assumed power. This is the reason why the
year 1978 was chosen as the beginning of the transition to democracy for purposes of the




analysis made in this thesis. This was, however, an antagonistic and confrontational phase.
During this period, PW Botha held the position of prime minister (1978) and eventually
resigned as president in 1989. This was an important stage in the reform and transition
process in South Africa, which was characterised by liberalising and democratising reforms
initiated and imposed, from above, by PW Botha.
PW Botha supported limited power-sharing with South Africa’s coloured and Indian
communities (see Sisk, 1995:60). The president’s liberalising (but not democratic) reforms
stimulated intensiﬁed demands from South African blacks for their full incorporation into
the political system. This phase was further characterised by the rise and mobilisation of an
anti-regime civil society, as well as by the policies of ameliorative liberation initiated by the
reformers in the government. Borrowing Zartman’s (1991:14; Sisk:1995) terms, a “mutually
hurting stalemate” developed during this phase that eventually led to the conﬂict becoming
“ripe” for resolution in 1989.
THE CRUCIAL PHASE OF TRANSITION (1989-1991)
The crucial phase of transition was the period of the initiation of negotiations for democracy
through compromise between the regime and anti-regime camps. Thus, this phase was
characterised by preliminary negotiation of the democratic transition through compromise.
Demands for more extensive reforms led to criticism from PW Botha and was a factor in
his eventual resignation as President. In this period, Mr FW de Klerk was elected leader
of the ruling NP and became president of South Africa. President de Klerk’s speech at
the opening of parliament in Cape Town on 2 February 1990 was, as already mentioned, the
turning point for transition to democracy in South Africa. It resulted in the release of Nelson
Mandela and the unconditional lifting of the prohibition on illegal organisations. This led to
important changes in the domain of political society. Soon after, De Klerk and Mandela held
meetings the Groote Schuur Minute (1990), the Pretoria Minute (1990), and the National
Peace Accord (1991) between the government and the ANC came into being. This period
was the most critical time for democratic transition in South Africa. President de Klerk
also emphasised the importance of negotiations as pointed out by Huntington (1991:611).
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The crucial phase of transition was, therefore, also the period of initiating negotiations for
democracy through a compromise between the regime and the anti-regime camps.
Thus, in 1989, South Africa began a process of democratic transition through compro-
mise. Preliminary negotiations dealt with the reciprocal beneﬁts to the leaders of political
society. This phase shifted away from the antagonistic confrontational phase, to a phase
of negotiations between the regime and the anti-regime. The evolution of the negotiation
process in South Africa led to the establishment of a set of nascent institutional structures
to discuss “talks about talks” (Kim, 1997:4).
THE MATURITY PHASE OF TRANSITION (1991-1994)
The maturity phase of transition was the period of democracy through compromise, culmi-
nating in the inclusive elections of 1994. Thus, this phase was characterised by the actual
transition to democratic procedures and institutions. As the leaders wrote tentative transi-
tion pacts, the problem of an alternative institutional choice as eventually set out in a new
interim constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 of 1993) and
the formation of an interim government, became a serious issue regarding transition during
this phase. The maturity phase of transition, culminated in the election, which included all
races, in April 1994.
Through these steps, the process of democratisation in South Africa culminated in the
formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) after the 1994 election. Thus, this
phase also laid the groundwork for democratic consolidation.
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY: SEQUENCE AND AIMS OF THE
CHAPTERS IN THE THESIS
In chapter two, the theoretical framework for this study will receive attention. Various ap-
proaches and theories applicable to the study of transition to democracy are introduced.
The macro-structural approach is the ﬁrst to receive attention and theories that are based
on the “macro-structural” approach will be discussed. Secondly, the “micro-behavioural”
approach, focussing on theories of the dynamic interaction among the actors during the
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democratic transition process, will be discussed. Existing studies of democratisation in
South Africa will also be discussed. Finally, the three modes of transition from authoritari-
anism to democracy, receive attention. The ﬁrst is a transition imposed from above, where
the government (incumbents) is more powerful than the anti-regime groups (challengers) and
the forces of reform are more powerful than conservative forces (hardliners or standpatters)
within the government. The second is a transition from below where anti-government forces
eﬀectively exploit the regime’s disadvantages, such as the failure of the economy, corrup-
tion and violations of human rights. The third is a transition through compromise where
democratisation is produced by the combined actions of government and the opposition.
A systematic distinction is drawn between the deterioration of the authoritarian regime,
democratisation and the consolidation of democracy.
This facilitates the formulation of the research hypothesis that guides this study and par-
ticularly the part stating that the democratisation of South Africa was established through a
compromise that was negotiated between the major political actors and which reﬂected the
inner dynamics, as well as the mutual dynamic relations in the domains of, state - political
society - civil society (see section 1.3).
In chapter three, the focus is on an analytical description of both the internal and external
environmental background of the transition in South Africa, up to 1978, and the commence-
ment of the ﬁrst phase of the transition. In particular, development in South Africa shows
that the democratic process can be understood in terms of the outcome of complex inter-
actions between political actors and structural conditions. The internal cleavages resulting
from the divisions and the structure of conﬂict that are of importance in the South African
case are the following: ﬁrstly, racial divisions; secondly, class divisions; thirdly, ideological
divisions; and fourthly, the struggle against apartheid. Additional macro-structural factors
of transition relevant within the South African context are the following: ﬁrstly, a weak-
ening demographic base; secondly, economic pressure; thirdly, the international pressure of
isolation; and fourthly, ethnic and regional conﬂict.
In this chapter, there is also an analysis of the deterioration and breakdown of authori-
tarian regimes and the relevance thereof for the transition in South Africa. It is argued that
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the direct causes of deterioration include the following: economic crises, declining legiti-
macy, divisions among incumbents, mass mobilisation, and the high costs of repression (Gill,
2000; Gillespie, 1987 and 1990; Pye, 1990). Thus, authoritarian rule deteriorates primarily
because of internal factors, although external factors also play a role during the process of
liberalisation.
In chapter four, the “initial phase of transition” (1978-1989), that is characterised by the
ameliorative liberalisation of the antagonistic and confrontational phase, will be analysed.
The emphasis is in particular on the antagonistic structure between the state versus the
anti-regime civil society in the absence of a buﬀer zone of political society.
In this chapter the ameliorative liberation by the government of PW Botha, is also
analysed, as well as the challengers’ mobilisation of civil society. It will be discussed how
the erosion of the power of the authorities was caused by a number of factors, such as the
economic crisis, a legitimacy crisis because of the failure of the policy of apartheid, divisions
amongst the incumbents, mass mobilisation against the regime, and lastly, by repression
becoming more costly.
The “crucial phase of transition” (1989-1991) will be dealt with in chapter ﬁve. During
this phase the threshold of democracy was crossed by moving from a mutually antagonistic
confrontational phase to a mutually beneﬁcial phase of negotiation. Under examination are
the internal dynamics and changes in the domains of, state - political society - civil society.
An analysis is made of the process of pre-negotiation, including tentative negotiations, be-
tween the main political actors for transition in South Africa. The political implications of
this process are assessed.
In chapter six, the focus is ﬁrstly on a description of the adopted strategy of transition
between South Africa’s political actors and the institutional logic of negotiations in the “ma-
turity phase of transition” (1991-1994). Secondly, there is an analysis of the process that
resulted in the institutionalisation of a new political system through ﬁerce strategic interac-
tion. Chapter six is also concerned with the beginnings of the consolidation of democracy
in South Africa. The groundwork for democratic consolidation in South Africa was laid by
the holding of the ﬁrst democratic election in 1994. South Africa’s ﬁrst democratic election
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in 1994 was a remarkable achievement in light of the fact that there was no civil war and
that democracy has not fared well on the African continent. Undoubtedly, the latter fact is
more than enough reason why South Africa’s democratic consolidation should be the focus
of research. In practice, initial pacts usually precede the ﬁrst elections, while further pacts
may follow elections; for example, those that are written into a new democratic constitution.
The discussions commence with a focus on the role of the political actors and election in 1994
and in the last instance a brief look at some of the dilemmas important to the consolidation
of democracy.
Chapter seven, is the conclusion of this thesis. In this chapter, the experience of demo-
cratic transition in South Africa is reviewed in accordance with the analytic framework of




APPROACHES AND THEORIES IN THE STUDY OF
DEMOCRATISATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Profound political regime transformations have taken place, since the Portuguese Revolu-
tion in 1974 in, for example Greece, Spain, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Czech
Republic, Poland, Hungary, and even in Benin, Nigeria, Malawi and some South Ameri-
can states (Huntington, 1991:679; Mainwaring 1992:1-2). The diverse experiences of these
states in terms of their paths to democracy require a more in depth theoretical analysis of
transitions to democracy. Various scholars have developed several theories in an attempt to
explain these transitions.
The basic theoretical framework for this study, therefore, is based on existing theories
of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, as well as previous research in this ﬁeld.
Included are studies on the reasons for the emergence of democratic regimes from authoritar-
ian regimes, as well as the process of transition to democracy. The purpose of this chapter,
therefore, is to analyse these existing theories of transition to democracy in order to develop a
suitable analytical framework in terms of which the transition to democracy in South Africa
can be analysed.
The theoretical literature on democratisation oﬀers several competing explanations on
change from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. As already mentioned, ana-
lysts have long been interested in whether, how, and why democracies are established and
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eventually consolidated. The debates generated by these inquiries raise several issues that
are important to this study.
The ﬁrst set of issues that is of importance, concerns the relative impact of structural
factors on political change versus the behavioural actions of elites, and events. The ques-
tion is whether a transition to democracy is a function of underlying preconditions at the
economic and societal level. Alternatively, the question is whether political change depends
on the preferences and choices of leaders, as well as on their skills at mobilising resources,
counteracting opponents, and taking advantage of opportunities. According to Bratton and
Van de Walle (1997:19-20) there is more to this debate than the old dilemma of whether
history unfolds deterministically as a result of shifts in the social forces, or irregular through
the actions of great men. They further argue that a complete theory of political agency
would also attend to the endeavours of ordinary citizens, the interplay between elite and
mass actions, and the unintended, as well as the planned consequences of political events
(Bratton and Van de Walle 1997:19-20). Thus, in order to understand and assess more ac-
curately the prospects for democracy in a divided society in which conﬂict is prevalent, it
is important to analyse the conditions that will urge political actors in divided societies to
choose a democratic political system.
The second debate concerns the degree to which political change is determined by national
and/or international factors. The question is whether the trajectories of regime transition are
best understood in terms of the separate and distinctive domestic histories of each state or,
whether a more holistic perspective in which they are regarded as parts of larger international
systems should be adopted. In the latter instance, they are subjected to powerful inﬂuences
from beyond their own borders. These questions are particularly relevant in the case of
small, indebted polities on the margins of an increasingly global economy in a post-Cold
War world (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:19-20).
A third debate concerns the institutional choices that actors make. The institutional
choice approach, by explaining why political actors make the institutional choices they make
for the transition and the new political order, is one of the approaches that are relevant
in this regard. This approach explains how choices evolve because of strategic interactions
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among the actors during the process of negotiation. An understanding of the reasons for the
choices made by the various actors will facilitate the description of the process of negotiated
transition by explaining the positions of various actors during negotiations, and by making
some tentative predictions about the outcomes thereof. It may even become possible to
assess whether the outcome will be democratic, and what type of democracy it might be.
Such an analysis may even provide clues to the possibility of consolidating such a democracy.
The ﬁrst objective in this chapter, therefore, is to review the various approaches to these
issues taken in the literature on transitions to democracy. The arguments developed by
inﬂuential writers who propose diﬀerent interpretations of democratisation, are discussed.
The discussion also provides an overview of the eﬀorts to apply these frameworks to South
Africa. Existing studies on democratisation, therefore, receive attention.
Some of the theories that have been advanced to explain the complexity of democratisa-
tion and the transition from authoritarianism to democracy could in terms of their method-
ological approach be broadly grouped into two categories, namely macro-structural theories,
and micro-behavioural theories (Rustow, 1970; Pridham, 1984: 6-27; Przeworski, 1986:47;
1991:96-99; Mainwaring, 1989:29; Huntington, 1991:31; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997:19-
20). The focus in this chapter therefore will be on aspects of these two categories of theories,
relevant to this thesis.
Thus, the ﬁrst approach to receive attention, in this chapter, will be the “macro-structural”
approach with the focus on the conditions that make democratisation possible or may ob-
struct it. Attention will be paid to theories emphasising culture, wealth and international
intervention. The second approach to be discussed will then be the “micro-behavioural”
approach that focuses on the dynamic interactions among the actors in the process of tran-
sition to democracy. Attention will be paid to theories emphasising strategic choices, modes
of transition, power-sharing and the integration of power. This is followed by a discussion of
the theories of democratisation that are prevalent in studies on South Africa. The interactive
approach to democratic transition, as well as the three ways of transition to democracy will




The second objective of this chapter is to search for an appropriate analytical framework
for analysing South Africa’s transition to democracy. In this search for an analytical frame-
work, South Africa’s transition to democracy is regarded as “democratisation established
through compromise”. Furthermore, this compromise was negotiated between the major
political actors and reﬂected the inner dynamics, as well as the mutual dynamic relations in
the domains of, state - political society - civil society. The study of state, political society
and civil society relations is therefore important. It is argued that civil society, which can
incorporate organisations such as churches, trade unions, social clubs and neighbourhood
groups, could strengthen existing democracies, or could contribute in bringing democratic
change to authoritarian regimes.
The theories that have been developed in an attempt to explain the process of democrati-
sation often imply certain normative assumptions. A number of normative assumptions are
relevant to this study. Firstly, democracy is regarded as a desirable goal (see O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986:3). In the words of Dahl (1989:2), “the idea of democracy is universally
popular”. Reasons for accepting this assumption include, according to Dahl (1989), the fact
that democracy is the only form of government that enjoys popular legitimacy and protects
the rights of the individual. There is also some evidence that democracies do not ﬁght
other democracies; thus, more democracies imply a more peaceful world order. Studies by
Dahl (1989), Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989), Huntington (1991) and Fukuyama (1992),
have also found some evidence that the existence of democracy is positively correlated with
economic development. There may therefore be some economic advantages to democracy.
Secondly, accepting democracy as a desirable form of government implies that a transition
to democracy is also a desirable occurrence. If a democracy is, therefore, to be established,
then there will be a need for strategic choices.
2.2 STUDIES IN DEMOCRATISATION: THEMACRO-STRUCTURAL
APPROACH
As mentioned, the literature on democratisation oﬀers a wide range of competing explana-
tions about regime change and there is an important debate around the relative impact of
25
Chapter 2
structural factors versus individual actions and events on political change. The focus in this
section, therefore, is the macro-structural approach to transitions to democracy.
Structural analysts regard the prospects for political change as being embedded in the
architecture of the relevant social system. Viewed from this perspective, democracy is seen
as a political expression of the social order. The process of democratisation, representing a
general trend towards the inclusion of previously excluded groups in the various institutions
of the state, is in the realm of political authority, similar to the breakdown of feudal systems of
economic production and aristocratic social status (see Bratton and Van de Walle 1997:20).
According to the structural analysts a regime transition to democracy, is the product of
factors such as culture, technological innovation and their application to production, the
spread of market-based social relations, external (international) inﬂuences and the emergence
of new social identities. Przeworski (1991:96) even stated that to some protagonists of this
approach, the outcome such as democracy is uniquely determined by conditions, and history
goes on without anyone ever doing anything.
Theorists who favour the structural perspective - regardless of whether they rely on
empirical cross-national statistical data or on comparative historical case studies - study
aggregate phenomena (hence macro). Their explanations of political trends, therefore, always
return to a foundation of macro level structures that solidiﬁed during the past. According
to them, social patterns, once forged, often persist beyond their original conditions (Bratton
and Van de Walle 1997:20; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992:7).
Macro-structural factors have been found to be important both in establishing, as well
as in maintaining a democracy. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:19) also discuss macro-
structural factors and are, for example, of the opinion that individual actions are less deter-
mined by “macro” structural factors during the breakdown of authoritarianism than during
the breakdown of democratic regimes. Accordingly, the factors that receive extensive at-
tention in case studies by the macro-structuralists are the interests of external forces and
capital, while the interests of a particular sector of the national elite receive little attention.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue, on the other hand, that elite dispositions, calculations
and pacts largely determine whether an opening (to democracy) will occur. They emphasise
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that domestic factors play a predominant role in a transition to democracy and in particular
any important division within the authoritarian regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:19).
Accordingly a good starting point for looking at the crisis of an authoritarian regime is the
“opening”, that is the appearance of political and ideological space for a challenge to be
mounted against it.
Furthermore, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:3) argue that regime transitions are abnor-
mal periods of “undetermined” political change in which “there are insuﬃcient structural or
behavioural parameters to guide and predict the outcome.” A contingent model of change as
advocated by O’Donnell and Schmitter assumes that one agent’s initiative prompts another
actor’s response and that political events cascade from one to another.
Proponents of the structural approach, in contrast, see political transformation as deter-
mined and they seek to discover the patterns of determination by inductive generalisation. In
the macro-structural approach, it is argued that political actors face extremely narrow sets
of choices. Their rational choices are clearly constrained by the distribution of resources and
their interest to maximise income and/or power, in terms of which they calculate optimal
strategies (Shin, 1997:10).
The main argument of structural theories is that it is diﬃcult to establish democracy in
the absence of certain objective conditions that facilitate democracy. Structural conditions
have become a conceptual tool with which to judge both the possibility of sustained demo-
cratic rule in ﬂedgling democracies and the chances of its development in non-democratic
states.
The basic hypothesis of the macro-structural approach is, thus, that structure determines
human behaviour. Studies in the macro-structural approach, therefore, focus on conditions
that may be favourable and unfavourable to democracy. Theorists in this approach try
to determine necessary and/or suﬃcient conditions for a democratic regime - conditions
without which democracy cannot occur and/or conditions that are suﬃcient to bring about
democracy. De Schweinitz (1964) and Lipset (1959; 1992) are examples of scholars of this
approach. De Schweinitz compared advanced capitalism to socio-economic conditions of
industrialisation and democratisation, while Lipset analysed the level of economic develop-
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ment of capitalism as an infrastructure of democratisation. Other examples of studies include
Almond and Verba (1963), Moore (1966) Lipset, Seong and Torres (1993), Rueschemeyer
(1991), Apter (1977), Pridham (1990) and Vanhanen (1990).
The macro-structural approach oﬀers useful clues to understand the role of environmental
factors in studies on democratisation. Analyses of these theories are inevitable in order to
understand and identify the factors that could promote or restrict a democratic political
system (see Huntington, 1984:196).
It is important to note that proponents of this approach downplay the importance of the
short term dynamics of political development. To them, decisions made by the relevant po-
litical actors are regarded as products of their interpretation of the prevailing socio-economic
structures and political institutions (Karl and Schmitter, 1991:270). They argue that the
existing structures can be decisive because they may either restrict or enhance the options
and strategies available to the various political actors attempting to construct a democracy
(Roxborough, 1988:360). These studies try to demonstrate that democracy is a consequence
of “historically-created structures”, such as socio-economic development, inequality and class
structures, sub-cultural cleavages, education and foreign control (see Przeworski, 1986:47;
Dahl:1971:32; Vanhanen, 1990:41-2).
Scholars however focus on diﬀerent preconditions, but for purposes of this study, the
following theories will receive attention: the political culture theory, the wealth theory of
democracy, and the international situation theory.
2.2.1 THE POLITICAL CULTURE THEORY
Political culture is one of the central research themes in political science, but political sci-
entists remain divided on its meaning. In The Civic Culture (1963:13), Almond and Verba
regard political culture as the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward po-
litical objects among the members of a political system (in their words “nation”). The
subjective realm underlies and gives meaning to political actions. Since The Civic Culture
(1963) the concept of political culture and quantitative cultural studies have been a recurring
source of debate, and a recurring source of new research initiatives.
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For purposes of this study, the concept of political culture can be deﬁned as a broadly
shared set of ways of thinking about politics and government and political culture then
provides the general psychological environment within which the political system must work
(Ranney 1996:62). Thus, in essence political culture theorists argue that there is no context
free political thinking and action (see Eckstein, 1988).
The role of culture in human development has been the focus of many scholars. Even in
the works of the ancient Greeks such as Aristotle, there is an implied link between culture
and regime. Several earlier works, such as that of Johann Gottfried Herder, Alexis de
Tocqueville and Montesquieu, provided the intellectual antecedents of modern theories on
political culture (Formisano, 2001:394). Max Weber, for example also explored the role of
culture as a factor in economic development.
Political culture theory was considered of great importance during the 1960s, however,
most of these theories made use of contributions dating back to the 1920s and 1930s. The
rise of the political culture concept during the 1950s and 1960s was part of the more general
ascension of culture “to explanatory prominence in the social sciences and history.” Berkhofer
(1972:198, 299, 300) stated that culture was given causal eﬃcacy as well as being caused,
and political culture as underlying patterns of ideas and values, acquired the same traits.
Initially, political scientists were excited by the possibility of measuring variations among
the political cultures of diﬀerent nations, but they eventually turned to the study of such
entities as “elite political culture” and “ethnic political culture”.
The political culture literature helped to provide political science itself with a sense of
legitimacy and authority after World War II (Pye, 1972:286). Contemporary theories in
political science on the role of political culture began with Almond’s seminal article of 1956,
Comparative Political Systems. According to Almond, “Every political system is embedded
in a particular pattern of orientations to political action”; he referred to this pattern as
“political culture.” He also suggested that the then popular term, “ideology,” be conﬁned to
“the systematic and explicit formulation of a general orientation to politics,” leaving political
culture to encompass “the vaguer and more implicit orientations” (Formisano, 2001:394). In
the light of subsequent deﬁnitions, it is astonishing that Almond initially rejected such terms
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as “attitudes to politics”, “political values”, “national character”, and “cultural ethos” as
intrinsic to political culture; he deemed them “unstable and overlapping”. Ironically, later
deﬁnitions refer to attitudes, values, and the like as standard elements of political culture -
and remain so (Almond, 1980:1-36).
An important early study on the role of political culture in establishing and maintaining
democracy is Almond and Coleman’s, The Politics of Developing Areas (1960). Soon after,
political culture research took oﬀ as a political science sub-ﬁeld (Pye, 1972) and in 1963 the,
abovementioned, seminal work of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, appeared. They
themselves give credit to Laswell’s, Power and Personality (1946).
The Civic Culture is a cross-national study oﬀering a theory of political stability and
democracy that implicitly celebrated Anglo-American representative government. It became
a major work of the political culture approach. Almond and Verba (1963:x) state explicitly
that there exists in Britain and the United States of America (USA) a pattern of political
attitudes and underlying social attitudes that is supportive of the democratic process. The
main focus of The Civic Culture is the political culture of democracy (1963:ix; 1). A psycho-
logical or individualistic approach resulted from the authors’ use of survey research methods
used to study political culture in ﬁve democracies of that time, namely the USA, Great
Britain, Germany, Mexico, and Italy. These methods led to ﬁndings of three basic types of
political culture, namely parochial, subject and participatory, that the authors claimed were
relevant to all political systems. The “civic culture” that was regarded as being supportive
of democracy was then a balanced mix of these three types (1963:29).
For many scholars The Civic Culture’s importance lay in its methodology, not only the use
of survey methods, but also the attempt to employ the survey methods in a cross-national
context. Almond and Verba also focussed on ancient questions of normative democratic
theory, reﬂecting their attendant bias in favour of stable democracies. As time passed, many
of the ﬁndings reported in The Civic Culture seemed at odds with those of later research
conducted in some of the polities studied (Almond, 1980). These discrepancies helped to
discredit the political culture paradigm for almost two decades.
Another early seminal work on political culture is that by Pye and Verba, Political Culture
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and Political Development, published in 1965. The Pye and Verba perspective in Political
Culture and Political Development, sometimes referred to as the “neglected tradition” in
political culture research (Lane, 1992:367), focuses on each polity’s critical elites and masses
in order to study the inner structure of their mediating orientations (Laitin, 1978; Lichter,
1979; Lockhart, 1984). The contributors examined the political cultures of several polities,
namely Japan, England (the relationship of English society to British government), Germany,
Turkey, India, Ethiopia, Italy, Mexico, Egypt, and Soviet Russia. Multiple political cultures
and sub-cultures were identiﬁed in each of the polities studied. Egypt’s political culture, for
example, appeared as an interactive mix of the distinctive mediating orientations of three
groups, namely the urban middle-class elite, traditional rural bourgeoisie, and the traditional
peasantry. The political culture of England, in contrast, resembled a domestic balance in
power system in which elites assimilated talented upstarts and expected deference from the
masses. Its peculiar mixture could best be described as traditionally modern (Pye and Verba,
1969:129).
The culturalist paradigm gained new impetus in the late 1980s through the work of, for
example Inglehart (1988), Eckstein (1988), Putnam (1993) and Wilson (1993).
Central to political culture theory is the concept of “oriented action”, in terms of which
political actors respond to situations through mediating “orientations” rather than directly,
that is, how they interpret those situations (Almond, 1990; Pye and Verba, 1969; Eckstein,
1988; Mayer, 1989:183-184; Putnam, 1971:651-653). Ongoing research into the processes of
political change and the emergence of democracy (Elkins, 1993; Putnam, 1993; Thompson,
Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987) conﬁrmed the importance of oriented action.
These orientations are what Eckstein (1988:790) called the “soul-stuﬀ”, or “mind-stuﬀ” in
terms of which experiences are processed. Mediating orientations must be diﬀerentiated
from attitudes. The latter are more speciﬁc, whereas the former appear as cultural dis-
positions that may vary cross-nationally. Even elites and masses in the same polity often
exhibit distinctive political cultures (Gaenslen, 1986; Putnam, 1971, 1993). Analyses of the




Three core kinds of mediating orientations have been identiﬁed in political culture the-
ory, namely: cognitive, aﬀective, and evaluative. Cognitive mediating orientations centre on
knowledge about the political system; its roles and the incumbents of these roles; its pro-
cesses; and its outputs. They give meaning to experience (decoding). Aﬀective mediating
orientations are feelings with respect to the political system’s institutions, roles, person-
nel, process, and performance. They provide feelings that prompt political actors to act.
Evaluative mediating orientations embody judgments about whether the political system’s
process and output reﬂect those values. They are important in setting goals to be pursued
by the political actors (Almond and Verba, 1963:14; Bill and Hargrave, 1981:86-88; Eckstein,
1988:791-803; Parsons and Shils, 1951:58-60). Culturalists postulate about the emergence,
consolidation, and persistence of political regimes by focussing on the content and internal
structure of these core orientations.
In spite of the renewed interest in political culture, and convincing evidence of a link
between regime type and culture, explanations of transitions to democracy premised on
political culture, are criticised on a number of grounds. Shin (1997:43-45) identiﬁes six
fundamental criticisms with regard to the notion that democracy is dependent on political
culture.
Firstly, changing social and economic conditions, such as economic development and its
consequences may shape a state’s political culture. There is historical evidence that attitudes
and values may change in response to economic development and a democratic political
culture may thus be the outcome of the facilitating eﬀects of long periods of social and
economic development (Diamond, 1992b:475). Huntington has, for example also suggested
that a link exists between culture and religion (1984, 1991). Political culture, therefore,
should not be regarded as a singular and independent actor in the institution and preservation
of democracy. Any attempt to do so would be reductionist and therefore fail to take account
of other possible explanations of the reasons why democracy is the “preferred” regime in a
particular society.
Secondly, a correlation between democracy and political culture does not necessarily im-
ply a causal relationship between political culture as an independent variable and democracy
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as the dependent variable. What brings about the culture of people’s willingness to compro-
mise and bargain, and the eﬀort to search for means of accommodating diverse opposition
groups? Democracy itself might even be a cause rather than an eﬀect of democratic political
culture (Shin, 1997:43). This position is increasingly favoured by a number of scholars (see
Di Palma, 1990:30; Diamond, 1990:57).
Thirdly, there is the problem of determining what people’s attitudes really are. It is
not possible to quantify “cultural values” in the same manner, as it is to quantify eco-
nomic development. Nor is it possible to determine that particular democratic outcomes
occurred because certain groups favoured particular political values and courses of action
(see Pinkney, 1994:24-25; Shin, 1997:44). More fundamentally, how did democratic values
develop within an authoritarian political dispensation? It has been argued in the past that
the Roman Catholic Church is not democratically organised, yet it played an important role
in facilitating democracy in Latin America (see Huntington, 1991:72-85).
Fourthly, political culture theory ignores the crucial role of political leaders and activists.
According to Dahl, (1989:261) political leaders and activists can inﬂuence the course of
political events, because they create and maintain political events, such as the stability of
regimes and their transformation. Weber referred to political leaders as the “switchmen of
history” (Kotze and Du Toit, 1995:34; Shin, 1997:44). Furthermore, it is argued that the
proponents of democratic culture, as a prerequisite for democracy, ignore the strategic choices
political contenders make, and how these determine the nature of a transition to democracy
(Przeworski, 1986:47-57; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:19; Karl and Schmitter, 1991:270-
271; and Fukuyama, 1992:220). The role of political leaders, such as Nelson Mandela and
FW de Klerk would be discussed in chapter six of this thesis.
Fifthly, cultural homogeneity is often emphasised, but is not necessarily a precondition for
democracy (Shapiro, 1993:126-127, 298-311). Dahl, (1989:255), for example, is of the opin-
ion that cultural homogeneity cannot guarantee democracy, and under certain conditions,
democracy can function well, despite extensive sub-cultural pluralism. Examples of poli-
ties characterised by signiﬁcant cleavages, but which are nonetheless democracies, include
Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands. Their sub-cultural plural-
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ism has been successfully converted into democracy by means of appropriate consociational
democracy and/or federalism (Lijphart, 1991c:488; Shin, 1997:44). Lijphart (1977:228) ar-
gues that an extended period of successful consociational government may be able to resolve
some of the major disagreements among the segments of society and thus depoliticise seg-
mental divergences. It may also create suﬃcient mutual trust at both elite and mass levels
to render itself superﬂuous (Shin, 1997:45).
Sixthly, the relationship between political culture and structure must be treated as a two-
way street where structural elements are used consciously to create or reinforce speciﬁc values
and norms (Arat, 1991:69; Shin, 1997:45). Although political culture theory may contribute
to an understanding of the reasons for transition to democracy by regarding culture as the
major factor explaining variations in political structures, the interaction between them is far
more complex.
Thus, an approach premised on cultural homogeneity as a precondition for democracy is
simply too static and too deterministic to adequately account for the complex eﬀects of deep
subcultural cleavages on the prospects for a transition to democracy (see Dahl 1989:254-260).
In spite of the above criticism, political culture theory remains an important school within
theories on democratisation. The crucial question is: What is the importance of political
culture theory for an understanding of democracy in general and the South African case
in particular? For purposes of this study, it is important to note that studies conducted
on political culture found links between political cultures and various regimes. In political
culture theory, it is argued that the institution and preservation of democracy are dependent
on particular supportive habits, ideas and attitudes among citizens (Inglehardt 1988:1204-
1205).
Elections, for example, are products of political cultures, and they are statements about
these political cultures. Elections may be periodic demonstrations of the viability of polit-
ical cultures, or, as the history of military governments in Africa and South America have
demonstrated, they may be the points at which political cultures break down.
Within the South African context, cultural heterogeneity is of particular importance.
South African society is indeed deeply divided by conﬂicting racial, ethnic, religious, and
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linguistic based values and interests. How important were these divisions and how were
they managed in South Africa’s transition to democracy? Up to 1994, there had never been
universally competitive elections. For much of South Africa’s history, parties advocating
universal franchise had been banned and the basic civil freedoms listed by Huntington as
necessary for democracy had been absent (Shapiro, 1993:126-127). Therefore, it was argued
before 1994 that South Africa’s rigid racial and ethnic divisions, as well as the absence of
a democratic political culture, made democracy in a common state unlikely (see Lijphart,
1985; Horowitz, 1991:42-86).
However, some positive factors concerning political culture, as would be discussed in
more detail in chapter three, were present, namely the democratically committed elites
and the history of political competition within the ruling elite under the old regime all
suggest that a degree of conﬁdence in the possibility of a successful transition was warranted
(Huntington, 1991:111-112). Shapiro (1993:141) argued the presence of positive factors that
can be associated with political culture of which the most important is perhaps a relatively
long history of the presence of a rule-of-law state. This was unfortunately often honoured
in the breach rather than its observance during the heyday of apartheid. Nevertheless, it
left institutional traces that had been useful in holding the apartheid government to account
for violence as would be later demonstrated through such institutions as the “Goldstone
Commission” (see chapter 5), and in facilitating and structuring the negotiations at the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the Multi-Party Negotiating
Process (MPNP) (see chapter 6).
With hindsight, the election of April 1994 in South Africa, in fact provided a report on
the health of the emerging South African political culture on the questions of consent and
legitimacy (Alexander, 1994:18-19) and eventually on the consolidation of democracy.
In conclusion, a useful way of approaching political culture is to see it as a synthesis of
contradictory elements or impulses. For instance, the often conﬂicting demands of liberty
and equality, or of ethnicity and common citizenship might struggle for expression. Elements
of continuity and change will mark a political culture in either evolutionary or revolutionary
transformation. To observe that the political culture, which evolved in South Africa, is
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marked by deep contradictions does not make South Africa unique, but there are aspects of
these contradictions that make it singular among others with similar experiences (Alexander,
1994:19).
2.2.2 THE WEALTH THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
The search for a relationship between economic development and democracy has been the
focus of many scholars and in particular in the ﬁeld of comparative politics. The search for
such a relationship became even more important after the failure of many newly independent
states to establish democratic rule after World War II (Lipset et al, 1993). Modernisation
may be one reason why the incidence of democracy often correlates with economic develop-
ment. Modernisation theory became, therefore, particularly important in this regard (see
Landman, 2003:65-93; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997:157).
The modernisation approach had its origins in classical liberal theory (Apter, 1977). Re-
search dating back to the late 1950s and early 1960s, emphasise the relationship between
political systems and the socio-economic and structural conditions embodied in the pro-
cesses of industrial growth and modernisation, such as higher literacy, urbanisation and
Gross National Product (GNP) (see Lipset, 1959; Lipset et al, 1993; Huntington, 1984;
Bollen and Jackman, 1985). Theorists in the modernisation approach are, thus, of the opin-
ion that commercial and industrial societies are more favourable to competitive politics than
predominantly agrarian societies are. According to their assumptions, economic develop-
ment independently aﬀects orientations conducive to democracy, among citizens (Vanhanen,
1997:11). Democratisation, therefore, might be an inevitable consequence of socio-economic
development.
The question of whether a relationship exists between the nature of an economy of a
state and democracy is a threefold question. Firstly, there is the issue of whether (and
if so, why) wealthy polities are more democratic relative to less wealthy, poorer and poor
polities. The second issue is whether economic development will lead to the development of
democracy in non-democratic states. The third issue is whether continued economic devel-
opment can maintain a democracy (see Landman, 2003:65-93). Searching for the “linchpins”
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of democracy, modernisation theorists, subsequently, argue that democracy is the result of
progress, which is deﬁned as economic and social development that goes hand in hand with
industrialisation (see Lipset et al, 1993). It is, thus, assumed that the best strategy for pro-
moting a transition to democracy, would be to raise the level of socio-economic development
(Vanhanen, 1988:2).
As mentioned, attention was paid to the role of literacy, urbanisation, and GNP in seeking
to account for democratic development (Lipset et al, 1993:155). Lerner’s (1958), The Passing
of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, made an important contribution in
the ﬁeld of modernisation by presenting a model in which three types of orientations were
identiﬁed, namely traditional, transitional and modern. In determining these orientations,
literacy, urbanism, media participation and empathy were used as criteria. Modernisation
is regarded by Lerner as movement away from a traditional to a modern participant way of
life (Landman 2003:75-76).
Several other important studies were conducted within this paradigm, often paying atten-
tion to diﬀerent aspects and even manifestation of a possible relationship between economic
development and democracy. Two seminal works in this regard are: Lipset’s 1959 essay,
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy and
Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth of 1961.
Lipset’s general argument (1959)1 was simply that “democracy is related to the state of
economic development...the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sus-
tain democracy” (Lipset, 1959:75; 1960:31). To demonstrate his argument, he classiﬁed the
states in his study into two sets, namely those of Latin America (as one), and those of Europe
and the English-speaking states as the other (Lipset, 1959:73). Based on their experiences
with democracy, these two groups in turn were each classiﬁed into two categories. European
and English-speaking states were classiﬁed into stable democracies versus unstable democra-
cies and dictatorships. Latin America, on the other hand was classiﬁed into democracies and
unstable dictatorships versus stable dictatorships (1959:73-74). Within each region or set,
1Asserting a broad and multi-stranded relationship between the level of economic development and
democracy, Lipset’s essay broke new ground in what came to be known as “modernisation theory”. It also
became an essential reference point for all future work on the relationship between political systems and the
level of economic development (Diamond 1992b).
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he then compared the two groups of regimes on a wide range of indicators of socioeconomic
development - wealth (income, transport, healthcare and communications), industrialisation,
urbanisation and education. He found that within each regional set, the more democratic
states had consistently and often dramatically higher mean levels of development than did
the less democratic states (Lipset 1959; Diamond, 1992b:450).
Proponents of modernisation theory, building on the arguments found in these two works,
claim that as states save and invest at appropriate levels, their infrastructure and social in-
stitutions will expand and liberal democratic institutions will ﬂourish as a natural response
to the functional imperatives of society, by opting for the best form of governance. The
development of social institutions thus raises the level of education of the population, im-
proves its social and spatial mobility, and promotes the political culture that supports liberal
democratic institutions (Hartlyn and Valenzuela, 1994:102). In short, modernisation theory
assumes that the process of socio-economic development is a progressive accumulation of so-
cial changes that will eventually culminate in the democratisation of that society (Przeworski
and Limongi, 1997:158).
There are several other important studies in the earlier phase of the search for a rela-
tionship between the wealth of a state and democracy (see Landman 2003). Important in
the earlier phase are the work by Coleman (Almond and Coleman, 1960), Cutright (1963),
Cutright and Wiley (1969), Dahl (1971), Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979), Bollen and Jack-
man (1985). In a second phase, characterised by more sophisticated statistical analysis, the
research by Helliwell (1994), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) and, Przerworski and Limongi
(1997) are important. The arguments and ﬁndings of Winham (1970), Huntington (1984,
1991), Vanhanen (1990), Rueschemeyer (1991, 1992), and Fukuyama (1992) are basically in
agreement with Lipset’s original argument, which posits a strong and positive correlation
between a state’s socio-economic development and its level of democratic performance.
In a comprehensive study, Bollen and Jackman (1985), for example, determined a correla-
tion between the variables of economic development and democracy in over 100 states (using
political indicators for 1960 and 1965). They found that “the level of economic develop-
ment had a pronounced eﬀect on political democracy, even when other non-economic factors
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are considered” (Bollen and Jackman 1985:38-39). In another comprehensive study, Hunt-
ington (1984) noted, “the correlation between wealth and democracy is thus fairly strong”
(Huntington, 1984:199, 218; Shin, 1997:15).
From these studies, can be concluded that the predominant ﬁnding of quantitative com-
parative research on the “correlates” of democracy is that there is a “stable positive rela-
tionship between socioeconomic development and democracy” (Rueschemeyer et al, 1992:
26; Diamond 1992b; Bollen and Jackman 1985).
How does economic development promote transition to democracy? The answer to this
question is not straightforward. Even though several important studies suggest a correlation
between economic development and democracy, other studies by, for example, Przeworski and
Limongi (1997) questioned the interpretation of the ﬁndings of earlier studies in this regard.
Several cases do not support a correlation between economic development and democracy.
Oil-rich nations, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, have authoritarian political
systems, in spite of a high per capita income.2
Wealth itself, therefore, may not necessarily be a factor in the democratisation of undemo-
cratic political systems. Broad based economic development, that includes industrialisation,
appears to be more important in contributing to democratic transition, than wealth resulting
from the sale of natural resources such as oil (Huntington, 1991:65). Dahl (1971:53-61) re-
ferred in this regard to the apparent importance of norms about equality, private ownership
and in particular a decentralised economy. Muller (1996) in turn points out the negative
eﬀect of income inequality, which is often a consequence of economic development, on democ-
racy. Thus, sheer economic wealth may not necessarily be suﬃcient for the development of
democracy, nor be able to maintain it.
In trying to explain the reasons for the correlation between economic development and
democracy, it is argued that the process of modernisation is a movement away from tradi-
tional society to a modern participant society characterised by urbanisation, literacy, the
development of civil society, media participation and political participation. The dramatic
rise in the proportion of secondary school students around the world between 1965 and 1985
2In 1976 they had per capita GNPs of over$4,000, ranking well up among the wealthy polities. In 1992,
Saudi Arabia’s GDP per capita was $7,940 and that of Kuwait $16,160 (Huntington, 1991:65)
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may have had a special impact on citizens’ demands and so indirectly on political structures
as well (Lipset et al, 1993:168).
Economic development, thus, may give rise to certain trends that could facilitate the
development of democracy. Correlational and causal relationships, as well as causal paths
among various variables were the focus of diﬀerent, yet related studies by a signiﬁcant number
of scholars. These studies often diﬀer in the interpretation of exactly how democracy is
“caused” by economic development. Even though the ﬁndings of some of these studies are
conﬂicting, there are also important similarities to be found in these studies. The following
are important in this regard:
∙ “Urbanism” was identiﬁed by Lerner (1958:89) as one of the characteristics of a mod-
ern participant society. Economic development facilitates urbanisation, an increase
in the literacy rate, as well as increased exposure to the mass media (see McCrone
and Cnudde, 1967:78; Diamond, 1992b:462-463; Huntington, 1984:199). It is argued
that urbanisation aﬀects the democratic political development primarily by increasing
educational levels, which in turn increases mass communications, such as newspaper,
television and radio (Diamond, 1992b:462-463). These may all contribute towards the
development of a political consciousness among the population. It is thus also necessary
to pay attention to the importance of variables such as literacy and communication in
the development of democracy.
∙ Higher income is particularly important in democratisation because of its impact on
education. There is a signiﬁcant relationship between income levels and the propor-
tion of children attending secondary schools. In 1985, the median secondary school
attendance in the low-income economies (including China and India) was only eigh-
teen per cent, compared to a median attendance of ninety-six per cent in the rich
industrial economies. The correlation between the proportion of enrolments in higher
education, and political freedom scores, is likewise signiﬁcant. Rising national income,
combined with an increase in schooling, may have a dramatic eﬀect on the attitudes
and the political demands of the newly educated generation (Lipset et al, 1993:167;
Shin, 1997:16-17). Formal schooling tends to modernise attitudes and values includ-
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ing a desire and willingness to have a say in the actions of government (Lipset et al,
1993:167; Inkeles and Smith 1974:133-143).
∙ The expansion of education and the accompanying increase in the literacy rate, as
well as the expansion of and increased access to communication media, heighten public
awareness of political issues and encourage popular demand for participation. Cutright
(1963) and Winham (1970) both found positive correlations between communication,
urbanisation, education, and transition to democracy. By using time-lagged correla-
tions over a long time span, Winham was able to infer more persuasively that socio-
economic development has a causal eﬀect on the development of democracy. His ﬁnding
that the data pointed to the causal priority of education and especially communication
(Diamond, 1992b:462; Shin,1997:16) is important. The better-educated populace is
better equipped to discern government propaganda from fact more easily than illiter-
ate or poorly educated citizenry, and are thus capable of resisting the inﬂuence of such
government practices (Huntington, 1968: 47-50).
∙ According to Diamond (1989:34) socio-economic development tends to loosen or sever
traditional ties of deference and obedience to authority. New interests are generated,
new consciousnesses kindled, and new political and organisational capacities are ac-
quired at the individual and group levels.
∙ Higher standards of living, may, facilitate the formation of a middle class. A mid-
dle class usually is an asset in a democracy, but depending on their interests may
on occasion obstruct democracy. Economic development and the accompanying im-
proved standards of living may give rise to greater social diversity, and increased civil
consciousness of the people (Manning, 1990:49-50; Shin, 1997:16).
∙ Likewise, economic development, increased education and the media may be beneﬁcial
to the development and nurturing of both civil and political society. The importance of
civil and political society within the context of South Africa’s transition would receive
attention in chapters three to six.
∙ It is also argued by, for example Huntington (1984:199) that a highly economically de-
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veloped and complex society, cannot be eﬃciently governed by an authoritarian regime
and therefore requires specialised political institutions (see Reuschemeyer, 1991:12).
∙ An economic developed society simply provides more opportunities and interests which
an authoritarian government may ﬁnd diﬃcult to address.
Despite these ﬁndings, there are many criticisms of modernisation theory. The following are
some of the criticisms levelled against the wealth theory in general:
Firstly, most of these studies can be criticised on conceptual and methodological grounds.
According to Diamond (1992b:451) Lipset’s study, for example, is a “static analysis of data
from a single time point, although it does classify regimes on the basis of their experience over
a long period of time (25 to 40 years).” Like other theories in the modernisation or “liberal”
school, it merely establishes correlation and not causality. Lipset (1959:72) even contended
that, “The high correlation which appears in the data...must not be overly stressed, since
unique events may account for either the persistence or the failure of democracy in any
particular society.” Yet, the study does assume and infer that democracy is the consequence
of various developmental factors (Diamond 1992b:451). Modernisation theory thus posits a
universal trajectory for all nations despite their relative historical timing of development,
namely, after Europe and North America.
A second point of criticism of the studies on the relationship between economic de-
velopment and democratisation, is that they often assume linearity and ignore the pos-
sible negative impact on democracy that, according to Huntington and Nelson (1976:20)
“the processes of changing from one developmental level to another might have” (Diamond
1992b:451). Without proper political institutionalisation, socio-economic development could
actually lead to political instability (Huntington, 1968). In other words, the very process of
development itself is a destabilising force. The deterministic and teleological nature of these
studies may therefore be questioned (see Przeworski and Limongi, 1997:176). Most objec-
tions arise in this sense for it assumes that all polities that achieve high levels of economic
development necessarily achieve democracy. Huntington surprisingly also concluded in his
groundbreaking study, “with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the
world may well have been reached” (Huntington, 1984:199, 218).
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Thirdly, theories focussing on the role of economic wealth in democracy, do not consider
other possible causal and intervening variables. Great care should therefore be taken to
infer causality from a mere correlational relationship. Putnam (1994), for example is of the
opinion that both economic development and democracy are dependent on “social capital”
and “civic engagement” (Putnam, 1994:9). The wealth theory also tends to ignore the
impact of colonisation and decolonisation, as well as the possible alternative outcomes of
development, for example, those that resulted from the revolutions in Russia, Mexico, China,
and Cuba.
Fourthly, from a regional perspective such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia, moderni-
sation theory is in fact ethnocentric, since it prescribes a formula for development based
on the patterns observed in the advanced industrial polities of Europe and North America
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978:535-357).
Lastly, the wealth theory is unable to predict the possible advent of democracy and
neither does it explain the more recent transitions in Eastern Europe, all of which, to varying
degrees, took place in a context of economic crisis. Economic crises, as would be discussed
in the chapters to follow, are often instrumental in regime breakdown and in providing the
necessary opening for regime change in which elites usually play an important role. This
criticism is also raised within the context of the South African transition to democracy in
the face of a long-term decline of economic growth, widespread poverty among black people,
relatively high inﬂation rate, and high unemployment. South Africa had long been considered
one of the polities where a transition to democracy was least likely (Shin, 1997:28; Giliomee,
1995:83).
2.2.3 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS OF TRANSITION TO DEMOC-
RACY
States and regimes are not isolated entities. They exist in an international system that
both undergirds them and exposes them to change. Most social scientists take the nation-
state as the prime unit of comparative analysis, but often discover that explanations of
domestic political dynamics require reference to “external” inﬂuences emanating from the
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international environment (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:27). Therefore, scholars such
as Dahl (1971:189-201), Huntington (1984:205-207; 1991:85-100) and Whitehead (1986:3-
46) are of the opinion that a polity is seldom solely shaped by its own people and that
international factors may be decisive in determining whether a state becomes a democracy
or not. In the extreme, some analysts even grant causal primacy to the international system,
treating it as an all-embracing whole in which states - and the regimes devised by their
rulers - are merely parts. An unfortunate consequence is thus the reduction of internal
political developments to mere functions of international relations (Bratton and Van de
Walle, 1997:27). In fact, the contribution of international factors is usually secondary to
internal or domestic factors, but the former often enhance the eﬀect of domestic factors.
The issue of whether international systems provide support or impose restraints on the
development of new states, including their political dispensation, is complicated by the fact
that these global systems are themselves changing. Analysts are only just beginning to
understand the nature and implications of the momentous events and trends that followed
the end of the Cold War. Important in this regard are, the collapse of communism in
the Soviet bloc, the universalisation of free markets, the mobility of ﬁnancial capital, the
global information revolution, the rise of social movements, the international emergence of
Western hegemony headed by the USA and the associated ascendancy of the ideology of
liberal democracy. Together these would challenge the political status quo throughout the
world, increasing the likelihood that authoritarian regimes would have to undertake at least
a measure of political liberalisation (see Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:28). When political
protesters and embattled leaders in the early 1990s spoke the language of liberal democracy,
they reﬂected the inﬂuence of powerful ideas emanating from Western arenas.
This literature on the “international context” of democratisation unpacks such compo-
nents as background conditions, decisive events, inﬂuential actors, and forms of inﬂuence.
Three types of international inﬂuences have been identiﬁed as important in this regard.
Firstly, direct and conscious policy (often in the form of pressure) from outside the par-
ticular state concerned, such as conditions for democratic reform imposed by international
donors and ﬁnancial agencies, and the threat of material sanctions on states. Munslow
(1993:299) is for example of the opinion that the move for democratisation on the African
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continent is primarily being driven from abroad. This is in line with Tom Young’s assertion
that the recent wave of democratisation is largely externally engineered (Hall and Young,
1997:262). Secondly, pressures emanating from the structures of the international economy
(Gill, 2000:18). Thirdly, the persuasive eﬀect of the example set by the democratisation
of other states as citizens jump on the democracy bandwagon. This is often referred to as
the “demonstration”, “contagion”, “diﬀusion,” “snowballing,” or “domino theory” of regime
transitions, whereby political events in one polity evoke eﬀects across international bor-
ders. These eﬀects may suggest why political phenomena commonly occur in “waves” (see
Pridham, 1991:10, 18-20; Huntington, 1991:100-106; Dahl, 1971:189-201).
DIRECT AND CONSCIOUS POLICY
The actions of foreign governments, non-governmental organisations and organisations from
political and civil society with links to similar organisations in a state with an authoritarian
regime, could be important in this regard.3 Their inﬂuence may be in the form of pressure on
the authoritarian regime to democratise, support for the democratising forces (even support
for liberation movements), or the promise of material beneﬁts (see Gill, 2000:63-64). How-
ever, the withdrawal of support for authoritarian regimes may also be a factor. Mechanisms
of such direct pressure usually include penetration, intervention, isolation and mediation
(Geldenhuys, 1989:272).4
The emergence of a global concern about human rights played an important role in this
regard. Human rights and democracy became major issues in international relations after
World War II. This manifested itself for example by the United Nations General Assem-
bly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, human rights legis-
lation of the US-Congress, the emergence of human rights organisations such as Amnesty
International, Freedom House, American Watch, and other intergovernmental human rights
organisations (Huntington, 1991:88-101; Gill, 2000:65). From the early 1970s, the USA in
particular made the promotion of human rights a major foreign policy goal and recommended
a variety of actions to promote that goal. The global concern about human rights began to
3These also played a role in South Africa as discussed in chapters 3-5.
4See chapter 3 for a discussion on these within the South African context.
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erode authoritarian regimes in the 1970s. Undoubtedly, the worldwide human rights revolu-
tion became a reality in the minds of political and intellectual leaders in most states. It had
a morale-boosting eﬀect on those opposing authoritarian regimes. For authoritarian regimes,
in turn, the diﬃculties and costs of ignoring human rights increased markedly. Thus, the
global impact of the human rights movement was an important factor in the overthrow of
some authoritarian governments (Huntington, 1991:88-101).
Furthermore, governments usually try to strengthen “friendly political movements” in
other states through diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. This is a mechanism
also used by Western governments and in particular the USA. Some diﬀusion of democracy
resulted, in large part, from the eﬀorts of the USA to create a world conducive to its best
interests. This was the case throughout the Cold War, as well as after its demise (see
Gill, 2000:19). Realists and idealists agree that the USA would beneﬁt if democracy were
a worldwide political order in which other democratic governments would be amenable to
USA foreign policy, strengthen its market economy, muster support for its initiatives, and
show respect for human rights (Solarz, 1985:19; Manning, 1990:96). Ironically, for the same
reason international communism also supported the democratisation of some South American
states. In order to provide stability and prevent the spread of communism, the USA often
resorted to supporting authoritarian regimes as for example in Chili, where a military coup
ousted the democratically elected President Allende in 1973.5
The role of international factors is therefore complex and regime changes thus may be
a consequence of changes in the policy of governments supporting authoritarian regimes of
other states. Thus, even the President of the former USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision
to withhold Soviet military protection from discredited communist governments in Eastern
Europe was a signal to pro-democracy forces that democracy could be instituted (Diamond
and Plattner, 1994).
5This also aﬀected the USA and Britain’s policy toward South Africa during the Cold War. Thus, as will
be discussed in chapter 5, after the fall of communism and the USSR’s support for liberation organisations




STRUCTURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
Pressures emanating from the structures of the international economy is largely a conse-
quence of overarching economic principles, the global ﬂow of capital with risk and political
instability as discouragement for investment, or the creation of dependencies that could aﬀect
democratisation (see Gill, 2000).6
The rising economic cost of maintaining an authoritarian regime within a global economy
could become an incentive for authoritarian regimes to democratise. However, pressures
emanating from foreign domination in general and economic dominance in particular are
also important.
According to theories of international dependency or, in neocolonialism the evolving
interests of capital at the core of the global economy either entirely block, or at best per-
manently subordinate, the prospects for development of poor polities. Dependency theorists
were mainly interested in capital accumulation and class formation at the periphery and
they therefore paid relatively little attention to political dispensations. Some such writers
recognised that Africa’s emergent bourgeoisie was a political class that owed its control of
economic means to the occupancy of state oﬃce. Others drew attention to the fact that
dependent states displayed weak organisational capacities (Wallerstein, 1979). While most
neo-Marxist scholars regarded national development not a top priority of the political class,
others like Richard Sklar (1983:11-24) identiﬁed “developmental dictatorship” as the polit-
ical regime most commonly associated with the neocolonial state in Africa. In a context in
which the principal focus was on economic accumulation for consumption by state elites,
analysts neglected the legitimation of states or the democratisation of their political regimes
(Huntington, 1987: Chapter 1). Thus, dependency theorists imply that the lack of economic
and political development would hamper the prospects for democracy. Dahl (1989:263),
however, is of the opinion that if the dominating state is a democracy its rule could stimu-
late the development of democracy in the dependent state, as was the case in some British
colonies such as Canada and Australia (see Huntington, 1984:206-207; De Villiers, 1993:86).
6Gill mentions that this needs more research but he indicates that even during the Cold War most
democratisation took place within the sphere dominated by “capitalist democracy” and after the fall of




Huntington (1991:100-101) is of the opinion that successful democratisation in one state
encourages other states in a similar situation to democratise, because they might become
aware of the advantages, possibilities, diﬃculties, and methods of successfully achieving
a democratic transition. Democratisation might, for example, be perceived as a cure for
their problems, or because the country that has already democratised is powerful and/or is
regarded as a political and cultural role model. Successful democratic transition in one state
serves therefore as an example for others.
In the age of the communication explosion that facilitates the spread of political ideas,
it is no longer possible for one state to prevent its people from receiving information on
international events. The exposure of citizens to multiple information sources and the free
exchange of ideas pose a direct challenge to the structures of political control imposed by
authoritarian regimes (Shin, 1997:56).
Moreover, in the interconnected international society, it is diﬃcult for any state to deviate
from the dominant political and social trends in the world. Hence, the international demon-
stration eﬀect is felt everywhere (Huntington, 1991:102). The toppling of hard line regimes
in East Germany and Bulgaria, for example, led both incumbent and opposition groups in
then Czechoslovakia to recognise and act upon the vulnerability of their own regimes.
This type of international diﬀusion can occur within regions undergoing regime transitions
as well as from dominant cores to dependent peripheries. Geoﬀrey Pridham (1994:7) argues
that a favourable or supportive geostrategic environment has been essential, or even crucial
for successful transitions to constitutional democracy in postwar Western Europe, Southern
Europe in the 1970s, Latin America in the 1980s and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold
War. Also with reference to Eastern Europe in the spring of 1989, Kumar (1992:441) ﬁnds
that the causes of the revolutions and the conditions of their success were largely external
- the result of changes in Soviet policy, and by ideas mainly derived from Western liberal
ideas going back to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.




Firstly, Vanhanen (1990:118) argues that the eﬀects of international inﬂuence tend to be
diverse and complex and therefore almost impossible to quantify (Shin, 1997:64). Although
most analysts therefore acknowledge some role for international forces in democratisation
in the late twentieth century, a small literature grant causal primacy to the international
system, treating it as an all-embracing whole in which states - and the regimes devised by
their rulers - are merely parts. An unfortunate consequence is thus the reduction of internal
political developments to mere functions of international relations (Bratton and Van de
Walle, 1997:27).
Secondly, there may be alternative explanations of democratisation, for foreign interven-
tion may not necessarily lead to democratisation. For example dependency theorists, based
on their interpretations of Latin American experiences, argue that foreign inﬂuence may in
fact inhibit democratic development. This was also largely the case in those states on which
the USSR exercised inﬂuence (De Villiers, 1993:87).
Thirdly, external pressures may topple an authoritarian state, but their ability to es-
tablish a democracy is more limited. Democracy cannot be imposed in a similar way as
authoritarianism, and external inﬂuence can only add a helping hand if some of the precon-
ditions mentioned are already there (Shin, 1997:64). This is clearly demonstrated by the
history of African states with authoritarian political dispensations.
Jackson and Rosberg (1982:1-24) for example indicate that African states beneﬁted from
achieving independence during a period when internationalism reached a high-water mark
(see Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:278). At the same time, the Cold War often enabled African
political leaders to attract resources, and obtain protection for their chosen regimes by
playing one superpower oﬀ against another. In comparison to the states of early modern
Europe, forged internally out of feudalism and absolutism, African states and regimes were
in large part the creation of a post imperial international order. Charles Tilly (1975:46) has
noted that “the later the state-making experience...the less likely...internal processes...are to
provide an adequate explanation of the formation, survival or growth of a state.”
Fourthly, other, more cautious voices warn against assuming that liberal values are gain-
ing universal acceptance, pointing to the persistence of indigenous political values and the
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limited capability of Western powers to promote democracy abroad (Huntington, 1993:22-
49).
Fifthly, intervening variables are often not taken into account. The case for an externally
inspired process of political change is often favoured within Africa. After all, the political
openings in African polities from 1990 onward occurred almost simultaneously, implying
a shared response to a common external stimulus, such as the collapse of communism or
the end of superpower rivalry. Yet, this does not demonstrate an external origin to these
transitions. For this to be the case, political outcomes would also have to be consistent,
but regime transitions were widely divergent across African polities. Outcomes that ranged
from the establishment of democracy to the deepening of military dictatorships, suggest
that major explanatory variables may in fact intervene between the international context
and the transition processes. Thus, international factors do not fully explain transitions
to democracy. As Fishman (1990:440) notes, “To emphasise the distinctiveness of speciﬁc
cases simply avoids the false assertion that there is one comprehensive causal constellation
accounting for signiﬁcantly diﬀerent outcomes and processes.”
To summarise: although international factors and involvement can have negative eﬀects
for the promotion of democracy, the evidence is overwhelming that it can enhance transition
to democracy. It helps to eﬀect transition to democracy by raising the perceived costs of
maintaining a repressive authoritarian regime, creating and widening the feasible political
space to the opposition forces before and during transition, and mobilising contacts to per-
suade the need for restraints by the hardliners during transitions (Shin, 1997:64). However,
in order to have a meaningful eﬀect the international context needs to be favourable toward
democracy. The withdrawal of support for authoritarian regimes as well as the active pro-
motion of values that facilitate democracy is important in this regard. It should thus not be
assumed that the international context would automatically favour democratisation.
At the time of South Africa’s transition, international inﬂuence as exerted by the USA,
European Union, the Vatican and even the then USSR was predominantly pro-democratic.
The regional or global trend was, and still remains, pro-democracy, and powerful external
actors made the promotion of democracy an explicit foreign policy aim (see Huntington,
50
Chapter 2
1991:86). The wave of democratisation after the collapse of communism in Eastern Eu-
rope seemed to leave South Africa with no option but to follow (Giliomee and Schlemmer,
1994:188). As would be discussed in chapter ﬁve it is doubtful that President FW De Klerk
would have been able to move toward democratisation without the worldwide collapse of
communism (Shapiro, 1993:133). In turn, democratic change in South Africa has also stim-
ulated political change in the region (Diamond, 1993).
2.2.4 SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITI-
CAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Several authors such as Huntington, 1984 and Shin, 1997 stress the importance of a widely
diﬀerentiated and articulated social structure demonstrated by the presence of autonomous
social classes, political and civil society organisations, pluralism - even highly structured
(e.g. caste system in India) - an autonomous bourgeoisie and even a feudal aristocracy
(Huntington, 1984:202-205). It should however be noted that discussions on these are often
included in other structural theories and in particular those dealing with wealth and culture
and to a lesser extent international factors. Likewise, these factors often receive attention
in theories on elite behaviour (see Gill, 2000:4-7). However, Gill is also of the opinion that
the problems encountered with the explanatory ability of most structural and behavioural
theories are due to the fact that insuﬃcient attention was paid to political and civil society
(Gill, 2000:7, 58-62).
For our purposes, due to their importance within the South African context, the role
of political and civil society organisations should brieﬂy be noted separate from the other
theories. 7
On the one hand, the presence of organisations representing for example religion, labour,
business, culture, professional and occupational groups, as well as political interests (such as
political parties), could be an indication of the existence of a culture of democracy. These or-
ganisations would thus be in a position to sustain democracy by providing a counter-balance
that would prevent the centralisation of political power, and by becoming the “vehicles” for




increasing and channeling political participation, education and even international inﬂuence
(see Huntington, 1984:203; Gill, 2000:4-5, 60-62). On the other hand, they could become
a signiﬁcant force in eroding the powerbase of an authoritarian regime and even eventually
the breakdown of such a regime.
Gill (2000:60-61) however also concedes that the role of these organisations may diﬀer
from one society to another and would depend on the popular support they could mobilise
and their ability to maintain themselves under authoritarian rule. Political parties are par-
ticularly important during transitions for they often are the best placed to negotiate with the
rulers, to determine the rules of the political game and to ensure the honouring of agreements.
In concluding on the uses of the macro-structural approach, it is important to note that it
has several limitations that should be borne in mind in studies of transition to democracy.
The following are important in this regard;
Firstly, Rustow (1970) and Przeworski, (1991:96) are of the opinion that the structural
approach’s determinism in the sense that democracy is determined by satisfying certain func-
tional prerequisites, is problematic. Structural theories have thus been criticised for being
too deterministic by orienting the activities of political actors who instead believed that the
success of democratisation might depend on their own strategies and those of their oppo-
nents, rather than on structural conditions (Przeworski, 1991:96). Structuralists however
maintain that they do not imply that individual decisions made at particular points in time
can be predicted by pre-existing social, economic or political relations (Karl and Schmitter,
1991:272). Huntington (1984:198) also acknowledges Rustow’s contribution in helping to
provide a more balanced approach to studies of democratisation, but cautions against the
extreme of ignoring these factors altogether.
Secondly, the reductionist nature of these theories are also problematic for explanations
are usually limited to these factors only. Rustow (1970:337) argues that the search for the
causes of democracy primarily in economic, social, cultural, psychological, and international
factors are limiting and seemingly ignore political factors. Neither do these theories provide
for a systematic analysis of possible relationships between the various variables identiﬁed
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in diverse theories. What connection exists for example between cultural and economic
variables? Thus, the persuasiveness of this approach is only relative.
Thirdly, and following from the above, the nature of the relationship that exists between
macro-structural variables and democratisation is not properly clariﬁed. Rustow (1970) is of
the opinion that correlations are often incorrectly elevated to causal factors.8 For example,
various macro-structural “pre-conditions” could in fact depend on democracy. Karl and
Schmitter (1991:270; Shin, 197:69) for example argued:
empirically, the structural conditions commonly considered preconditions for
democracy may be better perceived as the outcomes of democracy, rather than as
the explanation of democracy’s emergence. Greater economic growth and more
equitable income distribution, higher levels of literacy and education, and in-
creases in media exposure are considered products of a stable democratic process
rather than as prerequisites of its existence.
A positive correlation does therefore not necessarily imply causation. The causation
between democracy and structural conditions is complex and not necessarily unidirectional.
A manifest correlation may be accidental or may even be the result of intervening variables.
Fourthly, by focussing on macro-structural conditions for democracy and democratisa-
tion, the processes involved in democratisation are neglected. Thus, the macro-structural
approach is weak in analysing the various paths of the process of democratisation, or the roles
that elites may play in such transitions. Structural theories can therefore explain only one
part of transition to democracy. According to this approach, structural factors are necessary
conditions for democracy. However, structural factors may determine the range of options
available to decision-makers and may even guide them to speciﬁc choices (Karl, 1990:7).
Thus, although we cannot deny the importance of structural factors in the transition to
democracy, there is room for political actors to make choices or for political engineering that
increase or decrease the probability of the persistence and stability of a regime (Vanhanen,
1988:5).
Fifthly, as Kitschelt (1992:1028-1029) points out these theories do not adequately explain
why polities with comparatively the same socioeconomic structure form vastly diﬀerent po-
8Rustow (1970:337) contends that the structural theorists often jump from the correlation between
democracy and other factors to the conclusion that those other factors are the causes of democracy.
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litical systems, nor why democratic transition does not occur in certain polities despite the
changes in objective conditions. Neither does it answer the question of why a transition
transpired at a particular time (Shin, 1997:69). Thus, critics of the structuralist approach
also argue that most of the various propositions (and variables) within the structural ap-
proach are at most plausible and only applicable to a few cases. This seems to indicate that
the causes of transition to democracy diﬀer from case to case and from time to time (Shin,
1997:69). Neither do these theories account for the uncertainties and reversals possible in
any real historical situation (Whitehead, 1986:38; Levine, 1988:384).
In addition, structural theories are even unappealing to scholars who oppose the be-
havioral theories because it elevated structural factors to political importance (Przeworski,
1991:97)
In the context of this study it is accepted that suﬃcient evidence exist for the presence
of these variables during transitions of democracy. It is therefore argued that the presence
of these variables during the South African transition needs to be investigated even though
this may not necessarily imply a causal relationship between these variables and the South
African transition.
2.3 STUDIES IN DEMOCRATISATION: THEMICRO-BEHAVIOURAL
APPROACH
In terms of the micro-behavioural (or process) approach, the focus in studies of democrati-
sation should be on the origin or birth of democracy and not on controversial preconditions.
Consequently, a transition to democracy is viewed as the outcome of deliberate attempts
made by actors to transform political structures, institutions and behaviour in order to at-
tain particular goals. Attention is paid to the strategic calculation and selection process
of political actors, such as elites and political parties; the various paths to democracy; the
modes of transition; and the outcomes - that is the nature of democracy and the institu-
tions decided on (Rustow, 1970:344; Karl, 1990:8; Burton and Higley, 1987:295; Przeworski,
1991:ix-xii). Thus, outcomes depend less on objective conditions than on subjective rules
surrounding strategic choices. This has the advantage of stressing collective decisions and
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political interactions, which receive little attention in research focussed on preconditions
(Karl, 1990:6). The basic assumption of the micro-behavioural approach is, therefore, that
structure controls the behaviour of humans, but is not decisive in democratisation - the
dynamic “process” of democratisation rather than the conditions of democratisation is thus
emphasised.
Rustow (1970) made one of the ﬁrst important contributions in this regard. His genetic
theory, which focussed on the “genesis” of democracy, was presented as an alternative re-
search strategy to the macro-structural approach. According to the genetic theory the data
used in the macro-structural approach to determine preconditions, are obtained from sta-
ble democracies that already exist and thus cannot forecast the outcome of the process of
democratisation. The process itself may suddenly stop or be reversed and is therefore char-
acterised by uncertainty and indeterminacy. Therefore, the preconditions of democratisation
do not guarantee successful democratisation (Rustow, 1970).
Despite diﬀerences in research strategies, it is claimed that micro-behavioural theories re-
store causal analysis (Rustow, 1970:340; Karl, 1990). They are focused on pursuing strategic
choices, as well as the payoﬀ, of main political actors including the various “paths” that they
follow. Other important researchers in this approach are O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986),
Burton and Higley (1987), Kaufman (1986), Share (1987), Karl (1990), Mainwaring (1992),
Valenzuela (1992), Przeworski (1986, 1991, 1992).
An important focus is on the possibility (and the stability) of “democracy through com-
promise” - a process in which the “moderates” among the main political actors (from both
the incumbents and the challengers) often play a crucial role. Przeworski (1992) for example
emphasised, “the theory of strategic choice” in which he made use of the game theory.
Such a research strategy provides a persuasive and theoretical basis for the understand-
ing of the dynamic process of democratic transition. It, thus, contributes to a better under-
standing of the “structure of choice”, as well as the goals and strategies that drives the main
actors, “the once- dominant search for prerequisites of democracy has given way to a more
process-orientated emphasis on contingent choice” (Karl, 1990:1).
Furthermore, it is argued that this approach provides a more dynamic perspective on
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democratisation since every political system and every transition to democracy is unique.
According to Rustow (1970:346, 357) the genesis of democracy need not be geographically
uniform for there may be many roads to democracy; neither need it be temporally uniform
because diﬀerent factors may become crucial during successive phases. Likewise, it is not
socially uniform because the attitudes that promote democracy are not necessarily the same
for politicians and for ordinary citizens (Rustow, 1970:346). Therefore, a better knowledge
of a particular transition to democracy can be acquired through a close examination of the
actual causes and political processes, including its historical background, and the major
political actors and their roles in the process.
The proponents of the micro-behavioural approach often focus on particular facets of
transitions to democracy and thus establish various theories. For a better understanding of
the variety of contributions, in this regard, it is important to pay attention to the following
elements of actual democratic transitions: key actors, the various paths, identiﬁed strategies
and choice, modes of transitions and the institutional outcomes. It is however important to
note that these elements are identiﬁed for analytical purposes for in most theories they are
integrated. 9
2.3.1 KEY ACTORS IN TRANSITIONS
The discussion above has given an indication that a variety of actors10 from the state, po-
litical society and civil society are involved in transitions to democracy. Based on their
positions and behaviour during transitions, a number of categories of actors are identiﬁed
which require further elucidation. These include the incumbents, elite, challengers, hardlin-
9The concepts used in this section, as well as the associated terminology, are often given diﬀerent content
by diﬀerent authors. However, this is largely due to the heterogeneous backgrounds of scholars and diﬀering
research contexts. During the discussion, it will become clear how the most important terms and concepts
are used in this thesis. Note e.g. Huntington (1991:114) comments on the diﬀerent terms used in this regard.
Huntington Linz Share/Mainwaring
(1) transformation = reforma = transaction
(2) replacement = reptura = breakdown/collapse
(3) transplacement = reptforma = extrication
See Linz (1978:35), Share and Mainwaring (1986:177-179); Przeworski (1991:xi).




ers, standpatters, softliners, liberalisers, reformers,11 moderates and radicals.12
∙ The incumbents are those that hold positions of power within the state.13
∙ The concept of elite is often referred to in transitions to democracy. It refers to those
who are able, through their position in, for example political institutions, government,
business, trade unions, the military, the media, religion and academia, to aﬀect political
outcomes seriously and regularly. They may include both the established, as well as a
counter-elite (Burton and Higley, 1987:296).14
∙ The challengers are those that oppose those that wield power within a particular state
and could include a counter-elite.15 The terms challengers and opposition are often
used interchangeably. However, within the South African situation this is rather prob-
lematic. There was an oﬃcial parliamentary opposition which did not necessarily seek
to democratise the political dispensation - for example the Conservative Party (CP)
favoured a more stricter enforcement of the apartheid system.
∙ Hardliners are those within the “authoritarian bloc” or in Huntington’s words the
“governing coalition” (1991:121) that believes that authoritarian rule is possible and
desirable. Hardliners usually consist of various factions and the most problematic are
11Huntington (1991:122) identiﬁes democratisers and liberals among the reformers.
12The terms hardliners and radicals are often used interchangeably in the literature - likewise, the terms
softliners, liberals and moderates. Within the South African context, the term “verligtes” was used to
refer to the liberalisers, softliners or reformers among the ruling elite, while the term “doves” were used for
moderates among the opposition. The term “verkramptes” was used to refer to hardliners and standpatters
among the ruling elite, while the term “hawks” were used to refer to the radicals among the challengers.
13In the literature they are sometimes referred to as the government, power bloc, authoritarian bloc,
regime, regime bloc and ruling elite. In the study, the term “government” refers to the executive (or
cabinet) only. The term incumbents is wider than the government but narrower than the “power bloc” - the
term “power bloc” refers to all that is associated with the exercise of power and is used as a synonym for
the “ruling elite” - and may include individuals and organisations from political society and civil society..
The incumbents therefore include the government and others who exercise power within state institutions -
security forces particularly are important in this regard. The term “authoritarian bloc” refers to the power
bloc or ruling elite in an authoritarian dispensation. The term “regime” refers to a system of rule (e.g.
democracy), while the term “regime bloc” refers to all that is associated with a particular system of rule
and is broader than the concepts of government and ruling elite (may include the oﬃcial opposition).
14As indicated above the established elite who are involved in the exercise of power are often referred to
as “the ruling elite” and within a non-democratic system, they are referred to as the “authoritarian bloc”.
15In the literature, they are sometimes referred to as anti-regime, anti-regime forces, anti-government
forces, challengers and opposition. In the study the terms “anti-regime”, “anti-regime bloc” and challengers”
will therefore refer to those who oppose a particular system of rule and the anti-regime bloc will therefore
include all that is challenging the existing regime. The term “opposition” is wider than the term “challengers”
and the former may include dissenting voices from among the ruling elite. Challengers are therefore those
whose goal is to replace an existing regime - and in the context of democratisation, with democracy.
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those who oppose democracy and could therefore remain a source of possible coups and
conspiracies (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:16). They are often found among mem-
bers of the security forces, the legal fraternity and bureaucracy (Przeworski, 1991:67).
Huntington (1991:121) uses the term standpatters16 in this sense and he notes that in
non-communist regimes they are often rightwing, fascist and nationalist.
∙ Softliners are those within the “authoritarian bloc”, who may behave similar to hard-
liners but realise that a need for electoral legitimation may arose in the near future
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:16).
∙ Liberalisers are those within the “authoritarian bloc” who decide to liberalise the
political dispensation. They may include both hardliners and softliners who may for
very diverse reasons opt for change - often to secure their own positions. They may
signal a split within the ruling elite (Przeworski, 1991:55-66). Huntington (1991:122)
notes that they do not necessarily support democratisation.
∙ Reformers are those within the “authoritarian bloc” who may or may not have been lib-
eralisers, but wish to change the political dispensation. They usually include politicians
and members from business groups (or managers) (Przeworski, 1991:67-68). Hunting-
ton (1991:122) notes that they may be either democratisers or liberalisers - liberalisers
favouring limited reform and not democratisation.
∙ Radicals or extremists are those that hold uncompromising attitudes within the oppo-
sition (challengers) and favour a profound transformation of the political dispensation
(Przeworski, 1991:68). Their behaviour is often similar to that of hardliners. However,
extremists may not necessarily support democracy.
∙ Moderates are those within the opposition who may not necessarily be less radical, but
behave moderately because they fear the hardliners (Przeworski, 1991:68).
16The term “standpatters”, is used in early 20th century USA history to designate conservatives in the
Republican Party as against the Insurgents or progressive Republicans. The term is said to have originated
in Mark Hanna’s remark concerning an election - all that was necessary for Republican success was, in poker
parlance, to “stand pat.”(The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001 Columbia University Press).
However for purposes of the study the “hardliners” are regarded as more extreme than “standpatters”.
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In terms of the micro-behavioural approach, the process of democratisation unfolds because
of the actions, interactions and choices of these various types of actors.17
As mentioned in chapter one and in section 2.2, these actions and interactions are of
particular importance in and between the domains of, state - political society - civil society.
STATE
The concept of state remains contested within the political sciences. The modern state, as
Berki (1989:12) wrote, is rather a baﬄing phenomenon. Its meaning and signiﬁcance appears
to derive from diﬀerent cultural, political and developmental traditions.
The term is unfortunately often used interchangeably with other terms such as regime,
nation, government and authority. It is therefore worth considering diﬀerent conceptions of
the “state”.
Some merely equate the concept of state with the institutions exercising authority over
a population. An example in this regard is the idea that the term, “state,” refers to the
behavioural relationships between rulers and ruled which take place within institutional
structures. In other words, the term “state” describes a set of institutions comprising the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Thus, the state is a set of governmental in-
stitutions (Stepan, 1988:4). Deﬁnitions such as these ignore the territorial and sovereign
dimensions of the concept of state though they may be useful when the stated relationship
is the focus of a particular study.
The territorial and sovereign dimensions of the concept of state are also absent in Marxist
and related literature. Engels for example argues that:
The state...is rather a product of society at a certain stage of development; it
is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble con-
tradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is
powerless to dispel. In order that these antagonisms, these classes with con-
ﬂicting economic interests, may not annihilate each other and society in sterile
struggle, a power apparently standing above society, became necessary for the
purpose of moderating the conﬂict and keeping it within the bounds of “order”




and it is this power, arising out of society, but placing it over it, and increasingly
alienating itself from it, that is the state (in Chilcote, 1981:191).
Thus, according to Engels and proponents of Marxist theory the “state” is the politically
dominant class. The class that controls the means of production has control over the political
power. Therefore, in this context the state becomes simply a protector of the ruling class
interests. Speaking further of the state, Engels stresses that: Because the state arose from
the need to hold class antagonism in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in
the midst of the conﬂict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful,
economically dominant class, which through the medium of the state, becomes also the
politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the
oppressed class (in Chilcote, 1981:192).
President Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America (USA) on the other hand
stressed the territorial dimension of the state and he has deﬁned the concept of state as, “a
people organised for law within a deﬁnite territory”.
Skinner’s (1989:112) analysis of the state, in turn, implied the sovereign dimension of the
state. He showed that the concept of the state had a doubly impersonal character - that is
the state is distinct from its rulers, but also from the ruled. Likewise, Dicey spoke of the
legal sovereignty of the state.
For purposes of this thesis, the concept of state is deﬁned as a political association that
establishes sovereign jurisdiction over a people within a deﬁned territory, and is characterised
by its monopoly on legitimate physical force (see Heywood, 1997:413). Furthermore, the state
is an abstraction that depicts many institutions, rules and values (see Jackson and Jackson,
2003:15-16). Thus, it is important to bear in mind that governments may come and go but
that the state remains - the concepts of state should therefore not be confused with the
concept of government.
Diﬀerent conceptualisations of the state may have implications for democratisation. This
is particularly important within the context of elite settlements where diﬀerent actors often
conceptualise the state diﬀerently - which was the case within the South African transition.
One of the crucial issues often faced during transitions, is separatist movements who in
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fact may contest the very territorial boundaries, as well as the jurisdiction of a particular
state. Examples in this regard are the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Likewise,
within the South African context (as would be discussed in the next chapters) the peculiar
organisation of political power, the creation of the homelands and the issue of citizenship
were all manifestations of a particular conceptualisation of the state, which in turn was
contested by the opposition challengers.
The state performs a number of distinct functions. However, expectations of what the
functions should be or should not be, often depend on a particular political culture and the
dominant and/or oﬃcial ideology of a state. The functions expected from a minimalist state
will diﬀer from those expected of a maximal state. Thus, the functions of the state in a
liberal democracy will diﬀer from those in a social democracy, as well as those subscribing
to the communist ideology. Traditionally one of the most important functions of the state
is internal and external security. This is precisely one of the reasons why the state holds the
monopoly on physical force. Together with other functions such as providing in the basic
needs of its citizens and perceptions that the state is in addition a moral authority, views
on the functions of states could become important during transitions as was indeed the case
during the South African transition.
The state, furthermore gives rise to a number of actors that could play a crucial role
in transitions as was alluded to above. The government is the agent of the state and acts
on behalf of the state, but governments may also act on their own behalf. In states with
an authoritarian political dispensation these two concepts are often not viewed as being
essentially two separate entities. Furthermore, state institutions are actors that may play
an important role during transitions. Of particular importance in this regard is the security
forces and in particular the military which often are the source of resistance to change, as
well as the overthrow of governments.
CIVIL SOCIETY
The concept of civil society has received some attention in both chapter one and section 2.2
above. Historically, the concept of civil society refers to an entity that exists outside the
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state, often in opposition to the state (see Dahrendorf 1990; Gellner, 1991:495-510; Friedman,
1991:5; Gill, 2000:59). Alexis de Tocqueville (Cohen and Arato, 1992:16) already recognised
the importance of civil society in a process of democratisation and in democratic institution
building. However, the more recent usage of the term is often with reference to civil society
as being a bulwark against statism and particularly within the context of a democratic social
and political order where participatory and accountable governance is emphasised.
Dahrendorf (1990) provides the following description of the concept of civil society:
Civil society is about substantial sources of power outside the state, and more of-
ten than not, against the state [see also Cohen and Arato, 1992:31]. It means the
creation of a tight network of autonomous institutions and organisations which
has not one but a thousand centers and can therefore not easily be destroyed by a
monopolist in the guise of a government or party. Civil society in a certain sense
sustains itself. It does not seem to need the state. One thinks of Italian society,
maﬁa and all, though this codicil indicates the risk which a civil society runs if
there are not at the same time certain rules and procedures binding on everyone.
This is why I prefer to think of civil society as providing the anchorage for the
constitution of liberty, including its economic ingredients. Both are needed, civil
society and the state, but they each have their own raison d’eˆtre and their own
autonomous reality.
The term civil society is therefore descriptive of the space where free and voluntary hu-
man association, as well as the building of support-networks that is outside and autonomous
of the state, and distinctly diﬀerent, are possible (Encarnacion, 2001:53-55). These au-
tonomous groups aggregate the views and activities of individuals and act to promote and
protect the interests of those people including against the state (Gill, 2000:5; Cohen and
Arato, 1992:31). The following can be regarded as examples of important categories of
the constituent parts of civil society: trade unions, professional organisations, organised
business, co-operatives, farmers’ associations, religious based organisations, neighbourhood
associations, civic organisations, ratepayers’ associations, cultural organisations, women’s
and youth organisations, environmental groups and societies addressing a variety of issues
(see Encarnacion, 2001:53-55; Diamond, 1994:55-56). All of these may play an important
role during processes of transitions to democracy.
For a civil society to exist it is important that the state allows space for autonomous
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organisations which is not necessarily the case in totalitarian states (see Gill, 2000:5-7).
Friedman (1991:5-6) is thus of the opinion that civil society is important within a process
of democratisation because the mere existence of a civil society implies a guaranteed right
to organise, act and speak and is thus limiting the power of governments. Cohen and
Arato (1992:31-33) mention that the presence of a civil society are sometimes regarded as
an indication of the failure of the authoritarian rulers, particularly in a totalitarian state,
to control society. In addition, the right of all interests and values to organise provides the
basis for pluralism and the possibility of bridging cleavages in a divided society. It further
implies that the state may partly derive its legitimacy by defending this diversity. Thus,
civil society depends on a particular type of relationship between state and society for civil
society to exist and function properly (Friedman, 1991:5-6). In addition, civil society could
also act as an important mediator between government and the population.
Some scholars like Gill (2000:5-6) holds the view that a network of groups structuring
interests and pursuing them in the public sphere do not constitute a civil society unless it is
able to pursue these interests in the political sphere. In such a situation, autonomous groups
that structure individuals’ private lives preferably should be called “civil society forces”.18 As
would become clearer within the South African context such a view is extremely debatable,
for a signiﬁcant section of civil society was denied access to the political sphere even though
it was allowed space to exist.
During the phase of liberalisation the “opening” provided often bring a rise, or what
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:26, 48) call the “resurrection” of civil society and concomi-
tant political activism. This aﬀects the position of hardliners and softliners whose reactions
in turn have an aﬀect on the actions of the members of civil society. They further assert that
a revival of civil society should be seen against the background of the success of authoritar-
ian regimes in depoliticising as well as atomising their respective societies (O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986:26, 48).
18Gill (2000:6) admits that these forces constitute the potential for civil society. However, civil society
should be distinguished from inward-looking “parochial” groups of importance when they in fact interact
in some way or the other with the state concerned with private ends (Diamond, 1994:56). For purposes
of regime transitions, civil society and “civil society forces” are only of importance when they engage in




Political society is a particular layer of civil society (see Gill, 2000:6; Cohen and Arato,
1992) and, for this reason, a distinction is not always made between civil society and po-
litical society. However, within the context of regime transitions and in particular during
democratisation, it is important to distinguish between civil society and political society
(Diamond, 1994:57). Stepan (1988:4) identiﬁes “political society” as a component of civil
society and describes it as:
that arena in which the polity speciﬁcally arranges itself for political contestation
to gain control over public power and the state apparatus. At best, civil society
can destroy an authoritarian regime. However, a full democratic transition must
involve political society, and the composition and consolidation of a democratic
polity must entail serious thought and action about those core institutions of a
democratic political society - political parties, elections, electoral rules, political
leadership, intraparty alliances, and legislatures - through which civil society can
constitute itself politically to select and monitor democratic government. Groups
and institutions of political society are speciﬁcally political in their outlook and
have deﬁnite political aims. They thus seek to promote and protect their interests
in the political sphere (Gill, 2000:7). Thus, in a democracy, political society
consists of political parties and aﬃliated networks, legislatures, organisations
and campaigns, as well as the campaign organisations of individual candidates
(Diamond, 1994:57). The dynamics of the interactions within the domains of,
state - political society - civil society, in a democracy is regulated in such a way as
to ensure political participation and competition. Political society thus channels
demands to the state.
If a political society is allowed to exist in a non-democratic regime, political society
is usually narrower and less transparent, consisting of contending networks, cliques, and
factions within the ruling party, the military and the bureaucracy (Diamond, 1994:57).
Thus, political society is that arena where the state and civil society may overlap.
The concept of political society is thus useful to analyse the sphere which exists between,
on the one hand the realm of voluntary organised social life, and on the other hand the legal
and political institutions which regulate public conduct and policy. Political society thus is
organised for the realisation of political goals (see Kim, 1997:24).
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2.3.2 PHASES IN THE “PATHS” TO DEMOCRACY
The term, “paths to democracy”, usually refers to the route whereby a particular state
arrived at a democratic political dispensation. One of the ﬁrst scholars to identify trends
in these paths is Robert Dahl (1971:34-47). He identiﬁed three possible paths in this re-
gard: ﬁrstly, liberalisation precedes inclusiveness;19 secondly, inclusiveness precedes liberal-
isation;20 and thirdly, a shortcut where there is a sudden change to polyarchy (democracy)
through the sudden granting of universal franchise and the right to public contestation.
As indicated in chapter one, the most important phases identiﬁed by other scholars in
these “paths” of transitions21 to democracy are liberalisation, democratisation and consoli-
dation (see O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, Przeworski, 1988, 1991; De Villiers, 1993).
LIBERALISATION
Liberalisation is the provision, within an authoritarian dispensation, of increased opportu-
nities for public contestation and competition, which redeﬁnes and extends political rights,
particularly the various freedoms, and the right to privacy and fair trials (Dahl, 1971:34-35;
O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:7; Stepan, 1988:6). This is usually regarded as the beginning
of transition to democracy even though liberalisation does not necessarily imply democrati-
sation. Liberalisation thus provides “controlled openings of political space” (Przeworski,
1991:5; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:10).
In the literature on transition, various reasons are provided for decisions to liberalise an
authoritarian regime and the following are important in this regard:
∙ There is a need to relax social tension and the broadening of the social base of the
ruling elite in order to strengthen its position (Przeworski, 1991:57).
19An authoritarian regime (Dahl uses the term closed hegemony) provides more opportunities for public
contestation and competition which will lead to increased participation, that is inclusiveness, and eventual
polyarchy (Dahl, 1971).
20This is the situation when a legitimate authoritarian regime becomes more inclusive and then increases
the opportunities for public contestation (Dahl, 1971).
21The concept of transition generally refers to “the interval between one political regime and another”
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:6).
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∙ Divisions among the ruling elite arise, which increase the possibility of alliances between
factions of the ruling elite and other actors, for example from civil society (Przeworski,
1991:57).
∙ Liberalisers (or softliners) among the ruling elite may exert inﬂuence on the government
to liberalise (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:17).
∙ Domestic, internal and international factors may pressurise the ruling elite to launch
a transition (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:18-23; Przeworski, 1991:65). Przeworski
(1991:65) is of the opinion that in such circumstances, “the Liberalizers are likely
to persuade themselves that the opening will be successful, even that they will win
competitive elections if they proceed all the way to democracy”.
The phase of liberalisation is usually characterised by uncertainty, unpredictability and
the possibility of reversion and the clampdown by “hardliners” among the ruling elite (see
Przeworski, 1991:61). The possibility of such action would be inﬂuenced by the incumbents’
calculation of the cost of repression (Dahl, 1971:15).
Liberalisation may however facilitate further “liberalisation” if the ruling elite begin to
realise that “jumping ship seems as good a way to save one’s skin as shooting” (Przeworski,
1991:64). Furthermore, personal contacts may be established with the opposition. Liberal-
isation typically places the incumbents in a dilemma because they have to decide either to
democratise or to repress quests for democratisation and revert to the pre-liberalising phase
(Przeworski, 1991:64).
DEMOCRATISATION
The concept of democratisation refers to the processes whereby the rules and procedures of
democracy are applied to political institutions previously governed by principles of control
and exclusion, and/or are extended to include persons and groups who did not previously en-
joy democratic rights (see O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:8-9; Huntington, 1991:121-124).22
22O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:11-14) identiﬁes the stage of “socialisation” as a phase in the stage
of democratisation and which implies the extension of socialist principles such as redistribution This is
however a very ideological understanding of the concept of democracy. Though such aspects may be part of
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It is during this phase that the actors, strategic choices, modes of transition as well as the
institutional outcomes, all of which are discussed below, are of great importance. Democrati-
sation in eﬀect implies the “breakdown” of the authoritarian regime, or put diﬀerently its
inability or unwillingness to maintain the status quo.
CONSOLIDATION
The concept of consolidation refers to the eﬀective functioning of a new democratic regime
and the enculturation of democratic principles such as toleration and peaceful alternation of
governments (see Huntington, 1991:266).23
2.3.3 STRATEGIC CHOICE
An important theory often used in the micro-behavioural approach, is the strategic choice
theory, which emphasises the role of political actors and the manner in which they make
decisions. This approach is closely related to rational choice analysis and game theory
(Collier and Norden, 1991:229-230). Rational choice analyses may be understood as a broad
label for approaches that assume that actors make choices in the light of an assessment of
costs and beneﬁts. Game theory on the other hand is a more speciﬁc label for analyses,
which explicitly focus on the interdependence of actors. Like game theory, strategic choice
models involve games in which actors take account of what other players will do, but it also
places a particular emphasis on actions to inﬂuence these players’ choices. However, strategic
choice analyses tend to be less formal than game theory (Collier and Norden, 1991:229-230).
Analysts increasingly recognise the theoretical importance of strategic choices, which
political contenders make in determining the outcomes of transition, particularly transitions
to democracy. This theory holds that the appropriate decisions and choices by elites, both
from the authoritarian bloc and the opposition, are crucial in transitions to democracy (e.g.
Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1991; Karl, 1990; Burton and Higley, 1987; O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986; Share and Mainwaring, 1986; Przeworski, 1991). Strategic choice involves
a transition, for purposes of this discussion they are regarded as part of the choices that various actors need
to make or negotiate - as would become clear in the case of South Africa’s transition.
23As indicated this thesis does not include the stage of consolidation and thus it would not be discussed
in more detail. Some further comments will however be made in chapter 6.
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two essential components, namely “choice” and “strategy”. In focusing on individual choice,
this approach emphasises the fact that actors have discretion (Collier and Norden, 1992:230).
Models of strategic choice assume that political actors anticipate the likely subsequent
behaviour of others when making choices. Two implications ﬂow from this assumption,
namely interdependence and censoring (Smith, 1999:1257-1259). These imply that, when
evaluating which action to take, each actor considers the likely response of other political
actors. One actor’s choices cannot be considered in isolation, for each time an actor makes a
particular choice he/she prevents an observation of what would have happened had he/she
chosen the unrealised alternative (Smith, 1999:1255).
No absolute external determination of political outcomes is incorporated (see Smith,
1999). However, choices are inﬂuenced by the context and by changes in the context, but
in the end, it is the actor’s discretion that makes a diﬀerence. Actors design strategies
for the achievement of an intended goal, such as reform or democracy and each strategy
consists of a set of behavioural options for goal directed choices. These strategies may
vary in coherence and design and may range from single, isolated decisions to complex,
interrelated sets of choices, but during the process of transition, these strategies, in turn,
inﬂuence the behaviour of other contenders, such as political parties and interest groups.
Political outcomes thus in the end are the product of the interaction among diﬀerent actors’
strategic choices (Przeworski, 1991). Furthermore, choices are often made under adverse
conditions such as the uncertainty over critical factors, an overload of pressing issues, hard to
analyse interdependencies between diﬀerent items for decision on the agenda, harsh domestic
political constraints, and overriding economic scarcities (Dror, 1984:97; Shin, 1997:85). In
this way, ongoing interactions between diverse contenders and the strategic choices they make
shape the nature of the emerging political system, particularly, the nature of a transition to
democracy (De Villiers, 1993:20; Shin, 1997:83; Collier and Norden, 1991:229-230).
The theory of strategic choice particularly emphasises the central role of fundamental
political pacts24 between elites, which explicitly deﬁne the rules of the game. Pacts are often
24O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:37) deﬁnes the concept of pact as, “an explicit, but not always publically
explicated or justiﬁed, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to deﬁne (or, better, to redeﬁne)




elitist in nature and thus usually restrict the scope of direct mass participation during the
transition stage. This is often seen as an advantage because it could lessen the fears of
authoritarian elites and thus prevent them from reversing the transition process.
These pacts usually pertain, at least in the initial stages, to the rule-making aspect of
democracy rather than broader socio-economic democratisation (Shin, 1997:85). In O’Donnell
and Schmitter’s words (1986:37) “they are often initially regarded as temporary solutions
intended to avoid certain worrisome outcomes and, perhaps, to pave the way for more per-
manent arrangements for the resolution of conﬂicts.” They are most likely to result in new
regimes that only meet the minimum procedural requirements of democracy. As a result,
old authoritarian elites have less to fear from such democratic regimes and may believe that
they can still exercise great inﬂuence under the new rules of the game. The South African
experience25 clearly demonstrated the importance of strategic choices of elites during the
bargaining process, particularly timely compromises by skilful and pragmatic leaders, as was
the case in Southern Europe and Latin America. Remmer (1991:484 in Shin, 1997:85) sums
up the emphasis in strategic choice theory on the crucial role of elite choice as a “voluntaris-
tic understanding of political democracy”. This theory thus does not focus on structure,
but on statecraft (Zhang, 1994:110-111; Shin, 1997:85). The emphasis is thus on “possibil-
ism” or opportunities for change and taking advantage of uncertainty, while constraints are
deemphasised (Collier and Norden, 1992:240).
These choices are often analysed by making use of statistical methods (see Smith:1999).
Strategic choice is regarded as the explicit study of counterfactuals. It asks why political
actors choose one particular path over another. The key to understanding why actors stay on
a particular path is the anticipated consequences of deviating to a diﬀerent path. That these
consequences remain unobserved, precisely because actors seek to avoid them makes them
no less pertinent. Statistical methods may be used to analyse the relationship between the
dependent variable Y - that is the behaviour we wish to explain - and the independent variable
X - that is the factors that inﬂuence this behaviour (Smith, 1999:1255-1256). Statistical
procedures thus estimate the extent to which X inﬂuences Y and measure the overall ability
25In the chapters that follow it would become clear how, during South Africa’s transition, the various




of the relationship to predict variations in behaviour. To assess the explanatory power of a
theory, an appropriate method must assume the distributional relationship between X and Y
that the theory predicts. A shortcoming is that standard statistical methods typically assume
a linear relationship between X and Y, but strategic explanations often hypothesise a diﬀerent
type of relationship (see Rustow, 1970:345). Thus, standard econometric techniques may
fail to estimate the true impact of X on Y and, hence, misrepresent the explanatory power
of the theory, “Even if independent variables aﬀect incentives in a simple linear manner,
the interdependence and censoring inherent within strategic choice mean that the observed
relationship between X and Y is nonlinear” (Smith, 1999:1256). Nevertheless, there are
statistical methods that can overcome this problem. Thus, the statistical analysis of strategic
choices remains an important tool.
In a nutshell, a fruitful approach for explaining a transition to democracy is to look at
the critical role of key political actors and their strategic choices; to locate those choices
within the context of opportunities and obstacles that have to be exploited or overcome;
and then plot a probable outcome to the process (Slabbert, 1992:5; Shin, 1997:85). Thus,
“momentous choices” by elites could lead to a transition to democracy (Dror, 1984:97; Shin,
1997:85).
Strategic choice theory may also be criticised on a number of grounds. Shin (1997:86)
emphasises three important criticisms against strategic choice theory, Firstly, strategic choice
theory does not make adequate provision for the importance of “resolute pressure from be-
low” - that is without such pressure, incumbent authoritarian elites would not open a regime
to outside inﬂuences. No matter how skilled opposition leaders may be in negotiations, they
still owe their presence at the negotiating table to the pressure of the masses (see Pinkney,
1994:134). Secondly, it does not explain how negotiations within the often unequal relation-
ship between an authoritarian government and an opposition force culminate in a transition
to democracy and not in an authoritarian coup. Thirdly, strategic choice theory emphasises
that actors have discretion, but the scope of discretion depends on resources and constraints
on resources. Thus, it could be asked what economic resources are available in the domestic
and international context that may contribute to the promotion of reform and democracy.
What kind of political resources - organisational, ideological, or cultural - can be utilised by
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the promoters of change? When do resource constraints become severe enough to sharply
limit actors’ discretion? These questions must be addressed in any eﬀort to apply a strategic
choice perspective (see Collier and Norden, 1992:240; Shin, 1997:86).
2.3.4 MODES OF TRANSITIONS
For purposes of this study, the concept “modes of transition” refers to the “how” and by
“whom” a transition to democracy is eﬀected.
For analytical purposes and for purposes of this study three broad types of processes
of transition to democracy can be identiﬁed, namely “democracy from above”, “democracy
from below”, and “democracy through compromise”.
DEMOCRACY FROM ABOVE
In democracy from above the ruling elite take the initiative and play a decisive role in ending
the authoritarian regime and changing it into a democratic system - thus it is also referred
to as “imposition”. In democracy from above, (transformation or in Juan J Linz’s words,
reforma) the interaction between reformers and standpatters within the governing coalition
is of central importance. Transformation occurs when the elites in power take the lead in
bringing about democracy. Democracy from above only occurs if reformers are stronger than
standpatters are, if the government is stronger than the challengers, and if the moderates are
stronger than the extremists (radicals) are. In this situation, the rule of law is supported and
reforms are carried out within the existing authoritarian regime. Hardliners are rewarded by
security guarantees and beneﬁts, and reform forces carry out the transition strategy. Reform
forces support and raise moderation forces among the challengers (see Giliomee, 1995:105)
By the end of the 1980s, democracy from above accounts for approximately sixteen
out of thirty-ﬁve, third wave transitions that have occurred or that appeared to have been
emerging. These sixteen cases include changes from ﬁve one-party systems, three personal
dictatorships, and eight military regimes (Huntington, 1991:591). However, the line between
democracy from above and democracy through compromise is fuzzy, and some cases might
be legitimately classiﬁed in either category (Huntington, 1991:590-591).
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Because the government needs to be stronger than the challengers, democracy from above
often occurs in well-established military regimes, where governments clearly control the ulti-
mate means of coercion vis-a`-vis the challengers. It may also occur in economically successful
authoritarian systems, such as Spain, Brazil, Taiwan, Mexico, and Hungary where the lead-
ers had the power to move toward democracy. In each case the challengers were, at least at
the beginning of the process, markedly weaker than the government. In Brazil, for example
the people best situated to end the authoritarian regime were the leaders of the regime -
and they did as Stepan (1989: ix) states that when “liberalization began, there was no sig-
niﬁcant political opposition, no economic crisis, and no collapse of the coercive apparatus
due to defeat in war”. In Spain “it was a question of reformist elements associated with the
incumbent dictatorship, initiating processes of political change from within the established
regime” (Stepan, 1989 :ix). Typical cases of democracy from above among the communist
regimes are Hungary and the former Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. These are
all transitions from above where elite control was maintained throughout (Schmitter, 1990).
They are characterised by the use of unilateral action, including the possible use of violence,
to eﬀect a transition (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:39; and Schmitter, 1990).
There are two main sub-types of imposed transitions (see De Villiers, 1993:141-143).
Firstly, a foreign power imposes democracy after defeating the incumbent ruling elite mili-
tarily. Examples of this sub-type are democracies of post-war Western Europe established
in Austria, Italy and the former West Germany along with Japan (see Share 1987:531). In
these cases, stable democracies were created after the collapse of the preceding authoritar-
ian regime due to military defeat, and subsequent occupation by a foreign power (see Dahl,
1971:37-38; Pasquino, 1986:69-70; Stepan, 1986:71-72; Di Palma, 1990:32-33; and Vanhanen,
1990:119). In all of these cases, the authoritarian regime was completely delegitimated by
military defeat. Consequently the new democratic regime took steps to distance itself from
its authoritarian legacy (see Herz, 1982:275-292; Share, 1987;531-532; and Linz, 1990a:148).
Other examples of foreign intervention leading to the establishment of democracy include
the US interventions in Grenada and Panama (see Whitehead, 1986:3; MacEwan, 1988:119;
Huntington, 1991:24). However, democracy by foreign imposition is only really conceivable
with regard to small, weak states ( De Villiers, 1993:141).
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Secondly, a dominant group, such as the military, is able to impose unilaterally the con-
ditions of democratisation (Stepan, 1986:65). The change in regime is largely initiated from
above and the coercive power of the state is consistently brought to bear to determine the
timing, pace and content of change (Karl and Schmitter, 1991:275; De Villiers, 1993:141-142).
Recent examples are Turkey, Brazil and the former Soviet Union (De Villiers, 1993:142). It
is important for the authoritarian incumbents to have suﬃcient cohesion and resources to
impose the rules of an emerging democratic dispensation - or what O’Donnell and Schmitter
(1986:39) refer to as “a prior concentration of executive power”. Thus, the new rules can be
imposed unilaterally from above and the other players may obey them out of fear or respect
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:68).
De Villiers (1993:141-142) lists several strict limits that the ruling elite can set to deter-
mine the extent of the opening. These are:
∙ “Dangerous” parties or individuals, such as communists, may be prohibited from par-
ticipating in elections.
∙ The opposition is allowed to compete, but not to win signiﬁcant national oﬃces.
∙ Issues, such as human rights abuses by the military and redistribution, are excluded
from the transition agenda (see Stepan, 1986: 72-78).
Huntington (1991:127) argues that democracy from above in an authoritarian regime
requires the emergence of leaders within the structures of the authoritarian regime who
believe that movement in the direction of democracy is desirable or necessary. The main
reasons for liberalisation have already been alluded to above; they lie in the deterioration of
the authoritarian regime (Kaufman, 1986; Gillespie, 1990). In this context then, softliners
see liberalisation as a way of defusing opposition to authoritarian rule. They would like to
reduce repression, restore some civil liberties, reduce censorship, permit broader discussion
of public issues, and allow civil society greater scope to conduct their own aﬀairs.
Unfortunately, attempts to impose democracy from above may be mere attempts by the
incumbents to legitimise and/or secure their own positions and they may not necessarily




In cases of democracy from below (replacement or Linz’s reptura), challengers eﬀectively use
the regime’s disadvantages such as a lack of orthodoxy, failure of the government’s economy,
the corruption of politics and lack of human rights. In democracy from below the interactions
between incumbents and challengers and between moderates and extremists are important.
Replacement occurs when an opposition group takes the lead in bringing about democracy,
and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown. The challengers thus have to be
stronger than the government, and the moderates have to be stronger than the extremists
are. A democracy from below thus takes place when challengers mobilise from below and
then demand a change in regime with or without resorting to widespread violence (Karl and
Schmitter, 1991:275). Hence, mass-based challengers are able to achieve the expansion of
unrestricted contestation and participation (Karl, 1991:173; De Villiers, 1993:138).
Democracy from below, thus, involves a very diﬀerent process from democracy from
above. Reformers within the regime are weak or nonexistent. The dominant elements
in government are standpatters opposed to regime change. Democratisation consequently
results from the challengers gaining strength and the incumbents losing strength until the
government collapses or is eventually overthrown. The former opposition groups come to
power and the conﬂict then often enters a new phase as groups in the new government
struggle among themselves over the nature of the regime they should institute (Huntington,
1991:602).
Karl (1991:8-10)26 identiﬁes two sub-types of “democracy from below. The ﬁrst is labelled
“reform”27 where the incumbent ruling elite still have power even though they may be
severely weakened. The second sub-type is labelled “revolution” and is where mass actors
have gained the upper hand vis-a`-vis the ruling elite (Karl, 1991:8).28
In the ﬁrst sub-type, challengers, who are led by a nonviolent, moderate and pragmatic
26Using actor strength and strategies of transition as criteria Karl (1991) develops a typology consisting of
“pact” (elite ascendant and compromise), “imposition” (elite ascendant and force), “reform” (mass ascendant
and compromise) and “revolution” (mass ascendant and force). See also Karl and Schmitter (1991).
27Democracy from above and in particular those involving extended periods of liberalising, is also some-
times referred to as “reform from above” and should be distinguished from “reform from below”.
28A popular image of democratic transitions is that repressive governments are brought down by “people’s
power”, the mass mobilisation of outraged citizens demanding and eventually forcing a change of regime.
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group, must suggest tolerance and ability that could be a viable alternative for the govern-
ment. In addition, they co-opt into their ranks inﬂuential actors such as military leaders,
business leaders, professionals and leaders of religion (Stepan, 1986:65; Karl and Schmitter,
1991:275). Replacement involves three distinct phases: the struggle to produce the fall, the
fall, and the struggle after the fall. Revolutions usually entail the complete overthrow of the
government - often violent.
The role of civil society and political society in successful mass mobilisation may be
important in transitions from below. The essential characteristic of transitions dominated
by demands for reform from below, is successful mass mobilisation. Here it is important to
note that mass mobilisation is generally around interests driven from below. Hence, mass
mobilisation may be the chosen strategy of a social movement, an opposition party or of
local interests which were previously excluded from the authoritarian polity (De Villiers,
1993:138-139; Tilly, 1978:54-55). Some form of mass action did take place in almost every
third wave regime change completed or underway at the end of the 1980s. Examples of
such transitions are Solidarity in Poland and Civic Forum in the former Czechoslovakia
(Przeworski, 1988:76-79; Huntington, 1991:144).
Workers are often the ﬁrst and largest force to mobilise, because the workplace and
the market are places where people can meet without direct supervision. Furthermore,
political rights are necessary for workers to struggle for their economic interests. Thus,
workers organise autonomous unions which then embrace political demands that put them
in the forefront of the struggle for democracy (De Villiers, 1993:139-140; Przeworski, 1988:73;
Keck, 1989:282-289, and 1992:49-51; Valenzuela, 1989:466-469; Anstey, 1991b:26; Cooper,
1991:24-29; Therbon, 1977: 32-35).
However, Huntington (1991:602) argues that most third wave democratisations required
some co-operation from those in power. Only six democracies from below had occurred
by 1990. Democracy from below was rare in transitions from one-party systems (one out
of eleven) and military regimes (two out of sixteen) and more common in transitions from
personal dictatorships (three out of seven). Leaders who created authoritarian regimes are
usually reluctant to end those regimes. Changes of leadership in military regimes were much
75
Chapter 2
more likely through “second phase” coups or, in one-party systems, through regular succes-
sion or the action of constituted party bodies. Personal dictators, however, seldom retired
voluntarily, and the nature of their power - personal rather than military or organisational
- made it diﬃcult for opponents within the regime to oust them and, indeed, made it un-
likely that such opponents would exist in any signiﬁcant numbers or strength (Huntington,
1991:603). Personal dictators often hang on to power until their death and thus the death of
the dictator often coincides with the end of an authoritarian regime. Examples are Franco
who was leader of Spain and died in 1975, and Ceausescu who was leader of Romania and
executed in 1989 (Huntington, 1968:8-12).
Even though democracy from below is characterised by extensive mass mobilisation,
this takes place within certain self-imposed limits (De Villiers, 1993:139; O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986:27; Morlino, 1987:73; Ash, 1990:139-140). Often this is the outcome of
a learning curve where threats to overthrow an authoritarian regime is met by counter
action by the incumbents, This was the case in Poland in 1981 when Solidarity threatened
to overthrow the authoritarian regime, which in turn responded with martial law and a
crackdown. However, by 1988-1989, “both sides had learned their lessons” and then “pursued
policies of moderation and compromise in leading Poland toward democracy” (see De Villiers,
1993:139; Huntington, in Rustow, 1992:122).
Democracy from below which involves reform has a greater chance of success than democ-
racy from below involving revolution. According to Karl, (1991:8) revolutions may produce
stable governments but seldom consolidated democracies.
DEMOCRACY THROUGH COMPROMISE
In the case of democracy through compromise or what might be termed transplacement (or
“reptforma”)29 the most important elements are negotiation and co-operation. In democracy
through compromise, the central interaction is between reformers and moderates among the
government and challengers respectively. The two sides should not be widely unequal in
power, while each side should be able to dominate the antidemocratic groups within its




ranks. Transplacement thus occurs when democratisation results largely from the joint
action by the incumbents and challengers (see Linz, 1978). In virtually all cases, groups
both in power and out of power play some role and these categories simply distinguish
the relative importance of incumbents and challengers. In some cases, the reformers and
moderates agree at least on a temporary sharing of power (Huntington, 1991:590; see also
Przeworski, 1991:56).
Leaders among the incumbents and the challengers begin to realise that negotiations are
inevitable - the forces favouring confrontation thus lose their position. Moderate groups
clearly recognise the advantages that would be brought by negotiation. Reformers within
government isolate hardliners, take the leadership within government and manage to secure
support for negotiation from military forces and the government bureaucracy. They further-
more succeed in assuring the old-guard that their interests are secure, as well as elevating
the prestige and “authority” of the challengers. The positions of both sides are adjusted
through negotiation (Stockton, 2001:94).
Thus, a transition to democracy is the outcome of combined actions by the incumbents
and the challengers. Within the government, the balance between standpatters and re-
formers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime - unlike the
situation where standpatter dominance could result in democracy from below (Hunting-
ton, 1991:608). Among the challengers, pro-democracy moderates are strong and able to
dominate antidemocratic radicals who are not strong enough to overthrow the government.
Hence, the challengers also begin to realise the virtues of negotiation. Both sides have to be
pushed and/or pulled into formal or informal negotiations with their adversaries.30 Skilful
leadership is thus vital in any negotiated transition.
According to Huntington (1991:609), eleven of the thirty-ﬁve liberalisations and democrati-
sations that occurred or began in the 1970s and 1980s resembled the model of democracy
through compromise, such as Poland (1988), Czechoslovakia (1989), Uruguay (1983), and
Korea (1987). In addition, the regime changes in Bolivia (1982), Honduras (1983), El Sal-
vador (1983), and Nicaragua involved signiﬁcant elements of democracy through compromise.
30The following chapters would provide a clear indication of the dynamics of the push-pull factors within
the South African context.
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In El Salvador and Honduras, the negotiations were in part with the US-government, acting
as a surrogate for democratic moderates (Huntington, 1991:611-613).
For a successful transition to democracy through compromise, it is important for the
dominant groups among both incumbents and challengers to recognise that they are inca-
pable of unilaterally determining the nature of the future political system. The incumbents
and challengers often develop these views after testing the strength of each other in a di-
alectical process. Governments usually believe they would be able to secure their positions
indeﬁnitely without incurring unacceptable costs, while the challengers usually believe that
it would be able to bring about the downfall of the government at some point in the not
too distant future. For as long as both sides hold on to these uncompromising and often-
unrealistic views, serious negotiations are impossible. It is important for both sides to realise
that the costs of non-negotiation in terms of increased repression, further alienation of peo-
ple, the increased possibility of a hard line takeover of the government, and possible increased
pressure from the international community could escalate (Huntington, 1991:609).
Huntington (1991:609) argues that the democracy through compromise dialectic often
involves a distinct sequence of steps. Firstly, the government engages in some form of
liberalisation and begin to lose power and authority. Secondly, the challengers exploit this
loosening by and weakening of the government. The challengers expand their support and
intensify their activities with the hope and expectation of bringing down the government.
Thirdly, the government reacts by forcefully containing and suppressing the mobilisation
of political power by the challengers. Fourthly, government and challengers as contenders
perceive a standoﬀ emerging and begin to explore the possibility of a negotiated transition.
However, it is possible for the government, to restore its power - at least temporarily. On
the other hand, the challengers could continue to develop its strength - thus further eroding
the power of the government and eventually bringing about its breakdown or downfall.
Democracy through compromise however requires some equilibrium in the strength between
government and opposition, as well as uncertainty on each side as to who would prevail in
a major test of strength. In these circumstances, the risks of negotiation and compromise
appeared less than the risks of confrontation and catastrophe (Huntington, 1991:609).
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In chapter four it would be discussed how politics in South Africa in the 1980s under
PW Botha evolved along the lines of the four-step model (Huntington, 1991:610).31 Un-
certainty, ambiguity, and division of opinion over democratisation thus tend to characterise
the ruling circles in democracy during situations of compromise. These regimes were not
overwhelmingly committed to holding on to power either ruthlessly or to moving decisively
toward democracy (Huntington, 1991:612).
Furthermore, Huntington (1991) argues that each party has an interest in strengthening
the other party so that it can deal more eﬀectively with the hardliners and extremists - which
was also the case in the rapport between President de Klerk and Mr Mandela.32
Negotiations for regime change usually are preceded by “pre-negotiations” about the con-
ditions for entering into negotiations. These might include aspects such as which individuals
and groups would be involved in the negotiations and what the rules would be (Huntington,
1991:614-615).33
Democratic transition through political pact making has been emphasised by scholars
because it has most consistently produced stable democracies (see O’Donnell and Schmitter,
1986; Higley and Burton, 1989; Karl, 1990). Democratic institutions arising out of transition
pacts tend to have greater chances of survival.
31As would be discussed in chapter 4, PW Botha began the process of liberalising reform in the late 1970s,
thus arousing black expectations and then frustrating them when the 1983-Constitution denied blacks a
national political role. This led to uprisings in the black townships in 1984 and 1985, which stimulated black
hopes that the collapse of the regime was imminent. The government’s forceful and eﬀective suppression
of black and white dissent then compelled the opposition to revise their hopes drastically. At the same
time, the uprisings attracted international attention, stimulated condemnation of both the apartheid system
and the government’s tactics, and led the USA and European governments to intensify economic sanctions
against South Africa (Huntington, 1991:610). As the hopes for revolution of the ANC radicals declined, the
worries of the NP government about international legitimacy and the economic future increased. The ANC
remained committed to the use of violence, but saw negotiations as the more likely route for achieving ANC
goals. After becoming president of South Africa in 1989, FW de Klerk also emphasised the importance of
negotiations (Huntington, 1991:611).
32In 1990, for instance, Mandela commented on the problems FW de Klerk was having with white
hardliners and said that the ANC had appealed “to whites to assist De Klerk. We are also trying to address
the problems of white opposition to him. Discussions have already been started with inﬂuential sectors in
the right wing.” At the same time, Mandela said that his own desire to meet with Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi
had been vetoed by radicals within the ANC and that he had to accept that decision because he was “a
loyal and disciplined member of the ANC”. De Klerk obviously had an interest in strengthening Mandela
and helping him deal with his militant left-wing opposition (Huntington, 1991:614).
33For example in South Africa, the government’s precondition was that the ANC renounce violence. ANC




The outcomes of transitions decided on by the various actors are likewise important within
the micro-behavioural approach. Political actors make choices over preferred institutions,
or rule structures, for the future political dispensation (Sisk, 1995:44).34 Various outcomes,
such as the form of the state (federalism versus unitary state), form of government (presi-
dential versus parliamentary) and the electoral system (single-member constituencies versus
proportional representation or the mixed system) are important.35 Sisk (1995:51) identiﬁes
four broad sets of institutional choice preferences, namely majoritarianism (unrestrained ma-
jority rule), centripetalism (integration and incentives for moderation), consociationalism36
and partition (see also Lijphart, 1985). Political dispensations based on power-sharing, par-
ticularly consociationalism, versus those based on the integration of power (centripetalism)
are of particular importance for divided societies, particularly within the South African
context.37
The crucial question underlying these theories refers to those conditions that will provide
incentives for political leaders to respond to conﬂicts in deeply divided societies by prompting
them either to search for a bargained resolution to such conﬂicts or to exacerbate the conﬂicts
by taking extreme positions and try to impose unilateral policies. The Rabushka and Shepsle
(1972:86) thesis holds that given the existence of intense ethnic preferences in a society, it is
politically proﬁtable and rational for ambitious politicians to increase the salience of ethnic
prejudice, hatred, and fear. Attempts are then made to outbid politicians who try to sell
moderation, having created a polarised political marketplace in which “the rhetoric of co-
operation and mutual trust sounds painfully weak” (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972:86).
34Of particular importance during negotiated transitions is how the various actors change their positions
in this regard. Thus, institutional choice models may be used (see Sisk, 1995). For purposes of this discussion
the focus is mainly on options in choices pertaining to how power could be distributed and exercised in a
divided society.
35It is not possible to pay attention to all possible aspects of the institutional proﬁle and constitutional
framework of a new political dispensation decided on.
36Lijphart(1977), by using the criteria “social culture” (homogeneous-fragmented) and the actions of
elites (competitive-coalescent) identiﬁes four types of democracy: Firstly, homogeneous-coalescent depoliti-
cised democracy; secondly, homogeneous-competitive centripetal democracy; thirdly, fragmented-coalescent
consociational democracy; fourthly, fragmented-competitive centrifugal democracy. He later generalises the
consociational democracy as a consensus model and a logical opposite of the majoritarian model.




Some scholars such as Arend Lijphart are of the opinion that majoritarianism, particularly
the Westminster version, is problematic for deeply divided societies such as South Africa.38
According to Lijphart (1977), the theory of consociational democracy oﬀers a diﬀerent out-
come to the conﬂict potential of deeply divided societies. He (1985:6) argues that a system
of elite co-operation can counter these divisive forces within a constitutional framework with
the following characteristics:
∙ Executive power-sharing among the representatives of all signiﬁcant groups.
∙ A high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it.
∙ Proportional representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and
public funds.
∙ Minority veto on the most vital issues.
A preference for a system of power-sharing among elites in a divided society is based
on the assumption that the way in which these elites negotiate compromised solutions to
divisive issues, could counter ethnic extremism and promote moderation. Lijphart (1977:236;
1985:118)39 also preferred a consociational type political dispensation for South Africa, “the
outlook for democracy of any kind is poor, but if there is to be democracy at all it will
most certainly have to be of the consociational type.” Lijphart sees the following positive
outcomes of a compromise between the various segments: sharing of power through a grand
coalition; formal limits on power through the exercise of the mutual veto; a fair distribution
of power through proportionality; and the delegation of power through guaranteed segmental
autonomy.
Lijphart (1977:100; 1985:130) is of the opinion that given certain “favourable conditions,”
rival political leaders can make the “self-negating prediction” from which they will infer that
38Likewise partition, for in South Africa the system of apartheid largely resembled the principles of
partition, while majoritarianism could also usher in racial or ethnic dominance. However, most challengers
in South Africa favoured majoritarianism (see Sisk, 1995:31-36).




it is politically more proﬁtable to respond to conﬂicts in deeply divided societies by searching
for negotiated solutions, than to respond with ethnic extremism. These favourable conditions
that promote consociationalism include a society with: a small population composed of a
small number of segments of relatively equal size; no majority segment and segments of
approximately equal size, as well as segments that are geographically concentrated and of
relative socioeconomic equality; traditions of accommodation and overarching loyalties; and
lastly common external threats. Awareness of the destructive conﬂict potential of deeply
divided societies and an assessment of perceived future costs and beneﬁts could motivate
elites to co-operate with one another in order to avert such conﬂict. This could provide the
catalyst for pre-emptive action to prevent the escalation of conﬂict.
Lijphart (1985; 1989; 1991a) criticised the classical assumption, that social and cul-
tural homogeneity is an essential condition for democracy. His analyses of plural societies,
such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria, demonstrated that in cases
of heterogeneous and fragmented culture, stable democracies might be established by the
accommodation of, and compromise among the elite of each sub-society - consociational
democracy.40
After applying his model to South Africa, Lijphart (1985) regarded South Africa as
suitable for consociationalism and suggested that consociationalism be used as a prominent
mechanism to settle the long drawn out conﬂict involving the various races. However, other
scholars such as Horowitz (1991:138-139) dispute this claim by Lijphart by arguing that
majority oppression is a possibility. In the case of South Africa it would be possible for the
black segment of the population to be a dominant majority.41
Consociationalism has both advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of consoci-
ationalism is that it maintains, legitimises, and strengthens communal claims against the
state and could thus limit state power. On the other hand, too much autonomy through
for example the mutual veto can lead to further claims beyond the intention of the original
agreement (see Duchacek, 1973:9 in Sisk, 1995:35). This can encourage centrifugal forces in
40In this thesis, under the assumption that the essential attributes of consociational democracy and a
consensus model are the same, consociationalism and the consensus model will be used in contradiction to
majoritarianism.
41Racial cleavages in South Africa will be discussed in chapter 3.
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the polity that may be diﬃcult to contain. Another disadvantage is that consociationalism
can lead to “immobilism”.42 Furthermore, the rather well deﬁned nature of the segments
suggests that inter-segmental conﬂict could overwhelm co-operation. Structural guarantees
for communities, for example, through a minority veto, could provide a built-in incentive for
maintaining the rigidity of the segments.
THEORIES ON THE INTEGRATION OF POWER
To counter the disadvantages of consociationalism, Horowitz (1985:601-652; 1991) oﬀers
an alternative institutional option to divided societies, namely centripetalism. Instead of
entrenching communal representation, political institutions should encourage integration
across communal divides. For a democratic government to be eﬀective in a divided society,
it is important to create incentives that would encourage moderation. Thus, moderates
must be rewarded while extremism must be discouraged. These incentives should motivate
politicians to appeal beyond their own communal segments for support.
Centripetalism (Horowitz, 1985; Sisk, 1995:34-38) could promote the integration of power
because it creates a series of systematic incentives for segmental members by removing the
dividing environment between segments. This could be achieved by inducing competition
on purpose. The assumption is that politicians are rational actors and will do whatever
they need to do to be elected. Thus, the polity can be engineered to encourage inter-
communal co-operation as a prerequisite for electoral success. This is contrary to the logic of
consociationalism, which holds that it is necessary to control competition in order to reduce
the level of conﬂict between segments. Horowitz, however, contends that the mentioned
incentives are better than consociational constraints, such as the mutual veto, because they
oﬀer reasons for politicians and divided groups to behave moderately, rather than obstacles
aimed at preventing them from pursuing hegemonic aims (Horowitz, 1991:261; Sisk, 1995:36).
Another advantage is that the integration of political power is concerned with constituency-
based moderation rather than a reliance on the belief that political leaders alone can foster
moderation. The key to constituency-based moderation is the electoral system, which there-
42This term refers to a crisis of indecision in government and is a common criticism of inaction that can
result from the use of the mutual veto (Sisk, 1995:35).
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fore should be designed in such a way that leaders must appeal to the moderate sentiments
in the electorate and isolate forces of extremism. This would foster compromise between the
leaders and their constituents and would allow politicians to make the kind of compromise
required for a divided society to be truly democratic and stable. To safeguard minority in-
terests, Horowitz advises that the system should make the votes of minority members count
(Horowitz, 1991:175-176; Sisk, 1995:36).
In order to achieve these eﬀects, Horowitz (1991; 1993) favours a “power-centred presi-
dential system”, federalism, subsequent preference voting.
A power centred presidential system
Horowitz (1991:205-214) is of the opinion that, if a special majority is required a presiden-
tial system is potentially less exclusive than parliamentarianism. There is an old debate
between, on the one hand, the consociationalists such as Lijphart (1977) and Linz (1990:51-
70), who argue that parliamentarianism is more inclusive, and on the other hand, Horowitz
(1990:73-79) who is a defender of presidentialism (Sisk, 1995:36). According to Horowitz
a parliamentary-chosen executive, is problematic because whichever party or coalition of
parties has a bare majority in the legislature can choose an executive without taking into
account the preferences of the minority. Thus, parliamentary elected executives fall in the
winner-takes-all, government-versus-opposition pattern of politics, which will nurture divi-
sions in an already divided society (Sisk, 1995:36-37). According to Horowitz (1991:205),
it is important to prevent a single group from capturing “the state permanently by merely
capturing a majority in parliament”.
A separately elected presidency, on the other hand, could have the broadest possible
national appeal and with a strict separation of powers from the legislature, could proliferate
points of power at the centre, thus allowing some parties to win sometimes, and others
to win at other times. This would reduce the confrontation between the various segments
(Sisk, 1991:107-108). A strong, statesmanlike, moderate president - forced to appeal to the
least common denominator of electoral sentiments - can serve a unifying, nation-building
role. Furthermore, a strong executive would be able to push legislation through a divided
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parliament. Strong but benevolent leadership might be required to make tough economic
decisions or redress historical injustices.
Horowitz’s ideas also have some limitations and particularly with regard to South Africa
(Sisk, 1991:102-113). Firstly, like Lijphart, by limiting the focus of analysis to racial cleav-
ages and problems, the structure of cleavages of South African society, is over simpliﬁed.
Secondly, this oversimpliﬁcation is even more pronounced in his simplistic conceptualisation
of “race”. As Southall (1993) indicated, Horowitz is dividing all races according to the
only criterion “language”, not considering compound factors such as historic experiences,
coexistence between racial segments and the level of union, compatibility and contestation
between racial variables. Thirdly, Horowitz has excessively positive assumptions about the
presidential system. He is of the opinion that if the right to vote is extended to non-white
segments, and the presidential system is based on the principle of absolute majority, post
racial democratic competition could exist. However, unless the old system’s legacies, in-
cluding white privilege and non-white deprivation are addressed, confrontation between the
various races could be intense. Thus, Horowitz’s power-centred presidential system that
induces real integration of people may stop at the level of an ideological model.43 Fourthly,
majoritarianism remains a problem. Majority rule is more eﬀective in conditions of national
homogeneity and the exercise of equal rights and duties. On the other hand, centripetalism
could, according to, Horowitz nurture homogeneity and a sense of unity in a divided society
like South Africa, if “equalness” is promoted. Thus, in order to achieve unity, centripetalism
requires a strong power-centred presidential system. Horowitz’s position on this logic of
centripetalism however is vague (Shapiro, 1993:142-150).
As referred to in chapter one, Horowitz’s prescriptions for conﬂict-regulating institutions
for divided societies (and for South Africa) overlap those of Lijphart to a large degree - both
advocate federalism, for example. Yet they are distinguished in important ways. Horowitz
(1985:568-76) is an indefatigable critic of the consociational model for two important reasons
(Sisk, 1995:35). Firstly, he argues, the consociational approach emphasises the ability of seg-
mental elites to contain underlying communal conﬂict (preventing the outbidding danger).
43Nevertheless, Horowitz’s logic is reﬂected in the same way in the dispute with Linz (1993), who is of
the opinion that a cabinet system is better than a presidential system.
85
Chapter 2
As noted earlier, the incentive for elite moderation in consociationalism is rooted in elite
realisation of the costs of conﬂict. “There is no reason to think automatically,” Horowitz
(1991:141) writes, “that elites will use their leadership position to reduce rather than pur-
sue conﬂict” (Sisk, 1995:35). Horowitz (1985, 1991, 1993), therefore, rightly focuses on
the incentives and disincentives for moderation a political system generates. In his view
consociationalism not only overestimates deference by communal groups to their leaders and
underestimates the power and role of dissatisfaction with inter-group compromise, it may
even provide elites with incentives to encourage conﬂict. If individual elite power in the
consociational system is only as strong as the constituency the leader represents, politicians
can stir up hostilities among their communities to strengthen their own hand. Tsebelis (1990
in Sisk, 1995:35) describes this problem as “elite-initiated conﬂict”.44
Federalism
Federalism can serve four important purposes in a divided society, according to Horowitz
(Sisk, 1991:108, 201). Firstly, in combination with the electoral system federalism could
encourage the proliferation of political parties, which is conducive to inter segmental com-
promises and coalition building. At the same time, it would counter hegemony at the central
level (Horowitz, 1991:221-222). Secondly, politics at the regional and local levels can serve
as training grounds for politics at the centre or national level. Thirdly, federalism disperses
conﬂict at the centre by resolving some issues at the regional and local levels. Finally, it
creates diﬃculties for any party hoping to get a hegemonic grip on the entire society - cap-
turing all of the provincial states would he a diﬃcult task. However, federalism may promote
subgroup cleavages in communally homogeneous states (Sisk, 1995:36-37).45
44There were strong grounds for seriously considering his blueprint for the constitutional structure of a
post-apartheid political system. The model that was put forward has potential for conﬂict resolution in
divided societies, irrespective of the kinds of divisions that beset them.
45Within the South African context federalism was often seen by the challengers as containing elements




To Horowitz, divided societies do indeed need some proportionality in representation (PR),
but not just the straight system of party-list proportional representation that Lijphart gen-
erally advocates.46 A system of preference voting - and preferably, alternative voting (AV)
is favoured. AV, a majoritarian system on the other hand with some proportionality eﬀects,
relies not on seat pooling (coalitions formed after an election), but on vote pooling (coali-
tions based on pre-election agreements). Voters do not only choose their ﬁrst preference,
but specify second or third preferences as well. In addition to AV, Horowitz prefers the
single transferable vote (STV), where candidates can make vote-pooling agreements. The
major precondition for a successful vote-pooling framework is suﬃcient party proliferation,
large heterogeneous constituencies, and conditions that make vote pooling proﬁtable: that is,
when moderation by political leaders causes them to gain more second- and third-preference
votes than the ﬁrst-preference votes, they lose by appearing soft on communal interests (Sisk,
1995:37). The list systems favours seat pooling, that is assuming no party wins an outright
majority, seats are pooled to form a governing parliamentary majority. Coalitions that rest
on intergroup vote pooling, as well as seat pooling would be inclined to accommodation and
thus reward statesmanship (Horowitz, 1991:177).
Why is subsequent-preference voting preferred for divided societies, in Horowitz’s view?
The logic is that in order to win, politicians must seek to obtain the second, or third-
preference votes of those who would not ordinarily vote for them. In order to gain those
alternative votes, leaders must behave moderately towards other communal groups. Outbid-
ding will not occur on the extremes; because politicians will try to outbid each other. They
will compete with one another to ﬁnd the political centre (moderates). Centripetal forces
will override centrifugal ones. The critical diﬀerence between the consociationalist system
and Horowitz’s is thus the formation of electoral coalitions by constituents as they specify
their second or third preferences beyond their own narrow group interests (Sisk, 1995:38).
46The list system, Lijphart (1990a:2-13) allows parties to choose lists of candidates and voters vote for the
parties, often in a single national constituency. The proportion of votes for the party is directly translated
into the same proportion of seats in parliament; that is, party lists provide for the most direct vote/seat
ratio possible (Sisk, 1995: 37).
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2.3.6 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MICRO-
BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH
The Micro-Behavioural Approach, which provides a fresh outlook on the study of transition
to democracy, has several uses and limitations.
It is a dynamic approach for the analysis of the short-term dynamics of transition poli-
tics, particularly where a high level of uncertainty and unpredictability prevails. Secondly,
it draws scholarly attention to the micro aspects of the emergence and the breakdown of
democratic regimes. Thirdly, obviating the more or less deterministic views of the structural
approach, it allows an ample degree of inconclusiveness and open-endedness in suggesting
the paths of transition to democracy (see Shin, 1997:87).
Despite these merits, the micro-behavioural approach involves the following shortcom-
ings. Firstly, this approach comes down to a behavioural-centred line by making structural
variables secondary. As a result the selected behaviour and the transition strategy of actors
become independent variables that explain democratisation. Structural dynamics that may
shape democratic transition is therefore disregarded. For example, in the case of the strate-
gic choice theory, the attempt to solve the problem of “integrating structure and behaviour”,
assumes that structural conditions constrain the strategic choice options of actors - that is
the “structure of choice”. However by separating the constraint itself from strategic choice,
it fails to ﬁnd an inner dynamics between structure and behaviour (see Karl, 1990:6).
Secondly, by focusing on strategic interactions between actors who participate in democrati-
sation, this approach is useful in pursuing the dynamic development processes of democrati-
sation. However, it falls short in explaining the macro-structural environment and causes of
democratisation, which might constrain or promote transitions to democracy. Thus, actors
may make decisions with regard to a transition to democracy without considering whether
democracy could be sustained and consolidated. It therefore simply does not guarantee a
democratic political dispensation in the long term (see Karl, 1990:6-7).
Thirdly, the course of democratic transition followed according to this approach and
the game model between actors is excessively diagrammatic. There are some deviations,
but many studies that analyse transitions to democracy in terms of the micro-behavioural
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approach, investigate the transition game that hardliners/moderates of regimes and anti-
regimes play. Subsequently the democracy through compromise that has been facilitated by
the moderates is presented as an exemplary route of transition and often as the only route
to transition.
The problem is the fact that the transition game and the transition route of this approach
are only based on a virtual and probable situation about choice behaviour of actors and the
cost of their actions. However, abstract probable situations do not necessarily apply to real
examples of democratisation. Thus, this approach has the danger of simplifying real social
situations excessively. Therefore, for this study the explanation power of concrete analysis,
social and economic conditions, which control selection behaviours of individual actors, as
well as the dynamic relations between these actors, need to be considered simultaneously.
Lastly, the focus is often on the behaviour of elites and even though they may play
important roles in a democracy, democracy in itself implies the involvement of the masses.
2.4 AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S TRAN-
SITION TO DEMOCRACY
It is at this stage necessary to provide a brief overview on studies that focussed on South
Africa’s transition.
A proliﬁc literature developed around South Africa’s political dispensation and the prob-
lems South Africa encountered in this regard. Three phases can be identiﬁed in this liter-
ature, namely those that were written prior to what is regarded in this study as the initial
phase of transition (1978-1989) those written during the period 1978-1994 and lastly those
written since 1994. The literature of the ﬁrst two phases are to a large extent characterised
by critical analyses of South Africa’s political dispensation, the problems it faced as well
as elaborate studies on possible alternatives. After South Africa’s transition to democracy
through negotiations between various political actors and with the drafting of the ﬁnal in-
terim constitution, which was based on a multi-racial power-sharing model, South Africa’s




During the ﬁrst two phases important studies were made by a signiﬁcant number of
South African and foreign scholars. This literature also reﬂected the various positions of
the scholars vis-a`-vis the South African political dispensation. Of particular importance
was thus the anti-apartheid literature focussing on black consciousness, Marxism and anti-
colonialism. These either provided intense critiques on, or a descriptive analyses of the
South African dispensation. Historical works are also important in this regard. Examples of
scholars during this period are: Adam, Arnold, Giliomee, Horowitz, Lijphart, Marx, Maphai,
Moodley, Schlemmer, Schrire, Sisk, Southall and Slabbert.47
However, if the focus is on the analyses of the actual transition, the studies are not abun-
dant. Though it was the biggest political change historically in South Africa, a systematic
and comprehensive study has not yet been done. Important studies up to now, include
those of Slabbert (1990a), Rantete and Giliomee (1992), Van Nieuwkerk (1992), Ottaway
(1993), De Villiers (1993), Giliomee (1995), Adler and Webster (1995), Kim (1997) and Shin
(1997).48
Slabbert (1990b; 1992) made several critical analyses of South Africa in transition and
in particular paid attention to pre-negotiations. However, he does not provide a systematic
analysis of South Africa’s transition.
Rantete and Giliomee (1992) applied the following three types of democratisation to
South Africa, namely transition through transaction, transition through extrication, transi-
tion through breakdown. They evaluate the democratic transition route of South Africa by
analysing pacts. Their analysis is limited to the initial phase of democratisation. In their
analysis of the preliminary negotiations between the NP-government (incumbents) and the
ANC (challengers), they argued that the ﬁnal transition would be moulded by the outcomes
of negotiations.
Such was also the position of Van Nieuwkerk (1992). He added as objects of analysis the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Conservative Party (CP) to the NP-government and
the ANC, and he made a cross-analysis of them. Thus, he deepened the level of analysis,
47The bibliography provides a comprehensive list of important authors and works during these phases.
48There are also numerous works documenting the history of the transition, as well as works providing
important biographical detail of important actors and in particular with regard to Mandela and De Klerk.
90
Chapter 2
but his analysis did not go beyond the preliminary negotiation phase.
Ottaway (1993) made her analysis after the preliminary negotiation phase. Her approach
was more developed, because she included social and economic variables in the analysis of
the alternative proposals of each party with regard to a new political dispensation. Espe-
cially, in analysing the process of establishing a constitution for organising the new political
dispensation, she focused on the fact that negotiation and transition strategies reﬂect the
power relations and economic interests of civil society. By dividing the arenas of struggle
during the negotiations for the establishment of the constitution simply into the local and
economic arenas, she failed to grasp the dynamic interactions in the domains of state, civil
society and political society.
After the transition was settled in the interim constitution Giliomee (1995) supplemented
his initial analysis (Rantete and Giliomee, 1992) and tried to combine micro-behavioural
analysis and macro-structural analysis (see also Giliomee, Schlemmer and Hauptﬂeisch,
1994). For this purpose, by using the model of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) he identiﬁes
the following phases in the transition, namely liberalisation, democratisation, consolidation.
He replaces the types of change of Share and Mainwaring (1986) with that of Huntington
(1991), namely democracy from above (transformation), democracy from below (replace-
ment), democracy through compromise (transplacement). He argues that in connection with
the democratic transition in South Africa, “democracy from above” of the NP government
and “democracy from below” of the ANC are converged into “democracy through compro-
mise”. Here, he identiﬁes several macro-structural factors, which forced concessions from the
incumbents to the challengers, namely relative population decrease of the white ruling bloc,
economic crisis, and international pressure. Of course, contrary to the existing approaches,
it was meaningful to try to combine macro-structural variables into micro-behavior analysis.
His analysis has, however, some limitations. He mainly focuses on the role and position
of the ruling elite and thus creates the impression that liberalisation at the initial phase
of transition was a an initiative of the incumbents only. Thus, pressures emanating from
the challengers (particularly from below) and interactions of power between the incumbents
and the challengers are not systematically analysed.49 Core variables of political change
49This kind of position is revealed in his evaluation of the liberalisation phase from the late 1970s to
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in South Africa do not receive the necessary attention. Nevertheless, Giliomee concludes
that the transition was achieved by democracy through compromise, but in the analysis of
the compromise between regime and anti-regime camps insuﬃcient attention was paid to
pressure from below.
Adler and Webster (1995) focus on analysing the inﬂuence of civil society on the process
of democratisation through compromise. Examining the strategic model of Przeworski (1991;
1992) critically, they insist that the democratic transition in South Africa has not been led
only by reformers of the regime camp and moderates of the anti-regime camp. According
to them, anti-regime radicals did not take a position of uncompromising maximalism. They
were not actors that could be changed into moderates. Standing on a range of strategic
possibilities, they were using their inﬂuence continuously regarding compromise between
reformers and moderates. Radicals in South Africa were not isolated or did not become
neutralised, but they were strategic actors who aﬀected compromising processes progressively
in the transition.
Adler and Webster’s analysis also has limitations. The ﬁrst problem concerns the dividing
criteria of actors. Dividing lines between radicals and liberals, reformers and moderates, and
radicals who allow transition through negotiation and those who reject transition through
negotiations and pursue uncompromising maximalism, become vague. If the criterion of the
division is “attitude toward negotiations”, eventually, the radicals are rather included in a
progressive group of moderates. The problem does not stop here. This thesis acknowledges
their progressive role in the democratic transition in South Africa, but does not argue that
their inﬂuence was not powerful enough to decide the characteristics of the transition. If it is
true, Adler and Webster overestimated the capability of the progressive group of moderates.
According to Adler and Webster, one representative of the strategic radicals is the Congress
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a core supporter of the ANC. The transition
strategy of COSATU was to secure the following in the drafting of an interim constitution:
Principle of majority rule, guarantee of the right to labour and labour unions, and securing
the late 1980s. Opposing the “elite-response perspective” of Price (1991), that the liberalisation measures
were just a response of the national elite to anti-regime camp struggles, which had eroded the base of white
national power, he follows the “elite-initiative perspective”, which views the liberalisation measures as an
active alternative strategy of the national elite for the continuance of the system.
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of labourers’ participation in economic policy decision-making. What we should remember
here is the fact that though this kind of transition strategy is similar to the standpoint of
ANC leaders, in the real negotiations to establish the constitution, these conditions were
modiﬁed and diluted. For example, the government method was far from majoritarianism,
but was based on a “temporary power-sharing type”. Dense consociationalism relatively
weakened the progressive role of strategic radicals.
De Villiers’ (1993), Kim (1997) and Shin (1997) all apply and analyse various theories
on transitions to democracy within the context of South Arica’s transition. De Villiers
focuses on theories of negotiations, Kim on the phases in transition and Shin on the need for
a synthesis between macro-structural and micro-behavioural theories. Even though, all of
these are applied and analysed within the South African context the focus is on the theories
and not on the explanation of the South African transition.
All of the above literature on South Africa provide important information that can be used
in an analysis of South Africa’s transition. They however do not provide a comprehensive
analysis of South Africa’s transition.
In compiling an analytical framework for the analysis of South Africa’s transition it is
important to integrate structural and behavioural factors. Such methodologically is however
challenging. Studies of democratisation in South Africa have a tendency to be divided
between those that follow the macro-structural approach and those that follow the micro-
behavioural approach. In cases where structure and behaviour are integrated, there is still
an inclination towards the structural approach.
Each of these approaches, as previously examined, makes a signiﬁcant contribution to the
general understanding of transition to democracy. However each approach contains certain
limitations, as previously mentioned. Considering the limitations of accepted theories, a syn-
thesis of the structural and behavioural theory is a ﬁrst step in the analysis of South Africa’s
transition. Thus, the combination of structure and behaviour thus establishes an alternative
approach to the macro-structural and the micro-behavioural approach. Several authors such
as Shin (1997), Giliomee and Schlemmer (1994), Karl (1990) have made contributions in
this regard but non has provided a name for an alternative approach. Karl (1990:1) refers
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to the need for an “interactive approach that seeks explicitly to relate structural constraints
to the shaping of contingent choice”. Thus for purposes of this study such an approach
would be labelled an “interactive approach”. It is important to note that it integrates the
basic assumptions of the macro-structural approach with those of the micro-behavioural
approach. As mentioned, in this chapter the existing theories on democratisation were anal-
ysed with the aim of developing a framework for the analysis of South Africa’s transition to
democracy. The crucial interactions in the process of democratisation were those between
government and challengers, between reformers and standpatters among the ruling elite and
between moderates and extremists amongst the challengers in the opposition (see Hunting-
ton, 1991:590). In all transitions these three central interactions play some role. In the
proposed framework the following elements are thus important: the domains of state - civil
society - political society, structural and behavioural variables; the chronological phases of
transitions, choices and compromise through negotiations, as well as alternative institutions.
In order to overcome the shortcomings of the various theories on democratisation, the
framework for analysis consists of the state, political society and civil society and provision
is made for both structural and behavioural variables. Furthermore, the inter- and intra-
dynamics of relations within and among the domains of, state - political society - civil
society, together with structural and behavioural considerations, provide considerable scope
for analysing the procedures for decisions on alternative institutions for the establishment of a
new political dispensation. This is possible without neglecting the chronologically sequential
dynamics of a negotiated transition to democracy.
Thus, it is argued that the dynamics of a transition to democracy cannot be explained
by only focusing on strategic choices made by the main actors. Micro-behavioral theories
can anticipate the transition strategy and tactics that may be chosen by the actors at a
speciﬁc point in the chronological sequence, but has diﬃculty in explaining the background
that forced the choices, as well as the nature of political change as calculated by the actors
in the choice process. This implies that at the various points of political change structural
variables limit the behavioural variables. In order to analyse the dynamics of a transition to
democracy eﬀectively, both the deﬁning force of structural variables working in the domains
of state - political society - civil society, as well as the strategy and tactics for transition as
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chosen by the various actors, must be considered.
Of particular importance in this framework is the role of political society which theo-
retically has a mediating function between the state and civil society. This contributes to
an analysis of the dynamics of a transition to democracy by compromise. The nature of
interactions or confrontation between the state and civil society is important in the political
changes made during transitions. In the case of a transition to democracy by compromise,
attention must be paid to the fact that the zero-sum confrontational structure between the
domains of the state and civil society is theoretically rearranged to a non-zero-sum struc-
ture by means of the mediating role of the political society. Thus, to clarify the question
of transition to democracy through compromise, the analysis of confrontation between the
domains of state and civil society, together with political society theoretically mediating be-
tween them, is important. Thus, the introduction of political society, for analytical purposes
has considerable advantages. In the chapters to follow, it would however become clear that
initially the position of political society was problematic within the South African political
landscape. This resulted in interesting dynamics in and among the various domains.
Furthermore, where the transition of democracy by compromise is the object of anal-
ysis, it is necessary to distinguish, for analytical purposes, between the various phases of
the transition process. Thus, the “complex conjuncture”, with diﬀerent motivational at-
tributes, of the course of transition to democracy is used for analytical purposes. In the
case of transitions to democracy by compromise, the “initial phase”, the “crucial phase”
and the “maturity phase” each has a unique set of immanent principles at work. The initial
phase is characterised by initial attempts at ameliorative liberalisation of the political land-
scape. The crucial phase of transition which occurs before the threshold of democratisation
is crossed, explains the complex situation at the time of preliminary negotiations, where
the mutually hostile phase of confrontation turns to a mutually beneﬁcial phase of negotia-
tion. In addition, the maturity phase of transition produced after crossing the threshold of
democratisation explains the dynamics of transition during the period of grand compromise,
where the institutional alternatives for a new political dispensation are sought. Thus, at-
tention was also paid to the selection of these “institutional alternatives”. The appropriate
strategy for a transition and a suitable model for the new political dispensation favoured
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by the individual actors during the maturity phase of transition are basically moulded by
the structural factors which limit their actions. The propensity of the micro-behavioural ap-
proach to emphasise only the chronologically sequential game of negotiation, while ignoring
the actors’ choice environment, is thus avoided. Table 2.1 provides a brief summary in this
regard.
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Choices for new institutions
2.5 CONCLUSION
Thus, the focus of this chapter was the theoretical background to the study. In the chapters
that follow these will be applied as indicated to the South African transition. In the next
chapter the focus will be on the environment in which the transition to democracy in South
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Africa commenced. In the case of South Africa, before the transition commenced, the do-
mains of state - political society - civil society was complex and problematic because political
society was racially divided and only the white segment had access to the state. Civil society
was also racially divided and the anti-regime civil society comprised mainly of non-whites.
Thus, the route to mediate political interests was largely based on race. Racial cleavage and
conﬂict nurtured along these lines worked as strong, structural factors of political change,




THE ENVIRONMENT OF TRANSITION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The focus in this chapter is on the macro-structural and micro-behavioural context that
preceded the initial phase of transition, which commenced in 1978. South Africa, as indicated
in chapter one, is one of a few states with signiﬁcant socio-political cleavages that have
experienced a relatively peaceful transition to democracy. After a period of negotiations,
the government eventually agreed to the principle of universal franchise and democratic
elections, even though they had little chance of remaining in power.
The initial phase of transition, that is the period of 1978-1989, was an important stage
in South Africa’s transition, in the sense that, even though it was a crucial decade of antag-
onism, confrontation and resistance, it prepared the ground for the transition to democracy
in the 1990s. As mentioned in chapter one, this phase was characterised by attempts at
reform and liberalisation. However, the basic contours of, state - political society - civil soci-
ety relations were already being shaped during the period that preceded the initial phase of
transition. Events during this period should, therefore, not be isolated from their historical
context. How did the history of South Africa unfold to the point where political reform was
attempted? Which structural factors in the social, economic and political context shaped
these events? It is also important to pay attention to what the position of the various elites
was vis-a`-vis one another, as well as to how and why they arrived at that position.
Several theories, focussing on transitions to democracy, were examined in chapter two.
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Theoretically, transitions to democracy are, as was discussed, explained by two approaches,
namely the macro-structural and micro-behavioural approaches. It was mentioned that the
macro-structural approach focuses on the structural prerequisites for transition to democracy,
while the micro-behavioural approach focuses on the changes in behaviour or the sequence of
events and the strategic choices exercised by the political role players (Diamond, 1992:472;
Huntington, 1991: 34; Przeworski, 1986:47; Rustow, 1970; Shin, 1997).
In the case of South Africa, the process of transition was started because it became
increasingly diﬃcult for the existing ruling structures to be eﬀective in practice. There was
a complex set of interactions between structural conditions and political actors even prior to
the initial phase of transition. Thus, the interconnectedness of structural factors and political
actors prior to the initial phase of transition, is of particular importance in an analysis of
South Africa’s transition.
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to connect the South African experience to
the larger theoretical issues as discussed in chapter two. For this purpose, South Africa,
as an example of transition in a divided society, is introduced as a case study by paying
attention to the salient features of the South African society and politics and, in particular,
the salience of race, ethnicity, class, and ideology as sources of “cleavages” and conﬂict. The
initial phase of transition unfolded within the context of these societal divisions, as well as
a conﬂict that was fomented primarily along these divisions. Racial discrimination and the
exclusion of various segments of society from the political process, on the basis of race, were
deﬁning features of the political landscape. The role of the state in the conﬂict generated
along these lines of division is important. The state had been used and particularly since
the advent of NP rule in 1948, as the agent of the whites who dominated politics and the
economy.
South Africa, prior to the transition, had a long history of social, political and economic
segregation and exclusion based on race, which fostered the abovementioned divisions. Early
segregation eventually led to the development of the ideology of apartheid that, together with
nationalist ideas, provided the guiding principles for the political thinking of the NP. After
coming to power, the NP government embarked on a comprehensive restructuring of society
99
Chapter 3
based on racial segregation and exclusion. From the discussions in this thesis, it will transpire
that the nationalist and apartheid ideology of the ruling white minority, however, invoked a
strong counter-ideology (and counter-elite) among the excluded majority.
The policy of apartheid was essentially characterised by racial segregation. Though only
oﬃcially instituted after the NP came to power in 1948, racial segregation and, the exclusion
of the majority of people from the political process, had a long history going back to the
early settlement by whites and the era before the creation of the Union of South Africa in
1910. The eventual transition to democracy in South Africa implied, however, the end of
apartheid as an oﬃcial policy of the government. Several factors, already present in the
environment prior to transition, aided on the one hand, the dismantling of apartheid and
on the other hand, the democratisation of South Africa’s political institutions. Factors such
as the growing internal unrest, together with the political, social and economic costs of
apartheid, as well as an increasingly hostile international environment, are important in this
regard. The NP and members of the elite from other sectors of society began to realise that
the game played according to the old rules had become too costly, when compared to the
envisaged advantages of a more legitimate political dispensation, although a new political
dispensation would require the inclusion of the black majority.
In this chapter, the conditions prevailing in the environment and the factors that prompted
the initiation of the transition to democracy in South Africa are therefore discussed. Bear-
ing in mind that neither structural, nor behavioural approaches can fully explain South
Africa’s multidimensional transition to democracy, political change in South Africa and the
macro-structural and micro-behavioural factors of transition identiﬁable at this stage, will
also be discussed. The focus will be on the inherent cleavages and the nature of conﬂict in
South Africa during the period that preceded 1978. Events during the pre-1978 era give an
indication of the relationship between the structural forces and strategic choices of political
actors as the analysis of political liberalisation in the following chapters will demonstrate.
The period 1910-1978 will, however, receive particular attention.1
1The year 1910 is the year in which the Union of South Africa was established. The fact that non-whites
were excluded from this process was a factor in the establishment of the South African Native National
Congress (later the African National Congress) in 1912. Even though the political problems generated by
apartheid received attention prior to 1978, the latter year is, for purposes of this thesis regarded as the
beginning of South Africa’s transition to democracy. Note, however, that in the discussion it was not always
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The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to provide an analytical description of the en-
vironment of the transition. For this reason, the various internal cleavages, namely race,
ethnicity, class, and ideology will receive attention. The structure of the conﬂict in South
Africa will be discussed with reference to the ethnic and regional conﬂicts, as well as the
struggle against apartheid that shaped the alignment and role of the elites vis-a`-vis one an-
other. Other macro-structural factors to receive attention, are: the weakening demographic
base of the whites, the economy and the international environment, particularly economic
pressure and international isolation. In these discussions the state - political society - civil
society relations will receive attention only brieﬂy since a more detailed discussion of these
will be provided in chapter four.
3.2 MACRO-STRACTURAL FACTORS: THE STRUCTURE OF SO-
CIETY AND INTERNAL CLEAVAGES
Several cleavages, amongst which, race was (and still is) a dominant cleavage, can be identi-
ﬁed in the South African society. The most important sources of cleavages prior to, and at
the time of the transition to democracy, were race and ethnicity, class, and ideology. These
cleavages often coincided with each other. The overlap of race, ethnicity, class and ideology
were so intertwined, that to some scholars it seemed total.2 This aspect of South Africa’s
transition is of particular importance in this thesis - that is democratisation in a divided
society, particularly, in the presence of conﬂict (see Sisk 1995: 13-15).
The cleavages that existed in South Africa, prior to 1978, were the product of rather
complex forces within the South African society. Scholars often disagreed on the exact nature
of these forces. According to Horowitz (1991:2), South Africa was “doubly divided“. There
was, ﬁrstly, a conﬂict between competing values and interests and, secondly, also a conﬂict
about the conﬂict, or what he called a metaconﬂict. The latter conﬂict was reﬂected in the
possible to neatly separate available data according to these phases, because data often covered time frames
that diﬀered from those used in this study - thus data may on occasion overlap with some of the other phases
in the study. Attempts were however made to limit the incidence of such overlap.
2Lijphart (1985: 35-37), using Rae and Taylor’s (1970:22-23) index of fragmentation, calculated the
division by “ethnic” groups (14 in total - including Afrikaners and English) of South Africa as 0.89. On a
scale of 0 to 1, the value is 0 for a completely homogeneous society (the possibility of belonging to diﬀerent
segments is nil). The value 1 occurs in the hypothetical society where each individual belongs to a diﬀerent
segment. South Africa’s score is close to that of a completely fragmented society.
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diﬀerent ways in which South Africans initially perceived their society and its conﬂicts, and
the inability of South Africans to agree on common terminology to describe their diﬀerences.
As indicated in chapter one, there were fundamentally diﬀerent interpretations of what were
the reasons for the diﬀerent societal cleavages. This was particularly true of the debate on
ethnicity as a source of cleavage (see Horowitz 1991:2-9). Questions that were frequently
asked by scholars were: To what extent did ethnicity divide South Africans? Is there indeed
one South African nation, or is it a state inhabited by a multiplicity of nations? Is “non-
racialism” or “multi-racialism” the predominant feature of a shared interdependence? These
fundamental issues highlighted the complex and competing varieties of belief systems in
South Africa and were central to the disagreements over the nature and structure of the
conﬂict.3
In order to understand the societal context of the transition, it is important to pay
attention to race, ethnicity, class, and ideology as the most important cleavages in South
African society.
3.2.1 RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLEAVAGES
Race has had a long history in South Africa as a source of politically relevant cleavages. The
basic racial categories that could usually be identiﬁed were: whites, coloureds (a category
that included a variety of subgroups, for example those of mixed descent and descendants of
the Khoisan and slaves), blacks and Asians (usually with reference to Indians and “other”
Asians such as the Chinese).4
Although race as a source of cleavage was politicised and institutionalised, the politici-
sation and institutionalisation of ethnicity were even more complex. There were claims on
3There were on the other hand also factors that mitigated against absolute cleavages. Religion, and in
particular the cross-racial nature of Christianity, provided a common value system that could bridge the
race-class-ideology divide to a certain extent. Religion was, however, also relatively problematic. Some
denominations had separate churches for the various race groups, but the shared value system should be
noted. Protestant churches in particular, are often democratically organised. Some members of the various
race groups were therefore, exposed to democratic values during the years preceding South Africa’s transition
to democracy (see Wilson and Thompson, 1982:229, 401-401). Black Christian activists were also important
in early black political activity (see Karis and Carter, 1972:3-12).
4It is important to note that as was mentioned in chapter 1, the words used to designate these categories
of the population are controversial, often regarded as pejorative, not consistently used and have undergone
change during the course of history. See chapter 1 for an explanation in this regard.
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the one hand, that ethnicity was used in order to create artiﬁcial cleavages in the tradition
of “divide in order to rule.” On the other hand, ethnic diﬀerences were regarded as being
a source of cleavage among blacks (see Horowitz1991:1-49). Both race and ethnicity are
discussed in more detail in the following subsections.
Racial cleavages became a dominant factor in South Africa and in particular, after the
NP came to power in 1948 and the adoption of several acts that prescribed and proscribed
race relations. Racial identity had been woven into the societal, legal and political struc-
tures of South Africa, and explicitly in 1983 into the constitution (Republic of South Africa
Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983; see Sisk, 1992:8 ). Furthermore, ethnicity as a source of
cleavage was engineered in the government’s “homeland policy“.
For purposes of this discussion, four important historical periods are identiﬁed, namely
pre-1910, 1910-1948, 1948-1978 and 1978-1994.5 The pre-1910 period will not receive much
attention, since that is the era before the creation of the Union of South Africa, which is not
the focus of this chapter. It is, however, important to bear in mind that racial cleavages had
their origins prior to 1910 and that “separate” legislation for the various race groups, was
adopted prior to uniﬁcation. The period 1978-1994 will be dealt with in more detail in the
following three chapters.
PRE-1910 ERA
This is the period of South African history that preceded the founding of the Union of
South Africa. Patterns of interaction existed among the various indigenous groups prior to
their contact with whites (see Wilson and Thompson, 1982:42-182). The arrival of whites in
1652 at the Cape, introduced a new era of social, political and economic interaction among
the population (both old and new) of what is now known as South Africa. White political
authorities created political, economic and social institutions that aﬀected both the lives and
livelihoods of the indigenous population (Karis and Carter, 1972:3).
The white settlers initially had contact with the indigenous Khoikhoi and San (Khoisan).
Early white settlement also brought slaves from Asia, Madagascar and West Africa (see Du
5Major events such as the coming to power of the NP in 1948 separate these timeframes, therefore an
overlap in dates is unavoidable.
103
Chapter 3
Toit, 1983). During the era of Dutch rule in South Africa6 the governing oﬃcials did establish
contact and consultation with the settlers through “burgher councillors“, “Landdroste“,
“Heemraden” and “Veldkornets,” but these were not extended to the Khoisan and the slaves.
The movement of the latter two groups was monitored and restricted (Thompson and Prior,
1982:23-28; Wilson and Thompson, 1982:213-227). The vastness of the territory made control
over the settlers diﬃcult -
The racial practices of the Dutch East India Company...caused them [whites]
to look upon themselves as a distinct and superior community...white farm-
ers...formed the dominant element in a loose-knit, preindustrial, racially strati-
ﬁed, plural society (Thompson and Prior, 1982:28).
Racial attitudes clearly developed from the interactions among the various population
groups and their contact in turn with the governing oﬃcials. Along their shifting frontiers,
white settlers, both Afrikaners and English came into contact with the black indigenous
population of Southern Africa.7 Whites were embroiled in various conﬂicts with black ethnic
groups, often forming alliances with some against others, in struggles lasting until the late
nineteenth century (Horowitz, 1991:10).
The establishment of several republics by the Afrikaners (Boers) in those areas that they
controlled, was important from a political perspective. The two most important republics
were the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal). These displayed
democratic characteristics, but non-whites were excluded from participation in the political
process (see Wilson and Thompson, 1982:364-372).
British rule8 brought changes to the political organisation of the various territories under
its control. Important in this regard were the more eﬀective application of the rule of law,
freedom of the press (1828), removal of restrictions on the movement of the Khoisan (1828)
and the emancipation of the slaves (1834-1838). Furthermore, a representative element in
government was established. A parliament for the Cape Colony was established in 18549
and a parliament for Natal in 1856. Parliamentary control over the executive, but subject to
61652-1795 and 1803-1805
7As indicated the term black will be used instead of African or black African or Bantu.
81795-1803 and 1806 till complete independence of the Union of South Africa (British rule existed in
various and varying territories as the history of the eventual Union of South Africa unfolded)
9Cape of Good Hope Constitution Ordinance, 1853.
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the British Parliament, commenced in 1872 in the Cape Colony and 1893 in Natal. Blacks
were either gradually conquered or, incorporated territorially in a peaceful manner into
the existing political dispensation. Some even managed to retain their social and cultural
structures. A colour-blind qualiﬁed franchise applied in theory under British rule, but due
to the nature of the qualiﬁcations, almost all non-whites were excluded from the political
process and political power was in the hands of whites (Thompson and Prior 1982:29; Wilson
and Thompson, 1982:311-333).
Events such as the British annexation of Transvaal in 1877 and the two Anglo-Boer Wars
that followed, gradually made relations between Afrikaners and the British authorities and
with English-speaking South Africans more important than relations with the indigenous
population (Horowitz, 1992:10). Relations between the authorities and in particular, blacks
were, therefore, treated with less urgency (see Thompson, 1960:117).
A number of events during the early history of South Africa are important for purposes of
this discussion: Firstly, of particular importance are the divisions that developed because of
race, culture and ethnicity. Deep divisions between English and Afrikaans-speaking whites
were important during this part of South African history (Wilson and Thompson, 1982:373).
The foundation of race and ethnicity as a source of cleavage was laid during the early history
of the white settlement in South Africa. The existence of various ethnic groups and the fact
that many blacks retained at least some part of their tribal land ensured that ethnicity
would remain a source of heterogeneity and possible cleavage (see Wilson and Thompson,
1982:310-311). Though intermingling of the races was, usually, not prohibited formally,
social separation has its roots early in South African history. The various authorities also
began to adopt legislation that treated the various races and even ethnic groups diﬀerently.
Restrictions were for example, placed on the ownership of land by Indians10 in Transvaal.
Pass laws were already in existence. In 1885 the Asiatic Bazaar Law No. 3 of 1885 that
negatively aﬀected the rights of all “Asians,” was adopted in Transvaal.
Secondly, the democratic political institutions that were emerging among the white set-
10Indian indentured labourers were introduced in Natal in 1860 to work on the sugar plantations. Many
Indians preferred to stay in Natal and not to return to India after the expiry of their contracts. They soon
migrated to other provinces. Discrimination led inter alia to the arrival of Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi
who soon inspired a struggle for freedom.
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tlers during the early history of white settlement were important. Thus, a political society
was already in the making, prior to the uniﬁcation of South Africa. Though some of these
were “racially blind,” (as was the case in the Cape Colony11 and Natal12), non-whites were
for all practical purposes, excluded from the oﬃcial political process. The political insti-
tutions created by the Afrikaners, excluded non-whites and non-whites remained excluded
after the British conquest of Afrikaner territories (Thompson, 1960:111). Political organisa-
tions, such as the “Kaapse Patriotte” (1779-1791) demanded political reforms (Wilson and
Thompson, 1982: 183, 214, 222). Political parties, such as the Afrikaner Bond, Het Volk
and Orangia Unie are examples of political parties that were established prior to uniﬁcation
in 1910 (Wilson and Thompson, 1982).
Non-whites were exposed to new political practices that impacted on their lives, although
they were mostly excluded from participating in the oﬃcial political processes. They also
began to organise themselves politically in order to protect and promote their interests and to
resist discriminatory practices (see Horowitz, 1991:12). The politically motivated, Imbumba
Yama Afrika, that was formed in the Eastern Cape in 1882 is an example. Likewise, the
Native Education Association and the Native Electoral Association were formed in 1884 in
the Eastern Cape in order to ﬁght for the rights and inclusion in the political process of blacks
(Karis and Carter, 1972:5). Other examples of political organisations for blacks included the
Natal Native Congress, the Transvaal Congress, the South African Native Congress (1902),
the Vigilance Association of the Eastern Cape, the Native United Political Associations of
the Transvaal Colony and the Orange River Colony Native Congress (see Karis and Carter,
1972:9-10).
Indians also began to organise themselves similarly and in the last decade of the nine-
teenth century, the Natal Indian Congress (1894) was founded. It was later followed by the
Transvaal Indian Congress and the South African Indian Congress.
Thirdly, the basic roots of civil society can be traced to the early history of white set-
tlement in South Africa. Various factors played a role in this regard. As a result of the
11Registered voters in Cape Colony in 1909: 121 346 whites, 14 388 coloureds, 6 633 blacks (Thompson
1960:110).




inhospitable nature of the region, settlers relied to a large extent, on each other and also
on religious orders for their survival and basic services in addition to those provided by
the authorities. Religious groups such as Christian churches were of particular importance
(Wilson and Thompson, 1982:229-230). Other organisations were however, also established
and examples of these are the Young Men’s Christian Organisation (Cape Town 1865) and
the Young Women’s Christian organisation (Cape Town 1886) (Joyce, 1989:398). Christian
Churches and Islam played an important role among non-whites. In order to deal with the
impact of white settlement in South Africa, non-whites therefore also formed religious or
culturally based groups among themselves. Some of these gave rise to political campaigns,
for example, Muslims from the Cape who demanded the right to practise their religion.
Early South African history thus laid the foundation for racial and ethnic cleavages as
well as the basis for the future development of both a political and a civil society that began
to be shaped along racial and ethnic lines. Though racially divided, cultural values that
could support democratic values were taking root among the various population groups.
THE PERIOD 1910-1948 AND STATUTORY RACIAL CLASSIFICATION
The union of South Africa was established on 31 May 1910 after deliberations at the National
Convention of 1908-1909.13 The delegates were all white men. Political rights for non-whites,
was an issue at the Convention but proved to be an obstacle because of the diﬀerences
in the political rights of non-whites that existed in the Cape Colony, Natal, Orange River
Colony (formerly Orange Free State) and Transvaal. The issue of race could have jeopardised
uniﬁcation and therefore a compromise was sought. It was agreed that each of the future
provinces would initially retain their own policies in this regard. Non-whites, except for
the retention of the qualiﬁed franchise of the former Cape Colony, were for all practical
purposes, excluded from the political process. The exclusion of most non-whites from the new
political dispensation was also criticised and gave rise to the saying that Britain attempted
“to reconcile the whites over the body of blacks” (Thompson 1960:117).
13It comprised of 12 delegates from the Cape Colony (British), 8 from Transvaal (Boer/Afrikaner), 5 each
from Natal (British colony) and the Orange River Colony (Boer) and 3 observers from Southern Rhodesia -
later Zimbabwe (Thompson 1960:90-92).
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The modern South African state developed from uniﬁcation in 1910. The history of
the evolution of race, ethnicity, class, and ideology as societal cleavages, was particularly
intertwined during the era that followed uniﬁcation. Non-whites were only marginally part
of the new political dispensation, yet became the focus of legislation and other regulations
that impacted on their lives. Legislation adopted almost exclusively by whites, increasingly
segregated non-whites in terms of where they could reside or own land, as well as in terms
of their employment and political rights.
Some of the worst fears of non-whites were conﬁrmed in the years following uniﬁcation.
Non-whites responded to their treatment by organising themselves, petitioning the Union
government and Britain, holding strikes, demonstrations and passive resistance campaigns
(see Karis and Carter, 1972:61-142). The exclusion of blacks from the political dispensation
also gave rise to new political organisations. In 1912 the South African Native National
Congress (SANNC - later the African National Congress or the ANC) was established (see
Karis and Carter, 1972:61).
Economic interests were extremely important in the quest for unity (see Thompson, 1960:
92), but became even more so in the development of the Union. The South African society, it
is argued, began to be shaped by powerful links between the new state and the mines, and the
role of white farmers in the new political dispensation, “the large gold mining companies and
the big land owners at the price of...the Natives...” (Karis and Carter, 1972:83). Relations
between the state and the mines, kept the question of labour supply as an issue of government
policy. Reserves, inﬂux control14 and the manipulation of traditional authority were re-
attuned to the needs of state-sponsored industrialisation. The new segregationist policy
became a reliable servant of mining and agricultural capital (Butler, 1998:15, Karis and
Carter, 1972:82-84, Guise, 1993:10, 12).
Non-whites, felt the eﬀect of being regulated where they remained on the land, and
also proletarianised through the migrant labour system (Butler, 1998:15). Several statutes
that aﬀected the role and position of blacks and other non-whites were passed during the
period 1910 to 1948. Various aspects of their lives were aﬀected by legislation. Residential
14The phenomenon of “inﬂux control” can be traced back as early as 1760 (Thomashausen, 1987:2).
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and social segregation increasingly became a consequence of legislation. Segregation and
legislation adopted to that eﬀect, have only in retrospect, come to be seen as a form of early
“apartheid” and therefore as a precursor of grand apartheid that became government policy
in 1948 (Butler, 1998:15; Mabin, 1992:405-406).
The ownership and use of land were contentious issues indeed. The Black Land Act
No. 27 of 191315 is usually regarded as one of the cornerstones of racial segregation and
discrimination in South Africa. The commission appointed in terms of the Black Land Act,
1913, allocated, for example, eighty seven per cent of land to whites - including much of the
most fertile land and leaving many blacks on land belonging to white farmers (see Guise,
1993:10, 11, 18). This act also barred blacks from acquiring, hiring or purchasing land
or having an interest in land outside the “scheduled areas” (Karis and Carter, 1972:228).
The purchase of native land by whites and tenants that were not labour based, were also
prohibited.16 The oﬃcial statement in November 1913 concerning this act implied inter alia
that, “Parliament had decided that an eﬀort should be made to put a stop to the many
social and other evils which result from too close contact between Europeans and natives”
(Karis and Carter, 1972:228).
The following are additional examples of discriminatory legislation that, in principle,
segregated the population in terms of race: The Housing Act No. 35 of 1920 made provision
for the Central Housing Board. Its practice of approving schemes for speciﬁc “groups” (in
eﬀect races) enhanced already entrenched segregation through public housing. The Blacks
(Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 192317 laid down the legal tools to further entrench the prac-
tices of segregation and inﬂux control (Butler, 1998:15; Guise, 1993:18; Mabin, 1992:407).
By 1920, 200,000 black workers18 were involved in migrant labour in any year. As taxes,
dispossession and population growth squeezed rural populations, they sought income oppor-
15Originally the Natives’ Land Act. Juta’s database is used for the names, numbers and dates of acts.
16Article 2 for example stipulated: “From and after the commencement of this Act, no person other than
a native shall purchase, hire or in any other manner whatever acquire any land in a scheduled native area
or enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire or other acquisition, direct or indirect, of
any such land or of any right thereto or interest therein or servitude there over, except with the approval of
the Governor-General“.
17Originally the Natives (Urban Areas) Act.
18This eventually grew to some 430 000 workers in 1961 (Butler, 1998:15). The percentage of blacks who
were urban residents rose from 19% in 1936, to 33% in 1970 and 44% in 1985. The government became
alarmed and eventually imposed severe limits on blacks to carry a pass for identiﬁcation (Guise, 1993).
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tunities in areas of economic activity. Increasing numbers therefore chose to supplement
rural economic activity by participating in the economically active centres. The authorities
responded with “inﬂux control” and a centralised system was in place by 1920. Under this
act, local authorities gained the potential power to restrict most blacks to townships and
compounds (Mabin, 1992:407). These powers, however, remained limited, and many urban
areas remained or became more racially integrated.
∙ The Black Administration Act No. 38 of 1927, made provision for moving blacks from
one area to another.19
∙ The Slums Act No. 53 of 1934 is an example of legislation that appeared less discrim-
inatory, but lent itself in practice, to programmes of segregation. Areas could become
segregated because local authorities were allowed to condemn buildings or whole neigh-
bourhoods, and move people - provided the funds were available - to new housing areas.
Some local authorities did so on a large scale and segregation was accomplished by al-
locating diﬀerent housing estates to diﬀerent “races” (Parnell, 1988:112-126; Mabin,
1992:409).
∙ The Development Trust and Land Act No. 18 of 1936 made provision for removing
blacks from “black spots,” that is “islands” of black owned land, surrounded by white
owned land.
∙ The Black Laws Amendment Act No. 46 of 1937,20 prohibited blacks from acquiring
land in urban areas from non-blacks, except if they had the approval of the Governor-
General.
Legislation, both at national and provincial level thus increasingly segregated the black,
coloured and Indian communities from the whites. Apart from the above examples of leg-
islation, there were also attempts by successive governments in power during this period to
introduce legislation that made provision for more substantial segregation. Many of these
attempts were, however, defeated or withdrawn. Legislation did not only attempt to sepa-
rate whites from non-whites but also to separate blacks from other non-whites. There are
19Originally the Native Administration Act.
20Originally the Native Laws Amendment Act.
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several examples of attempts that were made to legislate racial residential segregation even
more substantially.
The ﬁrst of these attempts was the gazetting of the Squatters’ Bill in 1912. The basic
idea underlying this bill was to move blacks from farms and established locations. It was
interpreted as an attempt to settle whites rather than blacks on the land. After a deputation
to the authorities by the SANNC, it was scrapped (Karis and Carter, 1972:75, 82-84). A
second example is the Blacks Administration Bill of 1917. This bill conﬁrmed the principle
of territorial segregation as well as a scheme for the administration of blacks. At the end
of World War I, the loyalty of blacks during the War was “rewarded” by suspending the
consideration of this bill (Karis and Carter, 1972:64-65).
Mabin (1992:407-408) also mentions the introduction of the Class Areas Bill of 1924
and the Areas Reservation Bill of 1926 as other examples of failed attempts to increase the
powers to eﬀect segregation. The Class Areas Bill of 1924 was introduced by the governing
South African Party, but it lapsed with the defeat of the governing party, by the election
pact between the NP and the Labour Party, in the general election of 1924. The new
government introduced similar provisions in the Areas Reservation Bill in 1926. This bill
was, however, withdrawn in order to proceed with discussions with the Indian government
on the repatriation of Indians (Mabin, 1992:407).21
Both bills originated from a desire to restrict the movement of Indians. The Natal
Municipal Association was prominent among those demanding restrictions on Indians. The
association held that every race should have its own area. It was argued that a local authority
should, therefore, have the power to compel people to reside in “Class Areas” (Mabin,
1992:408). These bills fuelled feelings of resentment among Indians and prompted the sending
of a deputation from India to South Africa in 1926 (Rosenthal, 1961:242).
Amongst other local authorities similar sentiments with regard to the segregation of the
various race groups, existed. There were for example, indications that the white-dominated
local authorities of the Cape Province (usually considered to be accommodating towards
non-whites) were concerned about the integration of coloureds and whites. In 1931 the Cape
21This is already an indication of the importance of international relations and the role it can play in the
political process of a state.
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Province Municipal Association, for example, resolved at its annual congress - attended by
delegates from many local authorities - to ask the Provincial Administrator for additional
powers in the existing Municipal Ordinance No. 10 of 1912 in order to replicate, for coloureds,
the location provisions of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 (Mabin, 1990).
Likewise, Indians were also often the target of discriminatory measures at local level.
The treatment of Indians did, as mentioned before, have international implications. To
a certain extent the legislation of the 1930s kept local (white) demands for control over
Indian property rights at bay, but the issue was characterised by frequent delays. A select
committee of 1930, for example, proposed a bill to reinforce the 1885 Asiatic Bazaar law,
which subsequently became the Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act No. 35 of 1932 (Mabin,
1992:405-409). The clause that would have compelled local authorities to set aside areas for
“Asians,” was postponed until after a second conference with the Indian government, on the
repatriation and emigration of Indians. After the NP was forced into a coalition with the
South African Party in 1933, the proposed clause fell away (Mabin, 1992:405-409).
In general, local councils, provincial administrations, and central government together,
had considerable, albeit, incomplete power to segregate the various populations groups of
South Africa.
Undoubtedly, legislation resulting in social separation of the various races, caused un-
happiness among the non-whites, but discriminatory legislation that impacted negatively
on their livelihoods had even more devastating consequences and fuelled discontent among
them. Legislation that aﬀected the ownership and use of land were, as already mentioned,
important in this regard, but there was also discriminatory legislation that aﬀected them in
terms of employment and of access to the political process. Important in this regard were:
∙ The Mines and Works Act No. 12 of 1911. It excluded black people from certain
positions of skilled labour.
∙ The Industrial Conciliation Act No. 11 of 1924, made further provision for job reser-
vation and placed limitations on the participation of blacks in trade unions.
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∙ The Representation of Blacks Act No. 12 of 1936,22 removed the black voters of the
Cape Province from the common voters’ roll and thereby separated them racially from
the other voters. Blacks from the Cape Province now only had the right to elect three
whites to represent them in the House of Assembly (Thompson and Prior 1982:78). A
failed attempt was also made to remove the coloureds from the common voters’ roll.
∙ The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act No. 28 of 1946, made provi-
sion for the separate representation of Indians by white members of Parliament.
From the examples already mentioned, it is clear that social, economic and political seg-
regation of the various races was steadily being written onto the statute books. There are
several reasons why segregation increasingly became an attractive option when formulating
policy. Britain initially, and later South African politicians, tried to reconcile English speak-
ing South Africans and Afrikaners. Racial exclusivity dominated the political organisation
of the Afrikaners, and in particular, those that established independent republics, long be-
fore uniﬁcation. Nationalism and Republicanism were to remain ideals among Afrikaners.
Nationalism increasingly provided the guidelines for decision-making and republicanism was
eventually realised with the founding of the Republic of South Africa in 1961.
On the other hand, poverty among, and the urbanisation of whites, that were often
unskilled, made segregation and job reservation attractive options in order to secure the
survival of white labourers. The mainly English speaking Labour Party for example, already
stated in 1910, in its election manifesto that its social reform regarding blacks would entail,
Separate representation for Kaﬃrs [sic] in [a] separate Advisory Council, and
no further extension of [the] Parliamentary franchise to them. The prohibition
of squatting and ’Kaﬃr farming’[sic] and of native ownership of land in areas
occupied by whites, and the provision of suitable native reserves were further
policy matters that they promulgated. Further points were proper educational
facilities and agricultural training for natives in reserves (Kleynhans, 1987:27).
A rising tide of nationalism among Afrikaners led to the founding of the NP in 1914
and also to the founding in 1918, of the Afrikaner Broederbond - a secret society promot-
22Originally the Representation of Natives Act.
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ing Afrikaner interests in all the important spheres of society.23 The segregation of whites
and non-whites was already an item on the NP’s programme of action for the election of
1915, “the natives must be trained up in their own territories to a national life of their own.
For this purpose native education must be brought under the Native Aﬀairs Department”
(Kleynhans, 1987:87). Success was achieved by the election pact between the NP and the
Labour Party in the election of 1924. A comprehensive statement of the envisaged segre-
gation policy included: the removal of black voters from the common voters’ roll; the ﬁnal
delimitation of land in terms of the Black Land Act of 1913; the representation of blacks in
Parliament by a few elected whites and the introduction of councils for blacks (Karis and
Carter 1972:147). During the election campaign of 1929, the NP spelled out its belief that
South Africa should remain the “white man’s land” (Karis and Carter, 1972:148; Kleyn-
hans, 1987:237-238). Segregation, thus, increasingly became an item on the political agenda
of decision makers and a political issue during elections.
Though coloureds were often treated diﬀerently and had more privileges than blacks,
coloured segregation was beginning to develop as an idea, and one which touched a raw
nerve in the coalition in 1933 between the South African Party and the NP. In spite of
Prime Minister Hertzog declaring that the destinies of coloured and whites were intertwined,
there were some moves towards a national policy on residential segregation. In March 1939,
Hertzog committed his government to social segregation, which included legislation for the
segregation of all new townships, and a means of segregating established areas (Mabin,
1992:411-412).
In May 1939, one of a series of bills which targeted Indian ownership in the Transvaal,
was introduced. Reference was also made to the drafting of longer-term measures. Local
referenda or enquiries to determine whether three-quarters of the population of a neighbour-
hood wanted total segregation, was an option that was proposed. If local opinion favoured
segregation, it should be achieved by a blanket insertion of restrictive racial “servitudes” in
23Being a secret society, it is not always easy to determine its exact inﬂuence. The Broederbond eventually
developed similar ideas as those of the Puriﬁed National Party - in Afrikaans the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party
(see Wilkins and Strydom, 1980). This party is also sometimes referred to as the second National Party.
It was formed after the original National Party merged in 1934 with the South African Party to form the
United South African National Party (later United Party). A breakaway group of nationalists under Dr D
F Malan formed the “Puriﬁed” National Party.
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all title deeds of the area (Mabin, 1992:412).24
Mabin (1992:407-408) stresses the increasingly important role that the Broederbond
played in the development of the policy of segregation and “early apartheid” in the po-
litical ideas of Afrikaners. He also notes that Wilkins and Strydom noted that the emerging
policy of the Afrikaner Broederbond on segregation, evolved from the time of its ﬁrst policy
document on the subject in 1933. The Afrikanerbond vir Rassestudie, whose leaders were
members of the Broederbond, studied the concept of apartheid from 1935 (Mabin, 1992:410).
It is therefore not surprising that the Afrikaner Broederbond constitution of 1944 stated
that “all Broeders in their political action will strive for...Segregation of all ’Coloured’ races
domiciled in South Africa...” (Wilkins and Strydom, 1980:353 quoted in Mabin, 1992:410).
Mabin, further, argues that the Afrikaner Broederbond was certainly capable of organising
itself nationally in support of parliamentary action by the Puriﬁed National Party and that,
given the conﬂicts and suspicions over economic and other matters between the Cape and
Transvaal members of both the Puriﬁed National Party and the Afrikaner Broederbond de-
scribed by Dan O’Meara (Mabin 1992:408), it is possible that the evolving policy regarding
the segregation of whites and coloureds provided a unifying force within these organisations
at the time.
Mabin is therefore of the opinion that it is reasonable to suggest that the attempt be-
tween 1937 and 1940 to endow local government in the Cape Province, through a provincial
ordinance, with powers to segregate coloureds from whites originated in policy circles in the
Puriﬁed National Party and the Afrikaner Broederbond. On the other hand, the apparent
support for segregationist policy as demonstrated by the actions of the white residents’ asso-
ciations, particularly in Cape Town, produced enough anxiety for General Smuts as Deputy
Prime Minister in the coalition government, to speak in support of segregation between
coloureds and whites in March 1938 (Mabin, 1992:410-411).
As can be noted from the many failed attempts to legislate segregation more compre-
hensively, “segregationists” did not simply have their way on relations among the various
races. National policy on the segregation of coloureds and whites, like that aﬀecting Indians,
24The means, though not the trigger, reappeared in the Group Areas Bill in 1950
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had entered a period of indecisiveness. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 and South
Africa’s participation in the war were considered more urgent and national legislation on
segregation was delayed as a result. Smuts became the new Prime Minister of the ruling
United Party after Hertzog was defeated in Parliament, in September 1939, on his quest for
South Africa to remain neutral during the war. Ethnic changes in some residential areas in
Natal, stimulated ad hoc measures by the government during the war (Mabin, 1992:412).
Servitude legislation was, however, not forthcoming. The general attitude towards the irreg-
ular settlement policy of the Smuts government, indeed, seemed to become more permissive
as suggested by the suspension of pass laws in 1940. Smuts became increasingly concerned
with “reconstruction” in the post-war world. The material realities of South Africa and the
focus on industrialisation ensured that national legislation on segregation disappeared from
the Smuts government’s immediate agenda (Mabin, 1992:411-413).
Several aspects of this period are important for purposes of this thesis. Firstly, segre-
gation as an unoﬃcial principle in decision-making and policy-making became increasingly
important as is demonstrated by both the successful and unsuccessful attempts to place
segregation more ﬁrmly onto the statute books. Race and segregation became important
election issues among the white electorate. South Africa, thus, became more and more
divided along racial and ethnic lines.
Secondly, a developing political society also showed racial and ethnic divisions and in-
creasingly developed along and as a result of these lines of divisions. Various political parties
were established among whites, as well as political organisations that were meant to channel
the political hopes, aspirations and frustrations of the non-whites that were excluded from
the “white” political process. Some of these political parties and organisations, such as the
ANC, NP and the Communist Party of South Africa (1921) survived to become key political
actors during South Africa’s transition to democracy. In 1930, the franchise was extended
to white women, but not to non-white women.
Thirdly, an expanding civil society began to play an important role in the political
processes. Of particular importance are the role of churches and the establishment of several
trade unions. Again, their membership and interests were mainly determined by race and
116
Chapter 3
ethnicity. Civil society had already begun to challenge the exercise of political power (see
Karis and Carter, 1972 and 1973). Both white and non-white churches held discussions,
organised petitions and deputations to ﬁnd a humane solution to the political and social
position of non-whites in South Africa. An example is the First and Second European-
African Conference sponsored by the Dutch Reformed Church in 1923 and 1927 (Karis and
Carter, 1972: 353). Trade unions organised strikes and boycotts of which the most notable
was the “Rand Revolt” (white trade unions) of 1922 (see Karis and Carter, 1972:146).
Fourthly, though race, ethnicity and discrimination were enduring issues, the white versus
non-white issue was not the only source of political dispute with which the authorities had
to deal. There were also issues like the reconciliation of Afrikaans and English speaking
people; relations with Britain as the colonial power; the issue of independence from Britain;
recognition of Afrikaans as the oﬃcial language; and South Africa’s participation in the two
World Wars. The importance of some of these other issues often made racial issues less
urgent.
The struggle by the non-whites against discrimination and oppression was becoming
increasingly more sophisticated. Again, there were diﬀerences in their basic approach. Some
preferred to co-operate with moderate whites, while others preferred a black or at most a
non-white approach, for example, the First Non-European Conference that was held in 1927
and that was followed by further conferences held in 1930 and 1931 (see Karis and Carter,
1972).
In general, there was uncertainty about government policy towards non-whites after the
end of the Second World War. This uncertainty together with many internal issues, fuelled
the coming to power of the Puriﬁed National Party together with the smaller Afrikaner Party
in 1948.
THE PERIOD 1948-1978 AND STATUTORY RACIAL CLASSIFICATION
Segregation of the races and legislation to that eﬀect were, as discussed above, often on the
agenda prior to 1948. At that stage it was not yet oﬃcial policy (see Duggan, 1973:22). The
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situation was soon to change following the coming to power, as mentioned, of the NP,25 with
the help of the Afrikaner Party in the general elections of 1948. Subsequently, immediate
expectations of legislation for compulsory segregation arose.
The NP spelled out its comprehensive “colour” policy during the election in a document
entitled, “National Party’s Colour Policy: Separation on Christian Principles of Justice and
Reasonableness “(Kleynhans, 1987:344). There were two dimensions to the Colour Policy,
namely separation and separate development as indicated by the following statements taken
from the Colour Policy:
A policy of separation (apartheid) between Europeans and Coloureds and be-
tween Natives and Coloureds will be applied in the social, residential, industrial
and political spheres...The Native reserves must become the true fatherland of
the Native. The Native must be taught to build up his own social, medical
and welfare services in the reserves in which his own eﬀorts will be employed
(Kleynhans, 1987:344-345).
In this policy, provision was also made for the repatriation of Indians and the revision of
Indian legislation, as well as comprehensive restrictions on the lives of Indians (Kleynhans,
1987:345-346). Indians soon faced the introduction of discriminatory legislation. The Asiatic
Laws Amendment Act No. 47 of 1948 came into eﬀect in October of that year. This act
repealed the chapter on Indian representation provided for in the 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure
and Indian Representation Act No. 28 of 1946 (see Mabin, 1992).
Apartheid had thus become the oﬃcial policy that laid down the fundamental principles
that would guide legislation during the apartheid era. In order to separate the various races
and to ensure their separate development, apartheid legislation focused on the segregation
of the races, entrenchment of the position of whites, separate social and political structures
for the various race groups, and legislation that would enable the authorities to deal with
opposition and dissent.26 “An integral Part of the apartheid policy has been in the underlying
thesis that legislation - and civil administration - is designed to put down all concerted
resistance to it - whether White or non-White” (Duggan 1973:26).
Legislation for compulsory segregation, however, was not immediate but delayed, pending
25At this stage oﬃcially known as the Herenigde Nasionale Party (Re-united National Party).
26In this section some of the important legislation will be dealt with chronologically.
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careful investigation and proposals (Natal Mercury, 6 November 1948) on how comprehensive
segregation could be justiﬁed and introduced (Mabin, 1992:419). That thinking included
the “question of land tenure,” as well as the white - coloured segregation question (Mabin,
1992:419).
Soon afterwards, the NP, in “its endeavor to make the country safe for Afrikanerdom...set
up a bulwark of restrictive racial legislation” (Giliomee, 1979:95). The Nationalists extended
and formalised previous policies of racial segregation. During the 1950s, the government
established a network of statutes that separated the various races spatially, socially and
politically (Horowitz, 1991:10-11). Racial segregation was, for example, an outcome of
the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No. 55 of 1949, which prohibited marriages be-
tween Europeans and Non-Europeans and the Immorality Amendment Act No. 21 of 1950
that prohibited sexual intercourse between Europeans and Non-Europeans (Thomashausen,
1987:2).27
The Population Registrations Act No. 30 of 1950 was, however, one of the pillars in
apartheid legislation.28 This act assigned every person to a racial category by requiring that
all be registered as either: white, coloured, Indian (or Asian, thus including the very small
Chinese minority), and black29 (see Boonzaier, 1989:185-186; Carter, 1958:81; Horowitz,
1991:8-12, Sisk, 1995:59; Thomashausen, 1987:2-3). It provided for the creation of a national
register on which every South African was classiﬁed according to race as deﬁned in the act.
Every birth was to be registered according to the race group of the parents. Classiﬁcation
by race was, obviously, driven by the demands of racial segregation. A person’s place on
the legally deﬁned population register, as prescribed by this act, determined where one
could live, work, learn, marry, and even swim (Sisk, 1995:8). Its repeal only in 1991 by the
Population Registration Act Repeal Act No. 114 of 1991 demonstrates the extent to which
it was fundamental to apartheid.30 As will be discussed in chapter four, race classiﬁcation
27The Immorality Act No. 5 of 1927 prohibited sexual intercourse between white and black (African).
28The Population Registration Act was adopted by the whites-only House of Assembly by the narrow
margin of 63-58. It originally provided for three categories, namely white, native (later bantu and later
black) and coloured. The category of Asian was later added (see Carter, 1958:81).
29Besides this oﬃcial deﬁnition of the term black, a common use of the term embraces all who were
oppressed on the basis of colour - coloureds, Indians and Africans. Thus to some “Black means anyone who
is not White, anyone who is discriminated against because of colour” (Du Toit, 1983:379). Likewise, since
1994, the term ’black’ has been used to designate those that were previously disadvantaged.
30At the opening of parliament in February 1991, President FW de Klerk announced that the Act would
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was the fundamental principle on which the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No.
110 of 1983 was based (Sisk, 1995:9).31
This act and its implementation were, however, controversial, as predicted by its oppo-
nents in 1950. It became a source of conﬂict and inspired political agitation. The diﬃculty
of the task of classifying people according to the prescribed racial categories was immense.
Carter (1958: 81; Sisk, 1995:8-9) states:
The deﬁnitions of the Act illustrate the degree to which customary associations
and community acceptance are decisive rather than colour as such. A white
person is one who is ‘obviously white in appearance’, or by ‘general repute and
acceptance’. But a person who is Coloured by general repute is ranked as such
even if he is white in appearance.32
A member of the opposition United Party33 remarked during a parliamentary debate,
“the epoch of the witch hunt is upon us. In the end, in order to avoid inﬁnite trouble and
vexation, it will be far more convenient to have some distinguishing mark tattooed on your
forehead like some oriental caste” (Carter, 1958: 82; see Sisk, 1995:8-9).34
The Population Registration Act entrenched race as a principle for legislation and public
policy. This act was soon followed by the Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950, which allocated
separate residential areas to the various population groups. This act was designed to segre-
be repealed (also that “the South African statute books will be devoid, within months, of the remnants
of racially discriminatory legislation which have become known as the cornerstones of apartheid)” (Sisk,
1992:59; Sisk, 1995:101).
31Article 52 of the 1983-constitution directly refers to the Population Registration Act, specifying that the
three chambers (House of Assembly, House of Representatives and House of Delegates) of parliament set up by
the constitution (it was commonly known as the tricameral parliament) represented the white, coloured and
Indian population groups respectively. Separate elections on separate voters’ rolls were employed to choose
representatives for these communities. Blacks were completely excluded from the system (See chapter 4).
32Until 1962, the societal acceptance of a person as belonging to a particular race group was the main test.
After this period, both acceptance and appearance had to be considered (Thompson and Prior, 1982:36).
33The United Party formed in 1934 as a fusion between the South African Party and most of the members
of the National Party. Under the leadership of General J C Smuts, it remained in power until 1948, (Worden,
1998: 157-158).
34The problematic nature and bureaucratic diﬃculties of classiﬁcation were evident from the ongoing
process of reclassiﬁcation. In the ﬁnal full year of the Act’s implementation, 1990, some 463 people were,
for example, reclassiﬁed racially (Sisk, 1992:59; see Thomashausen, 1987). The term, coloured, was in par-
ticular a matter of sharp contention. The category, coloured, is as mentioned a complex product of contact
among Europeans, Khoi, San, other Africans, and “Malays” brought by the Dutch from Indonesia (Horowitz,
1991:23-25). As in many other colonial societies, coloureds were placed in a middle position between Euro-
peans and blacks, their group boundaries, status, and prerogatives deﬁned by the Europeans. The objection
to the name coloured is expressed in alternative terminology for example the term the “so-called coloureds.”
As mentioned others are more likely to refer to so-called coloureds as merely black (Horowitz, 1991:23-25).
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gate every locality by race (Horowitz, 1991:8-12).35 If numbers allowed, provision was also
made for subdivisions in terms of ethnicity, language and culture (Carter, 1958: 85). It is
regarded for example, by Carter (1958:84) as the most far reaching and complicated piece of
apartheid legislation. Whole business and residential areas, declared “white” were eventually
cleared of non-whites, who had worked or lived there for decades (Horowitz, 1991:11).
The classiﬁcation of citizens on the basis of race and the allocation of group areas fa-
cilitated the limitation of the franchise and the policy of separate development, including
separate political rights.
The Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 195036 was one of the acts empowering the
authorities to deal with opposition to its apartheid policies. It placed a ban on organisations
that supported communism, but a very loose deﬁnition implied that anyone advocating
radical changes such as the equality of races could be regarded as a communist. Restrictions
were also placed on “communists,” and severe limitations were in eﬀect placed on some
extra-parliamentary opposition groups (see Karis and Carter, 1973:404; Carter, 1958).37
All of the former legislation paved the way for a series of statutes that provided important
steps towards separate development, or “positive apartheid” (see Carter, 1958:92). The ﬁrst
of these was the Black Authorities Act No. 68 of 1951. This act re-established the authority
of the tribal chiefs. It facilitated the inclusion of the tribal political structures of blacks into
the constitutional system of South Africa. This act therefore paved the way for separate
development, which would eventually entail self-government by blacks in the black areas
(Carter, 1958:92; Thomashausen, 1987:4-5). The issue of blacks in urban areas, as well as
educated and detribalised blacks, was however not addressed. Even more important was
that blacks were denied the opportunity to identify with South Africa as a whole, or with
the national interests of South Africa (see Carter, 1958:92-93).
35The Black Laws Amendment Act No. 54 of 1952 and the Blacks Resettlement Act No. 19 of 1954
furthered the aims of the Group Areas Act, by limiting the right of blacks to live in urban areas. It also
permitted authorities to relocate those not authorised to be where they were living, and provided for the
removal of “black spots,” such as Sophiatown, in urban areas.
36Its name was later changed to the “Internal Security Act“. The ﬁrst trials of those accused of ”statutory
communism” took place in 1952 (Carter, 1958:10).
37Other important examples in this regard are: Criminal Law Amendment Act No. 8 of 1953, Riotous
Assemblies Act No. 17 of 1956, Unlawful Organizations Act No. 34 of 1960, Criminal Procedure Amendment
Act No. 96 of 1965 and Terrorism Act No. 83 of 1967.
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The misnamed Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act No. 67
of 1952, required all blacks to carry identiﬁcation papers and hundreds of thousands were
arrested annually for failing to produce the documents upon demand (Horowitz, 1991:11).38
One of the most controversial pieces of apartheid legislation was the Black Education Act
No. 47 of 1953. Its implementation was one of the causes of the Soweto uprising in 1976.
This act transferred the control of black education (except for university39 and technical
training) from the provincial authorities to a newly created Department of Native Aﬀairs40
of the Union government. The role of state-aided mission schools in the education of non-
whites was severely curtailed by reducing their subsidies if the missionary organisations
wished to retain administrative control over these schools. The basic idea was that black
education should be more closely related to the traditions and distinctive characteristics of
its people. Expectations, such as following a professional career, should not be created by
the education of blacks (Carter 1958:102-103). These measures were seen as oppressive and
it also fuelled Marxist interpretations of the apartheid policy, whereby black education was
seen as a tool in the hands of the capitalists to provide labour for the mines and industry. The
consequence of this was the intellectual starvation of blacks. Limited funds were provided
for black education and during the budget debate of 1954 it was said, “anything needed over
and above this would have to be found by the Bantu community itself” (Carter 1958:106).
The Black Labour Relations Act No. 48 of 1953, eﬀectively placed trade unions under
white control and prevented blacks from striking (Carter, 1958:116).
The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 49 of 1953, provided for the segregation
of the various races in public spaces and the separation of facilities used by whites and
non-whites (Horowitz, 1991:11).
After a long drawn-out constitutional dispute, the Separate Representation of Voters Act
No. 46 of 1951 was validated by a joint sitting of the House of Assembly and the Senate
38In March 1972 the minister of justice reported to Parliament that 42% of prisoners serving sentences of
up to four months, have been sentenced for violating “inﬂux control” laws (Duggan, 1973:24).
39The Extension of University Education Act No. 45 of 1959 empowered the Minister of Bantu Education
to designate colleges for speciﬁc black ethnic groups. Separate educational facilities were also created for
coloureds and Indians (see Carter, 1958:102-104; Thomashausen, 1987:4). Non-whites had to acquire permits
to study at “white” institutions that did admit non-whites.
40The name of this Department was changed on several occasions.
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in 1956. Coloureds were placed on a separate voters’ roll and had to vote for white repre-
sentatives (Thomashausen, 1987:4-5; Carter, 1958: 119-144: Karis and Carter, 1977a:803;
Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:97).
During the premiership of Dr Verwoerd (1958-66),41 the apartheid system was reﬁned,
perfected, and enforced. Inﬂux control placed tough restrictions on the migration of blacks
to cities (Horowitz, 1991:11). Its critics argued that inﬂux control had two major objectives,
namely to channel black labour to speciﬁc destinations where it was needed, and to restrict
urbanisation in order to limit potential social and political problems (Maylam, 1995:19-38).
In addition, urban life was made unattractive to those permitted to migrate. Black workers
were, for example, forced to live in single-sex hostels far from their families, whom they
managed to visit only occasionally (Horowitz, 1991:11).
The passing of the Representation between the Republic of South Africa and Self-
governing Territories Act No. 46 of 195942 was of particular importance in “positive apartheid”
and was intended to set the “homelands” on the road to self-determination and, if desired,
eventual independence.43 Blacks would hence forward be able to determine their own des-
tinies through their own political structures. Subsequently, from 1960, it also abolished the
representation of blacks by whites in Parliament (Karis and Carter, 1977a:803). It is impor-
tant to bear in mind that the government interpreted self-determination, not on a collective
racial basis, but on the basis of ethnicity. This often led to the criticism of the government’s
policy of “divide in order to rule.”
Reality soon prevented the government from having it all their way. There was the realisa-
tion that not all Indians would be repatriated. In order to deal with the permanent presence
of Indians, restrictions were placed on the movement of Indians, as well as a complete ban
on their residence in the Orange Free State province (Horowitz, 1991:11). This prompted
the Indian government to take South Africa to the United Nations (UN). Likewise, there
41Dr Verwoerd is usually seen as the architect of apartheid. As leader of the National Party policy group
since 1948 and as Minister of the then Department of Native Aﬀairs since 1950, he created much of apartheid
legislation (Duggan, 1973:29).
42Originally the Promotion of Black Self-government Act No. 46 of 1959.
43According to the policy of “positive” or grand apartheid (large scale territorial and political separation),
blacks were to exercise their voting rights in the national “states“, or homelands, irrespective of whether
they lived there or in greater South Africa.
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was the realisation that some blacks had settled permanently in urban areas. This resulted
in the promulgation of the Urban Black Councils Act No. 79 of 196144 in which provision
was made for black “self-government” in the urban townships (see Thomashausen, 1987:6).
The government nevertheless proceeded under the leadership of Dr Verwoerd to establish
a haven for whites only, by promulgating legislation that segregated the race groups, that
promoted “self-government” and that dealt with any opposition to its apartheid ideals.
In 1961, South Africa, after a whites only referendum, became a republic (outside of the
Commonwealth) and thereby realised one of the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism (Thompson
and Prior, 1982:84). Non-whites were again excluded from any decision in this regard, with
the result that they failed to identify themselves with the republic and its interests and had,
in fact, resorted to more militancy and by June of that year, the ANC abandoned its policy
of non-violence (Karis and Carter, 1977a:361-364, 804-805).
Political segregation and separate development were furthered by the: Transkei Consti-
tution Act No. 48 of 1963 - a further step towards the self-determination of blacks; South
African Indian Council Act No. 31 of 1968 that established a council appointed by the
Minister of Indian Aﬀairs; Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act No. 50 of
1968 that provided for a Coloured Persons’ Representative Council; and Prohibition of Po-
litical Interference Act No. 51 of 1968 that prohibited non-racial political parties and foreign
ﬁnancing of political parties (Sisk, 1992:59-61; Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:96-103).45
Between 1970 and 1977, the black homelands were important, with some granted self-
government and others self-governing status. Transkei (1976)46 and Bophuthatswana (1977)47
even gained “independence”.48 Important in this regard was the National States Citizenship
Act No. 26 of 197049 and the National States Constitutional Act No. 21 of 1971 (Thompson
and Prior, 1982:92-93).50 In general, the policy of self-governing states did, however, not
44The Black Aﬀairs Administrative Act No. 45 of 1971 also provided for self-government in black town-
ships.
45Later renamed the Foreign Financing of Political Parties Act.
46Status of the Transkei Act No. 100 of 1976.
47Status of Bophuthatswana Act No. 89 of 1977.
48Their status as independent states were not recognised by the international community.
49Originally the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act. Blacks now became citizens of a “homeland” and
thus rendered them aliens within broader South Africa.




meet the needs of the urban blacks.
Apartheid legislation reached its zenith during the seventies, until the assumption of
power of PW Botha in 1978.51
A need to address the negative consequences of apartheid legislation led to the estab-
lishment of even more political and civil organisations among non-whites. Various political
movements were established to promote and protect the interests of non-whites. A number of
these organisations, such as the Youth League of the ANC, allowed multi-racial membership
(including whites). Some of these organisations were established to organise protest actions
such as during the Deﬁance Campaign of the 1950s and most of the smaller organisations
either aligned themselves with the major political organisations such as the ANC or were
eventually absorbed by them. Of particular interest is the adoption of the non-racial Free-
dom Charter by the Congress of the People at Kliptown in 1955. It was in turn adopted by
the ANC in 1956. The re-established South African Communist Party (SACP, 1953), the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC, 1959), the Black People’s Convention (1973) and the Aza-
nian People’s Organisation (AZAPO, 1978) were important organisations founded during
this period. Important was the intensiﬁcation of radicalism among non-whites and in partic-
ular, during the 1970s as demonstrated by the rise of Black Consciousness. Several of these
political organisations, as well as some of those previously established, were outlawed by the
authorities, for example the ANC, the SACP and the PAC. Most of them went underground
and/or into exile, from where they continued their activism from an international platform;
thereby intensifying international action against South Africa.
The oﬃcial prescribed political structures also gave rise to new political organisations,
for example, the Inkatha Freedom Party (Zulu) and the Labour Party (coloured). Towards
the end of the seventies, local grass-roots community organisations also mushroomed (Karis
and Carter, 1997: 214). It is important to bear in mind that most of these organisations
were organised on democratic principles to a large extent, even though it did happen that
some individuals played dominant roles within these organisations.
51During the Information Scandal, the previous Prime Minister, Adv John Vorster, resigned and was
succeeded by Mr PW Botha. He was regarded as more moderate than the ”heir apparent”, Dr Connie
Mulder, who was also implicated in the Information Scandal (see chapter 4).
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On the other hand, new pro-apartheid organisations were also established because there
were those who were of the opinion that by the mid-sixties, the NP was already deviating from
its apartheid policy. Examples are the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP, 1969) (Thompson
and Prior, 1982:105) and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB, 1973). Both leftist and
rightist radicalism were now further complicating forces.
However, organisations that were predominantly white, such as the Black Sash women
and the Torch Commando, campaigned for the rights of non-whites (see Carter, 1958:303-
333). There were also organisations among non-whites that preferred to co-operate with
the government in an eﬀort to improve the living conditions of non-whites. Inkatha and
the coloured Labour Party are examples in this regard. They were, however, often severely
criticised by organisations such as the ANC and PAC and even branded by some as sell-outs.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF APARTHEID LEGISLATION FOR DEMOCRATISATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA
The above discussion merely provides an indication of some of the most important pieces of
legislation that were promulgated in the government’s attempt to engineer society along the
lines spelled out in the apartheid policy. Apartheid legislation, however, had a wide range
of implications for the South African polity and in particular, any transition to democracy
based on universal suﬀrage.
Firstly, the policy of segregation divided the South African society along racial and eth-
nic lines. Each person was assigned to a particular sphere of existence, based on race and if
possible, based on ethnicity. Social contact between the races was discouraged by prohibit-
ing “mixed” marriages and associational life, as well as by allocating separate facilities and
amenities. Lack of contact, except in a hierarchical structure in the workplace, provided fer-
tile ground for the development of negative stereotypes and mutual suspicion. This severely
curtailed the development of mutual understanding, trust and respect among the various
race groups and even between some ethnic groups (e.g. the Zulu and other black ethnic
groups). The absence of trust, as would become clear in the following chapters, became an
obstacle on the road to democracy.
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Secondly, in spite of job reservation and inﬂux control, a racially integrated economy
developed in South Africa. The South African economy, though driven by whites, was
dependent on non-white labour. Two consequences followed from the inter-dependence of
the races in the economic sphere of South Africa. On the one hand, it proved to be a serious
obstacle to the apartheid engineers and one that they were unable to overcome. On the other
hand, the perceived exploitation of non-white and in particular black labour, provided fertile
grounds for Marxist interpretations and solutions to South Africa’s problems (as is discussed
in the following two sections). Though the shared economy was a positive factor in South
Africa’s transition, there was also the fear of Marxism with which they had to contend, and
particularly, during the Cold War era.
Thirdly, South Africans of all races and ethnicity shared a common, but white controlled
state and economy. However, the development of a common associational life was, as dis-
cussed, discouraged and prevented by legislation such as the Group Areas Act, Reservation
of Separate Amenities Act and the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, as well as pro-
vision for separate political structures. This largely resulted in dividing both political and
civil society along racial and even ethnic lines. Only the white political society had access
to political power, characteristic of Western democracies.
Fourthly, the development of political society and civil society played an important role in
the participation by whites in the political process. The vote was eventually extended to all
white South Africans eighteen years and older. The political rights that whites enjoyed were
similar to those found in Western democratic societies and were modelled on the Westminster
system. These political rights were a source of contention among non-whites who felt left
out of the early democratisation process. The political organisations that developed among
non-whites had as one of its aims, the extension of these political and other human rights
to non-whites. Though discrimination was an important issue, there was the belief that
discrimination could only be truly addressed if, and when, non-whites had secured political
rights similar to those enjoyed by whites. The African National Congress Youth League for
example, declared in its Manifesto of 1948 that:
[T]he goal of political organisation and action is the achievement of true democ-
racy...the admission of the African into full citizenship of the country so that he
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has direct representation in parliament on a democratic basis (Karis and Carter,
1973:141, 323-324).
Fifthly, a large number of political organisations were established among non-whites.
Access to political power was limited, in particular, after some of the organisations were
restricted or banned. For these reasons, civil society organisations such as religious organ-
isations, labour unions and sports organisations increasingly became involved in the non-
whites’ quest for political rights and an end to apartheid and discrimination. Thus, among
non-whites the distinction between political society and civil society was blurred. There was
some overlap with the white political and civil society, in the sense that some of the white
organisations sympathised with non-whites. There was, for example, the Torch Commando
and the Black Sash, as mentioned previously (see Carter, 1958:303-333).
A sixth important implication was that discriminatory legislation, based on race, aﬀected
the earning ability of non-whites severely. It also created a racial hierarchy in the sense that
whites enjoyed a privileged position, but the position of Indians and coloureds were better
than that of blacks who found themselves at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Nevertheless,
non-whites suﬀered because of apartheid legislation and even though there were diﬀerences
in opinion, co-operation among the non-whites was seen as an important weapon against
apartheid.
Lastly, these factors had important implications for future decisions on political institu-
tions for a democratic South Africa. No political dispensation that was based on race or
ethnicity would in future be acceptable to a signiﬁcant number of South Africans of all races,
but in particular non-whites.
In summary, at its height, apartheid had two complementary thrusts: racial separation
within South Africa proper and ethnic “self-determination” in the Bantustans. Concurrent
with the phasing out of segregation in the United States of America, was its reinforcement in
South Africa. As Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium were granting African independence
within existing colonial boundaries, South Africa was contemplating balkanised independence
for impoverished, disconnected dots on a map (Horowitz,1991:11-12).
Race classiﬁcation was therefore clearly driven by racial segregation as a policy. As noted
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by Fullilove (1998:1297-1298), “these systems constrained the opportunities of those in the
’inferior’ races and enhanced the life chances of those in the ’superior’ races“. Ellison and
colleagues (1996:1257-1262) also state that in South Africa, racial categorisation “ignores the
impact of social forces, legitimises discrimination and reinforces a racially structured view
of society.”
3.2.2 CLASS CLEAVAGES: CLASS DIFFERENTIATION AND RACIAL
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Class diﬀerentiation and stratiﬁcation are of particular importance within the context in
which the South African transition to democracy took place. The stratiﬁcation of society
into classes provides an important indication of the distribution of power in a society, that
is, whether power is distributed equally or unequally between groups of individuals. In the
previous section, it was mentioned that apartheid legislation severely aﬀected the earning
ability of non-whites and in particular of blacks, resulting in a racially based economic
hierarchy.
In the Weberian tradition, the class structure of a society is indicative of the diﬀerenti-
ation of life chances, attitudes and the behaviour of groups of individuals. Class, however,
is not the only basis for the stratiﬁcation of many modern societies. In the United States
of America (USA), Northern Ireland and Israel, for example, ethnicity has an additional
and important role in the stratiﬁcation process (Yaish, 2001:409). In these societies, the
diﬀerentiation of social power, as well as life chances, attitudes and behaviour, thus often
coincides with ethnic group membership (Yaish, 2001:409).
In a similar way, class and race were important in the stratiﬁcation of South African
society.52 They were indeed important dimensions of the context in which the transition
to democracy had to be eﬀected. Apartheid legislation was in many respects, a complicat-
ing factor in this regard. The struggle against apartheid was partially generated by class
diﬀerentiation, reinforced by a racially exclusive political system and administration.
Both a white and non-white working class emerged in South Africa and in particular
52Ethnicity also played a role, e.g. Afrikaners versus English, but for purposes of this discussion, the
overlap between race and class is important.
129
Chapter 3
after 1910. The white working class had access to trade unions and political society, for
example, through the South African Labour Party. They, therefore, succeeded in addressing
their position through political means such as the passing of legislation that provided for
mandatory job reservations. White labour was thus protected against competition from
the non-white working class. Their privileged position made class mobility a reality for
whites, resulting in an emerging white middle class. Blacks constituted the majority of the
working class, but restrictions such as inﬂux control, job reservations, limited access to trade
unions53 and only nominal access to political society,54 severely hampered class mobility
among blacks resulting in a disproportional small middle class (see Slovo, 1976; Southall,
1980). With only limited access to trade unions and political society, socialism and Marxism
were natural options for the black working class (Major, 2005:478; Carter, 1958:29-31, 60-
66).55 Due to the limitations placed on non-whites, it was easier for the small non-white
middle class to link with the non-white working class than with the white middle class and
in the process radicalising a section of the black population (see Slovo, 1976; Southall, 1980).
This was a destabilising factor as was evident during the 1976-riots. As a result, there were
indications that during the late seventies, the government tried to engineer a black capitalist
and a black middle class that could form alliances with “white” South Africa (Southall,
1980).
It is therefore not surprising that the combination of race, class and apartheid gave
rise to Marxist interpretations of the conﬂict in South Africa (see Mabin, 1989; Nattrass
and Ardington, 1990 and O’Dowd, 1991). Halisi (1989) is one example of such narrowly
based and deterministic neo-Marxist approaches to South Africa (Sisk, 1992:62). From a
“racial proletarianisation” perspective, the concepts of black and proletariat interacted and
competed at times as core ideas in black political thought and action (Halisi, 1989:59).
Interpretations such as these, complicated the already existing fears among whites that
53For example, the Industrial Conciliation Act No. 11 of 1924 only allowed for the registration (and thus
collective bargaining) of white, coloured and Asian trade unions. Black labourers were further marginalised
after 1948 (see Major, 2005).
54Blacks resorted mainly to unoﬃcial trade unions that were often supported by the CPSA/SACP (Carter,
1958:62). The adoption of some of the recommendations of the Riekert and Wiehann Commissions towards
the end of the seventies, made access to trade unions possible for blacks.
55The white working class were initially radical, but the state managed to curb radicalism among the
white working class (see Carter, 1958: 29-31; 60-66).
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resulted from demographic imbalances (see Le Roux, 1990:36-39).56 The essential point is,
however, that the politics of class and the impact of racial domination on class stratiﬁcation
and class action, cannot be ignored in an analysis of the South African conﬂict (Sisk, 1992:62)
and South Africa’s path to democracy.
Class stratiﬁcation, therefore, coincided with racial hierarchy in South Africa, but these
divisions constituted only one dimension of class stratiﬁcation in South Africa. From an
economic perspective, South Africa was an unequal society and there was a signiﬁcant corre-
lation between access to political power and economic prosperity. Access to political power
allowed whites the opportunity to use the state to gain economic ascendency and statutory
race divisions were important in this regard. The economic development of South Africa was
in general, an important goal of all Union governments since 1910 (see Duggan, 1973:65-103;
Kleynhans, 1987; O’Dowd, 1991). However, in the previous section there is a clear indica-
tion of how politics, legislation and public policy, gave preference to the economic problems
encountered by whites (see O’Dowd, 1991:56-57). Lewis (1990:41; Sisk, 1995:11) for example
states:
The objectives of South African governments since the 1920s, especially since the
NP came to power, have been to eliminate the class of poor whites. The civi-
lized labor policy and all of its successors put a ﬂoor under white incomes at the
expense of blacks. The result is that the bottom end of the income distribution
has all but been eliminated for white South Africans. It is often the large con-
centration of people at the bottom that provides extreme inequality according to
Gini coeﬃcients or any other measure.
Thus, as already implied, white control of most of the land and big businesses, job
reservation and racially based wage policies,57 the employment of whites in “white collar”
positions within the civil service, as well as better education for whites, all played a role in
a class structure that largely coincided with racial divisions (see Maasdorp, 1990:198).
The level of inequality in the distribution of income and resources in South Africa was,
therefore, understandably extremely high. Several researchers such as Dostal (1990:618),
56Blacks were already an overwhelming majority and together with the coloureds and Indians completely
outnumbered whites.
57For example in 1969 the average wages (in Rand) in the manufacturing industry were: 262 for whites,
69 for Asians, 64 for coloureds and 48 for blacks. In the mining sector: 341 for whites, 93 for Asians, 71 for
coloureds and 19 for blacks (Duggan, 1973:111-116).
131
Chapter 3
Lewis (1990:40) and McGrath, M D (1990) have substantiated this point. The Gini coeﬃ-
cient58 for South Africa, for 1975, was calculated at 0.68 (McGrath, M D, 1990:94). Extreme
income inequality was therefore a characteristic of the South African economy. The inequal-
ity is even more important when the distribution of the income is considered along racial
lines, as demonstrated by Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1: Racial Distribution of Income in South Africa, 1985
















Black 38 26 18 8 5 5 24.9
Asian 5 8 14 13 18 42 3
Coloured 26 22 19 7 12 14 7.2
White 2 1 2 2 10 83 64.9
Source: Data obtained from McGrath, M. D. (1990:95), McGrath, M (1990:95). Percentage
of total personal income data from Dostal (1990:610); Sisk (1992:63); Sisk (1995:10-12).
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FIGURE 3.1: Distribution of Income According to Race: Income in Rand %
The data59 in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 provide an indication of the disproportionate
58A common measure of income inequality that is used to compare income distribution across dif-
ferent population sectors. The values range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates perfect equality, i e ev-
erybody has the same income; increasing scores means greater inequality; and 1perfect inequality,
i.e. one has all the income. Most developed nations from Europe have Gini coeﬃcients of 0,24-0,36
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini coeﬃcient).
59Though the data is for 1985 it is also relevant for the era prior to 1978. See McGrath, M. (1990:91-98)
and is therefore used in this section.
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number of whites at the upper end, as well as their under-representation at the lower end of
the income scale, compared to those of the other population groups. In 1985, eighty per cent
of whites had annual incomes exceeding R16 000, compared to only ﬁve per cent of blacks.
Poverty among whites was almost insigniﬁcant. Only a total of ﬁve per cent of whites had
incomes of below R8 000 per annum, which was just at the poverty line. The data provide
an indication of extreme levels of inequality between race groups, as well as of relative equal
distribution within a particular race group (Sisk, 1995:10-12). As mentioned, the institutions
of the state played an important role in buoying white incomes in South Africa.
South Africans experienced both extreme income inequality, as well as widespread poverty.
Historically, this was, as already indicated, structured along racial lines. It was estimated
that during the seventies, some sixty per cent of blacks were living below the subsistence
level of income (see McGrath, M D, 1990:94-96; Wilson and Ramphele, 1989); and that
over half of black males were unemployed (Wilson and Ramphele 1989:18).60 Poverty was
worst in the rural areas. During the seventies, the per capita income of black households
in the metropolitan areas was 2,2 times the per capita income of those in homelands, and
3,7 times that of blacks in white rural areas (McGrath, M D, 1990:94; see also De Villiers,
1993:317; Pottinger, 1988:178; Wilson and Ramphele, 1989:4; Gagiano, 1990:10-11; Anstey,
1991a:38-39; Sisk, 1991:104; Van der Berg, 1992:145).
Even though the homelands had been created, economic development took place mainly
in the traditionally white areas. The income gap between the races narrowed during the
seventies, but the levels of inequality remained disturbingly high (McGrath M, 1990:95).
Several factors contributed towards economic inequalities and, in particular, poverty
among blacks and coloureds. One of the main dimensions of South Africa’s economy was
the long-term decline in the rate of economic growth, exacerbated by rapid growth in the
population and particularly among the poorest. The South African economy in general
stagnated largely during the seventies. After rapid economic growth during the sixties, the
growth rate slowed in the seventies.61 The annual growth rate declined to less than two
60It was also estimated that in 1975 about 4% of white families, over 24% of Indians and 50% of coloureds
lived in poverty (McGrath, M D, 1990:95).
61In the 1980’s it slowed further, to 1.4% which was less than the population growth rate (Pierre du Toit,
1990:65-66; Buys, 1992:161; De Villiers, 1993:316).
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per cent, real per capita income declined by ﬁfteen per cent, unemployment rose and the
price of essential commodities for blacks rose by forty per cent (Terreblanche and Nattrass,
1990:15-16). This resulted in a decline in personal income for most people and signiﬁcantly
higher unemployment (Strydom, 1991:374; Tucker and Scott, 1992:52-53). The international
economic environment such as, a global economic slump, high oil prices in the seventies
also had serious consequences for South Africa’s economy (McGrath, M, 1990:92; Slabbert,
1990b:7 and 1991a:9; and Sunter, 1992:170; De Villiers, 1993:316). All these factors played
a role in South Africa’s inability to achieve a high rate of economic growth, which in turn
exacerbated the problems accompanying demographic change and rapid urbanisation.
The policy of apartheid was, as already stated, another factor in income inequalities
and poverty among blacks in particular. In the report of the Second Carnegie Conference
on Poverty in Southern Africa, six key aspects of “apartheid’s assault on the poor” were
identiﬁed, namely: the shift from the incorporation of blacks into the economy to disposses-
sion; anti-black urbanisation policies (pass laws); forced removals and relocations; inferior
“Bantu” education; the crushing of black political organisations; and the destabilisation of
black community life (Wilson and Ramphele 1989:205-230). Important is the ﬁnding that
there was a need for a fundamental redistribution of political power, in addition to economic
transformation, in order to uproot poverty in South Africa. Black South Africans viewed
apartheid as a system of both economic and political domination (Le Roux, 1990:37). This
implied that economic reform would not be acceptable to non-whites without the necessary
redistribution of political power.
The socio-economic and political inequalities among the race groups, the structure of
class divisions based on race and the levels of absolute poverty among blacks in South Africa
are therefore important in assessing the role of material interests in the conﬂict that prevailed
in South Africa, as well as in a future transition to democracy.
Two characteristics of class cleavages in South Africa are important for purposes of this
discussion. On the one hand, there were racial divisions within particular classes and on
the other hand, there was a racial class hierarchy in the sense that the upper and middle
classes were predominantly white, while the lower classes were predominantly black. This
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race-class stratiﬁcation was further exacerbated by extreme income inequality leading to the
polarisation of South African society along these lines of cleavage. Intervention by elites
would eventually be important in bridging these cleavages.
The extent of poverty, the severity of income inequalities and the overlap of divisions
of class and race thus had, for several reasons, important consequences for South Africa’s
future political dispensation.
Firstly, the economy became an important target of political activism. Trade unionism
became increasingly eﬀective and received international support from, for example the British
Trades Union Congress (Major, 2005). Widespread strikes that were largely successful in
making real economic gains occurred, for example in 1973. This led to the taking of steps
to liberalise the labour sphere. Of importance in this regard were the Wiehann and Riekert
Commissions that investigated industrial relations and the utilisation of human resources
respectively (Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990:15; Race Relations Survey, 1977:6). Most of
their ﬁndings and recommendations were accepted and introduced during the late seventies.
Secondly, because of increased political activism (both domestic and international) inter-
national economic pressure on the South African government began to take its toll on the
economy (Jenkins, 1990).
Thirdly, as mentioned, the inequalities and divisions that existed stimulated various
ideological interpretations of both the causes of, and solutions to South Africa’s economic
problems. On the one hand, from a more liberal and capitalist perspective it was argued that
the South African economy had too high a level of government expenditure and involvement.
The apartheid policy entailed high and often wasteful expenditure because of the unnecessary
duplication of services along racial lines (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:128-129; Slabbert,
1992a:20; De Villiers, 1993:318-319). On the other hand, Marxists regarded the economic
inequalities as the product of racially based capitalist exploitation. Thus, as would be
discussed in the next section, there was not only an overlap of race and class, but also of
ideology.
Lastly, there were also indications that the government was rethinking some of the basic
principles of the apartheid policy by, for example, trying to facilitate the creation of a black
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middle class in both the homelands and in urban areas. Such a middle class could co-
operate with whites in order to stabilise the political scene in South Africa, as well as by the
liberalisation of the labour sphere.
As will be discussed further in this chapter, South Africa’s economic problems were
typical of those associated with a deteriorating authoritarian regime. However, the economic
problems were not exclusively the consequence of authoritarian rule. Economic problems
must also be seen within the context of a modernising society undergoing profound changes;
for example, demographic change and urbanisation (Schrire, 1991:13-21; Slabbert, 1992:32-
33; De Villiers, 1993:316).
3.2.3 IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES
The concept of ideology is an elusive and essentially contested concept in the sense that there
is controversy about its very deﬁnition (McLellan, 1995:1). In the large literature on ideol-
ogy, two traditions can be identiﬁed, namely one that revolves around the science/ideology
dichotomy; and another that revolves around the sectional interest/ideology polarity (see
Giddens, 1977; McLellan, 1986; 1995; Eagleton, 1991; Susser, 1995; Vincent, 1992).
Irrespective of how we deﬁne the concept of ideology, it is a feature of all societies,
because it provides a set of meanings according to which people make sense of the world
they inhabit. Ideology needs to be seen as part of reality, as the “very constitution of social
life” (Giddens 1983:179). As such, ideology plays a “cementing” role by relating individuals
to institutions and everyday experience and, in so doing, reproduces everyday relations of
domination (McLellan, 1995).
In the light of the above and for purposes of the discussion in this section, both a wider
and a more neutral meaning are attached to the concept of ideology. An ideology is, therefore,
regarded as a set of coherent ideas on which organised political action is based, irrespective
of whether such action aims at preserving, modifying or overthrowing the existing order
(Heywood, 1997:43).
Ideology was important within the South African transition to democracy, for on the
one hand, it provided the goals that various groups and movements had in mind for South
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Africa and on the other hand, it provided the parameters of what would and could be
negotiable within the South African context. Ideology, therefore, “demarcated fundamental
diﬀerences in how the society ought properly to be understood and organised” (Horowitz,
1991:1-2). The question whether a particular ideology is seen as an end in itself or merely
as a means to an end, is in itself important. Przeworski (1991:2) is, for example, of the
opinion that a causative factor in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was the
following: “Socialism - the project for a new future - was no longer the end; it had become
an instrument of traditional values“.
The history of the South African political landscape provided fertile ground for a variety
of ideologies to such an extent that ideology was an important source of cleavage. In fact,
South Africa was sharply divided along ideological lines (see Horowitz, 1991:1-9). This was
a logical outgrowth of the politics of exclusion based on race, as well as the extreme class
divisions as discussed above. South Africa was and still is home to a complex spectrum of
ideologies spanning from those that adhere faithfully to the principles of apartheid and racial
separateness to those that favour complete social and racial integration. On the other hand,
there were strongly held ideologies that represented almost the full range of “-isms” such
as capitalism, liberalism, various nationalisms, democratic socialism, Marxism, anarchism,
including the variations of each of these (see Reddy, 2000:406). A variety of organisations
advocated these ideological principles (see section 3.4).
The various ideologies that were (are) present in South Africa were often either a synthesis
of, or an eclectic combination of elements of various of the “standard” ideologies. Afrikaner
nationalism, for example, contained elements of ethno-nationalism, conservatism, socialism
and Calvinism (Carter, 1958:73-4; 340-1). Even within a single organisation, such as the
ANC, several distinct ideologies coexisted, often giving rise to factions within the organi-
sation. Lodge (1989:249), for example, writes: “African nationalism. Christian liberalism,
clandestinity, technocracy, Communist popular frontism, Western Marxism and indigenous
working-class radicalism, as well as residual elements of the Black Consciousness Movement,
are constituents in the ANC’s complicated ideological recipe.”
Ideologies tend to claim a monopoly on “truth” for its fundamental principles. Likewise,
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within the South African context, each ideology claimed to represent the “truth” of the
South African conﬂict, and thereby contributed to what Horowitz (1991:2) has described as
the metaconﬂict.
The classical left-right spectrum of communism, socialism, liberalism, conservatism and
fascism as determined by their respective views regarding society, the economy, the role of
the state, as well as the existing order62 is useful but problematic within the South African
context. It does not make suﬃcient provision for ideologies based on race. Within the
South African context, the right is usually reserved for Afrikaner nationalism and the left for
communism. Yet, black consciousness and Pan-Africanism are likewise exclusive and based
on race, but diﬀer from Afrikaner nationalism in their opposition on the existing order and
quest for radical reforms (Botha, 1996).
Two broad categories of ideologies are, therefore, important for an analysis of the South
African transition, namely those that involved principles of either exclusion or inclusion,
such as race and ethnicity, and those that fell into the classical left-right spectrum.63 It is,
however, not the purpose of this section to give a detailed account of all ideologies and their
fundamental principles, nor of how they contributed towards the metaconﬂict. The purpose
is merely to provide a broad outline of some of the most important ideologies that could
aﬀect, either positively or negatively, a transition to democracy.
RACE AND ETHNICITY AS IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
Underlying the ideologies of Afrikaner nationalism, African nationalism, Africanism, Pan-
Africanism and black consciousness64 is a fundamental principle, namely, the exclusion of
those that do not comply with a predetermined racial and/or ethnic criterion.
62The left-right scale is controversial but at least provides a useful “map” for the understanding of the
ideological spectrum (see Susser, 1995:273-274; Heywood, 1997:234-235).
63These categories did not necessarily exclude the other, for most ideologically based movements posi-
tioned themselves in terms of both. A two-dimensional spectrum classiﬁcation would therefore be possible
but falls outside the scope of this discussion.
64African nationalism and Africanism are usually regarded as the same within the South African context
and they both diﬀer only marginally from South African Pan-Africanism. Black consciousness developed




Afrikaner nationalism could, prior to transition, be regarded as the dominant ideology, for
it provided the norms and goals on which apartheid ideology and government policy were
based. Though the roots of Afrikaner nationalism can be traced to the history of early
white settlement, it was largely, a reaction to the British domination of the Afrikaner (Leatt
et al, 1986:57-58) and increased competition from the black population. Early Afrikaner
nationalism had as its goal: “to develop Afrikanerdom to the point where it could work on
equal terms with English speaking South Africa” (Carter, 1958:73) and at the same time,
it regarded South Africa as a white man’s land. In an election manifesto of the NP in the
1921-elections it was stated (Kleynhans, 1987:147):
The position which the National Party takes up and on which its whole existence
is based, and the fundamental reason of its republican movement, is the equality
of the British and the Dutch [Afrikaners] in South Africa. Because this equality
could not be obtained under the old S.A. Party Government, the National Party
was called into existence; and because in the opinion of the Nationalists this
equality will not be obtained so long as the British connection continues to exist,
the National party [sic] has adopted as its practical ideal the severance of the
connection...Equality between British and Dutch is not only an election cry for
the present. It is also the soul of the party’s origin and existence.
It was also stated in an election manifesto of the NP for the elections of 1924, that
(Kleynhans, 1987:187):
Civilised labour will thus have to be protected against the pressure of the un-
civilised labour within the white man’s territory. As regards the native, equal
care will be taken for his existence and development within his territory.
At this stage Afrikaner nationalism was to a large extent a means to an end, but slowly
Afrikaner nationalist political thought developed and became steeped in cultural conscious-
ness and religious doctrine, and in particular a speciﬁc interpretation of Calvinism (Moodie,
1975). The Afrikaans Dutch Reformed Churches65 and the Afrikaner Broederbond66 played
65There were three churches, namely the Nederduits Hervormde Kerk, the Gereformeerde Kerk and the
Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (usually referred to as the “NG-kerk” (NGK) and often in the English
press, as the Dutch Reformed Church). The Nederduits Hervormde Kerk can also be translated as the
Dutch Reformed Church, but is a separate church. The NGK also had separate missionary churches for the
diﬀerent race groups, that played an important role in politics.
66It was established in 1918, ﬁrst as an overt organisation, but later as a covert and secret organisation for
the promotion of Afrikaner interests. Membership was not open, but was based on the recruitment of suitable
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important roles in deepening the intellectual base of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid
ideology.
The exclusive nature of Afrikaner nationalism often inspired criticism from its opponents.
Concerning the link between South African Calvinism and the justiﬁcation for apartheid,
Adam (1979:17) for example wrote:
One of the most recurrent perspectives used to explain apartheid policies stresses
the primitive Calvinism of Boers who, in an isolated corner of the world, missed
the Enlightenment by being exposed only to the Old Testament rather than
Voltaire. In their harsh frontier existence, it is said, Afrikaners developed...visions
of a civilizing mission by a chosen people with a destiny in a sea of primitive hea-
then natives. Such ideological ﬁxations were frequently detected in contemporary
policies which in this view render Afrikaners psychologically incapable of adapt-
ing to a post-colonial reality.
Formal apartheid was thus a product of Afrikaner nationalism in the sense that it was
initially seen as a means to an end, that is, an instrument for Afrikaner self-determination.
The distinction between apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism eventually became blurred and
it evolved as an end in itself, or stated diﬀerently, some proponents of Afrikaner national-
ism were unable to conceptualise Afrikaner self-determination without apartheid.67 Ethno-
nationalism as a result became a guiding principle in the political activities of a signiﬁcant
number of Afrikaners and after the NP came to power in 1948, the messianic character
of Afrikaner nationalism, and apartheid as its twin, became increasingly important as the
government worked towards the realisation of Afrikaner nationalist ideals. Not only did
Afrikaner nationalism have Afrikaner self-determination as a goal, but they also regarded it
as the right of all other race groups and in particular black ethnic groups. The homelands
policy, as well as separate political structures for the coloureds and Indians, was based on
self-determination as a guiding principle (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:94-103).
members who were Afrikaans and active members of one of the Dutch Reformed Churches. Though it played
an important role in the development of apartheid ideology, and in particular the idea that God decreed
separate ethnic groups, it however later became instrumental in the movement away from apartheid. By the
late 1970s, members of the Broederbond held all top political, civil service, church and many educational
positions.. The Broederbond also ensured that the education of Afrikaner children conformed to the teachings
of the Dutch Reformed Churches and Afrikaner culture - as interpreted by the Broederbond (Giliomee and
Schlemmer, 1993:94-96).
67Giliomee and Schlemmer (1993:114) hold the opinion that apartheid “has always been the instrument
of Afrikaner nationalism, never its master.“
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The support of apartheid by the Afrikaner political elite was important, but through
the years it was also supported by virtually every institution of Afrikaner nationalism. The
creation of the Afrikaner nationalist establishment in the early 1920s, was a process that
has been called the “bureaucratisation” of the Afrikaner ethos (Slabbert, 1989:8). In this
institutionalisation of Afrikaner nationalist solidarity, the Afrikaner Broederbond was of the
utmost importance in ensuring Afrikaner cultural consciousness as the centre of Afrikaner
ethnic group solidarity. Giliomee (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:251) writes:
In the present decision-making process the Bond acts as a secret communication
channel between the Government and the Afrikaner elite...it is both a generator
of ideas and a sounding board of government initiatives.
Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid played a pivotal role in Afrikaner political think-
ing. Lemon (1987:64), for example, emphasises the “cohesion and single-mindedness” of
the Afrikaner community in its support for apartheid. As Carter (1958:73) puts it: “Never
before in the history of South Africa has so single-minded an administration been in power,
or one that represents so intense an Afrikaner nationalism.”
The relationship between Afrikaner nationalists and those whites, who opposed Afrikaner
nationalism (including a section of the Afrikaners) was an interesting dimension of Afrikaner
nationalism.68 Afrikaner nationalists tolerated white non-nationalists though they were often
critical of them and in particular of those who advocated a racially integrated South Africa.
There were white non-Afrikaners who supported apartheid ideology - though not necessarily
Afrikaner nationalism. This gave rise to the concept of, “white nationalism” that implied the
self-determination of all whites (see Horowitz, 1992:7). There were, however, few intellectual
grounds in support of such an inclusive “white nationalism” (see O’Dowd, 1991:42-45).
Whites and in particular Afrikaners, were however, socialised into a belief that only through
apartheid could they secure and maintain their survival and their privileged position.
Afrikaner nationalism reached its zenith in the early sixties soon after South Africa be-
came a republic in 1961 outside the British Commonwealth. Horowitz (1992:12) notes that
the ideology supporting apartheid was being undermined as the institutions of apartheid
68Not all Afrikaners were followers of nationalism, and especially during the later years of NP rule, many
English-speaking whites voted during elections for the NP. (The NP was the most important but not the
only political party in support of Afrikaner nationalism.)
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were being strengthened. Towards the end of the seventies, there were already clear indica-
tions of changes in the ideological principles on which Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid
were based. Giliomee (1982:1) describes the years 1976-1982, as the “rollercoaster years”
during which the key ideological shift from the ideology of apartheid orthodoxy to what
historian, Moodie, (Giliomee, 1982:10) has called the “ideology of survival” took place. The
rollercoaster years were years of change for Afrikaners. This period was also characterised by
many contradictions as the government tried to soften apartheid, yet simultaneously tried
to enforce, for example, its policy on homelands. At this stage, apartheid was no longer an
end in itself - similar in a sense to Przeworski’s (1991) observation regarding the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe.
Though self-determination usually is a principle of separatist movements, Afrikaner na-
tionalism as a comprehensive ideology had no acceptable international relatives.69 To the
international community, it was too reminiscent of German Nazism which had been dis-
credited in the Second World War (Sisk, 1992:126). The United Nations (UN) adopted,
for example resolution 2396, which branded apartheid as “a crime against humanity“, in
1968 (A/RES/2396 (XXIII) 2/12/1968; Sisk, 1995:65). Largely as a result of its reliance on
apartheid and racial discrimination, Afrikaner nationalism was therefore isolated from the in-
ternational arena. The exclusive nature of Afrikaner nationalism and of the concept of “white
nationalism” had a similar counter-reaction internally among non-whites, in movements such
as African nationalism, Pan-Africanism, black consciousness and ethno-nationalism.
African Nationalism, Pan-Africanism, Black Consciousness and Ethno-Nationalism.
Black identity and power found expression mainly in African nationalism (to which African-
ism70 and Pan-Africanism are closely related) and black consciousness. These could be
regarded as the antithesis of Afrikaner nationalism. Both Pan-Africanism and black con-
sciousness were inspired by the fate of blacks within a white dominated political context.
They believed that blacks should have their own pride, should struggle for their own libera-
69It diﬀers signiﬁcantly from other separatist ideologies such as some interpretations of Zionism and
Palestinian self-determination.
70According to Leatt et al (1986:93-94) the formulation of Africanism by Lembede of the ANC Youth
League predates its ideological emergence in the rest of Africa.
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tion, and should search out the symbols of black culture that would persist in a new society.
They argued that South Africa is part of the continent of Africa where the majority of its
citizens are black Africans and, therefore, the overarching and dominant culture should be
that of black culture. This view saw whites as part of South Africa, but of a black dominated
South Africa (Collins, 1993:28-29).
African nationalism gave impetus to the search for an African personality (Wilson,
1963:2). Pan-Africanism, in turn, essentially propagated the unity of all Africans and par-
ticularly, those on the continent of Africa,71 “They [blacks] were divided by strong tribal
diﬀerences which tended to merge into a strong sense of racial consciousness. The racial
connotation was directed at the white man, the foreign oppressor” (Snyder, 1984:177). Pan-
Africanism thus strove to promote the interests of blacks through the unity of blacks72 and
the end of slavery and colonialism.
Already in the late nineteenth century, South African black intellectuals were engaged
in a quest for black unity in order to campaign for black rights. At an early stage, South
African blacks participated in the Pan-African Congresses. John L Dube,73 for example,
attended the Pan-African Congress of 1921 on behalf of the South African Native National
Congress (later the ANC). Pro-black thinking in South Africa in the sense of “Africa for the
Africans” soon found an international intellectual home and became a legitimate goal for its
adherents (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:16; Karis and Carter, 1973:409, 413, 424, 469; 514).
Since its inception, Africanists who advocated an exclusive Africanism, formed an important
group within the ANC (see Karis and Carter 1973:412).
Some of the Africanists within the ANC, objected to the ANC’s principle of multi-
racialism and the role that Indians and whites played within the ANC (Karis and Carter,
1977a:17-18). The allegation was made that the ANC was communist controlled. In Novem-
ber 1958, under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe, a section of the Africanists broke away
from the ANC and established the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in April 1959 (Karis and
71Initially, the term ’African’ referred to the black people of Africa, but the term evolved to encompass
a more geographical meaning. However, it remains a disputed term with no consensus on who is an African
and who is not.
72Within the South African context there was a tendency to regard whites as settlers and therefore as
colonialists, excluded from the term “African.”
73First President of the ANC (1912).
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Carter, 1977b:147-149).74 In October 1958, Albert Luthuli blamed the Afrikaner nationalists
and the government for:
[I]njecting ‘the virus of prejudice and sectionalism’ into the African community.
White ‘panderings to racialism’...were causing some Africans to try to ‘emulate’
the Nationalists in claiming exclusive control of South Africa...We have seen
developing - even though it is in its embryonic stage - a dangerously narrow
African nationalism, which itself tends to encourage us to go back to a tribalism
mentality (Karis and Carter, 1977a:310).
Black consciousness was of particular importance in South Africa during the seventies
and originated with the establishment of the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO)
in 1969. It shared many characteristics with the earlier pro-black ideologies and the objective
of its adherents was the preparation of the people for, “equal participation in a transformed
society that would reﬂect the outlook of the black majority” (Adam and Moodley, 1993:110).
SASO was inﬂuenced by the writings of, for example, Senghor, Ce´saire, Fanon, and Freire,
as well as black radicalism in the USA, even though its leaders stated that it could not be
equated with “Black Power” movements overseas (Adam and Moodley, 1993:109-110; Karis
and Gerhart, 1997:107).
The emergence of black theology75 provided an additional stimulus to black conscious-
ness as “a moral and political alternative to the ideology of liberalism” (Karis and Gerhart,
1997:109). Like Afrikaner nationalism, black consciousness also embodies a “tapestry of atti-
tudes, belief systems, cultural and political values” (Maphai, 1994:131). Maphai (1994:131)
identiﬁes six fundamental principles of black consciousness, namely: the need to develop
self-pride among blacks and to reject the second-class status accorded to them by whites;
self-reliance in the struggle against oppression; the revival of black culture to enable them
to ﬁnd their true selves; the psychological liberation of blacks to eﬀect their complete eman-
cipation; the rewriting of South African history that was primarily written from a white
perspective; and the exclusion of whites from black organisations, to enable blacks to regain
their self-esteem. Black consciousness in essence, rejected non-racialism and relegated whites
74However, the PAC did later admit whites as members.
75A theological way of thinking that interprets the Bible from the standpoint of the oppressed and




to an inconsequential position in a “post-revolutionary South Africa” based on their own
interpretation of socialism (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:89-155). The black consciousness
movement, though important, never succeeded in mobilising signiﬁcant support away from
the older organisations such as the ANC.
Ethno-nationalism among the black population was a controversial phenomenon and
formed part of the metaconﬂict. On the one hand, it was seen not only as a creation by the
Afrikaner nationalist government with the purpose of “divide in order to rule” but also as
a moral justiﬁcation of apartheid. On the other hand, any form of ethnic pride was seen as
playing into the hands of apartheid policy and was therefore opposed by those opposed to
apartheid (both black and white). Inkatha yeNukululeko yeSizwe (later the Inkatha Freedom
Party) was, for example seen as promoting a form of Zulu ethno-nationalism at the expense of
a broader unity among blacks that could be more eﬀective in the struggle against oppression.
Non-Racialism
Non-racialism and integrationism were the antithesis to exclusive nationalism such as Afrikaner
nationalism and African nationalism.76 In the context of the complicated and historically
speciﬁc forms of racism found in South Africa, the forms of non-racialism (or anti-racism)
were equally complex. A signiﬁcant section of the ANC advocated non-racialism and be-
lieved that blacks should not merely beat on the door of white society and demand entry,
they believed that the South African society belonged to everyone on a free and equal basis.
Everyone should have free access to political power, to social life and to opportunities to
better their lives. Although the ANC acknowledged cultural diﬀerences, it believed rather
more in those elements that were common to all and in a communal life-style in the South
Africa of the future. In other words, it believed in a society in which racism played no role
(Collins, 1993:28-29).
These principles were included in the Freedom Charter that was adopted in 1955. Of
particular importance is the adoption of the Charter by direct participation of the people
76Pan Africanism is not a precise concept. International Pan-Africanism had several variations of which
non-racialism and integrationism as espoused by for example Du Bois was indeed a variant. The more racist
variant are often referred to as Garveyism (see Wilson, 1963).
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in a “Congress of the People” in 1955 (Marx, 1992:35). The faction within the ANC that
advocated an inclusive non-racialism is thus often referred to as the Charterists. Though
some of the economic principles adopted by the Charter cannot be reconciled with liberal
philosophy, the non-racialists within the ANC are often seen as adherents of a liberal tradition
(Adam and Moodley, 1993:25; Leatt et al, 1986:58-59).
Non-racialism was also important among some whites and in particular among “liberal
whites.” Within the South African context non-racialism became roughly synonymous with
liberalism (Karis and Carter, 1973:73). A number of Afrikaner intellectuals and politicians,
for example General Smuts and Jan Hofmeyr were regarded as liberals, but white followers of
non-racialism and liberalism came mainly from English speaking whites (see Karis and Carter
1973:73-76). In 1938,77 young liberals and progressives established the Libertas Bond in
Johannesburg and the Libertas League of Action in Durban, the Institute of Race Relations
and a new journal, The Forum, appeared as an organ for “Hofmeyrian liberalism” (Karis
and Carter, 1973:73). Hofmeyr’s early death was a blow to liberalism, but it did survive as
an ideology among whites and led to the establishment of several political parties, including
the non-racial Liberal Party78 and the Progressive Party.79
Ordinary whites often had little knowledge of the conditions under which non-whites
lived, but exposure, often by chance, brought them into what may be called a liberal frame
of mind (Collins, 1993:28-29; see Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:96).
Non-racialism and liberalism fell well within the international political discourse and,
within the international arena, liberalism was one of the intellectual grounds for the anti-
apartheid movement.
THE CLASSICAL LEFT-RIGHT SPECTRUM
The ideologies within this spectrum do not, as already indicated exclude notions of racial
inclusion and exclusion.
77The year in which Afrikaner nationalists celebrated the centenary of the Great Trek.
78Established in 1953 and disbanded in 1968 when multi-racial associations were prohibited.




Communism’s80 roots can be traced back to the early working class in South Africa. Initially,
it sought to further the interests of both white and black labour, but a series of directives
from Moscow since 1927, had transformed local communism into an instrument in the Soviet
Union’s (USSR) campaign against British interests, by having as a goal, the establishment
of an independent “native” republic as an interim stage on the way to becoming a workers’
and peasants’ republic (Carter, 1958:61). The Communist Party of South Africa (later the
South African Communist Party) subsequently aligned itself with the struggle against white
political domination and “white” capital. Communist ideology had its ups and downs and
the party even disbanded for a period during the ﬁfties. However, as the government’s im-
plementation of apartheid intensiﬁed, the government suddenly found vigorous resistance in
the form of non-white opposition to the political system. Several factors contributed towards
the appeal of communism to a section of the South African society. Poverty, widespread use
of unskilled black labour with few rights and only limited access to trade unions, provided
fertile soil for communism to take root in. Communist ideology, or scientiﬁc socialism, was
important in a number of organisations, including a faction of the ANC (Karis and Gerhart,
1997:151).
Its non-racialist principles and Moscow’s interference were, however, problematic to some
African nationalists (see Carter, 1958:61-64; Karis and Gerhart, 1997:46-47;151). While the
international status of communism provided, an important infrastructure for the struggle
against apartheid, it nevertheless, also placed the struggle within the scope of the Cold War,
which would in the end prove to be a major obstacle in bringing the various sides in the
conﬂict, together. Thus, the signiﬁcant support of communism placed apartheid and the
struggle against apartheid ﬁrmly within the international arena.
The eventual demise of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as an
ideology that promised a new dawn, undermined its ideological content within the liberation
80Communism is indeed a variant of socialism and is often referred to as revolutionary socialism and
scientiﬁc socialism. In South African literature, the term ‘socialism’ is often used to refer to communism.
In this thesis, the term ‘communism’ is used to refer to the ideology of which the Soviet Union was the
prime example. There were several variations of communism, such as Marxism and Trotskyism, but the




movements, thereby opening the door for a possible settlement of the conﬂict on terms other
than pure communist principles. This was clearly demonstrated by the events that were to
follow in the later phases of the transition as would be discussed in the chapters to follow.
It is however necessary to brieﬂy refer to these at this stage. It is unlikely that the South
African government would have moved towards negotiations with the ANC as long as it was
strongly backed by the Soviet Union. Even as late as September 1989, the government was of
the opinion that the ANC could never have a role in the negotiations (Giliomee, 1995:88-92).
From the government’s point of view, the external environment improved dramatically with
the fall of communism in 1989. For the ﬁrst time, it considered negotiations a viable option.
The severity of the internal problems experienced by the Soviet Union, prompted Moscow to
tell the ANC that it was up to the South Africans themselves to reach a political settlement.
At the same time, the South African government believed that it stood a better chance of
containing a legalised ANC without Soviet backing (Giliomee, 1995:91-92).
Socialism
Various forms of socialism were adhered to by several organisations. Non-revolutionary
socialism, African socialism, black communalism and social-democracy were all important
in this regard. Even Afrikaner nationalism had some socialist principles in the sense that,
even though private ownership was supported, it favoured an extensive role for the state,
both in society, as well as in the economy. This fact would bring it closer to the anti-apartheid
movements once the obstacle of racial exclusion was removed.
Due to the extent of poverty and the adverse living conditions of labourers, socialism
provided an attractive alternative to both communism and liberalism. On the one hand, it
was less extreme and less controlled by external forces than communism and on the other
hand, it provided for the interests of the majority that lived in poverty. In the Maﬁkeng
Manifesto, a policy document of the Black People’s Convention (a black consciousness organ-
isation) provision was made for a mixed economy even though the document was explicitly




The non-racial character of liberalism has already been discussed. Capitalism and individu-
alism are two additional features of liberalism that are of importance. In this regard, it stood
in opposition to both socialism and communism. Liberalism faced some economic obstacles
within the South African context, in the sense that capitalism and apartheid were seen to
be working together. Thus, liberalism concentrated on non-racialism and supported the
idea of a welfare state. The support for capitalism and individualism came mainly from the
white community and in particular those involved in “big business.” There were non-white
organisations, such as Inkatha that supported capitalism, but they were in the minority.
Conservatism and Traditionalism
Though conservatism and traditionalism diﬀer essentially (see Susser, 1995), they are similar
in the sense that both emphasise respect for established customs and institutions, hierar-
chy, as well as the role and position of the authorities. The more rightist organisations of
Afrikaner nationalism and ethnic traditionalism among blacks, shared characteristics with
conservatism and traditionalism respectively. The support enjoyed by both ideologies was
never signiﬁcant and was often the subject of intense criticism. The government tried to mo-
bilise ethnic traditionalism in support of apartheid, with the result that its supporters were
often labelled as collaborators. Conservatism among whites was again regarded as outdated
thinking that was not in touch with reality.
In conclusion, ideological cleavages are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, in terms of
its ideological spectrum, South Africa could be regarded as a polarised society, as there was a
continued wide gap in ideological orientation. The extremes of racially exclusive nationalism
among whites and its antithesis of African nationalism were complicating factors. Likewise,
were the extremes of communism and liberal capitalism. It was unlikely that the ideological
gap created by these extremes, housing the major players in the political game, could be
bridged without outside pressure. However, race exclusivity and “hard line” communism
were probably the most important obstacles to overcome. Once these were out of the way,
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the ideological gap would shrink considerably.
Secondly, ideological cleavages coincided largely with race and class cleavages. The sup-
porters of communism came mainly from non-whites and particularly from the black working
class - however, prominent and inﬂuential non-whites and whites were also members of these
organisations.
Thirdly, Afrikaner nationalism largely existed in isolation from the rest of the world.
All of the other contending ideologies had international equivalents from which support
could be mobilised. Because of the internationalisation of the struggle against apartheid,
Afrikaner nationalists enjoyed very little international support from a nationalist ideological
perspective. It was therefore unlikely that Afrikaner nationalism could have survived in the
long term in a globalising world.
3.2.4 CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND CLEAVAGES
Conﬂict81 and violence82 have been part of the South African political scene throughout its
history. From the discussion of racial, class and ideological cleavages it is obvious that these
cleavages provided fertile ground for conﬂict and violence which were nurtured along the
various lines of division. In turn, these cleavages were, nurtured by the very conﬂicts and
violence that they had engendered.
The conﬂicts and violence that were present within the South African society were multi-
faceted and complex dynamic entities. The purpose of this section is merely to draw attention
to those aspects of conﬂict and violence that are relevant to an analysis of South Africa’s
transition to democracy. Conﬂict, as well as violence, is indicative of the extent of polari-
sation that exists between the “warring” parties involved in the conﬂict. Thus, part of the
transition to democracy required a settlement of the conﬂict and an end to the violence
present in the South African society.83 However, the true nature and causes of the conﬂict
81For purposes of this discussion, the concept of “conﬂict” implies a state of opposition between ideas
and interests that may involve a struggle, often violent, among opposing parties.
82The term “violence” for purposes of this discussion, has two diﬀerent, yet related meanings, both of
which are important within the South African context. The more common meaning implies the use of
physical force in order to cause harm such as injury and destruction. A second meaning is the unjust and
unwarranted display of force in order to manipulate people into compliance.
83It is again important to take note of the work of, for example, John Keane (1988) in which it is argued
that violence is integral to democracy.
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were issues of dispute. There was, for example, no consensus on whether conﬂict was the
result of a class struggle, or of a struggle against apartheid only, or the consequence of a
desire for equal rights including equal political rights, or whether it was indeed a complex
manifestation of a combination of all of these aspects (Horowitz, 1991:27-32). Diﬀerences
in how the conﬂict was viewed were important for it implied diﬀerent interpretations of the
real problems and their solutions. It could aﬀect any future decisions on negotiations as well
as the content of those negotiations, “For instance, South Africans who challenge racial dis-
crimination argue that their success will be the ﬁrst step toward ending national domination
or class exploitation, which they view as outgrowths of discrimination” (Marx, 1992:6).
Within the South African context, there were two broad categories of violence, namely
those that involved the state, either as perpetrators or as targets of violence, and communal
violence (both inter- and intra-) that involved sections of society.
Various aspects of the socio-political context of South Africa were of particular impor-
tance with regard to conﬂict and violence in the pre-liberalisation phase. Firstly, the imple-
mentation and enforcement of apartheid were regarded by its opponents as violence perpe-
trated by the state. Secondly, the opposition to apartheid broadened, as the intensiﬁcation
of its struggle against apartheid eventually led to the commencement of the armed struggle
itself. Thirdly, the eruption of the Soweto riots prepared the way for a more intense and
sophisticated internal struggle. Fourthly, the emergence of black-on-black violence would
prove to be a complicating factor in the transition, as will be discussed in the following
chapters. Lastly, the attitudes of all parties to the various manifestations of the conﬂict,
hardened.
VIOLENCE INVOLVING THE STATE
As mentioned before, the implementation and enforcement of the policy of apartheid were
seen by its opponents as a form of violence perpetrated by the state. Thus, the state was
seen as the initiator of violence. Opposition and reaction to apartheid took on many forms,
moreover, becoming increasingly violent as part of the struggle against apartheid. Z K
Matthews stated in 1964:
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Being under the domination of another group is not exactly a pleasant thing for
those who have to suﬀer it, and there is nothing else for the latter group to do
but to continue to ﬁght against domination until they overcome it (Karis and
Gerhart, 1997:352).
Conceptually, the conﬂict between the apartheid state and the forces seeking an end
to its rule, was portrayed as the antagonism between “the masses” and “the regime.” The
opponents of apartheid did not make clear distinctions between the state, structures and
departments within it, and the government, as they all seemed to be part of what they
perceived as the same repressive machinery.
In the early history of the Union, civil disobedience, petitions and deputations, strikes
and boycotts as well as demonstrations (marches) were often used in reaction to government
policy. The Deﬁance Campaign84 of the ﬁfties signalled an intensiﬁcation of the reaction by
those that opposed apartheid and the apartheid government. In its aftermath, the success
of a non-violent struggle began to be questioned:
[D]id not reliance on such tactics [the Deﬁance Campaign] impede the develop-
ment of popular realization that the South African system was inherently vio-
lent and could be destroyed only by revolutionary violence85 (Karis and Carter,
1977a:646).
Likewise, government clampdowns intensiﬁed and became more violent. A turning point
in the history of violence came with the Sharpeville incident on 21 March 1960, when police
opened ﬁre on thousands of demonstrators that had participated in a march organised by the
PAC. By the end of March, the South African government had called a state of emergency
(Karis and Carter, 1977a:804). Criticism of non-violent resistance had grown among loyal
members of the ANC and by the following year, the ANC had decided to “depart from its
50-year-old policy of non-violence...and agreed to the formation of a military wing” (Karis
and Carter, 1977a:648).
The spiral of violence involving the state and its opponents continued and another crit-
ical point was the eruption of the Soweto Riots of 1976.86 This was the beginning of the
84Campaign for the Deﬁance of Unjust Laws.
85In many instances, the term, “violence,” is used as a synonym for, “armed struggle,” or at least to
“cause physical injury and damage.”
86There was a long prelude to the Soweto Riots that eventually erupted in June 1976. It was fuelled by
unhappiness about “Bantu” education, and in particular, the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of
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mobilisation of the masses, and in particular the youth, resulting in the intensiﬁcation of
the armed struggle, as well as intense and violent attempts by the government to suppress
the uprising (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:156-188; Race Relations Survey, 1976:51-87). Ac-
cording to the government-appointed Cillie Commission, 575 people died in the riots during
the period 16 June 1976 and 28 February 1977, while the SAIRR estimate of deaths for the
period between June 1976 and October 1977 was 700 (Guelke, 2000:240-241). The nation-
wide uprisings that were to follow, “brought momentous developments in popular awareness
and...a new political consciousness and sophistication” (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:184).
Until the Soweto riots, the armed struggle had mainly been planned outside South Africa
because the organisations involved had already been banned in the early sixties. It was easier
for the government to deal with and contain the external armed struggle, than was the case
with the internal uprisings that brought a new dimension to the conﬂict. Pressure was
to be exerted on the government to such an extent that it became diﬃcult to govern the
country eﬀectively. Violence involving the state brought increased international attention
and intervention initiatives, to South Africa; put pressure on apartheid as a viable ideology;
and also questioned the government’s ability to rule without force.
Furthermore, there were indications of disunity among the elite group, as signalled by the
diﬀerences that existed between conservative (verkrampte) and more enlightened (verligte)
members of the NP and the Broederbond.87 The possibility of a regime breakdown was there-
fore not too far fetched. However, the capability of the state to retaliate with increasingly
more violent and repressive means,88 was underestimated by its opponents and signiﬁed clear
limitations to the armed struggle (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:24-25). The realisation soon
came that a search for a political solution remained important, “Neither side could defeat
the other, but each could prevent the other from ruling” (Adam and Moodley, 1993:21).
instruction in schools. Many left the country to join the armed struggle.
87The breakaway of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in 1968 from the NP, had already signalled
regime disunity in its approach to apartheid and the socio-political position of non-whites.
88In October 1977, the state security apparatus made a comprehensive crackdown on its opponents.
Eighteen organisations were banned, several newspapers closed, banning orders served on several critics of
the government and several others detained (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:316; South African Survey, 1977:3).




Events during the armed struggle, however, nurtured and exacerbated hostilities be-
tween the state and its opponents and hardened attitudes on both sides - casting doubt
on the settlement of the conﬂict without outside intervention. The support for the armed
struggle that came from communist states and particularly the Soviet Union, likewise made
international involvement in any settlement likely. The threat of communism and the So-
viet Union’s support of the struggle against apartheid did however, prompt the white elite
to rethink their strategies, “Fundamental to new government thinking was a comprehensive
‘national strategy,’ designed to unite black and white ‘moderates’ in a combined military and
socio-economic assault on a common enemy: ‘Marxism’” (Race Relations Survey, 1979:1).
COMMUNAL VIOLENCE
In the history of South Africa (even prior to 1910), most communal conﬂicts involved ethnic-
ity and/or ideology. Conﬂicts among black ethnic groups prior to the coming of whites were
a reality, as was the intense conﬂict between Afrikaners and the English. Conﬂicts involving
blacks and whites (e.g. the Frontier Wars), other than in the struggle, were important and
usually well documented. Since the seventies, black-on-black violence had begun to fuel
divisions within the South African society. The Soweto riots and the uprisings that followed
encouraged the elimination (often in brutal ways such as necklacing) of those blacks who
were regarded as collaborators with the regime and enemies of the struggle. The problems
the state faced as a result of black-on-black violence often seemed intractable and ﬁnding a
solution would be extremely complicated. Furthermore, the government were often accused
of manipulating black-on-black violence in an attempt to further its own agenda (see Guelke,
2000).
ETHNIC CONFLICT
A particular form of communal conﬂict was ethnic conﬂict. Ethnicity is, as has already been
alluded to, a controversial concept within any analysis of South African politics and a society
that involves cultural and linguistic diﬀerences. As such, it is part of the metaconﬂict in the




Some intellectuals such as the African nationalists, communists and some white liberals
rejected ethnicity and therefore also tribalism and factionalism as a source of cleavage (see
Adam and Moodley, 1993:21-22).89 Ethnic divisions were seen as creations of colonialism,
racism and capitalism in order to conquer and subjugate the peoples of Africa. Ethnicity
played an important role in the conquest of southern Africa, because the lack of unity among
tribal units made blacks vulnerable to conquest and exploitation. Thus, ethnicity had the
potential of being exploited for oppressive strategies in the classic sense of “divide in order
to rule” and could be politicised for this purpose. This viewpoint was inspired by the
conquest, oppression and exploitation of black tribal communities, as well as the authorities’
obstruction of any attempt to forge a broader unity among the tribes (Thompson and Prior,
1982:218; Horowitz, 1991:47-50; Adam and Moodley, 1993:21-22).
The launching of Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSiswe90 in 1975 as a primarily Zulu cultural
organisation closely associated with the KwaZulu homeland, paved the way for conﬂict
among blacks in Natal and other areas such as mining communities, where Zulu migrant
labourers were common. Inkatha members and supporters played a pivotal role in the
resulting conﬂicts, but whether these were essentially ethnic, or ideological in nature were
heavily debated. Ethnic interpretations also fuelled debates of whether these were natural
conﬂicts or the consequence of policies of “divide and rule.” Thus, conﬂicts involving ethnic
groups and the emergence of cultural movements such as Inkatha could not be regarded as
social developments with prime signiﬁcance in themselves, but could be viewed as a reﬂection
of more fundamental forces within the capitalist and racist power structures. Thus, according
to these arguments, it is apartheid and the system of racial exploitation that have to be
addressed, rather than their manifestations in the form of ethnic conﬂicts (see Horowitz,
1981:270; Thompson and Prior, 1982:217).
Inkatha, like the ANC, was opposed to apartheid, but the organisations diﬀered fun-
damentally in their strategies and policy. While the ANC refused to co-operate with the
structures of apartheid, Inkatha was prepared to function within those structures with the
89Tribes are cultural units and factions are divisions within tribes.
90A national cultural liberation movement. Later it evolved into the Inkatha Freedom Party.
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purpose of undermining them, but Buthelezi’s (the Inkatha leader) refusal to accept full in-
dependence for KwaZulu was a serious blow to the homeland policy. Whereas, the ANC was
a proponent of the armed struggle, Inkatha favoured peaceful negotiations with the govern-
ment. The ANC was a proponent of socialism, but Inkatha was a proponent of capitalism.
Lastly, while the ANC pleaded for sanctions against South Africa, Inkatha did not because
they felt that blacks would suﬀer the most (Venter, 1996:78).
In spite of these diﬀerences, friendly relations initially existed between the ANC and
Inkatha. However, the turning point came, when an ANC delegation under the leadership of
Oliver Tambo met an Inkatha delegation, led by Buthelezi, in London in 1979 during a three-
day conference. The purpose was to discuss strategies against the apartheid government
and to discuss closer co-operation between the two organisations. The high level of the
delegations from both organisations conﬁrmed that the conference was a show of power,
symbolising that neither wanted to subject itself to the other (Venter, 1996:81-82; Karis and
Gerhart, 1997:270-274), but “the two groups were discovering how wide was the chasm of
disagreement and competition that divided them politically” (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:271).
It seems likely that the two organisations each posited its own strategies for violent and
non-violent resistance and that neither was prepared to make concessions.
Whether ethnicity and ethno-nationalism lay at the root of these diﬀerences is a matter
of great debate and controversy. For some, ethnic or tribal divisions have structured South
African society, culture and history, and tribalism should therefore be a fundamental con-
sideration in any analysis of South African society. For others, ethnicity or tribalism is an
invention of the oppressor, devised to divide the majority. Even the mere discussion of the
concept gives it unwarranted recognition and status. Thus, the diﬃculties and obstacles in
the way of any positive examination of ethnicity in South Africa, particularly with regard
to conﬂict, are immense. Indeed, these diﬃculties are part of the problem itself (Horowitz,
1991:27-32).
The escalation of violence hardened attitudes, but ironically, at the same time, it also
served to bring the message home that the conﬂict would not be resolved merely by force. The
resistance to apartheid, and the system geared to ﬁght it, were interlocked in an accelerating
156
Chapter 3
cycle of revolution and repression. Obviously, conﬂict and violence would be complicating
factors in South Africa’s transition to democracy.
3.3 ADDITIONAL MACRO-STRUCTURAL FACTORS IN SOUTH
AFRICA’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
Apart from the societal cleavages discussed above, there were a number of other macro-
structural factors that could facilitate, or obstruct South Africa’s movement towards a tran-
sition to democracy. A changing demographic proﬁle was an important factor, but which
was also closely linked to other factors such as the political culture, economic development
and crisis, international pressure and regime disunity.
3.3.1 A CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE
The importance of a changing demographic proﬁle as a factor in the democratisation of South
Africa should be viewed against the backdrop of the main objectives of Afrikaner nationalism
and apartheid, as well as the goals set for South Africa as a whole. As already discussed,
economic development and the preservation of the dominant position of whites and white
culture were important in this regard, but these became increasingly diﬃcult to reconcile
with one another. A weakening demographic base of whites, changes in the class composition
and culture of the various race groups (including whites) and increased militancy among non-
whites, facilitated and even forced the rethinking of the political principles underlying the
South African political system among whites.
The demographic decline of whites was an important factor in the shift away from classic
apartheid (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:115; Giliomee, 1995:86-88). Until 1960, whites
constituted twenty per cent of the total population, but since then, the white demographic
base had begun to shrink. The proportion of whites to the total population, fell to fourteen
per cent by 1987 (Table 3.2).
Rapid urbanisation brought changes in the distribution of the population and in par-
ticular this resulted in fewer whites in non-urban areas and more blacks in urban areas.
Non-whites outnumbered whites in every major city and in white rural areas, non-whites
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TABLE 3.2: Population by Statutory Group, 1951-1987
1951 1970 1980 1987
Black 8,560,083 (67) 15,057,952 (70,5) 21,307,749 (73) 26,313,898 (74,5)
White 2,641,689 (21) 3,752,528 (17,5) 4,453,273 (15) 4,911,000 (14)
Coloured 1,103,016 (9) 2,018,453 (9) 2,554,039 (9) 3,069,000 (9)
Asian 366,664 (3) 620,436 (3) 794,639 (3) 913,000 (2,5)
Total 12,671,452 21,448,169 29,109,700 35,206,898
Percentage of total population (excluding Asians) appear in brackets.
Source: Race Relations Survey (in Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:115)
outnumbered whites by six to one (Duggan, 1973:11). Thus, proportionally white communi-
ties came increasingly under pressure from a black majority. The large number of urbanising
non-whites furthermore led to the growth of huge squatter-camps. By the late seventies, half
a million people were housed in informal settlements in greater Inanda, adjoining Durban,
250,000 in Edenvale-Zwartkops near Pietermaritzburg, 300,000 in Winterveld near Pretoria,
100,000 in Mdantsane near East London, and approximately the same number in Crossroads
near Cape Town’s airport (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:115-116). The adverse conditions
in these informal settlements posed several health and social risks, as Adam and Moodley
(1993:12) put it, “what happens among the have-nots eventually aﬀects the haves.”
During the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, South African whites enjoyed economic self-
suﬃciency, but a growing economy began to require more unskilled and skilled labour than
could be supplied by the white population group. As a result, there was an acute shortage
of human resources in both the public and the private sectors (Giliomee and Schlemmer,
1989:115). The government greatly increased the number of whites employed in the civil
service during the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid 1970s, the state had over-stretched itself
and there were simply not enough whites to staﬀ those positions in the private and public
sectors that were traditionally reserved for them. Even the implementation of the myriad of
apartheid laws came under pressure. The mammoth Department of Bantu Administration
and Development91 simply found itself unable to curb the ﬂow of blacks into the cities. Thus,
out of necessity, more and more positions, traditionally reserved for whites, were opened to
non-whites (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:116).
91The name of this department was changed several times in order to ”soften” its racial connotation.
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Strategic concerns placed an additional burden on whites. Strategically, the state found
itself increasingly in a hostile environment. The independence of Angola and Mozambique,
an anti-South African struggle in South West Africa (Namibia) and military involvement in
both Angola and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), overburdened a defence force consisting
of mainly white males (see Race Relations Survey, 1976:1). Extensive compulsory military
service by white males92 placed additional demands on a white workforce that was already
unable to meet the demands of ordinary employment. Lengthy periods of military service
disrupted the functioning of many sectors in the economy. Thus, as the military call-ups
lengthened, they were seen increasingly as a burden (see Guise, 1993:21). Conscription for
whites only, was in fact a form of discrimination against whites and hence a penalty on the
white population.
Increased black militancy at home made even further demands on an over-extended police
force. As President Botha expressed in a biography:
I realise that there are today tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of
brown people [coloureds] who are in all respects better than the weakest [swakste]
whites. This is one of the burning questions of our population. We must give
these people a say [inspraak], a greater share in the land - in the administration
of the country, as civil servants, and in many other positions which you cannot
ﬁll with your weak whites...If we don’t do this we will cause our own down-fall
(De Villiers and De Villiers, 1984:89 in Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:116).
A further problem was the tax base that consisted mainly of whites. The relative decline
of the white population, entailed a heavy tax burden on them to fund the administration of
a growing, mainly non-white, population and a costly apartheid policy. Figure 3.2 provides
an indication of the amount of tax paid by each population group in 1974.
Whites increasingly began to question the viability of a costly policy that was unaccept-
able to a proportionally growing majority. Moreover, specialists presented future scenarios
and demographic data to cabinet that pointed to a steady weakening of the white demo-
graphic and political base (Giliomee, 1995:87; Thompson and Prior, 1982:218-219). A re-
evaluation by the Afrikaner elite of apartheid as an instrument of Afrikaner self-determination
92Conscription applied to white males only. Apart from a two year compulsory period of military service,
there was an annual military service of usually three months’ duration. In addition, volunteers were recruited










FIGURE 3.2: Tax According to Population Group: 1974
Source: Race Relations Survey, 1976:213
was inevitable. In a document titled, Political Values for the Survival of the Afrikaner, com-
piled by the Afrikaner Broederbond, it was argued that ultimately the most important
prerequisite for Afrikaner survival was the acceptability of a new political dispensation to
the majority of the population. In a concluding passage, the document stated bluntly: “The
greatest risk that we are taking today is not taking any risks. The will to survive as Afrikan-
ers and our faith and energy will serve as our greatest guarantee” (Giliomee, 1995:87).
Changes in the demography and in particular the declining demographic base of whites
thus challenged the perception of apartheid as an instrument of white self-determination.
This would become, together with the other challenges the government faced, a source of
elite disunity.
3.3.2 POLITICAL CULTURE
In chapter two, the role and importance of the presence of democratic values within society
as facilitators of democratisation, were discussed. Within the South African context, it is
important to note that democracy was, as already mentioned, obtaining a ﬁrm hold on
the South African society during the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
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century. Whites became fully enfranchised when the vote was granted to white women in
1930. A white parliament was modelled on the Westminster system, the Rule of Law applied,
regular elections were held, the executive was accountable to parliament and participation
was unrestricted. Freedom of the press was largely respected by the authorities and the
government refrained from interfering in the political activities of political parties and even
of many of those organisations that campaigned for the rights of non-whites.
Even though non-whites initially enjoyed limited political rights, these were not extended
in the same manner as democratic rights had been granted to the white population. The
political rights of blacks were eﬀectively frozen with the establishment of the Union in 1910.
Thereafter, they faced an uphill and eventually futile battle to retain the limited rights
they had previously enjoyed. Thus, liberal democratic values were already well established,
not only among whites, but also among a number of non-whites. Part of the conﬂict was
about extending political rights to all South Africans, irrespective of colour. Non-whites
often worked closely with white liberals in their campaigns for political rights and had
therefore been exposed to these values. Liberal values for example, played a role in the
adoption of the Freedom Charter, which as mentioned before, had been adopted by the
people. Liberal values were, as indicated in the section on ideological cleavages, not the only
values that non-whites ascribed to. However, the importance of non-whites having been
exposed to democratic values, within South Africa, should not be ignored. In this sense, the
South African context for transition diﬀered substantially from many other transitions to
democracy.
For the greater part of the long history of non-whites’ struggle against oppression, peace-
ful means, such as deputations, petitions, consultations, conferences and civil disobedience
were the preferred methods of protest. The armed struggle was only adopted in 1961 and
it was often justiﬁed by arguing that it was a reaction to state brutality. However, rev-
olutionary solutions were advocated by the left-wing. Thus, preferences for solving issues
through peaceful means should be seen as compatible with some of the fundamental values




It should, however, be noted that white “democracy” was to an extent, a liability, because
the government often preferred to take decisions that would not endanger the power base of
the ruling party, but which were not necessarily in the long term interests of South Africa
as a whole. Thus, part of the reluctance to extend democratic rights, was the fear of losing
power.
3.3.3 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS
As discussed in chapter two, the economy has a double role in facilitating democracy. On
the one hand, increased economic development and aﬄuence will eventually lead to an
increased demand for political rights, as well as a better chance to sustain democracy. On
the other hand, research has shown that many transitions take place when the economy
comes under pressure (see Haggard et al, 1995; Gill, 2000). Both economic development and
economic diﬃculties were present in South Africa. An additional consequence of economic
development, within the South African transitional process, was its integration of the South
African society and the pressure it put on the viability of apartheid either as a goal in itself
or as an instrument for Afrikaner self-determination.
It is diﬃcult to correlate early democratisation in South Africa with economic develop-
ment, since the economy was quite underdeveloped. However, after the uniﬁcation, economic
development clearly correlated with political participation and activism. Economic growth
and modernisation were conducive to the organisation of labour in order to improve the un-
derpriviledged masses’ material beneﬁts (see Marx, 1992:192). Attempts to limit the access
of non-whites to a developing economy, in favour of whites, caused widespread dissatisfac-
tion and was an additional factor that prompted non-whites to campaign for their rights. In
spite of these limitations, the economic development of South Africa improved the economic
situation of all race groups in general.
Since the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the second half of the
nineteenth century, the South African economy underwent dramatic changes, which in turn,
aﬀected social patterns such as urbanisation. In spite of attempts to prescribe and proscribe
the non-whites’ access to the economy, it was the economy that played a cementing role
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in keeping the various “parts” of the population together. It was this fact that would
prove to be the Achilles heel of apartheid. For as long as whites could supply the economy
with its workforce, it was possible to preserve the colour-bar in employment (see Guise,
1993:22). This soon proved to be wishful thinking and non-whites increasingly became a
source of labour in an expanding and diversifying economy, “industrialists were more eﬀective
in imposing their interests upon the day to day administration of inﬂux control policy, than in
its design and legislative promulgation” (Posel, 1989:199; Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:116;
Giliomee, 1995:87).
Certain factors facilitated the entry of non-whites into the economy. As unskilled and
even semi-skilled labourers, they received lower salaries than whites received and were there-
fore in demand in the various sectors of the economy (see Duggan, 1973:111-116). The early
phase of industrialisation was characterised by the predominance of mining and agriculture
as well as a reliance on uneducated and poorly-trained black workers, many of whom were
migrants. Some employers preferred to make use of migrant labour. In fact, a migrant
workforce of South Africans helped to integrate geographically widespread communities into
the wider South African society and thus into South African politics as well. It had already
been stated in 1964 by the then Minister of Bantu Aﬀairs, that if apartheid were to fail it
would be due to uncontrolled economic integration (Posel, 1989:214).
Increased economic development, and the rise of the manufacturing sector since World
War II (Table 3.4) has increased the demand for a skilled and productive workforce.















1950 14.5 15.1 16.5 11.3 11.2 31.4
1960 11.9 17.8 19.1 10.7 10.8 29.5
1970 8.3 18.3 21.2 12.2 9.5 30.5
1980 8.5 11.5 25.6 12.1 9.9 32.4
*At constant 1974 prices by type of economic activity.
Sources: Giliomee and Schlemmer (1993:117); Greenberg (1980:426); South African Reserve
Bank Quarterly Bulletin, 1981
A shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour opened up new avenues for non-whites
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(Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:117; Posel, 1989: 204). The percentage of skilled and semi-
skilled labourers in the black workforce in the manufacturing industry increased from 9,5 per
cent to 16 per cent between 1936 and 1960 (Posel, 1989:205). There was likewise an increased
demand for black skilled labour in the other sectors of the economy. The percentage growth
in the employment of blacks soon exceeded that of whites and the trend was to continue.
Between 1971 and 1977, whites comprised only a quarter of the increase in fully employed,
skilled, blue-collar workers (15 600 out of 65 700). Employers increasingly wished to train
blacks and employ them in more senior positions in spite of opposition from white trade
unions and apartheid purists in the government. In 1977, at the end of a severe recession,
forty-ﬁve per cent of a sample of leading manufacturers expressed the view that the lack of
adequate skilled labour was compromising production and by 1980, this ﬁgure rose to eighty
per cent. These shortages forced both the government and employers to open the labour
market to non-whites (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:117).
These developments eﬀected major changes in the racial proﬁle of the labour market.
Middle-level human resources, for example, dropped from eighty-two per cent white at the
beginning of the sixties, to sixty-ﬁve per cent in 1981. The entry into middle-level positions
was spearheaded by coloureds and Indians, but the advance of blacks was not insigniﬁcant.
The apartheid hierarchy remained intact, because as whites moved upwards, non-whites
ﬁlled the positions that became vacant (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:117).
A small yet important professional and capital class developed among non-whites. There
was for example, a sharp increase in both white and black civil servants, particularly police,
teachers, and nurses, as the state tried to cope with the administrative demands of the
fast-growing black population.
Another important development was the narrowing of the gap between the remuneration
of non-whites and whites. Between 1970 and 1975 the white-black wage gap fell by 3,6 per
cent per annum and by 2,3 per cent per annum between 1975 and 1981(Nattrass, 1990:118).
Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989:117) quotes Merle Lipton (1988) as follows:
Increasing numbers of them [blacks] in many branches of industry...are doing the
same jobs as whites, even though this may be done on diﬀerent shop ﬂoors of the
same factory, in diﬀerent factories or in diﬀerent areas. Moreover, many of these
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blacks...are in superior jobs to those of some whites.
Even though non-whites and in particular, the black majority may have enjoyed equality
in the workplace, and may have occupied positions superior to whites, socially and politically
they still held inferior positions. It is understandable that this increasingly became an
untenable situation that would result in the intensiﬁcation of the onslaught on the “regime.”
As indicated segregation caused the black elite to co-operate and mobilise the black working
class, instead of co-operating with the white elite.
Mobilisation of the working class was aided by the growth in the number of black trade
unions and their increased sophistication - all products of industrialisation and economic
development. The growth of trade unions was facilitated by reforms in labour relations that
emanated from the recommendations of the Wiehann Commission of 1979. Unions were
established at shop-ﬂoor level and developed close links with various “struggle” organisa-
tions, such as civic associations in the black townships (Webster, 1991:54-55; De Villiers,
1993:331). Webster (1991:57), advanced the concept of social movement unionism, that is
“union involvement in new urban social movements such as the civics and other organisations
that are traditionally seen as outside the union movement” to explain the evolving form of
trade unionism (De Villiers, 1993:331-332). This type of unionism is common where the
working class is excluded from political participation. In other words, in addition to their
“bread-and-butter” function, unions become involved in a broad range of political issues (De
Villiers, 1993:331-332) as will be discussed later in this chapter and in chapters four and ﬁve.
The South African economy experienced signiﬁcant growth and diversiﬁcation, but also
increasingly experienced pressure in a number of areas. Shortages in skilled labour, politi-
cised industrial action, increased black militancy, the brain drain, government actions and
apartheid policy all began to impact negatively on production, investor conﬁdence and eco-
nomic growth in general. Another source of pressure came from the international arena and
international sanctions were important in this regard. International sanctions aggravated
some of the weaknesses of the South African economy and curbed economic growth. The
eﬀect of sanctions must, however, not be over-emphasised. Foreign investment was partly in-




Thus, sanctions worked in tandem with internal pressures to create a pervasive sense
of business pessimism. Only by negotiating a stable political framework attractive to new
investment, could the government hope to address the country’s fundamental economic prob-
lems, particular1y the grave crisis regarding unemployment among blacks and the over tax-
ation of the taxpaying section of the population (Giliomee, 1995:89).
Economic development slowly undermined and eroded apartheid and fuelled demands
for equal and democratic rights. The economic problems experienced because of a number
of factors, prompted the government to pay attention to these, including the demand for a
new political dispensation. Economic conditions could, therefore, be regarded as important
within the South African transitional process.
3.3.4 INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE
The role of international or external factors in the process of democratisation was discussed
in chapter two. As mentioned, the contribution of international factors is usually secondary
to domestic factors, but these often enhance the eﬀect of domestic (internal) factors. It
has been noted that international pressure may be decisive in determining whether a state
becomes a democracy or not (Huntington, 1984:205-7; 1991:85-100; Whitehead, 1986:3-46;
Gill, 2000:105-106).
According to Sisk (1992:126), there is a clear link between international political action
and the end of apartheid in South Africa. The government’s eventual decision to negotiate
was also inﬂuenced by economic pressures among which, foreign sanctions played a deﬁnite,
if complex, role (Giliomee, 1995:88). Apartheid in South Africa became one of the most
pressing issues troubling the international community in the twentieth century. No other
issue has commanded more sustained attention from the UN than apartheid. The focus in
this section is on the extent to which external factors might have determined South Africa’s
prospects for democratisation and which might have provided the needed incentives for the
various elites and broader segments of the population to move towards regime transition
(see Karl, 1990:4; Manning, 1990:94). In short, the focus is on the connection between the
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domestic and international struggle against apartheid.
The breadth and depth of the international pressure exerted on South Africa, both for-
mally through international organisations, governments, and international ﬁnancial institu-
tions as well as informally through the activities of non-governmental organisations such
as the London-based Anti-Apartheid Movement, were phenomenal. South Africa was con-
demned for its apartheid policy in virtually every international forum (Sisk, 1992:127).
As discussed in chapter two, three types of international pressure are important, namely
direct and conscious policy from outside the particular state concerned; pressures emanating
from the structures of the international economy (Gill, 2000:18); and the persuasive eﬀect of
the example set by the democratisation of other states (Pridham, 1991:10, 18-20; Huntington,
1991:100-106).
MECHANISMS OF DIRECT PRESSURE
Mechanisms of direct pressure usually include penetration, intervention, isolation and medi-
ation (Geldenhuys, 1989:272). All of these were employed in varying degrees by a number
of international actors to exert pressure on the South African government to put an end to
apartheid and to democratise itself.
Penetration
Penetration of the South African scene manifested itself in the presence and involvement
of international diplomats, agents, agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), busi-
ness and private individuals in the political, economic, defence and socio-cultural aﬀairs (see
Geldenhuys, 1989:272-278). Through penetration, South Africans and the government in
particular were exposed to diﬀerent ideas and experiences concerning its political dispen-
sation. The adversaries of the government (the ANC in particular) in turn, successfully
penetrated the international community and were able to inﬂuence them. Thus, a complex
network of interactions developed that would aﬀect both sides to the conﬂict. A constant
stream of foreign visitors came on oﬃcial and unoﬃcial “fact-ﬁnding” missions to South
Africa, often criticising the government either in public or in private (Geldenhuys, 1989:273).
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Pressure exerted by contact with Taiwan for example, directly improved the position of Chi-
nese in South Africa and most discriminatory measures that aﬀected them were abolished
in the seventies.93
Intervention
South Africa found itself in the unenviable position of being a target for international inter-
vention through more coercive measures. A number of reasons prompted the international
community to become more explicitly involved in the internal aﬀairs of South Africa. Some
of these reasons were: concerns over human rights; the fear that South Africa’s problems
could escalate into a civil war that might spread to the region; the strategic interests of
the major players in the Cold War; and aﬃnal ties of the population with other regions
of the world - whites and Europe; blacks, Afro-Americans and Africa; Indians and India;
Chinese, Taiwan and China; communists and the USSR (see Lijphart, 1985:1-2; Geldenhuys,
1989:278-281). There were a wide range of often diverse objectives with intervention - from
for example the unbanning of banned organisations to a complete restructuring of society
(Geldenhuys, 1989:280).
Up to South Africa’s independence, Britain was the colonial power in South Africa and
was therefore regarded by non-whites as having a moral duty to intervene in the internal
aﬀairs of South Africa and in particular with regard to discriminatory practices on the basis
of race. Britain, however, regarded conﬂict between the English and Afrikaners as a greater
threat to their interests than the quest of non-whites to secure their rights.94
This interpretation of interests was further complicated by the intervention of the USSR
when it targeted South Africa with the aim of encouraging a revolution amongst blacks
targeted speciﬁcally against British interests (Carter, 1958:61). During the Cold War that
followed, the West regarded the anti-communist white government as being on their side in
93Though the number of Chinese was small, their incorporation into“white society” provided an important
opportunity to learn from.
94Some, like O’Dowd (1991:44-45) simply are of opinion that Britain did not regard it in their interest to
grant non-whites in South Africa political rights, for it would create a precedent that they could not aﬀord
in the rest of the empire. It was only after 1948 and in particular after the wave of independence in Africa
that Britain actively began to exert pressure on the South African government. South Africa also tried to




the ideological struggle, but at the same time, they feared that should the conﬂict get out of
hand, South Africa might end up on the side of the USSR. Thus, there was the realisation
that a solution was necessary but that the solution should not jeopardise the interests of the
West. Important, in this regard is the veto that was accorded to the three Western powers,
namely the USA, Great Britain (GB) and France in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC). This was an important mechanism to inﬂuence South Africa’s internal aﬀairs.
As previously indicated, South Africa’s treatment of Indians did not go unnoticed by
the Indian government. It was indeed India that placed South Africa’s racial policies ﬁrmly
on the international agenda and in particular, the UN. The ﬁrst expression of international
disapproval of South Africa’s race policies was raised in the UN in a motion brought by
India pertaining to South Africa’s then 280 000 strong Indian population (Sisk, 1992:127).
This motion was approved by the General Assembly in 1946 (A/RES/44 (I) 8/12/1946).95
Several more resolutions on the position of Indians would follow.
The ANC also approached the UN and a resolution dealing with South Africa’s racial
policies was adopted in 195296 and a Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of
South Africa was also appointed.97 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that was
established in 1961 had the explicit goal of ending colonialism within Africa. At best, South
Africa was seen as a settler state in which the natural population were oppressed. With the
wave of independence of African States, who had become members of the UN98 since 1955,
the UN’s role would become more important.
The military, economic and cultural hegemony of the USA has spread over most parts
of the globe. The role of the United States of America as a vanguard for democracy in the
world, is important to the American people. The USA harmonised its foreign policy with
democratic values, therefore, the promotion of democracy has historically been a part of
95General Assembly resolution: Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa. A/RES/44 (I), 8
December 1946.
96General Assembly resolution: The question of race conﬂict in South Africa resulting from the policies
of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa. A/RES/616 A (VII), 5 December 1952.
97The Commission compiled several reports, such as: The United Nations Commission’s First Report on
The Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa, A/2505 and Add. 1, 1953; Second Report A/2719, 1954;
and Third Report A/2953, 1955.




USA policy. Huntington (1991) elaborates on the nature of American society, by quoting
Wiarda (1990:190):
The nature of the USA has left it little or no choice but to stand out among
nations as the proponent of liberty and democracy. Clearly, the impact of no
other country in world aﬀairs has been as heavily weighed in favor of liberty and
democracy as has that of the United States.
The Civil Rights Movement among Afro-Americans, as well as their political relevance
within the USA was important in moulding the foreign policy of the USA regarding South
Africa. Thus, a combination of liberal democracy, human rights and strategic interests
prompted the USA to intervene systematically in South Africa’s racial dispensation.
The Carter administration (1977-1980), made human rights a major theme of American
foreign policy and placed it on the world agenda (Huntington, 1991:91-92). This progressively
gained ground among mainstream political opinion in the USA to become political orthodoxy
by the mid to late 1980s. Regarding Southern African issues, President Carter said:
We...believe that our overall conduct of foreign relations will be strengthened by
the moral premise inherent in our stance on [Southern African] questions...We
made it very clear that we oppose apartheid. We think that because the South
African system is unjust, it may well lead to increasing violence over the years
(Rothchild, 1973:307).
The Carter administration’s method of handling of the problem of Southern Africa was
through an intervention involving their openly identifying and siding with the aspirations
of black Africa and other Third World states against South Africa. Moreover, Carter was
determined to put even more pressure on South Africa. The USA government began to
call for the introduction of the one-person-one-vote principle in South Africa (Geldenhuys,
1991:254-256; Jenkins, 1990:276-9).
The issue of military intervention was also raised and the theoretical grounds for such an
intervention was expanded to include a range of human rights issues, such as humanitarian
intervention in cases of crimes against humanity and the notion of precautionary intervention.
South Africa’s regional policies caused concern and calls for military intervention to counter




Enforced isolation could be linked with more radical forms of intervention. It has the objec-
tive to “quarantine” the target state to force it to submit to external demands and in the
case of South Africa, these were demands with regard to its racially based political system
and its aggressive policies in the region. A variety of sanctions such as diplomatic, political,
economic, military and socio-cultural, were the usual modus operandi used to isolate and
ostracise South Africa (see Geldenhuys, 1989:281).
After the Sharpeville incident in 1960, the regime experienced the eﬀects of international
exposure to apartheid and its associated economic, political and social costs. The denun-
ciation in the UN, capital ﬂight, and calls for international economic, social, and cultural
boycotts that followed in its wake, were all instrumental in systematically isolating South
Africa from the international community. The struggle against apartheid accelerated and
became widespread, so too did the condemnation from the international community (Sisk,
1992:126). The bulk of the UN resolutions adopted on South Africa since the 1960s have been
designed explicitly to isolate it from the international community (Geldenhuys, 1989:283).
Britain, the USA and in particular the UN, thus, changed their attitude, and approach
to the struggle, dramatically after Sharpeville. Some Western states such as the USA and
Britain, were hesitant about isolating South Africa completely, but even Britain agreed at
that stage that South Africa’s race policies were exceptionally unique and required more
drastic measures (Stultz, 1987:31). It is understandable that as UN membership of African
states increased dramatically, that calls for coercive sanctions against South Africa would
intensify. In 1961, the new African states joined forces in calling for diplomatic and trade
sanctions against South Africa. Several resolutions were adopted concerning South Africa.
In 1962, for example, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (1761: XVII)99 by an
overwhelming majority calling for sanctions against South Africa, which included a non-
binding arms embargo100 (Sisk, 1992:128). In 1963, the representative of the USA announced
the decision of the USA to stop the sale of arms to South Africa in the Security Council.101
99General Assembly resolution: The policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa. A/RES/1761
(XVII), 6 November 1962.
100The resolution was approved by a vote of 67 against 16 with 23 abstentions (Sisk, 1992:128).
101S/PV.1052. 2 August 1963.
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Rejection of South Africa’s policies grew steadily during the period 1960-1976, that is
between Sharpeville and the Soweto uprising. Thus, in 1977, there was again a marked
increase in the condemnation of South Africa, not only in the UN, but worldwide (Shin,
1997:182). The growing isolation at the UN was largely eﬀected by the erosion of the
number of “states prepared to openly oppose such resolutions” (Stultz, 1987:41). As the
perception of the legitimacy of the regime was systematically being undermined within the
international arena, actions against South Africa strengthened (Shin, 1997:182).
Worldwide, the campaigns for sanctions against South Africa gained momentum. De-
mands for sanctions were increasingly on the agenda of the USA Congress. This was, as
mentioned, particularly the situation during the Carter Administration when the Democratic
Party held the majority in the House of Representatives. The campaign for disinvestment
continued on USA campuses and in government employee unions. Liberal lobbyists scored
at the local level; twenty-six state governments and one hundred cities halted the invest-
ment of public money in companies dealing with South Africa (Geldenhuys, 1991:254-256;
Jenkins, 1990:276-9; Shin, 1997:184). Economic and military sanctions can only have an
eﬀect if such relations actually exist. Therefore, sanctions imposed by its trading partners
such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden which
all had unilateral measures in place in addition to their commitments as members of in-
ternational organisations, made it diﬃcult for South Africa to realise its economic goals
(Manby, 1992:198-199). South African law, however, made monitoring and enforcement of
these sanctions very diﬃcult.
The Protection of Businesses Act No. 99 of 1978 which barred ﬁrms from releasing
information about their operations without government approval, prevented South African
private ﬁrms or civilian parastatals from revealing the relevant information. Also, under the
National Supplies Procurement Act No. 89 of 1970 (as amended) the South African govern-
ment was able to commandeer any goods and services produced in South Africa regardless
of a company’s intentions or policies, and could have ordered that the transaction be kept
secret (Maxwell et al, 1979:593). These laws called into question any commitment made
by American ﬁrms to prevent the illegal end-use of their production. It also shielded the
companies from legal liability, because they bore no responsibility for end-use unless they
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knew of its destination beforehand (Raymond, 1987:144).
The debate on the economic sanctions against, and isolation of South Africa, was a long
and bitter one (see Adam and Moodley, 1993:52-58). Most of the debate surrounding South
African sanctions centred on the question of whether economic pressures were the most
eﬀective means of eliminating apartheid (Rodman, 1994:314). In general, it was, diﬃcult to
control economic transactions and South Africa even traded clandestinely with the USSR
and the majority of African States, for example (Geldenhuys, 1989:283).
Socio-cultural sanctions such as restrictions on travelling, access to data sources and at-
tendance of conferences were disruptive and often experienced by ordinary people. In many
instances, permission was granted by foreign governments for example, for the attendance
of conferences, provided that the attendee signed a document stating that he/she did not
support the policies of the South African government. The psychological impact of being
an undesirable, an outcast, through one’s support of the policy of apartheid was proba-
bly a factor in the changing attitudes of South Africans. Cultural sanctions also included
bans placed on the screening of certain television programmes in South Africa. Sports iso-
lation was extensive and South Africa was systematically prevented from participating in
most international sporting events, such as the Olympic Games. Furthermore, international
sporting administrations systematically curtailed participation in bilateral events such as in
cricket and rugby. Individuals from South Africa were also prevented from participating in
international events. Most ordinary white South Africans were probably aﬀected by or were
familiar with what was known as the sports boycott (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:359-363).
Although the issue of sanctions was not the only factor in the South African government’s
decision to initiate a process of negotiation with the black liberation movements and to repeal
the major apartheid legislation, such international economic isolation made it impossible to
repress the internal demand for political change indeﬁnitely (Manby, 1992:215-216).
Mediation
Throughout the history of apartheid, mediation and “good oﬃces” were other techniques
employed in an attempt to ﬁnd a peaceful solution to the dispute between the contending
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parties. An example, is the Group of Experts that were appointed by the UN Security
Council in December 1963 “to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South
Africa” and to advise on the UN’s role in that regard (Geldenhuys, 1989:286). Likewise, the
Commonwealth appointed a Group of Eminent Persons to impose mediation from outside.
The unilateral nature of these attempts made them largely ineﬀective. Mediation, however
increasingly became important and especially towards the later stages of democratisation
(Geldenhuys, 1989:286-288).
PRESSURE EMANATING FROM THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Pressure emanating from the global economy was another factor of importance. As men-
tioned, the debate on the eﬀect of economic sanctions remained unresolved. South Africa
was undeniably experiencing economic diﬃculties, but the question was whether these were
caused by sanctions per se, or merely by the realities of the international economy (see
Gill, 2000:21-25). Most of the problems South Africa experienced were also experienced
by other developing countries and some problems like escalating oil prices even aﬀected de-
veloped economies. The internal cost of apartheid, as well as the cost of containing the
spiral of discontent, was however, exacerbated by ordinary economic realities, both domestic
and international. Disinvestment was often not a conscious decision to boycott, but rather
the consequence of changes in calculated risk. Thus, risk increased as the spiral of discon-
tent continued and gained momentum unabated. Economic pressure resulting from a global
economy unquestionably made apartheid unaﬀordable and inﬂuenced decisions to liberalise.
DEMONSTRATION EFFECT OF SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATISATION
The demonstration eﬀect of the success of democracies and the successful transition to
democracies is another aspect of the international context that played a role in South Africa’s
eventual transition to democracy. Huntington (1991:100-1; Gill, 2000:20-21) is of the opinion
that successful democratisation in one state encourages other states in a similar situation
to democratise, because they might become aware of the advantages, possibilities, diﬃcul-
ties, and methods of successfully achieving a democratic transition. Successful democratic
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transition in one state serves therefore as an example for other societies. Thus, it is diﬃcult
for any state to deviate from the dominant political and social trends in the world. Hence,
the international demonstration eﬀect is felt everywhere (Huntington, 1991:102). Through
various communication media, South Africans were not only exposed to the events in the
third wave of democratisation, but also to the consequences of the failure to act timeously,
as was the case with the Iranian Revolution.
To summarise, the policies of apartheid and separate development went against the norm of
the dominant post-war themes of liberalism, decolonisation and self-determination, and the
principles of equality underlying the fundamental human rights doctrine. The resolutions of
the UN reﬂected the international community’s rejection of the South African government’s
defence of separate development as an instrument for the realisation of self-determination
for all (Sisk, 1992:127).
Thus, what in the end made international factors inﬂuential in determining South Africa’s
path to democracy? Globalisation or contemporary internationalisation is usually regarded
as an explanation for the importance of foreign or external inﬂuence in political change.
Globalisation suggests that the political, economic, and social activity of human beings
and governmental systems increasingly interact and foster growing interdependence. The
interconnectedness of states and societies has intensiﬁed in the wake of globalisation, and in-
ternational borders have been weakened by modern communication systems and the informa-
tion revolution (Pridham, 1991:216-219). The emergence of a global socio-politico-economic
system which reaches beyond the control of any single state, the growth in international
organisations, and the intensiﬁcation of multilateral diplomacy and trans-governmental in-
teractions which can check and limit the scope of even the most powerful state, make most
countries vulnerable to the eﬀects of international factors.
The success of the apartheid policy of the NP in enfranchising Afrikaner South Africans
and bringing them into the capitalist sector of the economy, brought with it the realisation
that apartheid was ineﬃcient in the long term and had a negative impact on the living
standards of both whites and blacks alike. This realisation was reinforced powerfully by
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South Africa’s continued economic dependence on foreign capital for growth. In addition
to the factors outlined above, there were the enormous costs, such as economic and sports
isolation, imposed on the regime by the international community.
3.3.5 REGIME BREAKDOWN AND ELITE DISUNITY
The concept of regime breakdown implies the “deconstruction or disintegration” of a regime
(Gill, 2000:8). The breakdown of a regime has been identiﬁed as an important stage in
regime transition, by providing an opening that could facilitate the ushering in of a new
government and regime - though it does not necessarily guarantee that the new regime
will be democratic. Within an appropriate macro-structural environment, elites may utilise
opportunities in the event of a regime breakdown and make the transition to a democracy, a
reality. As demonstrated by studies of the third wave of democracy, “democracy could not
be successful without the withdrawal or collapse of authoritarian power...the emergence of
a democratic regime must be preceded by authoritarian breakdown” (Gill, 2000:8). Conﬂict
and political mobilisation, economic crisis, and international pressures are, as discussed, all
important in this regard. Likewise, elite disunity among the ruling elite, is important and
could signify a loss of power and a weakening of the regime.
There were indications that elite disunity was already a reality among the ruling elite
towards the end of the seventies. There were early diﬀerences among the ruling elite on
whether apartheid ideology should be interpreted in a rigid and purist manner or in a more
ﬂexible and pragmatic manner. The breakaway of a number of more conservative followers
from the NP over the latter’s less dogmatic interpretation of apartheid resulted in the break-
away of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (“Reconstituted National Party” - HNP) in 1969. In
general the NP and in particular the Afrikaner Broederbond contained as already mentioned,
more “verligte” (enlightened) and more “verkrampte” (conservative) factions, often result-
ing in conﬂicting statements concerning government policy (Race Relations Survey, 1979:7).
Disunity gained momentum with the revelations and consequences of the information scan-
dal that ushered in a more pragmatic and less conservative government under PW Botha
in 1978 (Race Relations Survey, 1979:6).102 As will become clear in the following chapters,
102Even though PW Botha is usually regarded as conservative, a more conservative Dr Mulder was also in
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elite disunity in the face of increasing challenges brought about by conﬂict and mobilisation,
economic and international pressure, would become a serious problem with which the ruling
elite would have to deal. Within the South African context and unlike most other transitions
to democracy, an added problem was the fact that the regime was dependent on the white
electorate. Thus, loss of election support was a reality with which the governing party had
to deal.103
In conclusion, macro-structural factors were therefore, important in the South African tran-
sition to democracy. Certain factors proved to be serious obstacles to transition and in
particular, the presence of deep cleavages and conﬂict and violence that were fomented and
nurtured along the various lines of divisions. To a large extent there was a conﬂuence of
statutory race divisions, class structures and ideology. These were however mitigated by:
a political culture that was experiencing the nurturing and growth of democratic values,
the equalising eﬀect of religion, and in particular, Christianity and a common, but expand-
ing economy. While these macro-structural factors were advantageous for a transition to
democracy, they would soon come under pressure and would in turn exert pressure on the
regime. Thus, hardening attitudes in a political culture that became more hard line, eco-
nomic stagnation, international pressure and elite disunity all pressurised the government
into the realisation that apartheid had become a liability and was no longer an instrument
for Afrikaner nationalism.
3.4 STATE - POLITICAL SOCIETY - CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID
From the discussion, thus far, it should be clear that the South African state had a peculiar
and complex structure. A complex and expanding political society, as well as a civil society
that could interact with and/or challenge the state, had already been in the making from
an early stage in South African history, albeit along racial lines.
line for the then premiership.
103A classic example of election support hampering policy decisions is the case of the British Labour Party
and the trade unions (see Greenaway, et al, 1992:164-182).
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As already alluded to, both political society and civil society played an important, yet
complex role in the struggle against apartheid. Organised non-white opposition to white
rule has a long history antedating apartheid. Facing a regime that had largely excluded
them from political participation, three interrelated questions were of primary importance
to organisations in the struggle (Horowitz, 1991:13): (1) Who belonged to South Africa? (2)
Who should be included in the struggle against the regime? (3) What political dispensation
would be appropriate for a future South Africa? The responses to these questions varied
over time, as well as amongst organisations and they were not formulated in isolation, but
as part of a reaction to white preconceived notions. These reactions, in turn, inﬂuenced
white responses. Racial, ethnic, class and ideological cleavages were, therefore, important
in the dynamics of the South African polity within the domains of state - political society -
civil society. It is within these domains that the macro-structural factors impacted on South
African society, in general and the elite, in particular (Horowitz, 1991:13).
It is at this stage necessary to provide a brief outline of the most important actors, issues
and actions present in the domains of state - political society - civil society.104
3.4.1 STATE
As mentioned before, the state had been controlled by whites and in particular by the NP
since 1948.105 A complex set of political structures had been created to safeguard the position
of whites and to provide political outlets for the other race and/or ethnic groups.
Though all South Africans of all races, were “theoretically” citizens of the South African
state, this was not the case in practice.106 In the struggle, reference was made to ﬁrst-class
citizens (whites) and second-class citizens (non-whites). Only whites had a say in how the
state should be governed and while the executive was indeed accountable for its actions, it was
only to the white electorate. Furthermore, South Africa had, because of its parliamentary
104It is not possible to give a full account of state - political society - civil society relations. Preference is
therefore given to what would become important in the ﬁnal stages of the transition.
105A distinction has to be made between the NP as an ordinary party and the NP in “oﬃce.” The reality
confronting a ruling party diﬀers signiﬁcantly from its interactions with its constituency as well as with the
party bureaucracy (see Katz and Mair, 1994).
106Citizenship was indeed a complex phenomenon and due to apartheid policy many non-whites were
deprived of their citizenship.
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executive system, an incomplete separation of executive and legislative functions. Thus,
state and “white” political society overlapped to an extent.
As implied, separate political structures were created for the other race groups. Indians,
coloureds and blacks, thus, were permitted a marginal degree of “input” with the establish-
ment of a variety of political structures. The South African Indian Council (SAIC),107 was
established in 1964, but was a nominated institution for the greatest part of its existence.
The coloureds had the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council108 (CPRC) that was es-
tablished in 1968 and consisted of forty elected and twenty nominated members (Karis and
Gerhart, 1997:238-239).
Blacks had to be content with the homelands. Based on ethnic identity, the policy of
homelands made provision for full republican status of a homeland, if desired. This had
implications for an analysis of the state, because the state saw the homelands as potential
separate states that would have no need for political participation in a “white” South Africa.
By the end of the period under discussion, two homelands had already gained “independence”
namely Transkei (1976) and Bophuthatswana (1977). They were soon to be followed by
Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981). However, their “statehood” was never endorsed by the
international community and they remained largely dependent on the South African state
for the conducting of their aﬀairs (see Thompson and Prior, 1982:92-94). The government
regarded apartheid as the only means of safeguarding both traditional culture and political
structures. Thus, they erred in regarding a desire to cherish culture and ethnic political
structures as the legitimation of apartheid.
All the structures for non-whites formed part of South Africa’s political dispensation,
but all (including the homelands) remained subject to the white government and legislation
passed by a white controlled parliament, thereby relegating them to the same level as that
of the white provincial structures, except that the latter had far more political powers.
In addition to extensive local government structures for whites, provision was made for
quasi-political structures at local level for the other race groups, such as the Urban Bantu
Councils and the Community Councils for urban blacks. Lack of ﬁnancial means and strict
107The abbreviation of the South African Indian Congress established in 1920, is also SAIC.
108It is also known as the Coloured Representative Council (CRC).
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subordination to white controlled political structures made them ineﬀective and therefore
discredited within the struggle (see Venter, 1989:105-106; Thompson and Prior, 1982:95-98).
Although there were signs of a rethink of the policy of apartheid, the state became
increasingly repressive in a spiral of opposition and suppression. As the state became more
and more repressive, the security apparatus gained inﬂuence and importance within state
structures as would be discussed in chapter four.
3.4.2 POLITICAL SOCIETY
As discussed in chapter two, political society consists of those groups that are speciﬁcally po-
litical in their outlook and aims, in order to promote and protect their constituents’ interests
within the political sphere. These usually include political parties, political movements and
groups primarily organised to act within the political sphere, but it also includes institutions
such as legislatures and other consultative fora (see Gill, 2000:6).
As implied above, political society109 in South Africa was divided on the basis of race and
these divisions were exacerbated by the statutory provision of separate political structures
for the various race and ethnic groups. Even though some organisations allowed membership
of all races and in particular, within the “non-white” category, non-racial political organi-
sations were in reality, few in number and most were eventually banned.110 For an analysis
of South African political society, it is important to mention its basic composition. Firstly,
a variety of political parties and other groups functioned within the spheres of the system
of state institutions and structures, either in support of, or in opposition to the basic prin-
ciples underpinning South Africa’s political dispensation. These institutions and structures
included the white parliament, provincial and local legislatures, CRC, SAIC and a number of
homeland “legislatures.” Secondly, a number of organisations functioned legally, but outside
the institutions and structures of the system, often because they did not regard these as
being legitimate. Thirdly, a variety of banned groups and organisations such as the ANC,
SACP and PAC functioned outside the existing political order. It is also customary to distin-
109Again not all the organisations in political society can be discussed, and the most prominent are
mentioned here only.
110Note the Prohibition of Political Interference Act No. 51 of 1968 (later the Prohibition of Foreign
Financing of Political Parties Act).
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guish between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political activity. The latter, included
organisations from all three of the mentioned categories and will be used in combination with
the above.
PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR APARTHEID
The NP was the main proponent and architect of apartheid even though racial and ethnic
segregation was a fact long before it came to power.
National Party (NP)
It was originally founded in 1914 to promote the interests of Afrikaners in particular. It
dominated the political scene during the second half of the twentieth century and was largely
responsible for formalising apartheid. The NP who was the primary proponent of apartheid
made every attempt from 1948 onwards to institutionalise and make a success of apartheid.
During its uninterrupted rule from 1948, it was able to consolidate its support base among the
white electorate and a section of civil society, and to weather challenges emanating from white
politics. However, towards the end of the seventies, there were, clear indications of disunity
among the elite of the ruling party as anti-apartheid activism increasingly gained ground.
Disunity was evident in the conﬂicting statements regarding government policy made by
the more liberal (verligte) and more conservative (verkrampte) members respectively of the
cabinet.
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR APARTHEID
There were a number of right-wing political groups that favoured segregation and a political
dispensation based on race and the preservation of Afrikaner culture. Most of these were
politically insigniﬁcant and only the HNP and AWB deserve to be mentioned. Furthermore,
there was a belief that apartheid was supported by a signiﬁcant section of non-whites.
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Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)
The HNP was established in 1969 because of a perception that the NP was increasingly
deviating from the central beliefs in apartheid ideology. Therefore, it advocated a “purist”
interpretation of apartheid, however, it was unable to mobilise suﬃcient electoral support.
In by-elections held after the Information Scandal in 1978, the HNP increased its support
at the expense of the NP, but still failed to win any seats in Parliament. It also increased
its support as a result of claims by the HNP that the government had betrayed the interests
of the white workers by adopting the recommendations of the Wiehann Commission with
regard to black labour (Race Relations Survey, 1979:10-11). However, for the most part of
its history the HNP was, unrepresented in Parliament and of marginal political signiﬁcance
only (see Thompson and Prior, 1982:105).
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)
The AWB was an Afrikaner cultural-political organisation founded in 1972. Its aim was to
ensure the political freedom of Afrikaners. It never participated openly in elections, but
was vocal on many political issues and was perceived to be a possible instigator of negative
reactions to any departure from apartheid by the NP.
Support for apartheid among non-whites
It was extremely diﬃcult to assess the support for apartheid among those non-whites who
participated in the structures provided for them by the government. The ruling ideologues
were inclined to interpret such participation in these structures as a legitimation of the policy
of apartheid. This was, as mentioned, important in the thinking of the government. For
this very reason, most participants in the struggle objected to any form of participation in
apartheid structures, as this was seen as a legitimation of apartheid and of the government.
Those who participated argued, in turn, that these structures could be used to oppose
the government and its policies peacefully, by maintaining dialogue and exerting pressure on
them. In general, even though a minority might have supported separate political structures,
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discrimination that went hand in hand with apartheid was universally condemned. The
Freedom Party in the CRC was, for example, in favour of co-operating with the government
but advocated a multi-racial parliament and rejected both black and white domination (Race
Relations Survey, 1978:15-17).
A complex web of interactions developed between the system structures and the non-
system opposition to apartheid. Though for very diﬀerent reasons, both the government
and those opposed to culture and traditionalism, viewed culture and traditionalism as being
irreconcilable with a non-racial democratic dispensation (see Oomen 2005). It is, however,
doubtful whether there was any signiﬁcant support for apartheid among those that “co-
operated” within these structures. Yet, as the history of South Africa’s transition unfolded,
these structures were often targeted by the non-system opposition.
PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID
Parliamentary opposition to apartheid had a long and varied history, but towards the end
of the 1970s, only the PFP and the NRP were of any signiﬁcance.
Progressive Federal Party (PFP)
For the greatest part of NP rule, the United Party (UP)111 was the dominant opposition
in Parliament. The UP was unable to develop a viable alternative policy to apartheid that
would be acceptable to the white electorate. This would eventually lead to its demise.
The UP, however, gave life to a number of other political parties and the history of the
PFP can also be traced to the UP when a liberal faction of Members of Parliament (MP)
broke away from the UP in 1959 to form the Progressive Party (PP) - mainly as a result of
unhappiness with the UP’s policy regarding non-whites. The PP favoured a qualiﬁed but
non-racial franchise, arguing that the alternative was revolution. The formation of the party
immediately preceded the peak period of confrontation between the NP and the ANC-led
Congress Alliance, at the start of the 1960s (Williams and Hackland, 1988:210).
111The UP was originally the United South African National Party, that emerged from the election pact
between the South African Party and the National Party in 1934.
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During the ﬁrst general election that the PP contested, it lost twelve of its thirteen
parliamentary seats and was left with only one MP, namely Helen Suzman, for the next
thirteen years. In the 1974, elections, it won a total of seven seats. In 1975 it merged with
the Reform Party (founded after another split from the UP after the 1974 general elections).
At the merger congress, the party was renamed as the Progressive Reform Party (PRP)
and the new party increased its representation to eleven MPs. The new name lasted only
until 1977, when, after a further merger with yet another breakaway group from the UP,
it became the Progressive Federal Party of South Africa (PFP) (Williams and Hackland,
1988:210).112 In the general elections of that year, the PFP won seventeen seats and for
the ﬁrst time, became the oﬃcial parliamentary opposition to the ruling NP (Williams and
Hackland, 1988:210; Race Relations Survey, 1977:19-21).
The PFP advocated the idea of liberal democracy, which was based on individual par-
ticipation in a multi-party, competitive system, albeit within some form of geographic fed-
eralism. It rejected the representation of deﬁned racial or ethnic groups, but indicated that
it would not oppose the right of the homelands to opt for independence, on condition that
a majority of the people concerned expressed such a desire in a referendum (Race Relations
Survey, 1977:20). The PFP policy did attempt to safeguard the white minority position
through its federal provisions and a Bill of Rights. However, nothing in its policy guaran-
teed participation of minority parties in the executive. Opinion polls, conducted by Market
and Opinion Surveys in the period 1974 to 1987, consistently showed minimal white support
for a system in which they would no longer be in a position to choose their own white rep-
resentatives (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:158). Thus, in retrospect, it is clear that the
PFP approach had little potential of winning signiﬁcant electoral support at the expense of
the NP.
The party argued, however, that increased support for a non-racial model would be the
only eﬀective means of demonstrating to the black majority and to the international com-
munity that increasing numbers of whites were prepared to break decisively with apartheid
112During the local government elections in Johannesburg, the new PRP obtained the most seats but not
a majority. The UP then formed a governing “coalition” with the NP, that caused widespread dissatisfaction
among members of the UP resulting in a breakaway. The UP was dissolved in June 1977, the remainder of
its members forming the New Republic Party (NRP).
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(Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:58).
New Republic party (NRP)
The NRP was created by the remaining UP members of parliament and supporters in 1977.
It was of importance mainly because of its position as the oﬃcial opposition for a brief
period in 1977, until it lost this position to the PFP in the elections of November 1977.
It championed a federal/confederal model with the maximum devolution of powers to local
communities, as an alternative to the NP’s apartheid and separate development and the
PFP’s liberal model respectively (Thompson and Prior, 1982:10).
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID WITHIN THE SYSTEM
Opposition to the government, apartheid and the system itself, was rife within the political
institutions established by the government to accommodate the political aspirations of non-
whites. Of these, the Labour Party in the CRC, the Indian Reform Party (In the SAIC)
and Inkatha (the KwaZulu homeland) were the most vocal in their opposition. Though
these three political organisations joined forces in the South African Black Alliance, it was
undoubtedly Inkatha that was the most prominent of the three.
Inkatha
Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSiswe (National Cultural Liberation Movement), was reestablished in
1975 by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a hereditary chief of the Buthelezi tribe and a Prince
of the Zulu Royal House (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:251-252, 771).
Historically, “the party” of the Zulu had had strong support among Zulu migrants in the
PWV113 and the Orange Free State114 goldmines. It was Buthelezi’s role in the government
of the KwaZulu homeland that reinforced the perception that Inkatha was primarily an
organisation for Zulus. This also fostered criticism that Inkatha was collaborating with the
apartheid regime, or at least as being too close to the government. Yet, Buthelezi was not




in favour of “independence” for KwaZulu and was opposed to apartheid in general (Sisk,
1995:144-145).
By later opening membership to non-Zulus and criticising the system, Buthelezi and
Inkatha performed a balancing act between cultural traditionalism, working with the gov-
ernment, and the liberation of all non-whites in the spirit of “African humanism.” Buthelezi
was thus one of the major critics of the South African system and he regarded South Africa
as one country with “one economy and one destiny” (Prior and Thompson, 1982:206).
The South African Black Alliance (SABA)
In 1978 Inkatha, the coloured Labour Party and the Indian Reform Party joined forces to
form the South African Black Alliance (Race Relations Survey, 1978:15). At its founding,
the Labour Party expressed the belief that “if the coloured people wanted to survive in SA,
they had to think in terms of a close alliance with all black people” (Race Relations Survey,
1978:31). The Reform party, in turn, expressed the hope that the Alliance would heal the
rift between blacks and Indians (Race Relations Survey, 1978:31). They were later joined
by the small Dikwankwetla Party of Qwaqwa and leaders from Gazankulu and KaNgwane
- both small homelands. The SABA aimed for a just society, unity among organisations
opposing apartheid, a common strategy in the struggle against apartheid and non-racialism
(Race Relations Survey, 1978:31-32; Karis and Gerhart, 1997:227-230).
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID OUTSIDE OF THE SYS-
TEM
As already indicated, non-whites and in particular blacks, have organised themselves polit-
ically since an early stage, in order to promote their interests and to secure their rights.115
Most of the relevant organisations and their members were banned, restricted or under
surveillance for their opposition to the government and the prevailing political dispensation
of South Africa. These organisations included both non-racial and pro-black organisations.
115As already mentioned in section 3.2.1, antecedents to the founding of the ANC, are Imbumba Yama
Afrika (Union of Africans - 1882), and Mahatma Gandhi’s Natal Indian Congress (1894). Most of the
founders of the ANC were middle class professionals who came together in a spirit of African nationalism in
order to overcome divisive regional and tribal diﬀerences (Karis and Carter, 1972:61).
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African National Congress (ANC)
As mentioned in section 3.2.1, resistance to the exclusion of blacks from political power on
the basis of race, led to the founding of the ANC in 1912.116 By 1923, the organisation had
adopted a “Bill of Rights,” that included an aﬃrmation of the following rights: the right of
blacks and coloureds to the principles of liberty, justice and equality in the eyes of the law; a
right to the democratic principles of equality of treatment and equality of citizenship in the
land irrespective of race, class, creed or origin; a right to an equal share in the management
and direction of the aﬀairs of the land; and the right to direct representation by members of
their own race in all the legislative bodies of the land, otherwise there can be “no taxation
without representation” (Leatt et al, 1986:90-91).
The following are of particular importance in the long history of the ANC: the presence
of various factions within the ANC; its co-operation with the SACP; the adoption of the
Freedom Charter; its banning by the government; the armed struggle; its underground and
lastly, its exiled structures.
As discussed in section 3.2.3, the ANC housed both Africanist and non-racial factions.
Already at an early stage of its history, some of its members and oﬃcials were simultaneously
communists. In 1927, for example, the ANC elected as its Secretary-General one of South
Africa’s ﬁrst black communists, Eddie Khaile, who, a year later, was elected to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of South Africa - CPSA117 (Horwitz, 1993:46; Karis and
Carter, 1977b:50). Thus, the ANC housed three main ideological strands and their adherents,
namely the Africanists, non-racialists and communists. Africanists promoted African self-
reliance and national pride. By 1944, an “Africanist” tendency was prominent in the ANC
Youth League118 led by Anton M Lembede. A Youth League policy statement declared,
for example, that Africa was the black man’s country. This statement had two important
implications. Firstly, it implied that blacks had an exclusive or at least a prior right to
116Originally as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC). Its name changed in 1923.
117Later the South African Communist Party (SACP).
118Most of the founders of the Youth League were of middle class origins and professionals (Karis and
Carter, 1973:98-100). Founding documents refer to a “need for vigilance against Communists and other
groups which foster non-African interests” (Karis and Carter, 1973:100). An outstanding philospher of




South Africa. Secondly, it was critical of the ANC’s co-operation with whites, particularly
white communists.119 Non-racialists, in turn, saw the Africanists’ thinking as a mirror image
of Afrikaner nationalist ideology (Horowitz, 1991:12-19; Karis and Carter, 1977a:310). The
communists within the ANC were important for they brought the working class into the fold
of the ANC. After the World War II, the presence of communists would also ﬁrmly place
the ANC and thus a signiﬁcant section of the struggle, against apartheid, within the Cold
War dynamics.
The adoption of the Freedom Charter was, as indicated in section 3.2.3, another milestone
in the history of the ANC and the struggle. Non-racialism triumphed in the Charter but did
not resolve all the diﬀerences with the Africanists. In opposition with the declaration in the
Freedom Charter of 1955 that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white...”,
“the Africanists rejoined in their journal that ‘[t]he African people have an inalienable claim
on every inch of the African soil...The non-Africans are guests of the Africans [and] have to
adjust themselves to the interests of Africa, their new home’” (Sisk, 1992 :114).
The ANC succeeded in functioning mainly on a racially inclusive assumption in choosing
its allies and in advancing plans for a future South Africa, “a racially exclusive orientation
was a minor strand running throughout the history of African political thinking” (Karis
and Carter, 1973:404). There were however, times that the ANC came under an Africanist
inﬂuence, mainly as a result of the role of Youth League leaders such as Oliver Tambo, Walter
Sisulu and Nelson Mandela. In December 1949, it adopted, for example, a more militant
African nationalist Programme of Action advocating black self-reliance and opposing co-
operation with other race groups (Karis and Carter, 1973:403-409; Sisk, 1992:113). However,
they, soon shifted to the acceptance of non-racialism and by the time of the ANC’s Deﬁance
Campaign of 1952, the ANC had already returned to a policy of co-operating with the
multiracial, but disproportionately white and Indian, CPSA, as well as with other whites who
opposed apartheid. Opposition to the inﬂuence of other race groups within the organisation
would remain but was often muted. The ANC thus succeeded in maintaining some liberal
aims, even though it sometimes referred to the leading role Africans had to play in the
119Theoretically, the constitution of the Youth League was non-racial, for membership was also possible for
“young members of the other sections of the community who live like and with Africans and whose general
outlook on life is similar to that of Africans” (Karis and Carter, 1973:101).
188
Chapter 3
liberation struggle, and some of the Charterists even spoke of “settlers,” thieves who have
“come and stolen my land” (Sisk, 1992:113; Karis and Carter, 1973:403-409).
For most of its history, the ANC favoured peaceful, or what it termed constitutional,
means of promoting the interests of blacks and other oppressed. Closer co-operation with
the CPSA/SACP in the ﬁfties gave a more revolutionary interpretation to the struggle (see
Kotze, 1994).120 NP policy and events following the Sharpeville incident such as the state
of emergency and the banning of the ANC in 1960, led to the ANC taking up the armed
struggle and creating Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK - Spear of the Nation) in 1961 as an armed
organisation separate from the ANC.121 MK was essentially a guerrilla organisation formed
to bring about change through violence. After the banning of the ANC, it subsequently went
underground and many of its leaders went into exile, from where they would organise and
conduct the struggle against the regime from a number of international platforms (Marx,
1992:37-38).
An important dimension of the ANC, was thus its ability to unite under one banner a
variety of ideologies and strategies. It also managed to recruit members and supporters from
other organisations in the liberation struggle successfully (see Marx, 1992:95-105). Thus, co-
operation and co-optation as a means to achieving the noble goal of liberating the oppressed,
including women, were important in the strategy of the ANC. This has, however, often led
to claims that the ANC saw itself as the only organisation in the liberation of the masses
and that it did not tolerate opposition (see Guise, 1993:48).
120The fact that communists were members of the ANC did not imply an alliance between the CPSA and
the ANC; such an alliance only came to fruition much later (see Kotze, 1994).
121It was banned on 8 April 1960, the policy of non-violence was abandoned in June 1961 and MK formed
in November of 1961(Karis and Carter, 1977a:804-805).
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South African Communist Party (SACP)
The SACP was established in 1921 as the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA).122
Of particular importance for purposes of this discussion are the CPSA/SACP’s non-racial
character; involvement in the labour unions; principle of equality; a quest for a “Native
Republic;” co-operation with the ANC; its banning; and its involvement in the struggle.
As mentioned in section 3.2.3, the CPSA initially merely sought to promote the interests
of labourers and the working class. However, a series of directives from Moscow since 1927
had as its aim “a Native Republic.” The objections of local communists in this regard were
defeated at the sixth World Congress of the Communist International in 1928 with the
adoption of a resolution that stipulated as objective: “An independent South African Native
Republic, as a ﬁrst step towards a workers’ and peasants’ republic, with equality for races”
(Kotze, 1994:43; see Carter, 1958:61). This became formal party policy.
The ANC and the CPSA/SACP have been closely linked for much of their existence
even though there were initially considerable diﬀerences between them. The former was a
national organisation dedicated to promoting black political and economic rights; the latter,
an international organisation committed to the goal of a socialist “native” revolution in
South Africa (Horwitz, 1993:46). The ANC and SACP have shared members since their
earliest years as already mentioned and the roles of Eddie Khaile, Bransby Ndobe and Elliot
Tonjeni in both the ANC and the CPSA are examples in this regard (Horwitz, 1993:46;
Karis and Carter, 1977b:50, 110,154, 158). Under the leadership of JT Gumede, greater
co-operation between the ANC and the CPSA was encouraged during the twenties (Karis
and Carter, 1977b:34-36).
Moses Kotane was another widely respected and admired leader of both the ANC and the
CPSA/SACP. A member of the CPSA since 1929, he was elected Secretary-General of the
CPSA in 1939 (Karis and Carter, 1977b:50-52). He did much to foster trust and co-operation
122Originally the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). It was formed by a number of socialist
organisations such as the International Socialist League. These organisations were not allowed to join
the Communist International (Comintern) because only one organisation per country was allowed. They
subsequently joined forces to form the CPSA (Kotze, 1994:42-43). The CPSA was dissolved before the
Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 1950 was passed. However, in 1953 it was decided to revive the
party as the South African Communist Party as an underground party (Kotze, 1994:43-45). Kotze is of the
opinion that it could in fact, be regarded as a new party.
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between the two groups. Connections between the CPSA and the ANC, however, contin-
ued to rely primarily on common membership and individual personal ties. As mentioned
previously, the ANC Youth League (which included members such as Oliver Tambo, Walter
Sisulu and Nelson Mandela) increasingly agitated against communism while the CPSA, in
turn, frequently criticised the ANC in public (Horwitz, 1993:46). There were several other
unsuccessful attempts by some in the ANC to prevent dual membership and/or to curb the
inﬂuence of the communists in the ANC. Once their common goals had been established,
the two organisations began to co-operate even more closely.
Apart from its close association with the ANC, the CPSA had been important for many
years for its role as an oﬃcial South African political party that formally admitted blacks,123
as well as its involvement with the working class and in particular, black labourers.
The CPSA disbanded itself on 20 June 1950, prior to the NP government’s passing of the
Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 1950. By that time, the majority of its members
were blacks who would, after its disbandment, inevitably turn to the ANC.124 Thus, with
its re-establishment as the underground SACP in 1953, close co-operation between the ANC
and SACP was certain (Everatt, 1992:20; Carter, 1958:69; Karis and Carter, 1973). After the
banning of the SACP and ANC in 1960, they established even closer ties in exile. Members
of both organisations, for example, jointly founded Umkhonto we Sizwe. SACP members
now held so many high positions in the ANC that a journalist later wrote that, “[in] most
respects...the Party came to dominate the ANC. So many prominent members of the ANC
in exile were also members of the SACP that, at times, it became impossible to know on
whose behalf they were speaking” (Horwitz, 1993:47). The collective leadership of the ANC
is of help in explaining the inﬂuence of the communists despite their small numbers. The
tightly knit and well-organised communists frequently caucused before ANC meetings and
established platforms that enabled them to vote as a bloc. The devotion of its members
to the then illegal party, as displayed in other organisations, was largely responsible for the
survival of the SACP during its four decades of exile (Horwitz, 1993:47).
123The CPSA did contest elections and in particular the election of white parliamentary representatives
for blacks and at the local level. It was successful,on a number of occasions, but its members were later
expelled in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act (see Carter, 1958:69-70, 356).
124The communist J B Marks, (of mixed descent) was for example elected as President of the ANC in
Transvaal in November 1950 ( Karis and Carter, 1973: 408).
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Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)
From the discussion above, it transpires that for a long time there had been concern among
some Africanists about the inﬂuence of whites, Indians and communists within the ANC. In
1958, as some African countries had already received their independence, some Africanists
under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe, advocated a breakaway from the ANC and founded
the PAC in April 1959 (Karis and Carter, 1977b:147-149).125 Important for purposes of this
discussion are: the PAC’s pro-African stance; the oscillating approach regarding the position
of whites in South Africa; its militant nature; and its banning by the government.
The leadership of the PAC identiﬁed itself with the Pan-African Movement. At the
inaugural convention of the PAC in April 1959, Sobukwe quoted George Padmore, “there is
a growing feeling among politically conscious Africans throughout the continent that their
destiny is one, that what happens in one part of Afrika [sic] to Africans must aﬀect Africans
living in other parts” (Karis and Carter, 1977a:513). He added that it is the sacred duty
of “every African state to strive ceaselessly and energetically for the creation of a United
States of Afrika [sic]” (Karis and Carter, 1977a:513). Only a United States of Africa would
thus be able to solve the problems of the continent and more particularly, the problems
associated with colonialism and white supremacy. At the same time, the PAC favoured
African neutrality in the global struggle for power, or the Cold War (Karis and Carter,
1977a:510-512).
Furthermore, the PAC held that multi-racialism is inappropriate as it lacked the necessary
emotional appeal to mobilise the black masses - only an exclusive “African nationalism”
would (Karis and Carter, 1977a:318-320). Race and the position of whites would remain
issues involving fundamental contradictions. In the same opening address, Sobukwe stated:
The Africanists take the view that there is only one race to which we all belong,
and that is the human race...the freedom of the African means the freedom of all
in South Africa, the European included, because only the African can guarantee
the establishment of a genuine democracy...multi-racialism is in fact...a method of
safeguarding white interests...We aim, politically, at government of the Africans
by the Africans, for the Africans, with everybody who owes his only loyalty to
125The inﬂuence of the ANC Youth League was important in the breakaway, but it is important to bear in
mind that important members with Africanist sympathies such as Oliver Tambo, Walter Sizulu and Nelson
Mandela remained with the ANC.
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Afrika [sic] and who is prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African
majority being regarded as an African (Karis and Carter, 1977a:514-516).
The Africanists thus did not quite resolve the oscillation in their pronouncements that
implied at certain times that whites did not belong in South Africa at all (or only belonged
there as mere guests) and at other times, that whites were only disqualiﬁed from playing
a part in the struggle for a South Africa, that nevertheless, might ultimately include them
on equal terms. In general, however, the PAC’s view has been to refer to whites as colonial
“settlers” in “occupied Azania” (Horowitz, 1991:12-19). The PAC’s inability to resolve these
contradictions and its rigid ideological approach, as opposed to the ANC’s pragmatism,
would prevent it from making signiﬁcant inroads into the support base of the ANC (see
Marx, 1992:36-39).
At a conference in December 1959, the leaders of the PAC made a generalised call for a
dynamic decisive campaign to crush, once and for all, white domination (Karis and Gerhart,
1977:555-565). It was decided to embark on an anti-pass campaign. A few months later, this
was translated into plans for a campaign to be launched on 21 March 1960, when Africans
would be asked to go to police stations without their passes and surrender so that they could
be arrested (Gurney, 2000:127-128; Marx, 1992:37; Karis and Carter, 1977b:564).
The PAC leaders were aware that confrontation could end in bloodshed. On several
occasions, police had opened ﬁre and killed demonstrators. In the build-up to 21 March,
the PAC’s President wrote to the Commissioner of Police in Cape Town, asking him to
instruct his men not to allow themselves to be provoked into violence (Karis and Gerhart,
1977a:565-566). However, the march erupted into violence and the police killed several
demonstrators at Sharpeville. The signiﬁcance of the Sharpeville massacre was that it led to
an international outcry and particularly in Britain (Gurney, 2000:127-128). The government
reacted by banning the PAC in 1960.
After the PAC had been banned, it was forced into exile and had to go underground.
Poqo126 was a militant grass-roots “organisation” closely associated with the PAC and were
responsible for violent attacks on police, whites and those blacks perceived as collaborating
126Poqo means “independent” in Xhosa (Karis and Carter, 1977a:669). It was regarded as the internal
armed wing of the PAC.
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with the government. The Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army (APLA) was the armed wing
in exile (Marx, 1992:38).
The PAC and its associated organisations executed a number of terrorist acts in South
Africa. In general, the PAC was plagued with leadership and organisational problems, yet it
would remain an important actor in the struggle against apartheid (see Leatt et al, 1986:103-
104).
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM)
The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) entered the organisational vacuum left by the
banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960. Important at this stage are: its deﬁnition of the
concept of black; its pro-black, yet elitist, ideology; the number of political and civil society
organisations that were established in its wake; as well as its role in the Soweto riots.
Structural factors such as the rapid economic development experienced after the political
turmoil of the 1950s and early 1960s, the rapid urbanisation, a surge in the number of
educated blacks and contact with “black ideology” on the continent and among the African
diaspora, led to an increased awareness of the eﬀect of apartheid on the position and psyche
of blacks. In section 3.2.3, reference was made to black consciousness as an important
ideology among blacks that stressed the importance of changing values, self-image, self-
help and psychology to undermine the idea of ascribed inferiority, dependency and white
paternalism. Black solidarity and black pride were regarded as constituting the antithesis
of white racism and superiority, with the synthesis lying somewhere between these two
extremes. As implied, whites were excluded from the movement in order to encourage black
self-reliance (Marx, 1992:11; Maphai, 1994:125-135). Like African nationalism and Pan-
Africanism, black consciousness was ambiguous as to how they viewed the ultimate place
of whites in South Africa. For some, such as Steve Biko, who advocated black solidarity in
the struggle for liberation, whites could be included on equal terms once the struggle was
over.127 Biko also stressed the disadvantages of black/white co-operation and interaction
and in particular, its divisive dimensions. According to Biko, involvement in white circles
127 In the “SASO Policy Manifesto” of 1971, it is stated that black and white will continue to live together
(Karis and Gerhart, 1997:481).
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created, a false sense of optimism about the possibilities of change amongst those blacks
“privileged” enough to be part of the liberal world. This state of aﬀairs produced divisions
and inequalities among blacks in general. He regarded those who were taken in by liberal
discourse as “dull-witted, self-centered blacks” who, “in the ultimate analysis...[are] as guilty
of the arrest of progress as their white friends, for it is from such groups that the theory of
gradualism emanates and this is what keeps the black confused and always hoping that one
day God will step down from heaven to solve their problems” (Howarth, 1997:45-46).
Black consciousness provided the ideological tenets for the BCM that had its origins at the
black universities in particular, and among the clergy in the late 1960s. Having formulated
its ideology, the BCM by using a variety of mechanisms began to spread a message of racial
assertiveness that could, once in practice, challenge the established order through its very
aﬃrmation (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:89-219; Leatt et al, 1986:105-119; Maphai, 1994:125-
135; Marx, 1992:39-60; Thompson and Prior, 1982:201-204;).
The BCM was born with the formal establishment of the South African Students’ Or-
ganisation (SASO) at Turﬂoop, (a university for blacks), in July 1969.128 Though initially
regarded as elitist and idealistic, it sought to unite all of the oppressed falling under the
term “black.“129 The BCM eventually did have emotional appeal beyond its intellectual
roots, but its ideology retained an emphasis on changing the self-image of blacks and ideas
about power rather than on directly attacking the physical manifestations of power (Marx,
1992:11). After its establishment, the number of organisations among non-whites prolifer-
ated (see Stanbridge, 1980:98) and many of these were established in the spirit of black
consciousness.
The BCM was initially seen by the government as being aligned with the ideas under-
lying the apartheid policy. However, a more confrontational attitude among its leaders and
organisations, as well as the role it played during the Soweto uprising and its aftermath, soon
provoked the wrath of the government. Several organisations were banned and the most im-
128The decision pertaining to the establishment of SASO took place at Marianhill (KwaZulu-Natal) in
December of 1968 (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:95).
129In terms of black consciouness, the concept of “black” was controversial. While it included all those
oppressed among Africans, coloureds and Indians, it excluded whites and those Africans coloureds and
Indians that could be associated with the oppressor. For purposes of this study, the term “black” will still
be used to designate Africans.
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portant leaders, including Steve Biko (who died in custody) detained (Marx, 1992:39-105).
Apart from the negative impact of the state’s clampdown on the BCM, there had been a
gradual movement away from black consciousness towards a more inclusive ideology since
the Soweto uprising. The “disenchantment” with some of the fundamental principles of the
ideology, would open up space for the future non-racial United Democratic Front (UDF).130
Though SASO was essentially a student organisation, it had explicit political aims and
could therefore, be regarded as a part of political society. Several other political organisations
were established, amongst which the Black People’s Convention and the Azanian People’s
Organization (AZAPO) can be regarded as important for the purpose of this thesis.
Black People’s Convention (BPC)
The BPC was established in 1972 to satisfy a need for an overt political organisation that was
to seek economic justice for the oppressed in the spirit of black consciousness. It favoured an
economy based on communalism. In addition, it opposed the homelands policy, campaigned
against foreign investment, favoured sanctions, including a sports boycott, and established
the Black Community Programmes (BCP). The latter addressed the material conditions of
the oppressed, but also served to conscientise the masses. These programmes were contro-
versial within the BCM and the other organisations of the struggle such as the ANC. It
was alleged that the improvement of the material circumstances would impact negatively on
the envisaged revolution, “that BCP would detract from enthusiasm for resistance to white
domination” (Marx, 1992:56).
The BPC sought unity with the ANC and the PAC in an attempt to form one libera-
tion group. These attempts brought it into confrontation with the state and shortly after
Biko’s death, the government clamped down on the BPC, banning it and other associated
organisations towards the end of 1977.
130Founded in 1983 as a uniﬁed front against the 1983-constitution.
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Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO)
After the banning of organisations in the BCM in 1977, AZAPO was founded in 1978131
in the tradition of black consciousness. It regarded itself both as a political party and a
liberation movement, spoke of “repossessing the land”, repeatedly described Azania (South
Africa) as belonging exclusively to blacks and took the position that the struggle had to
proceed without the participation of whites (Horowitz, 1991:12-19; Maphai, 1994:126-127).
It was essentially a black nationalist, anti-capitalist, and anti-liberal organisation. AZAPO
adherents incorporated strong elements of class analysis into their thinking, but it was not
the orthodox class analysis that excluded thinking along racial lines. Race and class were
merged by referring to blacks as, “a race of workers” (Marx, 1992:86-94; Horowitz, 1991:12-
19). Though non-violent in nature, it adopted a hard line against negotiations with the
white government on a new constitution, because like the exiled PAC, it wanted power to
be transferred to blacks (Horowitz, 1991:12-19).
For AZAPO, the struggle was not merely an anti-apartheid one, but a struggle by blacks
to repossess the land. AZAPO was authoritarian in its outlook and intended imposing its
beliefs on the whole of South Africa. It favoured a unitary socialist state and the nation-
alisation of the means of production, banks, insurance companies, communications, and all
small businesses including those of shopkeepers in the black townships (Guise, 1993:20).
However, AZAPO was regarded as being inﬂexible and having stagnated in its approach to
the struggle and was thus unable to capitalise on the political turmoil that was inspired by
black consciousness. Those that ﬂed the country had no choice but to join either the ANC
or the PAC and most joined the ANC (Marx, 1992:89-102).
In summary, South Africa had an extremely complex political society in which political rights
were determined by race. In addition, political society was divided on the basis of race, class
and ideology and these divisions often coincided. Non-racialism was, however, a prominent
alternative to race as a fundamental principle within the political debates and it would gain
important ground as the history of South Africa unfolded.




An expanding civil society, as was alluded to in section 3.2.1, was a reality in South Africa.
As will be discussed in chapter four, it gained importance during the liberalisation phase of
South Africa’s transition to democracy. The role of civil society is important in this analysis
of South Africa’s transition and a brief outline of civil society132 is, therefore, necessary at
this stage.
The characteristics of the South African civil society that were important towards the
end of the seventies are the spectrum of interests, the role of race, class and ideology in
the political alignment of these organisations: as well as their political and international
aﬃliation.
Civil society encompassed a wide spectrum of organised interests, each with their own
constituencies. Because of South Africa’s exclusory political dispensation and statutory in-
terference in the private domain, there was often a need to pursue some of these interests
within the public sphere, resulting in pressure being put on the state and/or support pro-
vided. However, there were clear divisions along racial, class, ideological and political lines.
In the literature on the engagement of civil society with the state, there is a tendency to
stress the “demands” made and pressure exerted on the state (see Gill, 2000:4-7; 58-62).
Within the South African context, however, it was clear that segments within civil soci-
ety, clearly provided support for the state and even made demands that conﬂicted with the
interests of other sections of civil society.
The following organised interests are of particular importance for purposes of an analysis
of South Africa’s transition, but most of these gave rise to separate organisations based on
race, class, ideology and political aﬃliation.
132The concept of civil society is problematic but as indicated in chapter 2, a distinction is made in this
thesis between civil society per se and political society. Many scholars however, regard political parties
as part of civil society. For purposes of this discussion, a distinction is made between those organisations




CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS
Since an early stage in South African history, churches and religious organisations have played
an important role in channelling the needs of society to the authorities and questioning the
exercise of power over non-whites as well their rights in the political dispensation. This was
a reality even before the Union was established in 1910 (see Karis and Carter, 1972:5-8,
349-355). Race, denomination and ideology were, however, important in the organisation
of religion in South Africa. For example, attempts were, made to institutionalise inter-
denominational and cross-racial co-operation among the various Christian churches, but
some of the black churches favoured black self-reliance in the spirit of Pan-Africanism, while
others even remained part of those churches deemed to be dominated by whites.
Churches became politicised, during the apartheid years, because of the actions of the
government. As indicated, the white Dutch Reformed Churches (DRC) played an important
role in the government, but even among these churches, there were diﬀerences in opinion with
regard to the reconciliation of apartheid and discrimination with the Bible (Race Relations
Survey, 1978:42-43). For example, at the Cottesloe Conference in 1960, eighty church leaders
(including Afrikaans Dutch Reformed leaders of which Beyers Naude was one) rejected the
government’s policies (Storey, 1998:188). Other examples of the politicisation of religion
were the restrictions on the worship of blacks in white areas and in churches for whites
and schools operated by churches. Schools operated by various churches were important,
but came into conﬂict with the authorities with regard to the admission of non-whites and
“Bantu education” (Race Relations Survey, 1977:40-41). Churches, furthermore, played an
important role in the agitation to end conscription and in providing moral support to those
who refused to do military service (Race Relations Survey, 1977:42).
The South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Christian Institute (CI), the Uni-
versity Christian Movement (UCM) and the South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference
(SACBC) were of particular importance in the struggle against apartheid. They found emo-
tional support in the World Council of Churches (WCC) that had been established in 1948.
The WCC provided moral and ﬁnancial support to the struggle against apartheid, ostracised
those South African churches who did not take a stand against apartheid and mobilised the
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international community against apartheid. Furthermore, most denominations had their
own international communities, for example, the international Roman Catholic Church, the
Lutheran World Federation and the World Methodist Council, “the church of God from
around the world had come to stand with its brothers and sisters in South Africa” (Storey,
1998:188).
Church organisations also provided input with regard to political alternatives in South
Africa. Even the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed) warned the government
against legislation that caused oﬀence (Race Relations Survey. 1977:43). The anti-apartheid
CI (Christian Institute) undertook important studies with regard to a just political dis-
pensation for South Africa. The Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid South Africa
(SPROCAS)133 was important in this regard. Its ﬁnal report was published in 1973 and was
one of the earliest proposals that contained consociational elements (Lijphart, 1985: 47-51).
TRADE UNIONS
The nature and activities of trade unions were largely prescribed by government legislation
pertaining to job reservation, the position and “rights” of labour organisations and segre-
gatory legislation in general. Trade unions played an important role, in articulating the
interests of workers, often including demands beyond the workplace and had contact with
overseas and international workers’ organisations such as the British Trade Union Congress
(TUC) World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (see Major, 2005).
Race as a factor in trade unions is clearly demonstrated by the early history of trade
unions, after the Union came into being. The Rand Rebellion (Red Revolt) in 1922 was
sparked by the reaction of white labourers to attempts to replace white workers with cheap
black labour. Furthermore, the Industrial Conciliation Act No. 11 of 1924 placed limitations
on the activities of black workers and their unions - only white, coloured and Asian workers’
unions were allowed to register oﬃcially. Even though black unions were not outlawed, they




unions did admit black workers on an individual basis (Major, 2005:478) and unregistered
black unions did join umbrella organisations. Thus, job reservation and limitations placed on
black unions resulted in the workers becoming organised along racial lines. Black unions were
even further marginalised and radicalised, after the introduction of the policy of apartheid
- even using security legislation to do so (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:189-191). Black unions,
thus, increasingly became dependent on the CPSA and many union oﬃcials were removed
as a result of its banning in 1950 (Major, 2005:478-480; Carter, 1958:66-74).
Largely because of job reservation and racial divisions among trade unions, successive
white governments were able to curb the activities of black trade unions and prevent a
united trade union front. In spite of this, and even though black unions were not oﬃcially
recognised, they were nevertheless responsive to militant leadership and established or joined
various umbrella organisations which managed to represent their interests and even mobilise
illegal strike action amongst its members (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:192-196; Major, 2005:482;
Marx, 192:190-192). Important in this regard were, for example, the Trade Union Council
of South Africa (TUCSA) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) that
were both founded in the ﬁfties.134 SACTU was allied with the ANC and suﬀered a severe
blow with the banning of the ANC.135
In the early 1970s, ﬁve groups became involved in building a progressive union movement,
namely: SACTU and ANC activists; worker leaders recruited from emerging unions; white
liberal university students and intellectuals; individuals and dissidents from the established
unions, mainly TUCSA; and individuals from the black consciousness movement (Baskin,
1991:20; Karis and Gerhart, 1997:197-198). Many individuals in these groups were socialists
with various leanings, but due to the nature of the repression at the time, a low proﬁle
was kept from the outset. Unions frequently started as advice oﬃces and concentrated on
building on the few legal rights black workers possessed.
Industrial action in the early seventies is generally regarded as a watershed in the history
of trade unionism in South Africa and it led to the introduction of various reforms in an
134Another example is the Council of Non-European Trade Unions that had already claimed an aﬃliation
of 119 unions in the 1940s.
135By the late sixties, the senior leaders of SACTU were almost all in exile. But the leadership cadre
began to surface in new and often clandestine organisations (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:197).
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attempt to depoliticise the working class by bringing them “under the ambit of legislation”
(Karis and Gerhart, 1997:211). As mentioned in section 3.2.2, both the Riekert and Wiehann
Commissions were appointed in 1977 for this purpose.
Towards the end of the seventies, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOS-
ATU) with 20 000 workers organised within ten industrial unions (Baskin, 1991:448), emerged
as the main union federation advocating transformation of the polity.
Even though non-racialism was advocated by some activists, trade unions remained
largely organised and politicised along racial lines and in the process, they were being
groomed as future channels for political expression by the oppressed, or as has already
been mentioned, social movement unionism (Webster, 1991:54-55). Trade unions were also
an important area where demands made on the government, engendered conﬂict along racial
lines. White unions favoured job reservation, while non-white unions opposed such practices.
The international contacts of non-white trade unions would increasingly become important
in mobilising international support against apartheid (see Major, 2005).
Politicised trade unions were thus a reality in South Africa prior to its transition to
democracy. Interestingly, some unions supported government policy including that of the
NP. Thus, there was no united front against the government (Carter, 1958: 72).
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES
Several organisations were established to protect and promote various interests, such as min-
ing, agriculture, business, industry and employers in the economic sphere. Race once again,
played a role and capital was in the hands of mainly whites. Some of these organisations
supported the government, while others were opposed to the government. The Chamber of
Mines (established in 1889), for example, inﬂuenced public policy on a number of issues,
but in particular, on labour issues. Though initially adhering to government policy, includ-
ing minimum wages, job reservation and migrant labour, the economic boom in the early
seventies placed it in a position to make powerful demands on the government, such as the
scrapping of conventional and statutory discrimination and thus providing economic upward
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mobility to non-whites136 (see Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:73-76). Agriculture was organ-
ised in terms of its own unions, examples of which included the South African Agricultural
Union and the South African Sugar Association (see Nattrass and Ardington, 1990). There
were also organisations serving traditional farmers. Furthermore, the Afrikaanse Handelsin-
stituut (AHI)137 and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC)138
were examples of organisations among business leaders. Examples of organised industry
and employers’ associations were the National Textile Manufacturers’ Association and the
South African Motor Industry Employers’ Association (see, Race Relations Survey, 1977;
1978:183-202). These organisations experienced at ﬁrst hand, the impact of international
sanctions.
STUDENTS, PARENTS AND TEACHERS ASSOCIATIONS
Students, parents and teachers associations formed part of another important set of organisa-
tions that interacted with government. Again, race and ideology played an important role. Of
particular importance were: the conservative white Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB), the lib-
eral but predominantly white National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the black
consciousness’ South African Students’ Organisation (SASO), the ANC’s Congress of South
African Students (COSAS)139 and AZAPO’s Azanian Students’ Organisation (AZASO). The
Soweto uprising gave rise to organisations such as the Soweto Students’ Representative Coun-
cil, the Soweto Parents’ Association and the Soweto Teachers’ Action Committee (see Marx,
1992:90-96).
CIVIC ORGANISATIONS
The establishment of civic organisations, such as the Port-Elizabeth Black Civic Organi-
sation (PEBCO) and the Soweto Civic Association, was an important development in the
136Another indication of the role economic development played within the South African transitional
process.
137Translates as the Afrikaans Commerce Institute and it gave support to Afrikaans businesses. It provided
support to the government but during the later stages of the transition favoured political changes.
138It provided valuable support to small business enterprises but was also accused of being capitalist and
opposed to the interests of the masses (see Karis and Gerhart, 1997:147).




struggle against apartheid: “The basic structure common to all these civic organisations was
to mobilize communities around concrete grievances or demands and to protest peacefully
for redress until agreements could be negotiated” (Marx, 1992:111). These organisations
became overtly political at the local level and became important for their success at “negoti-
ations“; and succeeding in winning concessions through methods such as stayaways, as well
as consumer and rent boycotts (see Marx, 1992:110-112; Karis and Gerhart, 1997:332-335;
764-765).
SPORTS ORGANISATIONS
There were numerous sports organisations but they were mostly race based as a result of the
eﬀect of apartheid policy on sport. International aﬃliation of the local organisations, was im-
portant in the struggle against apartheid. A number of international incidents pertaining to
sport140 resulted in international pressure calling for the isolation of South Africa in the area
of international sport. Non-racial sporting organisations such as the South African Rugby
Union (SARU), the South African Council of Sport (SACOS) and the South African Non-
Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) were involved in politics adhering to the principle
that “there can be no normal sport in an abnormal society” (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:734).
SANROC was able to exert considerable inﬂuence on the government and its ﬁrst major
success was the exclusion of South Africa from participating in the Tokyo Olympics of 1964
(Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 361).
THE MEDIA
It is important to note that the media is a vital part of civil society in a democratic regime
and that freedom of the media should be a valued principle pertaining to the political culture
in a democracy. As discussed in chapter two, the media plays a vital role in the dissemination
of political information, ideas and values. In fact, it provides channels for the articulation of
interests, demands and support, as well as for the exchange of ideas and the open discussion
of issues of public interest. The media is also a useful tool in the mobilisation of the masses
140For example, the Arthur Ashe (tennis) and Basil D’Oliviera (cricket) incidents.
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against an authoritarian regime. All of these were important within the South African
context because freedom of the press has been an established value in South Africa since
1828 (Wilson and Thompson, 1982:316-317). South Africa also had an extensive array of
newspapers that were supplemented by radio and television, other publications and the ﬁlm
industry (see Diamond, 1994:71-72).
Some characteristics of the various types of media in South Africa impacted negatively
on their role in the political domain. The press was often divided along party lines with the
supporters of a particular political party usually reading only the party “mouthpieces.” Thus,
Afrikaans newspapers almost exclusively supported the NP and supporters of the NP usually
only read the newspapers that supported their own party alignment. English newspapers, in
turn, supported the opposition parties and were instrumental in pressurising the government
on the policy of apartheid. This led to the reinforcement of existing political ideas and
hampered the exchange of ideas in an unbiased manner. Radio and television were controlled
by the government and the content of their broadcasts monitored in order to protect the
image of the government. Those in the struggle usually regarded radio and television as
propaganda machines of the government. Censorship and an increased clampdown on several
opposition newspapers, particularly those in support of struggle organisations, were obstacles
with which the media had to deal.
In general, the media was extensive and the freedom it enjoyed probably unparalleled in
authoritarian regimes. The media thus had the potential of becoming a vital instrument in
a transition to democracy in South Africa (see Diamond, 1994:71-72).
OTHER ORGANISATIONS
In addition to all the above organisations, numerous local and foreign interest groups and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the South African Institute for Race Rela-
tions, the Urban Foundation and the Black Sash were also operating in South Africa. They
were often directly involved in political issues, did research and provided assistance to those
aﬀected by apartheid policies and the struggle.
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The above summary of organisations discussed in the preceding pages, merely provides an
outline of the nature and extent of a home-grown and prosperous civil society that was part
of the South African scenario. Even though some sections of civil society supported the NP
government, important inputs in favour of changing South Africa’s political dispensation
would in future come increasingly from the “white” but independent civil society. Though
there were attempts to unite civil society into a uniﬁed front against apartheid, most of these
organisations, though often co-operating with one another, had been functioning more or
less independently of others up to that time. A broad uniﬁed front, as discussed in chapter
four, would however materialise in the near future.
In summary, various aspects of civil society are important in a discussion on the role of
civil society in South Africa’s transition to democracy. Firstly, on the one hand, a section
of civil society succeeded in challenging and pressurising the authorities and made demands
on them, but on the other hand, a segment of civil society provided vital support to the
government. Secondly, in addition to the demands made on the authorities, civil society
channelled and even articulated some of the demands emanating from the excluded section
of political society, thereby exercising inﬂuence over both the state and the masses. Thirdly,
it played an important role in the mobilisation of the masses and provided much needed
moral and material support to the masses during times of political turmoil. Fourthly, many
organisations within civil society belonged to international organisations that provided both
moral and material support to them, as well as being inﬂuential in the mobilisation of the
international community against South Africa’s political dispensation. Fifthly, many of the
organisations of civil society had constitutions that laid down the rules in terms of which
they could function, as well as the powers and roles of their oﬃcials and members, thereby
providing valuable experience that could be of use in negotiations and a future democratic
dispensation.141 Sixthly, important research was conducted by civil society organisations
and political alternatives were devised for South Africa.
Civil society, thus, provided clear indications of groups that had a stake in the future
dispensation of South Africa (see Gill. 2000: 95). How they would act in future would be
141The constitution of 1975 adopted by the Pimville/Klipspruit Residents’ Committee is an example and
appears in Karis and Gerhart (1997:736-738).
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determined by what they perceived as being in their best interests.
3.4.4 STATE - POLITICAL SOCIETY - CIVIL SOCIETY INTERAC-
TIONS
It is evident from the discussion thus far that the state, as well as political society and
civil society, was structured along racial and ethnic lines which resulted in complex sets of
interactions within and among the domains of state - political society - civil society, and
across the existing divisions within each domain. At this stage, it is necessary to look brieﬂy
at the nature and consequences of some of these interactions in order to draw attention to
the complex nature of the South African political scene, and how these interactions played
a role in South Africa’s transition to democracy.
Racial divisions that were a direct result of the policy of apartheid produced diﬀerentiated
interactions between the state and, on the one hand, a politically empowered white political
society, and on the other hand, an excluded, politically unempowered and disempowered
non-white political society.142 However, there were interactions and co-operation across
racial and ethnic divisions within political society. The government of the state reacted by
legislating against co-operation across racial lines and by suppressing opposition to a political
dispensation that denied meaningful political rights to the majority of the population. The
excluded section reacted in turn, by exerting pressure of an increasingly violent nature on
the state and the latter again retaliated by resorting to more violent means in its suppression
of the opposition. After the banning of most of the important organisations championing
the rights of non-whites, the excluded section of political society turned to the international
community and to the internal civil society to further their aims. Important civil society
organisations, both white and non-white, increasingly channelled political demands to the
state and as a result, extended the sphere of opposition and increased the level of pressure to
which the government was exposed. Religious organisations and trade unions are examples
of organisations that played important roles in this regard.
Churches for example, played an important role in condemning apartheid and the govern-
142The proponents of apartheid, however, did believe that apartheid empowered all on a racial and ethnic




ment on moral grounds (Duggan 1973:120-133). The deteriorating relations between church
and state for example, led to crucial talks between the then Prime Minister, other cabinet
ministers and church leaders in 1971 (see Duggan, 1973:130-132). The government aligned
Dutch Reformed Churches, supported the government by insisting that its clergy and mem-
bers withdrew from organisations opposing apartheid. Most of the religious organisations
opposing apartheid, evoked scrutiny from the government and also provoked condemnation
by the government for improperly opposing apartheid, receiving funds from abroad and thus
allegedly acting as agents of foreign liberal agendas (Duggan, 1973:133). Nevertheless, church
and other religious organisations would increasingly become important in the struggle for a
new political dispensation.
In the battle between the trade unions and the state, some unions supported government
policy, including the apartheid policy of the NP. Thus, there was no united front against the
government (Carter, 1958: 72).
The Durban strike and other strikes of 1973 gave a lift to union membership and organi-
sation but the state responded to these strikes with a strategy involving both repression and
co-optation. It banned a number of individuals involved in the unions, but introduced a new
legal structure for trade unions (Cooper, 1996:63-64).
Growing labour militancy and deepening township protests culminating in the Soweto
Uprising of 1976 propelled the state into reforming labour law. The ﬁndings of the Wiehahn
Commission of enquiry, led to labour law reforms allowing, the formal recognition of black
trade unions within the oﬃcial industrial relations system for the ﬁrst time in South African
history.
The recommendations of the Wiehann Commission resulted in the enormous growth in
the new union movement143 alongside the old union movement. The strategy of the Wiehann
Commission of incorporating the new unions within the old movement failed, because of sig-
niﬁcant steps taken by the new union movement as early as 1979. The new unions applied
for registration in terms of the new legislation and through further organising and mergers,
these new unions grew into the mentioned national trade union body, the Federation of
143From under 100 000 members in 1979, to well over 2 million in 1993 (Macun, 1983).
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South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), with 20 000 workers organised into ten industrial
unions (Baskin, 1991:448). Despite some disagreement among the new unions, the FOS-
ATU federation was formed and this “united front” of union aﬃliates aimed at centralising
and strengthening the new movement against co-optation by the state. This move, simul-
taneously, countered the parallel white-led unions that were known to be opposing reforms
(Cooper, 1996:63-64). It was argued that oﬃcial legality would bring a number of beneﬁts,
such as the right to organise / recruit in factories, to sign recognition agreements and to
oppose the victimisation of union members. However, FOSATU’s policy was that unions
would only apply for registration on a nonracial basis and members would be signed on,
regardless of the new labour law which denied union membership to migrants and foreign
workers (Cooper, 1996:64).
In their strategy of opposing the state, the unions focussed on important industries with
large workforces and in particular in the metal, textile, and chemical industries. They found
success especially with multinational corporations that were vulnerable to international pres-
sure and sanctions.
In general the reaction of the state was, if possible, to co-opt and appease, but if not to
condemn, ban, prosecute and repress those opposing the political dispensation. Miscalcu-
lations and attempts at appeasement by the state often gave more impetus to the struggle
emanating from political society and civil society and often contributed to the creation of
political space in which resistance could take root and grow. It became increasingly ev-
ident that parliamentary politics as the primary political locus was being challenged by
extra-parliamentary activity that was becoming a formidable force to be taken into account.
Two important aspects concerning the state were however, important, namely the posi-
tion of the judiciary and attempts at reform by the government. It should be noted that
in the struggle against apartheid, the courts were still being regarded as a last resort for
justice, but due to the absence of the principle of judicial review and a Bill of Rights, the
judiciary was powerless to stem discriminatory and unfair legislation. The position of the
judiciary was complex, but there was still a perception that, even though the judiciary had
to adjudicate the laws of the land, a fair trial was still possible (see Duggan, 1973:131).144
144For example in late 1971 the dean of the Anglican Church, the very Reverend Gonville Aubie ﬀrench-
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As is evident from the discussion above, there were several attempts such as the legalisa-
tion of black trade unions, to appease the non-whites at least, and to lessen the increasing
internal and external pressures that were exerted on the government. There were some
reforms with regard to the coloureds and Indians, as well as the abolishment of certain
discriminatory legislation.145 Thus, already at this stage, there were indications that the
government had begun to rethink its apartheid policy. The labour reforms towards the end
of the seventies could be interpreted as a sign of early reform and liberalisation.146 An Inter-
Cabinet Council composed of whites, coloureds and Indians, was created, at central level,
in order to provide additional political accommodation to coloureds and Indians, but the
council was, instead seen, like most other attempts at appeasement, as a perpetuation of
apartheid. Thus, there were calls to boycott the Council in particular, because no provision
had been made for the inclusion of blacks (Race Relations Survey, 1976:21). A process was
also initiated to eliminate certain racial discriminatory practices, such as discriminatory no-
tices in buildings and lifts, budgeting more money for black education and housing, and to
narrow the wage gap.
In spite of a lack of legitimacy among the majority of the population, the government
still tried to hold the initiative in any reforms, including those mentioned above. The white
cabinet appointed a cabinet committee under the leadership of Mr PW Botha (the then
Minister of Defence) towards the end of 1976, to investigate possible changes to the political
dispensation concerning coloureds and Indians. A new constitutional plan, similar to that
eventually adopted in 1983, was tabled towards the end of 1976. The lack of any provision
for the incorporation of blacks was a factor in the heightened political activism that was to
follow (see Race Relations Survey, 1977:7-11).
However, the government was still of the opinion that it could exert enough force on
opposing elements to ensure that it will retain the initiative in reform as would be evident in
chapter four. The ability of the state to counteract pressures coming from a variety of sources
Beytagh, was convicted on charges of terrorism. On appeal the Appeal Court ruled unanimously that “the
mere intemperate expression of anti-government views could not be equated with terrorism or subversion”
(Duggan, 1973:131).
145Pressure by the Taiwanese government ended most discriminatory legislation pertaining to Chinese.
146Some critics in the struggle saw it as an attempt by the government to control the labour movements.
Yet, whatever the purpose, in reality this signalled a move away from purist interpretations of apartheid and
is an indication of the realisation by the apartheid elite that the economy is a common reality?
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was a factor that would inﬂuence the course of South Africa’s transition to democracy.
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective in this chapter was to provide an analytical description of the environment of
the transition to democracy. For this reason, an analysis was made of the macro-structural
factors that could hinder or facilitate a transition to democracy in South Africa. This was
followed by a description of the actors and various interactions in the domains of state -
political society - civil society and in particular, with regard to the struggle against South
Africa’s political dispensation and apartheid in particular.
Of importance is the discussion on the internal cleavages, which were structured along
racial, ethnic, class and ideological dividing lines. It was argued that racial cleavages were
often reinforced by ethnic, class and ideological divisions and that conﬂict was fomented
and nurtured along these divisions. These cleavages were initially nurtured by legislation
that sought the segregation of the various races and even ethnic groups, in a grand design
of separate development, or apartheid, that had as its goal, the empowerment and even-
tual self-determination of the various groups within separate political spheres. In practice,
apartheid resulted in discrimination based on race, the exclusion of non-whites from political
rights enjoyed by whites, economic restrictions placed on non-whites and widespread dissat-
isfaction with the prevailing political dispensation. Reference was made to the importance
of legislation that suppressed and proscribed opposition to the apartheid government’s en-
visaged political dispensation. Thus, the policy of apartheid engineered a complex society
characterised by white political domination, deep cleavages and conﬂict.
Thus, the cleavage structure of South African society and the conﬂicts fomented and
nurtured along the lines of division, as well as the state’s forceful implementation of the policy
of apartheid and its suppression of any opposition, would be complicating factors in South
Africa’s transition. Apartheid could therefore be regarded as a factor that would prove to
be an obstacle on the road to a transition to democracy. Just as it was diﬃcult for Afrikaner
nationalists to envisage their self-determination without apartheid, it was impossible for the




Other macro-structural factors, such as culture, economic development, international
intervention, elite disunity and pressure on the regime (regime breakdown), were found to
be present and were discussed. Several points are important in this regard.
First, it was mentioned, that democratic values were present in the political culture.
Whites enjoyed political rights associated with democracy and non-whites were exposed to
these values. Likewise, most of the organisations in which blacks participated nurtured
values and practices reconcilable with democratic values. As mentioned, the struggle was
for many, essentially, about democracy and not about race.
Second, economic development provided a stimulus for societal development in general,
which in turn, generated demands for a more inclusive economic and political dispensation.
Racial interdependence following industrialisation, deepened and exposed the inner contra-
dictions of the system - contradictions that would lead to a decline in the adherence to an
ideology promoting white domination. The conﬂuence of statutory race divisions, with class
structures and ideology were thus mitigated by a political culture that saw the nurturing and
growth of democratic values, the equalising eﬀect of Christianity, as well as an expanding
but shared economy that nurtured racial interdependence.
Third, because of internal pressure exerted by anti-regime forces, a declining demographic
base of whites, the increased cost of repression, the demands of an expanding economy, to-
gether with external pressure by the international society on the policy of racial discrimi-
nation, the legitimacy and eﬃciency of the racial oligarchy faced a crisis. Initial economic
development was later followed by economic stagnation that put further pressure on the
government and became a factor in regime disunity and “breakdown.” International inter-
vention became increasingly important and was a signiﬁcant factor in the stagnation of the
economy.
Thus, macro-structural factors that would complicate a transition to democracy were
present, but these were mitigated by the presence of macro-structural factors generally as-
sociated with successful transitions to democracy. Furthermore, there were factors present
that are usually associated with compelling an authoritarian regime to democratise. In spite
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of the presence of macro-structural factors that are normally supportive of democracy, the
multi-layered structure of the cleavages and the resultant conﬂicts that in fact, exacerbated
these cleavages, would require a change in the mindset of the elites and in all likelihood,
external intervention. Should apartheid no longer be a factor, the other cleavages would still
pose obstacles on the road to democracy. There was thus clearly, to use the words of Prid-
ham (1990:12) a “contending perimeter within which choices have to be made and solutions
sought.” Unlike other cases of negotiated transition where the primary motivating factors
were internal, Schmitter (1990) was doubtful whether South Africa’s transition would have
taken place were it not for the imposition of sanctions and various external constraints upon
domestic elites.
Other facets discussed were the expansion of a political society and civil society that
emerged largely along the aforementioned racial, ethnic, class and ideological lines of division.
Several important characteristics and dynamics of the domains of state - political society -
civil society, were identiﬁed. In addition, several important aspects concerning these three
domains, as well as the various inter- and intra-actions were also mentioned.
First, race played an important role in the institutions of the state. The state was complex
and it was dominated and governed by whites. In spite of apartheid prescribing the dominant
political values in the governing of the state, democratic values were also present, but for all
practical purposes, non-whites were excluded from participating in the processes resulting
from such democratic values. The state was powerful and was able to suppress opposition
to the political dispensation over a long period of time, albeit at an ever increasing cost.
Second, political and civil society were divided into regime and anti-regime segments
that were involved in a conﬂict in which race played a prominent, if not predominant, role.
Only the white political society could participate in the political processes and the exercise of
power. Both the white and non-white organisations of political society opposing the political
dispensation, were often banned and had to operate underground, in exile, in detention or by
channeling its activities through civil society. For these reasons, they sought to capture state




Third, the white civil society channelled its class and ideological interests in the domain
of the state through the political establishment, but the non-white political society had little
meaningful access to decision-making and the exercise of power. Thus, the non-white political
society was isolated from the legitimate “white” political processes and was consequently
unable to secure an institutional path to mediate its interests. For this reason, the non-
white political society relied on civil society in its engagement with the state. Because the
non-white civil society did not have access to political power, it confronted the state domain
directly that was depriving it of its freedom, political participation, as well as competition
and would eventually build (as discussed in chapter four) a broad based anti-regime bloc of
resistance to dismantle the racial oligarchy.
Fourth, hardening attitudes in a political culture that became more hard line on both
sides, economic stagnation, international intervention and pressure, the declining demo-
graphic base of whites, evidence of disunity among the ruling elite and the cost of repression
all pressured the government into the realisation that apartheid was becoming a liability that
could not serve Afrikaner nationalism indeﬁnitely. This was evident in the attempts by the
government to co-opt opposition and dissent and to initiate reforms such as labour relations
and the creation of more forums for political expression by the excluded non-whites, as well
as the appointment of a cabinet committee to investigate possible changes to South Africa’s
political dispensation.
In this chapter, it was argued that the authoritarian rule generated its own contradictions
and that macro-structural factors forced the authorities to adopt reformative liberalisation
measures that would accelerate a democratic transition of South Africa, as would be discussed
in chapter four. While the precise causes of each transition to democracy may vary (e.g.
with regard to the severity of the underlying economic and/or legitimacy crises) from case
to case, what is evident, is that these circumstances lead some members of the authoritarian
regime to reassess their interests.
In summary, the context in which a democratic transition had to be eﬀected, in South
Africa, was discussed in this chapter. The importance of several macro-structural factors,
as well as state - political society - civil society interactions, in bringing the government to
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rethink the political dispensation, was analysed and these factors would remain important
until the ﬁnal transition. Thus, towards the end of the seventies, apartheid policy and the
exclusion of non-whites from meaningful political participation were being reconsidered by
the authorities. This would usher in a new era in the political history of South Africa.
The importance of the initial phase of transition, namely the ameliorative liberation and
confrontation phase (1978-1989) in South Africa’s transition to democracy, will be analysed








This chapter covers the “initial phase of transition” between 1978-1989 during which Mr
PW Botha,1 was head of government, ﬁrst as Prime Minister and later as an executive Pres-
ident.2 This “initial phase of transition” was characterised, on the one hand, by ameliorative
liberalisation initiated by the government in its bid to introduce reforms from above and,
on the other hand, by mutual antagonism and confrontation between the government and
the anti-regime opposition in a cycle of resistance and repression. Racial conﬂict still over-
shadowed the ideological or class conﬂict even though these, often overlapped as discussed
in chapter three.
This timeframe provides an opportunity to analyse the interplay between macro-structural
factors and elite behaviour in transitions to democracy because both were important dur-
ing this phase of South Africa’s transition. The objective of this chapter is, therefore, to
analyse the role and importance of the macro-structural factors in the government’s reform
1Mr Botha became Prime Minister in September of 1978 on a reformist mandate after his predecessor,
John Vorster was discredited by the Information Scandal pertaining to the mismanagement of state funds
(often called Muldergate). It was a clear victory of the more liberal (verligte) faction within the NP over
the more conservative (verkrampte) faction that supported Dr Connie Mulder who was generally regarded
as the obvious successor to Vorster, but was also implicated in the scandal.
2South Africa initially had a parliamentary system of the executive with the head of government as




initiatives, as well as in the elite interaction in the domains of, state - political society - civil
society, particularly in the absence of an anti-regime political society with access to state
power. The relevance of both macro-structural and micro-behavioural theories of political
transformation in an analysis of the transition to democracy in South Africa can therefore
be evaluated.
Attention will therefore be paid to the importance of macro-structural factors in elite
actions during the initial phase and in particular to the structure of internal cleavages such
as racial, ethnic, class and ideological cleavages, including the conﬂict nurtured along these
lines of division. Furthermore, the changing demographic proﬁle, political culture, economic
development and crisis, international pressure, regime breakdown and elite disunity will be
examined. In addition, the interactions in the domains of, state - political society - civil
society will be analysed. The government’s reform initiatives, including the idea of power-
sharing among the various races and ethnic groups, as a new guiding principle in the thinking
of the policy-makers, will also receive attention. In addition attention will be paid to changes
in apartheid legislation, particularly, the new constitutional dispensation enacted in 1983,
increased security measures introduced by the state, and attempts to engage in talks with
the ANC. Furthermore, the support of and opposition to the government’s reform initiatives,
the emergence of a united front between the anti-regime political society and civil society, as
well as the antagonism between the state and the anti-regime civil society in the absence of a
non-white political society with access to state power. The role of political society and civil
society in the mobilisation of the masses and the eventual breakdown of the government’s
reform initiative will thus receive careful attention as well.
4.2 THE MACRO-STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF THE LIBERALISA-
TION PHASE
This study has already referred to the fact that there had been prior indications towards
the end of the seventies that there was a pressing need for the political dispensation to be
reformed in the interest of the future prosperity of South Africa. Reforms that preceded the
initial phase of transition were mainly aimed at appeasing the increasingly restive masses
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that were excluded from political power and to reduce international pressure on South Africa,
in particular the pressure on white South Africans and their government. The initial phase
of transition would however be characterised by more substantive attempts at reform of the
political dispensation.
The macro-structural factors, which, pressurised the authoritarian regime, as discussed
in chapter three, continued to be important in facilitating the transition to democracy, at
the same time, they hampered the transitional process. The nature and role of both the
positive and negative eﬀects of the macro-structural factors on the prospects for democracy
will thus be touched on brieﬂy in this section.
4.2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNAL CLEAVAGES AND CON-
FLICT
There were no signiﬁcant changes in the structure of the cleavages during the initial phase
of transition apart from the fact that the conﬂict and violence fomented along cleavage lines,
escalated and intensiﬁed. It is important to note that during this initial phase of transition;
race still overshadowed class and ideology as a source of cleavage and conﬂict, even though
they still overlapped signiﬁcantly.
RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLEAVAGES
The government’s reform initiatives favoured the interests of whites at the expense of blacks;
mainly considered the interests of whites and acted mostly on their behalf. The exclusion of
the black majority from the “reformed” political dispensation as set out in the Republic of
South Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983 (known as the 1983-Constitution), reinforced
race as a divisive force in the South African society as will be discussed further on in this
chapter. Thus, even though the government embarked on a road to liberalise the political
dispensation, the net eﬀect was that the excluded majority regarded these eﬀorts merely as
“reform apartheid” (see Guise, 1993:24-26; Lijphart, 1985:52-64; Sisk, 1995:67). However,
the essential features of reform apartheid lay in the government’s attempt to present its
rule as being in the interest of all South Africans. Likewise, the government continued to
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promote ethnic self-determination for blacks and therefore, according to the anti-apartheid
forces, continued to exploit ethnic diversity within the South African context (see Guise,
1993:23-25). Diﬀerences among black ethnic groups, particularly with regard to the Zulu-
people, intensiﬁed. However, this was often caused by disagreement over the objectives of the
struggle, as well as the methods that would need to be employed to achieve those objectives.
It was therefore obvious that race and ethnicity would remain the prime sources of cleav-
age and conﬂict during this phase and would be an obstacle on the one hand, but on the
other hand, it would fuel the search for an inclusive democratic political dispensation.
CLASS CLEAVAGES
As discussed in chapter three, class and race overlapped signiﬁcantly in South Africa (see
Table 3.1 of chapter 3). Protection of the white race group therefore implied protection of
the dominant class, which consisted mainly of whites.
Power-sharing was presented by the government as a mechanism to protect the cultural
integrity of all of the various ethnic groups, but cultural self-determination would coexist
with the reality of material inequality. Inﬂating the political power of cultural minorities thus
implied the entrenchment of the economic privileges of whites (MacDonald, 1992:720-722).
The overlap between class and race thus continued to further and promote Marxist inter-
pretations of the South African political dispensation and made it vulnerable to Cold War
tactics and strategies. Legalised trade unions for blacks provided a channel and mouthpiece
for black worker demands but also provided channels for increased politicisation of the black
workers (see Marx, 1992:222-226).
IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES
There were a few changes in the basic ideological cleavages as discussed in chapter three.
Under the leadership of PW Botha,3 the government displayed a more pragmatic attitude
3With more than a decade of experience as Minister of Defense (he took the post in 1966) after years
of ideological policies Botha brought a new pragmatic orientation to the NP (Sisk, 1992:141-142), but his
experience with the military sector would also aﬀect his political style (Grundy, 1983:9-11) as will become
evident in the discussion.
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towards the political landscape in South Africa and important ideological shifts were, thus,
mainly taking place within the government’s “reformed” interpretation of apartheid. The
principle of “power-sharing” (as discussed in section 4.3.1) was important in this regard.
Developments in the government’s approach were the idea of the “total onslaught,” and its
corollary “the total strategy.“4 The idea of a “total onslaught” on South Africa by conspirato-
rial forces of communist aggression from abroad was elevated for all practical purposes, from
military doctrine to state ideology during PW Botha’s tenure as leader of the government
(Swilling, 1988:5; Grundy, 1983:3-6).
The ideology of the “total onslaught” justiﬁed the government’s repressive measures of
civil unrest during the post-1985 state of emergency, but civil unrest, in turn, justiﬁed a
programme of reform. The application of an intense counter-revolutionary strategy, as well
as “a sophisticated hearts and minds approach” was, therefore, necessary (Swilling, 1988:5;
Sisk, 1992:142).
The political advantages of such a new strategy were important in the sense that the
government could promise reforms that departed from the strict ideological prescriptions
of apartheid and separate development. However, they could promise law and order and
continued white control simultaneously to the more conservative whites.
Not all nationalists embraced the government’s more pragmatic approach to South Africa’s
political issues. Opposition from a more conservative interpretation of apartheid ideology
culminated in the breaking away by a group under leadership of Dr Andries Treurnicht
and the founding of the Conservative Party in 1982 (Sisk, 1995:60-61; Adam and Moodley,
1993:150-152).
An important development towards the end of Botha’s tenure was the collapse of commu-
nism in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The loss of these international ideological partners
4The premises behind the doctrine are summarised in a passage from a White Paper on Defence tabled
in 1973: “The RSA is a target for international communism and its cohorts - leftists, activists, exaggerated
humanism, permissiveness, materialism, and related, ideologies. In addition, the RSA has been singled out
as a special target for the by-products of their ideologies such as black radicalism, exaggerated individual
freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed against us based on double standards. It is
against this global background that the government is developing its policy” (Slabbert, 1987:23). The belief
that South Africa was under siege was a theme that had long served to mobilise the white electorate behind




would prove to be a major predicament for leftist political parties and organisations and in
particular, the SACP. New political identities and alignments became necessities, but these
in turn, caused dissent, for example, within the SACP and the ANC (see Adam and Mood-
ley, 1993:82-95). There was a new search for democratic socialism, brought about by the
liberalisation of Eastern Europe (Adam and Moodley, 1993:87).
Race and class thus remained important principles in the ideological spectrum of South
Africa and would continue to dominate political goals and actions during this phase. How-
ever, increasingly the major players (most notably the NP, ANC and SACP) were moving
away from radical interpretations of their ideological underpinnings towards more pragmatic
interpretations.5 However, during this phase the hardening of attitudes along the lines
of conﬂict would curtail the possibility of positive outcomes of this emerging pragmatism.
Though pragmatism would yield few beneﬁts during this phase, it would open the way for
more normal discourse among contending groups during the phases that were to follow as
will be discussed in chapters ﬁve and six.
CONFLICT VIOLENCE AND CLEAVAGES
Conﬂict continued to be fomented and as a result, it escalated and intensiﬁed along the
cleavage lines. This is evident from the total number of deaths and arrests during the years
1985-1989 as indicated by Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
This phase also witnessed an increase in terrorist activities.6 In turn, the government
also stepped up its repression of resistance both internally and externally within the region
and a nationwide state of emergency was declared on 12 June 1986 (Marx, 1992:159-160).
There was an increase in the number of persons that faced treason charges - some of whom
were sentenced to death (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:xxxi).
In its counter-insurgency strategy, the government in particular made use of the above-
mentioned idea of a “total onslaught.” A vicious and intensifying cycle of resistance and
oppression would be the result. The government’s counter-insurgency strategy led to the
5As indicated, this was the case with the ANC and SACP after the collapse of communism towards the
end of this phase. Prior to these events, the SACP was often presumed to be following Stalinist communist
ideology (see Adam and Moodley, 1993:82).
6In 1985 there were 136, 231 in 1986, 235 in 1987 and 291 in 1988 (Race Relations Survey, 1988/89:xxx).
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TABLE 4.1: Monthly Totals of Political Fatalities in South Africa, 1985 to 1996
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
1985 4 35 76 46 66 45 96 163 69 86 101 92 879
1986 105 112 179 145 221 212 122 76 40 16 37 33 1298
1987 40 22 40 40 33 36 39 35 73 93 89 121 661
1988 211 107 62 48 58 76 94 112 108 90 85 98 1149
1989 126 95 89 99 89 38 96 104 135 116 129 287 1403
1990 210 283 458 283 208 150 247 698 417 162 316 267 3699
1991 187 129 351 270 318 150 164 184 282 218 283 170 2706
1992 139 238 348 300 230 324 278 361 339 332 299 159 3347
1993 135 148 143 212 339 309 547 451 425 398 370 317 3794
1994 239 259 537 436 207 119 136 106 109 106 94 128 2476
1995 131 87 79 138 100 82 92 61 69 49 54 102 1044
1996 39 47 59 67 45 53 64 63 81 57 47 61 683
Source: South Africa Survey, 1997:600
TABLE 4.2: The Spiral of Discontent: Rising Revolutionary Conﬂict in South
Africa, 1952, 1960, 1976-1977, 1984-1988
Arrests Related Deaths
Deﬁance Campaign (June 1952) 8,000 0
Sharpeville (1960) 18,000 67
Soweto (June 1976 B Feb. 1977) 5,980 575
1984-85 (Sept. 1984 - July 1985) 14,000 740
1985-88 (July 1985 - Dec. 1988) 31,000 3361
Sources: Sisk, 1995:65. For data from 1952 and Sharpeville, Lodge 1983; for Soweto and for
1984-85; and for 1984-88, IPSA 1989. South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR)
estimate.
rise of the security establishment as a major locus of state power. In order to understand
the spiralling cycle of conﬂict that increasingly destabilised the region, it is important to
take note of the increasingly important role of the security establishment in decision-making
in South Africa.
In the implementation of the ideology of a “total onslaught”, PW Botha elevated the role
of the security bureaucracy to the extent that these “securocrats” began to dominate govern-
ment (Adam and Moodley, 1993:41; Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:133-136; Grundy, 1983;
Sisk, 1992:143; Marx, 1992:159). Even the cabinet and the NP caucus became marginalised
in the resulting decision-making process. The security superstructure of the total strategy
was initiated in August 1979, when Mr Botha began to reorganise the structures of the cab-
inet and the bureaucracy (Grundy, 1983:10; Survey of Race Relations, 1979:6-7). Kenneth
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Grundy (1983:11-17) lists the following key components of the security establishment: The
Department of Defence and the South African Defence Force (SADF), the intelligence com-
munity, a segment of the intellectual community in the service of the security establishment,
armaments and related industries such as Armscor, the South African Police (SAP) and the
State Security Council (SSC).7
The National Security Management System (NSMS) was in place by the early 1980s and
functioned below the SSC and parallel to other civilian structures of government (Giliomee
and Schlemmer, 1989:134). Mr Botha managed the NSMS in a top-down well-coordinated
bureaucratic machine aimed at monitoring revolutionary activity and developing short- and
long-term strategies to defeat it (Sisk, 1992:143). It consisted of an intricate web of regional,
sub-regional and local (municipal) centres. There were four committees at every level of the
NSMS: one dealt with security, another with constitutional, economic and social aﬀairs, a
third with communication and local propaganda, while the fourth consisted of the chairs of
the other committees (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:134).8 The NSMS was thus able to
permeate every corner of the country and all segments of the population and set the stage
for the regime’s capability to curtail the revolt in the mid-1980s. The NSMS thus allowed
the government to challenge the threats emanating from the struggle eﬀectively through
the militarisation of governmental structures and their orientation towards a coordinated
counter-insurgency strategy. It eventually developed into a parallel government; most of
the oﬃcials were drawn from the security establishment. Even the moderating inﬂuence
of the cabinet, parliament, civil service and interest groups was aﬀected negatively (Sisk,
1992:143-144).
In addition to their repression of resistance, the military thinkers were also pressing for
domestic political, economic and social reforms to defuse the conﬂict and to prevent further
polarisation (Grundy, 1983:7-8). For a successful counter-insurgency strategy, alternative
structures were required in order to provide participatory outlets for those excluded from
7The SSC was established by the Security Intelligence and State Security Act No. 64 of 1972, as one
of the twenty cabinet advisory committees tasked to advise on national policy and strategy. With the
assumption of power by Botha, the SSC became one of ﬁve cabinet committees with an enhanced role in
policy-making (Grundy, 1983:15).
8The cornerstone of the securocracy built by PW Botha in the ﬁrst years of his rule was the reinvigoration
of the State Security Council - a round-table of the security establishment that was aided by interdepart-
mental committees, chaired by PW Botha and which met weekly to review security and intelligence matters.
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the political system in order to undercut the socio-political base of the revolutionary organi-
sations. This strategy required a careful balance between the creation of co-opting structures
and a gradual relaxation of apartheid legislation (Sisk, 1992:143).
The level of violence decreased somewhat during the second half of 1986 although a
rapidly spreading rent boycott continued unabated and the government closed down about
250 black schools (Arnold, 1992:43).
State repression was perceived as white against black and thus contributed to the racial
polarisation of the South African society and the hardening of attitudes on all sides of the
conﬂict. However, the conﬂict also began to draw more and more players and black-on-
black violence began to escalate and thus complicated the nature of the conﬂict (see Race
Relations Survey, 1988/1989:459-461, 597-631). This led to the internal displacement of an
estimated 60 000 non-whites of whom many sheltered in white areas (Race Relations Survey,
1988/1989:625). The various dimensions of the conﬂict would therefore be of increasing
importance throughout this phase.
4.2.2 CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE
The relative decline of whites would continue during this phase as is evident from Table 3.2
of chapter three.
On the other hand, the demands of a society growing in size posed several challenges
to the authorities. This was exacerbated by the demands made on the economically active
whites by a conﬂict that was escalating both internally and regionally. The demographic
reality, thus, increasingly made apartheid impractical in the long term.
4.2.3 POLITICAL CULTURE
It was mentioned in chapter three that the political culture in South Africa displayed many
traits that were conducive to democracy. The escalation of the conﬂict, however, nurtured
growing intolerance and the hardening of unaccommodating attitudes. These posed serious
threats to existing democratic cultural traits. The centralisation of the security machinery
and decision-making, together with a more coordinated and often intimidating resistance,
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posed additional threats in this regard (see Diamond, 1994:65-73). Several civil society or-
ganisations, such as the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA),
which was launched on 1 November 1986 made attempts to counteract these threats through,
education programmes for example (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:675-676). These were
helpful in spreading and nurturing democratic cultural traits in spite of the negative polit-
ical climate (see Diamond, 1994:65-73). At the same time, these organisations increasingly
pressed the government to democratise without any further delays.
4.2.4 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS
The role of economic development and economic pressure as macro-structural factors facili-
tating the transition to democracy was discussed in chapters two and three. As mentioned,
both factors were present in South Africa and played a role in the erosion of apartheid on
the one hand and in the liberalisation of the political landscape, on the other hand. Like-
wise, economic diﬃculties required action by the authorities to improve the socio-political
environment in an attempt to address the factors that had a negative eﬀect on the economy
(see Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:191-193).
In spite of the economic diﬃculties experienced, the material circumstances of the non-
white population did improve overall during this phase. The revision of legislation pertaining
to job reservation, housing, tertiary education and inﬂux control, as will be discussed in
section 4.3.1, were important to improve the material circumstances of non-whites. However,
as discussed in chapter two, these would, provide the building blocks for increased demands
for inclusion in the political process.
Economic expansion depended on skills that could no longer be provided by the white
population alone, thereby paving the way for an open labour market. However, a shortage
in skilled labour could not be overcome immediately and the lack of skills, together with in-
creased sanctions, retarded growth and exacerbated the problem of unemployment in general
and the non-white population in particular. International economic sanctions also played
a deﬁnite, albeit complex role in bringing the economy under pressure (Giliomee, 1995:88)
that contributed to the failure of the government’s liberalisation strategy and reform from
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above. Thus, the economic crisis of the 1980s weakened the authoritarian regime, increased
the relative costs of repression and inﬂuenced the government’s eventual decision to consider
negotiations.
However, a number of economic diﬃculties during this “initial phase of transition” were
of particular importance. Notwithstanding the fact that the investment rate experienced a
sharp decline in the 1980s, government consumer spending rose sharply (ﬁfteen percent in
1983 and twenty-one percent in 1991). Government spending as a proportion of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) was twice that of comparable states such as Chile and Hungary
(Giliomee, 1995:88-89). Two factors were important in this regard, the ﬁrst was increased
government spending on white employment in the public sector (an important part of the
ruling party’s constituency). The second factor was a sharp increase in the number of
civil servants (both black and white) required by the state to cope with the administrative
demands of the fast-growing black population and in particular the police, teachers and
nurses. A sharp increase in employment in central government that rose by seventy-ﬁve
percent between 1980 and 1991 (Giliomee, 1995:89) required an increase in tax revenue to
ﬁnance the expanding public service. This placed an additional tax burden, on a narrow
mainly white tax base (see Table 3.3 of chapter 3).
During 1985, GDP had declined by one per cent and the decline continued through 1986
while disinvestments grew. In 1985, the net capital outﬂow had reached R9.2 billion in the
ﬁrst half of 1986 it amounted to R2.6 billion, while US corporate investors decreased from
325 to 265 over a period of two years (Arnold, 1992:43).
A notable, but brief economic recovery that restored business conﬁdence was experienced
in 1987 and 1988. This conﬁdence was bolstered by a fall in the inﬂation rate, an increase
in the number of immigrants and tourists from abroad and a decline in the number of
mass-based challenges to the state that resulted from the imposition of consistent, albeit
highly unpopular, security management by the government. In addition, the overall black
unemployment rate was slightly reduced (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:191-193).
Adding to the emerging, cautious economic optimism was the realisation that the informal
sector had more vitality than had previously been thought. Thus, South Africa’s rate of real
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growth was higher than oﬃcial ﬁgures suggested. The informal sector was important in the
economic development of the non-white population and as indicated in chapter two, economic
development is an important catalyst of democratic political demands in an authoritarian
political dispensation (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993: 192). Estimates of the size of the
informal economy ranged between ﬁfteen and forty per cent of the recorded economy - even
the more probable lower ﬁgure was substantial (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:192).
The downturn in the economy that occurred in 1989 was not as sharp as had origi-
nally been feared. Most estimates suggested a growth-rate slightly above two per cent in
1989. Favourable property prices and the ﬁrst signs of renewed investor interest from abroad
accompanied this general trend (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993: 192).
The realisation that the economic conditions were dependent on the socio-political sit-
uation that was inﬂuenced by the political dispensation, were important in changing the
thinking and strategy of the government.
4.2.5 INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE
International factors as discussed in chapters two and three played an important role in bring-
ing about the deterioration of the authoritarian regime in South Africa. Direct pressure and
in particular, sanctions, increased both the international and economic costs of apartheid.
The UN, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), other international
and regional organisations, the USA and other Western powers increasingly condemned
racism and apartheid on a continuous basis and pressured both the South African govern-
ment and black organisations to engage in a negotiated settlement (Schrire, 1991:133). The
government’s decision to reform the political system and to negotiate was partly inﬂuenced
by international and in particular, economic pressures emanating from the international
economy and sanctions. The South African economic elite realised that they were failing
to use the opportunities oﬀered by a globalising world and that these missed opportunities
would weaken South Africa’s competitiveness in a global context in future.
Several international events were important during this phase, namely the independence
of Zimbabwe (1980), the escalation of South Africa’s Border War and its involvement in the
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Angolan Civil War, particularly the battle of Cuito Cuanavale and the subsequent withdrawal
of South African troops and the settlement by negotiation of South Africa’s control over
Namibia (Adam and Moodley, 1993:45-50).9 The ascendancy of the Reagan Administration
and its policy of “constructive engagement” towards South Africa, as well as a new British
government under Margaret Thatcher were important. The fall of communism in Eastern
Europe, the democratisation of the former communist states and the ﬁnal stages of the Cold
War were further developments towards the end of this phase, but the advantages of which
would only have an eﬀect during the next phase as discussed in chapter ﬁve.
The international community intensiﬁed its condemnation of Pretoria’s internal policies
both multilaterally and bilaterally (Sisk, 1992:141-142). It became increasingly diﬃcult for
the South African state to conduct bilateral and multilateral international relations. On the
other hand, this phase saw the expansion of the ANC’s international inﬂuence. The latter
opened missions all over the world, but of particular importance are the missions in some of
South Africa’s important trading partners, such as France (1981), Japan (1988), Netherlands
(1988), Washington, (1989) and West Germany (1984) (Pﬁster, 2003; Race Relations Survey,
1988/1989:641).10 On the other hand, in 1988 and 1989, the South African cabinet ministers
insisted, in both public and private interviews that sanctions made it more diﬃcult for the
cabinet to break ﬁnally with apartheid, because the electorate perceived it as capitulating
to foreign pressure (see Giliomee, 1995:88; Sisk, 1992:141-142).
The UN as the supreme international organisation, adopted resolutions pertaining to hu-
man rights, racism and apartheid on an annual basis, which condemned the South African
political system both directly and indirectly. In 1981, the UN, in co-operation with the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) organised, “The International Conference on Sanc-
9This battle was fought during the period from October 1987 to June 1988 between the South African
forces, Unita (of Jonas Savimbi ) and the remnants of the FNLA on the one side and on the other side,
Angolan and Cuban armed forces. The outcome was disputed since all sides claimed victory. Nevertheless,
it ended in the Peace Accord for Southern Africa signed at the UN on 22 December 1988. This paved
the way for Namibian independence and according to some scholars also for the South African transition
because the South African militarists realised that the conﬂict was becoming too expensive and that they
were not unbeatable. To their surprise, they also found the USSR ﬂexible during negotiations (see Adam
and Moodley, 1993:45-50).
10For a list of ANC missions see: Pﬁster, R. 2003. Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy
of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994. Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol 41(1).
Important missions already existed in the UK and in New York.
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tions Against South Africa,”11 at which the ANC and PAC, together with the South West
Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), became more vociferous in their appeal for sanc-
tions against South Africa. In December 1983, the UN adopted a resolution12 endorsing
the armed struggle in South Africa against the “illegitimate racist minority regime” (Shin,
1997:182).
The Commonwealth, with its historic ties to South Africa, condemned apartheid and
recommended a strong package of economic measures to its member states in the Lusaka
Declaration in 197913 and the Nassau Accord of 1985. It also appointed a group of “Eminent
Persons” to investigate the situation in South Africa and promote political dialogue with
the South African government (Manby, 1992:196-198). However, in August 1986 this group
produced a report concluding that the government was not ready for negotiated reform and
recommended the strict imposition and monitoring of sanctions. Britain disagreed with
the ﬁndings pertaining to the eﬀectiveness of sanctions. The Okanagan Statement and
Programme of Action on Southern Africa, was adopted by the heads of government from the
Commonwealth at the Vancouver summit meeting of October 1987. It made provision for a
“wider, tighter and more intensiﬁed” application of economic sanctions, increased assistance
to the victims of apartheid and to South Africa’s neighbours and greater coordination in the
implementation of punitive measures, but once again, these were resisted by the UK (Manby,
1992:196-198).
During the 1980s, there were two opposing views in the USA with regard to foreign
policy towards South Africa, namely the Reagan administration’s policy of “constructive en-
gagement”14 and congressional advocates of economic sanctions. Constructive engagement
endorsed co-operation rather than public pressure as the best way to encourage an evolu-
11International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, UNESCO House, Paris, 20-27 May 1981.
The Conference was attended by representatives of 122 governments, the United Nations organs, Organisation
of African Unity, the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, specialised agencies of the United Nations, in-
tergovernmental organisations, national liberation movements, international and national non-governmental
organisations as well as a number of experts and leading statesmen. The national liberation movements of
South Africa and Namibia - the African National Congress of South Africa, the Pan Africanist Congress of
Azania and the South West Africa People’s Organisation - were represented by high-level delegations led by
their respective Presidents (http://www.anc.org.za/un/undocs2b.html).
12A/RES/38/39 - “Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa” (5 December 1983
13The Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice issued at the Common-
wealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka, Zambia in August 1979.
14In order to avert a looming loss on a key foreign policy issue, and to stave oﬀ opposition at home,
President Reagan decreed a set of relatively mild economic and ﬁnancial sanctions in September 1985.
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tionary process of reform (Rodman, 1994:313-318). The strategy of constructive engagement
regarded economic statecraft as important and saw the free market as an instrument that
would increase foreign trade and investment that would help to expand the economy. In turn,
this would improve economic opportunities for blacks, because whites would not be able to
meet the additional demands for labour. At the same time, it would give the whites the secu-
rity they required to begin to move away from apartheid. Sanctions, on the other hand, were
rejected as part of this strategy because they would impose costs that would increase the
likelihood of repression and revolutionary violence. Even modest sanctions would create a
diplomatic climate of confrontation and impede the reform process (Crocker, 1981:323-351).
Two concrete examples of this new approach were the relaxation of restrictions on strate-
gic sales imposed by the Carter administration and support for a $1.1 billion International
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in November 1982 (Coker, 1986:210-213).
The USA came under increased international pressure for its policy towards South Africa
(see Magumbane, 1982) and the USA-Congress thus adopted the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act in 1986 that had implications for all industrialised states (Giliomee, 1995:88).
Changes in the priorities of the USSR, however, created opportunities for the USA govern-
ment to pursue its own agenda in Southern Africa. From late 1986, the USA’s strategy
in Southern Africa involved getting the Cubans out of Angola, the South Africans out of
Namibia and the launching of a democratisation process or at least a negotiation process
involving the ANC, as well as a freed Nelson Mandela.
In October 1986, the USA Congress passed the abovementioned Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act that banned new investments in and bank loans to South Africa, ended
air links with South Africa, prohibited a list of South African imports and threatened to
cut oﬀ military aid to any ally breaching the UN arms embargo on South Africa (Arnold,
1992:43). Equally important was the shift within domestic South African politics following
the military setbacks in Angola in 1988, previously mentioned, and the subsequent signing
of the mentioned Peace Accord on Namibia and Angola on 22 December 1988. This was a
major step in the realisation of the goals of the USA and it cleared the way for pressurising
the South African government (Daniel, 1996:103).
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George W Bush (Snr) continued with the policies of the Reagan administration in terms
of the promotion of human rights and democratisation, after he became president in 1988.
South Africa was seen as an important case for the global promotion of these ideals by
the USA. The revolutions in Eastern Europe made the promotion of global democratisation
possible under USA leadership and the transformation of its Cold War policies, which viewed
South Africa as a bulwark against communist subversion in Southern Africa. These were
thus transformed into more active policies promoting human rights and democratisation
(Rich, 1993:104).
Individual European states and the European Community (later the European Union)
increasingly pressured the South African government regarding the latter’s domestic poli-
cies. In 1985, the then European Community adopted its ﬁrst coordinated policy toward
South Africa since the implementation in 1977 of its code of conduct for businesses. The
1985-policy made provision for a series of measures, including an embargo on arms, oil and
sensitive equipment that could be used for security purposes (Manby, 1992:197-200). A
year later, imports of iron and steel from South Africa were suspended, though coal and
agricultural products (more signiﬁcant items of trade) were left untouched because of oppo-
sition from Britain and West Germany. Although the Nordic countries intensiﬁed its move
to implement more sanctions, they were economically less signiﬁcant. The OAU, the Or-
ganisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
and the Southern African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC) were important
instigators of international pressure against South Africa (Manby, 1992:197-209).
Therefore, not only did the international environment bring pressure to bear on South
Africa, but it was also a source of motivation. It is within this environment that the ruling
elite initiated their reforms from above.
4.2.6 REGIME BREAKDOWN AND ELITE DISUNITY
The association of internal and external factors with the breakdown of authoritarian regimes
is a dominant theme in the literature of democratic transitions. As argued in chapters
two and three, its fundamental theoretical proposition postulates that the transformation
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of social, cultural, and international conditions are basic causes of the liberalisation of an
authoritarian society in a move towards a democratic political system.
In South Africa, demands from the excluded masses, mobilised by the anti-apartheid
civil society, were maximised following the limited opening provided through liberalisation.
A number of internal and external factors as discussed above thus facilitated the deterioration
of the authoritarian regime in South Africa.
Deepening divisions between the various factions in the ruling party further weakened the
regime. As discussed later in this chapter, internal dissension compromised the NP’s future as
a ruling party in the long term. This, in itself, prompted the reformists to speed-up the reform
process, but the slow pace of the reforms hampered them during this phase. However, the
liberalisation measures introduced by the government during this phase, deepened division
between conservatives and reformists, which eventually resulted in the breakaway of a section
of the conservatives. Internal divisions would eventually lead to a new political leadership
and the replacement of President Botha by Mr FW de Klerk in 1989 and would lead to a
new era in the transition process.
4.3 STATE - POLITICAL SOCIETY - CIVIL SOCIETY AND AME-
LIORATIVE LIBERALISATION
As already discussed, macro-structural factors, as well as the actions of the anti-regime
political society and civil society, had forced the ruling elite to rethink the long-term viability
of South Africa’s political dispensation. Furthermore, Mr PW Botha, the Minister of Defence
at the time, chaired a cabinet committee tasked to investigate possible changes to South
Africa’s constitutional system. The realisation that the old rules of the game were no longer
viable and that reform was necessary for the future stability of South Africa prompted the
ruling elite to initiate a debate over alternative political institutions that could replace those
of apartheid - that is they engaged in the politics of institutional choice (see Sisk 1995:13-14;
Arnold, 1992:45).
As mentioned previously, changes to some aspects of the political dispensation were, al-
ready underway, but mainly to appease dissent and opposition to South Africa’s political
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dispensation. Once in power, Mr Botha sought to move away from classical apartheid, yet
aimed at remaining in control of the reform process (thus “reform from above“), while at
the same time keeping the white rightwing in the fold (Sisk, 1992:142-144; Arnold, 1992:45).
The government envisaged the establishment of a dispensation that would ensure eﬀective
participation in decision-making aﬀecting their interests for all race groups, that is a “broad-
ening of democracy” in order to allow non-whites more and better access to political power.
Furthermore, there was a need to improve the quality of life for all by improving access to the
economy and by addressing the conﬂict and violence (see Kotze, 1989:54; Taylor, 1990b:20).
Thus, reform during the initial phase of transition also sought to address the dimensions of
a “triple transition,” namely political and economic reforms, as well as a peace process.
The actions of the government in its “reform from above” agenda would aﬀect the dy-
namics of both the political society and civil society, thus giving rise to a complex network
of actions, reactions and interactions in the domains of state - political society - civil society,
which will receive attention in this section.
4.3.1 THE STATE AND REFORM FROM ABOVE
Questions concerning the government’s reform initiatives that are important in this study
are: How did the government understand the concept of reform? Why was the government
committed to reform? What did the reform programme entail? What was the outcome of
the government’s reform initiatives? (see Meyer, 1988).
According to Meyer (1988:162), the concept of “reform” implies far-reaching and funda-
mental evolutionary changes in contrast to revolutionary changes. Within the South African
context, it referred to state initiated actions in order to change the political, economic and
social dispensation.
As mentioned, a more “just” dispensation was regarded by the state security establish-
ment as vital for addressing the escalation of conﬂict and violence (Sisk, 1992:143; Grundy,
1983:8), but the viability of any reforms by the state would depend on their acceptability
to both whites and non-whites. Yet, the actions of the government during this phase gave
no indication of a readiness to relinquish power. It is doubtful whether the government
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interpreted the concept of reform as the beginning of a process that would eventually lead
to a totally new power conﬁguration in South Africa - except for a power-sharing model in
which whites would remain in control (see Kotze, 1989:162; Arnold, 1992:45).
Thus, the government, embarked on a range of reforms that involved actions and strate-
gies in a number of areas. Firstly, new ideas on which the political system could be based had
to be developed. Secondly, several changes to the legislation underpinning apartheid were
necessary to make “new” ideas and in particular, power-sharing acceptable to non-whites.
Thirdly, part of the programme of “reform from above” required a strategy for dealing with
a broad spectrum of opposition to the government’s intended reforms and the escalation in
violence. Fourthly, of particular signiﬁcance during this phase was the government’s explo-
ration of negotiations with organisations in the struggle and most notably the ANC (Taylor,
1990b:20).
The government regarded control of the reform process as essential and this, in turn,
necessitated the top-down approach and a “piecemeal” strategy to reform, as recommended
by Samuel Huntington, as a way of “softening” the white opposition (see Rhoodie, 1989:131-
135). Thus, the intention was to reform the political dispensation slowly and deliberately,
pausing at each stage to give the white electorate a chance to accustom itself to the changes
(Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:133). The government was also acting increasingly indepen-
dent of the NP as an organisation of political society as was seen in its movement away from
the apartheid ideology the NP had implemented since 1948 (see Rhoodie, 1989:130-131, 135
and Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:133).
THE IDEA OF POWER-SHARING
The idea of “power-sharing” became an attractive option in the government’s reconsidera-
tion of South Africa’s political dispensation. It was considered as a mechanism that could
accommodate the political aspirations of both the excluded majority and of the already em-
powered whites. “Experimenting” with the idea of power-sharing eventually paved the way
for the adoption of a new constitution in 1983. In order to accommodate “autonomous”
groups in a power-sharing model, the government revived the idea of a “constellation” or
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“commonwealth” of states (ﬁrst proposed by Dr Verwoerd) that would result in close co-
operation and links between “self-determining” race groups, regions and/or states (Giliomee
and Schlemmer, 1989:114-115; 127; 223-229).
South Africa’s parliamentary system, prior to reform, was based on “the winner-takes-
all” Westminster or majoritarian system, as well as apartheid in terms of which full political
rights were accorded to whites only. This implied that the white political party that had
a majority in Parliament (NP since 1948) was the ruling party. Since whites constituted a
minority in racial terms, the liberalisation of the political system by extending the vote, not
only posed the risk of the NP losing power but of whites in general (see MacDonald, 1992).
The NP and the government were in particular sceptical of a system of universal franchise
and in particular, of a system of “one-person, one-vote” in their opinion that would have
resulted in blacks permanently ruling whites (see Lijphart, 1985:5-7).15 Dr Gerrit Viljoen
(1990:2 in MacDonald, 1992:714-715), an inﬂuential member of the Afrikaner and NP elite,
said:
In divided societies such as South Africa, inter-ethnic parties are virtually un-
known ... It follows that simple majority rule in divided societies will result in
permanent rulers and in permanent opposition parties, which is a ‘sure recipe
for disaster’. It is for this reason that the National Party sees democratic power-
sharing, which ensures participation also for minorities, as the only viable form
of democracy for our divided society.
The nationalists thus regarded the ethnic diversity of South Africa as an argument
against democracy based on majoritarianism.16 They saw in power-sharing a way of se-
curing self-determination for whites and they therefore favoured “political power-sharing for
all substantial communities in our heterogeneous population” (MacDonald, 1992:714-715).
Consociationalists such as Lijphart (1985) echoed these sentiments.17 Proponents of conso-
15There was a tendency by political commentators and the government to equate universal franchise and
“one-person, one-vote” (often termed “one-man, one-vote“) erroneously with majoritarianism. See Lijphart
(1985:5-7; 25-26). Likewise, majority rule was treated synonymously with democracy (see Kotze, 2006:
107-108).
16For a discussion of the problems associated with majoritarianism in a non homogeneous society see
Lijphart, 1985:6-7, 18-26.
17Though consociationalism includes principles of power-sharing these are in fact two distinct concepts
that were often used synonymously within political debates on South Africa (for example, see MacDonald,
1992). Consociationalism is essentially a theory of elite accommodation and co-operation between deeply
divided groups whose autonomy (segmental autonomy) is institutionally guaranteed and there is strong
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ciationalism likewise argue that political stability in ethnically divided societies requires
eﬀective representation for the various groups and the ability to enshrine their interests with
vetoes (MacDonald, 1992:714-715). For these reasons, power-sharing and consociationalism
were considered as possible alternatives to the Westminster system (see Lijphart, 1985:6-7;
Rhoodie, 1989:140-170; Venter, 1989:313-316). Power-sharing was presented as a political
mechanism for the safeguarding of the cultural integrity of the various ethnic groups. The
nationalists, however, emphasised the feasibility of the mechanism as the strongest argument
for power-sharing (MacDonald, 1992:720-722).
Thoughts on power-sharing were already evident in the proposals made by Mr Botha
as chair of the said cabinet committee on possible changes to South Africa’s constitutional
system. In its thinking about “power-sharing”, the government of Mr Botha ruled out
the Westminster style of democracy where the winner takes all and minority parties are
eﬀectively excluded from power, at least until they win an election. Likewise, a class-based
constitutional structure based on a qualiﬁed franchise, for example, which may bring about
multi-racial middle-class rule was ruled out (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1993:133).
Power-sharing thus became the new principle in terms of which the government sought to
reform the political dispensation, while at the same time protecting the position of whites.
This is evident in Mr Botha’s remarks to his biographer: “The Nationalist Afrikaner has
resolved never to be subordinate again in his own country” (De Villiers, 1984:34 in Giliomee
and Schlemmer, 1989:132).
One of the ﬁrst institutions that resulted from the government’s reform and power-
sharing initiatives was the President’s Council. In 1980, the government gave constitutional
recognition to a permanent presidential advisory council with white, coloured and Indian
members as recommended by the Schlebusch Commission of Inquiry.18 This became known
as the President’s Council and began operating in 1981 (Lijphart, 1985:53). It was meant to
respect for principles of proportionality as well as veto rights (Taylor, 1990b:21). Lijphart (1985:6) deﬁned
the concept of power-sharing as “government by a broadly inclusive coalition.” Because that is also the most
important principle of consociational democracy he also uses the two terms as synonyms. For purposes of
this study, these will be regarded as two separate though related concepts.
18Established in terms of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act No. 101
of 1980. It consisted overwhelmingly of nominated members. Provision was made for a constitutional
committee, a science committee, a planning committee, an economic aﬀairs committee and a community
relations committee (Thompson and Prior, 1982:96-97).
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“deliberate” and provide advise on a number of policy issues including constitutional aﬀairs
and it continued to exist after the implementation of the 1983-Constitution. However, it
was dominated by whites and blacks were again excluded, as Boulle (1984b:173 in Lijphart,
1985:61) put it:
The government nominated a majority of whites to the council as a whole, as
well as to each individual committee, and most of the white nominees, and all
the committee chairmen, were in addition government supporters. These factors
ensured that the preponderant views on the council would be compatible with,
and supportive of, government policy.
Because it consisted mainly of nominated members, was dominated by whites and because
blacks were excluded, it lacked legitimacy and was even boycotted by organisations for
coloureds and Indians (Thompson and Prior, 1982:97).
Thus, the government remained committed to a political dispensation which would con-
tinue to be dominated by whites and continued to be organised in terms of relations between
the four statutory apartheid race groups and the idea of political “autonomy” for race and
ethnic groups as would become evident in the discussion on the 1983-Constitution.
THE AMELIORATION OF APARTHEID LEGISLATION
Changes to the legislation underpinning apartheid, particularly the legislation determining
the socio-economic conditions of non-whites, were necessary to make power-sharing a viable
option. Thus, in order to mobilise support for the government’s “power-sharing” dispensa-
tion among both whites and non-whites, it became necessary to amend some of the most
insensitive and discriminatory apartheid legislation (Taylor, 1990b:20).
Subsequent amendments to apartheid legislation (both prior and after the adoption of
the 1983-Constitution) thus aimed at putting an end to “hurtful” legislation, the granting
of political rights to the coloureds and Indians in the 1983-Constitution, as well as dealing
with an increasingly violent opposition (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:123-129).
The government subsequently introduced several initiatives to liberalise the political dis-
pensation in order to improve the position of non-whites. The following are important
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reforms in this regard:19
∙ The Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 57 of 1981 provided for the freedom of
labour organisations and associations, as well as the abolition of discrimination based
on race in labour relations.
∙ The Group Areas Amendment Act No. 62 of 1982 opened the door for racial integration
in sport, while the Group Areas Amendment Act No. 101 of 1984 provided for the
establishment of integrated business areas.
∙ The Universities, National Education Policy, and Technikons Amendment Act No. 75
of 1984 provided access to tertiary education for non-whites on a quota basis.
∙ The Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Amendment Act No. 72 of 1985
scrapped the sections prohibiting “mixed” or interracial marriages and sex, but it
ostracised whites who had married across the colour line by forcing them to live either
in one of the black residential areas or in one of the open or “grey” residential areas it
had sanctioned.
∙ New institutions were created at provincial and local levels. In an attempt to reform
from above, multi-racial provincial executive bodies (and Regional Services Councils)
were established in the hope that in this way, black leaders could be persuaded to
co-operate with and operate in white controlled institutions.
∙ The Black Local Authorities Act No. 102 of 1982 and No. 58 of 1986, the Black Com-
munities Development Act No. 4 of 1984 and No. 74 of 1986, the Local Government
Bodies Franchise Act No. 117 of 1984 and the Laws on Co-operation and Development
Amendment Act No. 91 of 1985, acknowledged the rights of urban blacks, provided
participation in own aﬀairs structures, provided for leasehold rights and ownership of
ﬁxed property. Likewise, the Regional Services Councils Act No. 109 of 1985 created
multi-racial and integrated provincial administrative institutions.
19See in this regard Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:123-129; Sisk, 1995:70; Taylor, 1990b:20;
Thomashausen, 1987:14-24; Chronology of Apartheid legislation.
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∙ The Constitutional Aﬀairs Amendment Act No. 104 of 1985 repealed the prohibition
on multiracial political parties.
∙ The Abolition of Inﬂux Control Act No. 68 of 1986 granted freedom of movement to
all people.
∙ The Identiﬁcation Act No. 72 of 1986 introduced uniform identity documents.
∙ The Restoration of South African Citizenship Act No. 73 of 1986 restored South
African citizenship to blacks living and working permanently outside the independent
homelands or TBVC states.
∙ Several proclamations provided access to hotels, public recreational facilities, and de-
marcated certain residential areas as “grey areas”, thus acknowledging that certain
neighbourhoods could be legally integrated.
In 1989, the government raised the possibility of changes to the Population Registration
Act for the ﬁrst time. Senior cabinet ministers declared that the “group character” of
society remained the foundation of government policy. However, the NP was prepared to
allow groups to form voluntarily and to entertain the possibility of an “open group” (Sisk,
1995:70).
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
At the centre of the reform programme was a new constitution that would accommodate the
political aspirations of coloureds and Indians in a new political dispensation and would enact
the government’s “experiment” with power-sharing. This was intended to bring coloureds
and Indians into the fold of central government (Sisk, 1995:68).
Thus, in February 1983 PW Botha unveiled a new political dispensation, which was
approved by sixty-six per cent of the white electorate in a referendum held on 2 November
1983 (Sisk, 1995:68).
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983 enacted the new polit-
ical dispensation and was based on the viewpoint that whites, coloureds and Indians have
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sets of mutually exclusive interests that could only be accommodated separately (Venter,
1989:45). For this reason, each of these three population groups had an “own” house or
chamber in Parliament catering for these exclusive interests. What came to be known as
the tricameral parliament subsequently came into being in 1984. Based on the racial clas-
siﬁcation of the Population Registration Act, it made provision for the House of Assembly
(whites: 178 members), House of Representatives (coloureds: 85 members) and a House of
Delegates (Indians: 45 members). Members for each house were elected on a separate voters’
roll (Arnold, 1992:37-38; Guise, 1993:24; Sisk, 1995:68; Taylor, 1990b:20; Venter, 1989:46-
48). For the ﬁrst time, Coloureds and Indians were incorporated into the deﬁnition of the
“nation” formally (Taylor, 1990b:21), while Africans remained aliens in South Africa with
their citizenship tied to the “homelands“.
In addition to the above, the following important changes in the structure of central
government were made:
∙ The parliamentary prime minister of the Westminster system was replaced by an exec-
utive president with broad legislative and executive powers, but was elected indirectly
by the three houses of Parliament. He was elected by an electoral college of 50 whites,
25 coloureds, and 13 Indians (4:2:1 ratio). In eﬀect, the party with a simple majority
in the white, House of Assembly, elected its candidate to the position. The State Pres-
ident served a ﬁve-year term as head of state and chief executive concurrent with the
term of Parliament. He chaired a cabinet of his own choice, and was the only source
through which legislation could be introduced for consideration by the Parliament
(Sisk, 1995:68; Guise, 1993:24; Venter, 1989:46-48).
∙ A distinction was made between the “own” aﬀairs of each population group and the
“general” aﬀairs of all population groups. It was the prerogative of the State President
to determine which were “own” and which were “general” aﬀairs. It is important to
note that own aﬀairs were based on culture and identity in order to further the “way
of life” of that particular group (Venter, 1989:62). Legislation on own aﬀairs required
approval in the relevant house. General aﬀairs on the other hand, required joint passage
of legislation by all three houses (Sisk, 1995:68; Guise, 1993:24; Venter, 1989:46-48).
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∙ Apart from the State President, the executive consisted of a cabinet composed of
a ﬂexible number of ministers appointed by the State President for as long as they
enjoyed his approval. There was no speciﬁcation concerning the composition of the
cabinet in terms of race and/or political aﬃliation - a shortcoming in terms of the
principles of consociationalism (Lijphart, 1985:56, 61). In addition, each one of the
houses had a Ministers’ Council consisting of members appointed by the State President
to administer departments dealing with own aﬀairs (Venter, 1989:56-58, 61-62).20
The President’s Council was retained and given a legislative role in approving disputed
bills, a deadlock breaking mechanism if all houses did not pass bills on general aﬀairs (Marx,
1992:114-115). The President’s Council remained loaded in favour of the white majority
through the 4:2:1 ratio - that is twenty were appointed by the House of Assembly, ten by
the House of Representatives, ﬁve by the House of Delegates and twenty-ﬁve by the State
President - of which ten were appointed proportionally (6:3:1) following the recommendations
of the opposition parties in the diﬀerent houses (Venter, 1989:54).
The President’s Council functioned as a second or upper house but only partially so. If
there was a dispute in the passing of a bill in all the houses, it could be referred to the Pres-
ident’s Council that could make either a recommendation or a decision. A recommendation
was not binding on the houses, but a decision was (Venter, 1989:54; Sisk, 1995:69). In the
latter case, the President could subsequently sign the bill, enacting it into law, notwithstand-
ing the objection of one or two of the Houses.21 Thus, as long as the President enjoyed a
majority in the white House of Assembly, he enjoyed a majority in the President’s Council,
which for all practical purposes, guaranteed the enactment of a bill as required by the State
President (Sisk, 1995:69).
The 1983-Constitution thus provided little eﬀective input for coloureds and Indians and
no representation or participation for blacks.22 The strategy behind the tricameral parlia-
20An amendment in 1987 provided for ministers’ representatives to assist ministers of the Ministers’
Councils with regard to duties taken over from the provincial councils (Venter, 1989:63).
21The Indian and Coloured Houses enjoyed no eﬀective veto (Giliomee and Schlemmer. 1989:131-132).
Consociationalism requires that all groups have guaranteed eﬀective representation and are able to enforce
their interests with vetoes (MacDonald, 1992:714-715).
22For comments on the l983-Constitution in general, see Welsh (1984). For in-depth critiques of the
tricameral system as a perversion of the consociational ideal, see Boulle (1984a), and Lijphart (1985). See
Taylor (1989) for a discussion of the system as an attempt to create a corporatist, co-optive system.
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ment was to co-opt coloureds and Indians into a system dominated by whites. Whether this
constituted a form of power-sharing is debatable (see Lijphart, 1985:56-63).23 The exclusion
of blacks constituted a serious disqualiﬁer from being true consociationalism (see Lijphart,
1985:83-117). Furthermore, segmental divisions were imposed statutorily and the segmental
authorities lacked the required “autonomy” since they were constitutionally and economi-
cally subordinate to the policies of the NP government, for under the 1983-Constitution, the
House of Assembly was the only site of eﬀective political control (Boulle, 1984b:98).
The 1983-Constitution displayed some consociational elements with regard to the political
position of whites, coloureds and Indians. Overall, the 1983-Constitution incorporated only
symbolic forms of power-sharing and also retained the unilateral conﬂict-regulation character
of its predecessor (Boulle, 1984b:218). According to Dr. Van Zyl Slabbert,24 it represented
“the crudest bastardisation imaginable of the logic of consociational democracy” (Slabbert,
1983:43). Lijphart (1985:63), however, implied that the 1983-Constitution was, at best,
a “quasi-consociational” constitution. It had more in common with apartheid than with
democracy - a result of the NP’s continuing adherence to its particular interpretation of
ethnicity. A number of international scholars such as Hanf, Weiland and Vierdag (1981:419)
were concerned that the government’s “corruption” of consociationalism would result in
the association of consociationalism with apartheid and would prevent blacks from looking
favourably at consociationalism as a possible future political dispensation for South Africa
(Lijphart, 1985:63).
However, the tricameral parliament was not intended as the only part in the government’s
power-sharing strategy. Alternative but separate accommodation for blacks was also pursued
in an overall plan that foresaw the eventual co-optation of the black community in what
Schlemmer (1988:13) termed, a “non-territorial race federation biased towards white power.“
As mentioned in the previous section, some changes were made at local and provincial
government level in order to address some of the opposition to, and criticism of the political
dispensation. Of particular importance was the multi-racial (including blacks) Regional
23Some oﬃcials claimed it was not the sharing of power but the sharing of responsibility (Lijphart,
1985:54).
24A former opposition leader in the House of Assembly.
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Services Councils (RSC) whose aim was to provide forums of joint decision-making at the
metropolitan level of local government (Guise, 1993:27; Venter, 1989:103).25 However, the
voting power of blacks on these councils was insuﬃcient for black local authorities to have
any meaningful input in decision-making. The CP also succeeded in dominating some of the
RSCs and in frustrating the aims of the NP (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:511-512).
The Promotion of Constitutional Development Act No. 86 of 1988 that provided for a
negotiating forum set to draft a constitution that would make provision for all South Africans,
was another step in the government’s envisaged complex constitutional scheme to include all
race groups (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:505). The forum would have included blacks
but the government found few who were willing to participate in, or co-operate with the
forum. The government also made attempts to include black ministers in the cabinet and
to provide for “own aﬀairs” type regional councils for blacks, but the response was negative
once again (Race Relations Survey, 1988/9:505-6).
Thus, the government under the leadership of Mr PW Botha, tried to reform from above
without aﬀecting the pillars of apartheid (Taylor, 1990b:20), namely racial classiﬁcation,
group areas, segregated and “bantu” education, as well as the racial organisation of political
life. The perception remained among non-whites that the government’s reform initiatives
were still driven by the need for whites to remain in control - hence, the label of reform-
apartheid. Thus, the statutory groups remained the government’s point of departure in its
attempted constitutional reform from above.
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
The idea of power-sharing was built into the new constitution and provision was made for
reform institutions at the regional and local levels to coincide with the security manage-
ment structures referred to previously that were already in place. This resulted in a well-
coordinated bureaucratic machine with the purpose of monitoring revolutionary activity and
developing short-and long-term strategies to defeat it (Sisk, 1992:143; Marx, 1992:159).
Opponents of the new political dispensation realised that the government was prepared to
25The government’s attempts to restructure the second and third tiers of government had resulted in a
further concentration of power in the government’s hands (Giliomee and Schlemmer. 1989: 131-132).
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adjust white minority domination but not abolish it (Sisk, 1995:70; Hirschmann, 1998:230-
235). The new constitution thus provided fertile grounds for uprisings against the South
African government in the mid-1980s and the subsequent political conﬂict assumed an
increasingly violent nature shortly after the inauguration of the tricameral parliament in
September 1984 (Sisk, 1995:70; Hirschmann, 1998:230-235).
Not only were confrontations between the security forces of the apartheid state and the
anti-apartheid civic and political organisations escalating, but also those at community level
between anti-apartheid organisations and those perceived as constitutional co-optees such
as Inkatha (Hirschmann, 1998:230-235; Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:459-461,597-631).
The government retaliated with a partial state of emergency in July 1985 and a full state of
emergency in June 1986 to counteract township violence (Marx, 1992:159-160). Repression
thus remained an important instrument of the government in pursuit of its policies. The
spiralling cycle of revolt and repression that accompanied the government’s reform initiative,
which lacked real change, widened the base of anti-apartheid opposition in society. Churches,
white liberals, and the press were newly targeted as enemies of the state, leading to a
polarisation of politics both across the political spectrum and within both the system and
the struggle (Sisk, 1995:71).
Thus, the popular struggle that reached new heights nation-wide in 1985, began to achieve
its aim of ungovernability, which in turn undermined white conﬁdence, but raised the morale
of the militant black youth (Lawrence, 1994:5; Beinart, 1994:241; Marx, 1992:167). This
promoted a premature belief among black people that the minority regime was on the verge
of collapse. As a result, mass mobilisation was accelerated and it challenged state control of
the townships, creating a crisis for the authorities.
During 1987, the government continued with its policy of “business as usual no matter
what happened and what the cost“. Therefore, the state of emergency continued; the po-
lice, military and black militants used repression and violence as a matter of course; the
rent boycott involved 650,000 supporting households and, for example, had already cost the
provincial authorities of the Transvaal R720 million (Arnold, 1992:43). The government con-
tinued to harass trade unions and black political organisations and maintained its censorship
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of the media. White liberals were accused of being the friends of terrorists and communists
in the service of Moscow (Arnold, 1992:43). Despite the rigid repression, it was announced
in parliament that political prisoners would no longer have to renounce violence (as was pre-
viously required) as a pre-condition for their release and on 5 November 1987 Govan Mbeki,
a senior ﬁgure in the ANC who had been on Robben Island with Mandela, was released
unconditionally - though he was later restricted. This was seen as a test for the release of
Nelson Mandela (Arnold, 1992:44).
The government appeared to be more repressive in its actions against anti-apartheid
organisations in 1988. In February, it banned the United Democratic Front (UDF) and 16
other organisations and placed restrictions on the Congress of South African trade Unions
(COSATU).26 The press was restricted and for some time, three newspapers were banned,
namely the New Nation, South and the Weekly Mail. In March, an international outcry
followed the conviction of the “Sharpeville Six“27 for murder because they had participated
in a demonstration in 1984 during which the Mayor of Lekoa Township was killed (Arnold,
1992:44). It was not the kind of publicity the government wanted (Arnold, 1992:44).
State security and repression thus remained an integral part of the government’s re-
form process. Ironically, repression strengthened solidarity among anti-apartheid forces and
broadened co-operation among the aﬀected and disillusioned segments of society in chal-
lenging a “common enemy“, and even alienated some former supporters of the government
(Marx, 1992: 253). Dissent among those who had to enforce security also became problem-
atic and weakened the state further (Marx, 1992: 253). For example, in July 1987 David
Bruce, a young white conscientious objector, was sentenced to six years imprisonment for
refusing to do military service, because he felt that to do so would imply support for racism.
The trial, which made international headlines, focussed attention on dissident young whites
protesting against conscription as a new group of protesters (Arnold, 1992:44).




INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ANC
As mentioned, the government also began to realise that it needed to “involve” dissenting
voices in its agenda for reform. Thus of particular signiﬁcance during this phase was the
government’s exploration of negotiations with organisations in the struggle and most notably
the ANC (Taylor, 1990b:20).
As early as the early eighties, there had been indications that in some circles of the
governing elite there was support for the idea of engaging the struggle forces in the search
for a solution to South Africa’s political problems. The government saw negotiations as a
possible way to arrest economic decline, domestic unrest, and increased international pressure
in the late 1980s. Stein (1989:239-240) considers the move toward negotiations to have been
triggered by the need to avoid an impending crisis (Lodge, 1989:45).
Secret discussions were initiated with political prisoners, including Mr Nelson Mandela
of the ANC. Leading members of the Broederbond met secretly with members of the ANC
outside of South Africa (Adam and Moodley, 1993:41-42; Marais, 1994:2-5). In spite of the
oﬃcial denunciation of dialogue until 1989 (Adam and Moodley, 1993:42), in 1986 President
Botha, stated:
We believe that a democratic system of government which must accommodate
all legitimate political aspirations of all South Africa’s communities, must be
negotiated. All South Africans must be placed in a position where they can
participate in government through their elected representatives (Kotze, 1989:54).
Likewise, there was a willingness on the part of the ANC to make contact with the
government. The ANC’s willingness for a negotiated settlement was rooted in the realisation
that it would not be able to achieve its strategic aim of promoting a generalised insurrection
(Lodge, 1989:45). Shortly before his resignation, President Botha met with Nelson Mandela
at Tuynhuys in July 1989. This was regarded as a step towards the future release of Mr
Mandela and future negotiations (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:xxviii).
However, such eﬀorts also caused divisions and intense rivalry among the ruling elite
and in particular; the security elite (see Adam and Moodley, 1993:39-45). The National
Intelligence Service (NIS) favoured a more diplomatic approach to an end to the conﬂict,
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while the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) followed a more hard line approach of
suppression within the context of a global Cold War (Adam and Moodley, 1993:41).
The above eﬀorts by the state in its reform programme from above perhaps give some
indication that at one stage, members of the government began to give serious consideration
to the extension of political institutions to facilitate political participation. However, it
was also clear that the government was not yet ready to relinquish control. The pillars of
apartheid remained largely intact, thus fuelling discontent instead of quelling it. Thus, the
state’s attempts at reform “from above” were seriously compromised by a backlash from
those who felt they were not part of the process.
4.3.2 POLITICAL SOCIETY
Though there were few changes in the basic structure of political society as analysed in
chapter three, a number of new actors emerged and there were a number of changes in the
role and prominence of other actors. The most important events within the political sphere
were new legislatures for coloureds and Indians provided for in the 1983-Constitution; the
split of the conservatives from the NP; the emergence of the United Democratic Front (UDF)
and the gains made by the ANC at the expense of other anti-apartheid organisations and in
particular, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM).
PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID
The NP remained the most important protagonist of apartheid - albeit in a revised form
- in Parliament. Under the leadership of PW Botha, decision-making in the NP became
centralised and as a result, grassroots NP branches and congresses lost power and inﬂuence.
As a result, the party structures became marginalised. The NP also saw its fortunes declining
in terms of electoral support. From an all time high of sixty-ﬁve per cent of the vote in
1977, its support base among the electorate declined signiﬁcantly to ﬁfty-eight per cent in
1981, ﬁfty-three per cent in 1987 and forty-eight per cent in 1989 (Botha, 1996:107). The
NP suﬀered losses to political parties on both the right (pro-apartheid) and the left (anti-




At a federal congress held in Pretoria in June 1989, the NP adopted a ﬁve-year plan of
action in which the NP tasked itself to create “a new South Africa in which every South
African can live in safety, prosperity and dignity, as an individual and as a member of a
group” (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:690-695)
To the right, the CP became an important factor. It was established in March 1982 by
a breakaway faction of the NP who became disillusioned by the NP’s new racial policies
and by its marginalisation of grassroots party structures (Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987:72).
During the 1987 elections, it gained enough support to become the oﬃcial opposition, a
position traditionally held since 1948 by political parties that opposed apartheid. The CP
opposed racial integration and full political rights for non-whites (Race Relations Survey,
1988/1989:653-658). Thus, a more radical pro-apartheid voice became important in the
white House of Assembly. Divisions and elite disunity among the supporters of apartheid
was evident in political society.
Among the political parties in parliament that opposed apartheid, the PFP remained the
most important even though it lost its position as oﬃcial opposition to the right wing CP in
the election of 1987. In the decade before 1987, the PFP sought to win suﬃcient electoral
backing to enable it to participate in the “politics of power” rather than the “politics of
protest.”
In 1981, the PFP increased its total of seats to twenty-six, winning eighteen per cent of
the vote (Williams and Hackland, 1988:210). In 1983 the PFP suﬀered a setback when it
campaigned for a “No” vote in the whites-only referendum on the 1983-Constitution and
thus found itself in the same camp as the right wing during the referendum campaign.
The constitution was however approved by a large majority (66,3%). The PFP suﬀered
yet another setback in 1986, when its eﬀective and charismatic leader, Frederik van Zyl
Slabbert, resigned because the party had little chance of becoming the government and
because parliamentary politics were no longer the primary political locus. He was replaced
by a previous leader, Colin Eglin (Williams and Hackland, 1988:210-211).
The 1987 elections caused problems for whites left of the government (Giliomee and
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Schlemmer, 1989:158). In the 1987 elections, the PFP only managed to win twenty seats
and fourteen per cent of the vote and lost its position as oﬃcial opposition (Williams and
Hackland, 1988:210). The losses suﬀered by the PFP in the 1987 election were ascribed
to the fact that the electorate considered the jump from apartheid to a non-racial political
dispensation as far too big. Even if whites were prepared to move towards such an outcome
in stages, they were not prepared to accept a sweeping transformation over which they had
no control (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:158). However, it should be borne in mind that
the NP’s policies moved slightly to the left and in the process; it made gains among the
traditional PFP constituents (Schlemmer, 1987:310-324)
Few in the PFP were prepared to go back to the politics of protest of the early 1970s,
when they had only Helen Suzman in Parliament to campaign for the liberal cause. Yet
while the PFP examined its leadership and electoral strategies critically, it rarely questioned
the form its liberal democratic stance had assumed (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:158).
However, the formation of the National Democratic Movement (NDM) and the Indepen-
dent Party (IP), as well as the setbacks experienced by the PFP, saw the launching of the
Democratic Party (DP) in April 1989, and with a triumvirate leadership (Race Relations
Survey, 1988/1989:xxix). This new grouping clearly inherited the PFP’s liberal democratic
approach. One of the leaders, Zach de Beer, declared: “In two words, we believe in Western
democracy.” He added: “that democracy [understood as majority rule] cannot succeed in di-
verse societies is a myth. Clearly the Democratic Party has come just at the time democracy
is most needed” (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:158). The DP favoured inclusive politics
and tried to bridge the gap between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups (Race
Relations Survey, 1988/1989:659).
The new legislatures for coloureds and Indians provided for in the 1983-Constitution,
brought a new dimension to political society and parliament in particular even though the
eﬀect was limited. Voter participation in the 1984 elections for the House of Representatives
and the House of Delegates were thirty-one and twenty percent respectively. During the 1989
election campaigns, participation was an issue once again (participation would eventually
be twenty and twenty-three per cent respectively) (Botha, 1996:108). In reality, due to low
voter registration among the coloureds and Indians, participation was signiﬁcantly lower.
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Most of the parties represented in these two houses saw participation as a way to undermine
the existing political dispensation and to set the agenda for even further reforms. The leader
of the Labour Party in the House of Representatives for example, stated that the aim is
“reconciliation of all groups on the basis of equality” (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:677).
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR APARTHEID
Extra-parliamentary support for apartheid continued to receive media attention and in par-
ticular, on the AWB. Most conservative groups among whites functioned outside of Parlia-
ment and increased militancy, though still isolated, became a factor.28 The 1989-election
campaigns brought a feud and further division among the conservatist and pro-apartheid
groups to the fore (see chapter 5). The CP rejected a call for an election pact among
conservative groups namely the HNP, AWB, Boerestaat Party, and the restricted Blanke
Bevrydingsbeweging (BBB). Such a pact was seen by the right wing as a last attempt to
defeat the ruling NP who was seen to be moving away increasingly from the basic tenets of
apartheid (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:xxix).
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF THE SYS-
TEM
Inkatha remained an important organisation opposing apartheid within the system and re-
garded itself as, “the strongest and most visible black advocate of the politics of negotiation
and nonviolent change” (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:667-675). Of particular signif-
icance in this regard, was Inkatha’s involvement in 1986 in the establishment of the Joint
Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal. It provided for joint administration at the
request of both the KwaZulu legislative authority and the Natal provincial council (Race
Relations Survey, 1986:99-104; 1987/1988:117; 1988/1989:509). Inkatha was also an impor-
tant participant in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba that was looking into an alternative political
dispensation for KwaZulu/Natal. It submitted a report in January 1987 to the minister of
constitutional development, who promised to consider its proposals. However, little came
28There were bombings of oﬃces of white academics who supported change, disruptions of meetings and
the killing of blacks by Barend Strijdom of the “White Wolves.”
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of it but at least it demonstrated an accommodating attitude among various groups in that
region (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:509; Ottaway, 1993:95-97).
Inkatha also found itself in a state of “Cold War” with the ANC for all practical purposes
because of its refusal to support violence and disinvestment (Guise, 1993:37-38).
Though still a banned organisation, the ANC led the extra-parliamentary opposition to
apartheid. Even though the ANC admitted to suﬀering some setbacks mainly because of
government action, in general, it was able to broaden its support base and authority inside
South Africa at the expense of state authority and even other anti-apartheid movements
and most notably Black Consciousness organisations (Race Relations Survey, 1988/89:636).
Important in this regard was the document released by the ANC that spelled out its vision
of a future South Africa. The following was proposed (Race Relations Survey, 1988/89:637):
∙ A multiparty democracy in a unitary state.
∙ Universal suﬀrage based on the principle of one person one vote.
∙ A bill of rights that would be enforceable by an independent judiciary.
∙ Protection of cultural and language rights, freedom of association, press and religion.
∙ Independent trade unions.
∙ Land redistribution coupled with the recognition of private property rights.
∙ A ban on racism and tribalism.
∙ A mixed economy.
∙ Declaring South Africa as a non-aligned state.
The ANC also held talks with a number of political, religious and sporting organisa-
tions, such as Inkatha, South African Council of Churches and the South African Rugby
Board (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:639-641). This clearly demonstrated the ANC’s
willingness to seek a political solution to South Africa’s problems, even though it refused
to renounce the armed struggle. Internationally the ANC won inﬂuence by broadening its
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international standing and for example, it was invited to send representatives to a number
of states. Together with the gains it made through the UDF it was clearly positioning itself
as a future key political actor. However, membership of the ANC and the SACP continued
to overlap.
Of particular importance among the extra-parliamentary opposition was the UDF, which
came into existence in Cape Town in August 1983, following a call by Reverend Allan Boesak
for the creation of an internally based anti-apartheid movement. Subsequently, 600 delegates
from 320 organisations met to constitute a loose federation of anti-apartheid organisations
(Sisk, 1995:71). The immediate impetus for the formation of the UDF was the government’s
1983 constitutional proposals (Seekings, 1992:93-94). Anti-apartheid, organisations and in
particular, the Charterists in the ANC feared that the apartheid government might co-opt
coloureds and Indians successfully into an alliance with whites. This had to be prevented
through the rapid deployment of political machinery capable of winning over coloureds and
Indians, but also the search for improved coordination between the growing numbers of
civil society organisations with little access to political power (Seekings, 1992:93-99). The
struggle for coordination of these organisations was particularly intense because there was
competition not only between these organisations and the state, but also amongst these
organisations (Seekings, 1992:93-99).
Even though the UDF was a broad based movement consisting of mainly civil society
organisations, it was founded speciﬁcally as a political movement aimed at changing the
political dispensation in South Africa by exerting pressure on the government and it was
instrumental in the mobilisation of a signiﬁcant section of civil society against the state.
The UDF was thus a popular alliance, which eventually spanned approximately 700 or-
ganisations; including civic organisations, youth and student organisations, women’s groups,
trade unions, religious groupings and sport organisations (Lodge, 1991:53).29 At its peak, the
UDF claimed a membership of 2,5 million (Donaldson, 1989:1)30 and resembled the Polish
29Lodge and Nasson (1991:51) reveal that by the mid-1980s, out of a total of 565 UDF aﬃliated organi-
sations, only 24 were explicitly political in nature. Others included were 313 youth, 47 student, 82 “civic”,
32 women’s, 18 worker, and 17 religious organisations (Hirschmann, 1998:230-235).




Solidarity movement. It was a multi-class, multi-cultural popular (or peoples’) front based
on the acceptance of the ANC’s Charterist principles. It put a great deal of emphasis on
popular grassroots democracy both as an organising principle and as an important part of
its ideological call for a future non-racial democracy (Louw, 1989:52-53).
The principles of the UDF were kept as few as possible, in order to facilitate a broad
alliance of groups and organisations opposed to apartheid and minority rule. The UDF
pledged allegiance to the Freedom Charter and was openly sympathetic towards the ANC,
placed itself in line as the internal successor to the banned organisation and subsequently
became an ANC front organisation. The UDF was, thus above all, a Charterist organisation
(Sisk, 1992:156; Sisk, 1995:71-72).
The UDF had little chance of gaining support from coloureds and Indians (and later from
whites) if it used the discourse of black African nationalism and therefore a key principle of
the UDF, as with the Charterists, was non-racialism.31 Non-racialism was more than UDF
rhetoric; it oﬀered a practical focus around which an alliance of diﬀerent interests could be
built. The UDF thus sought a single common non-racial nation founded upon the Freedom
Charter’s preamble, which states: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and
white” (Davies et al, 1984:314; Seekings, 1992:93-99). The UDF Charterists maintained
that: “All those who love South Africa, who consider it their home, who have contributed to
building it and are prepared to continue to develop the country as a democratic non-racial
state, are part of South Africa” (Suttner and Cronin, 1986:133). The UDF, thus, rejected
both the NP’s apartheid policy and the PAC’s Africanism, which implied that South Africa
belonged to blacks only (Davies et al, 1984:297). This does not mean that black nationalism
was not present in the UDF but it was made subservient to non-racialism (Louw, 1994:30).
Any organisation could aﬃliate provided it supported non-racialism, a united South
Africa and did not collaborate with apartheid institutions. The UDF recognised that class
and cultural diﬀerences existed in South Africa, but the more inﬂuential leaders, consistently
stressed the importance of cross-class unity, of promoting the cult of charismatic leadership
31Non-racialism should not be confused with multi-racialism. In the former, race is to be ignored as a
social-organising principle, whereas multi-racialism incorporates an acceptance of race groups and ethnicity
into its vision of social organisation.
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around Nelson Mandela and of avoiding anti-capitalist rhetoric that might alienate middle-
class allies (Lodge, 1983:213). However, the UDF believed that a common South Africanness
could be built (Seekings, 1992:96-99).
Mobilisation by the UDF focussed on non-collaboration and ungovernability in the inter-
nal struggle throughout the cycle of revolt and repression. Both led to a surge in township
violence aimed at countering the reforms, which Friedman (1986:20) called a “rising spiral
of random militancy and repression.” Non-collaboration, galvanised the UDF’s leadership
position in the struggle (Sisk, 1992:156).
The UDF was a multi-dimensional movement and contained numerous strands of over-
lapping and intersecting policy fragments such as non-racialism, socialism, nationalism, non-
sexism and egalitarianism (Louw, 1994:30).
Importantly, the UDF emerged as the most important legal opposition political movement
until it was banned in 1988 (Marx, 1993:148-149). It blossomed in the “open space” created
by the government in 1983 to allow those who might openly speak in favour of the new
constitution, to do so. It was thus in the paradigm of the liberalisation phase that the
regime provided an opening for its critics, yet maintained strict control over the rules of the
state (Sisk, 1992:155).
After it had been restricted, the UDF continued its activities under the banner of the
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM)32 which in eﬀect was the UDF operating under another
name. Its successful co-ordination and mobilisation of civil society organisations meant that
the ANC proﬁted at the expense of other black consciousness and pro-black organisations
(see Marx, 1993:97-98).
The ANC beneﬁted from the political turmoil mobilised by the UDF, but black con-
sciousness was unable to move beyond initial conscientisation, because it was regarded as
being too elitist and ideological, as well as short on pragmatism (see Marx, 1993:93-105).
Black consciousness was seen as being “all talk and no action...” unable to answer day to day
problems in the community and workplace. It could not be translated into practice while a
theory that presented a program for action” was required (Marx, 1993:101).




Likewise, other pro-black organisations such as the PAC and AZAPO were struggling to
broaden their support base. In 1989, Africanists within South Africa decided to organise
themselves and form the Pan Africanist Movement (PAM). It was not meant to replace the
PAC but to serve as its “aboveground” unit within South Africa (New York Times, December
27, 1989).
On the other hand, the UDF also succeeded in frustrating the government’s strategy of
co-optation (see Sisk, 1995:73)
Thus, important changes were taking place in political society. These would clearly pave
the way for a negotiated settlement as will become evident in chapters ﬁve and six.
4.3.3 THE RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
In chapter three, it was mentioned that South African civil society consisted of numerous
organisations, but that it was also divided along racial and ideological lines. During the
liberalisation phase, the following features were important: the emergence of COSATU and
the aforementioned UDF, as well as criticism of the government emanating from civil society
organisations normally regarded as being within the inﬂuence sphere of the state and/or had
access to political power.
The rise of civil society, or what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:27-28, 48-56) terms the
“resurrection of civil society” and which they deﬁne as generalised politicisation and popular
activation, became increasingly important during this phase in challenging the authoritarian
regime of South Africa.33 Thus, in this section it is necessary to pay some attention to the
position and role of civil society in South Africa during the liberalisation phase of transition,
particularly, with regard to the political dispensation and the undermining of the regime by
mass mobilisation.
In chapter two, it was argued that transitions to democracy partly result from concerted
33The state-civil society distinction is useful in the study of the process of transition to democracy of
authoritarian regimes where certain spheres of civil society have existed separate from the state. The study
of the resurrection of civil society becomes more signiﬁcant after authoritarian regimes have destroyed au-
tonomous civic organisations and political spaces, substituting them with state-controlled organs. However,
this was not the case within the South African context as civil society remained vibrant in its growth - both
in number and strength. (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986:48-50; Adam & Moodley, 1993:31). Thus the “rise
of civil society” and the mobilisation of the masses are more relevant within the South African case.
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challenges posed to the authorities by a powerful and well-organised civil society, and of
which the mobilisation of large numbers of individuals is “a crucial component.” Popular
movements involving mass mobilisation play an important role in political liberalisation and
the retreat of authoritarianism. Price (1994:181-191) is of the opinion that South Africa
was one of a few countries, undergoing transition to democracy which actually possessed a
vibrant civil society.
The importance of civil society in a transition to democracy in terms of O’Donnell and
Schmitter’s analysis (1986:48, 50), is that civil society requires the corrosion of the norma-
tive and intellectual base of a regime (Adam and Moodley, 1993:31). Challenges from below,
which result in ongoing conﬂicts in the socio-political realm of authoritarian regimes, have
often contributed to or determined the pace of transition. This makes a reversion to author-
itarian rule at the peak of popular mobilisation diﬃcult. Those resisting change (hardliners)
begin to realise that a return to repression will be extremely costly (O’Donnell and Schmit-
ter, 1986:27; Stepan, 1990:46). Huntington (1991:108-109) also maintains that some form
of mass mobilisation increases the pressure on the authoritarian incumbents, and raises the
costs of repression (Gillespie, 1990:57).
In South Africa, the political pressure civil society, in combination with international eco-
nomic sanctions, was able to exert through mass mobilisation, and in stimulating a spirit of
ungovernability, forced the state to adopt measures of political liberalisation and to consider
negotiations as an option to ending endemic political strife (see Marx, 1992:159-163). Civil
society, furthermore, contributed to the development of the basic, but vital preconditions for
democratic pluralism. Swilling’s (1990:156) opinion is that civil society is the crucial repos-
itory of democratic values and a rallying point for democratic forces. Thus, the presence
of a vibrant civil society and the appropriate structural conditions such as political culture,
economic development and international involvement, provided a favourable environment for
political liberalisation and the breakdown of the apartheid system.
As discussed in the previous section, the UDF34 played a particularly important but
complex role as a political movement in co-ordinating the inﬂuence of a signiﬁcant section
34Discussed as part of political society in section 4.3.2.
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of civil society within the South African context. Thus, it is important to keep the UDF in
mind in this discussion of civil society.
Religious based organisations of civil society and in particular, the South African Coun-
cil of Churches (SACC) continued to play an important role in opposing the ideological
foundations of the state and the exclusion of the majority from the political process.
Of particular importance during this phase is the criticism that began to emerge from
the government’s traditional religious support base, namely the Dutch Reformed Churches.
In 1986 the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) to which two-thirds of Afrikaners and ninety
per cent of cabinet members belonged, adopted a document called, “Church and Society,”
in which apartheid was declared a mistake, racism condemned as a sin, the withholding
of political rights regarded as an aﬀront to human dignity, and the authorities asked to
pay “ongoing and sympathetic attention” to regulations which people found oﬀensive. By
an overwhelming majority, the NGK voted in favour of opening the church to all races
(Guise, 1993:57). This constituted an important step in the “corrosion of the normative
and intellectual basis of the regime” (see O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:48, 50; Adam and
Moodley, 1993:31).
Trade unions, in turn, aﬃrmed their role and place within civil society after changes were
made to the laws governing labour and thus positioned themselves as important players in
the process of democratisation. In a comparative study of Southern Europe and Latin
America, Valenzuela (1989) argues that labour movements occupied a special place during
the transition from authoritarianism, especially because the organised network of the labour
movement gives it greater capacity for eﬀective and extensive mass mobilisation at critical
moments than other social groups. The labour movement in South Africa occupied a similar
place as that of its counterparts in the two countries mentioned above. Valenzuela (1989:446-
467) posits that South African trade unions possessed “a widespread base and the ability
to interfere with the economy“, and therefore he regards it as the antagonist that posed the
greatest threat to the apartheid regime.
In South Africa, economic growth and industrialisation led to an increase in the number
of semi-skilled workers to the point where they provided an organisational basis for trade
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unions. The growth of trade unions during this phase was facilitated by the labour relations
reforms, which resulted from the Wiehahn recommendations (mentioned in chapter 3) of
1977-1979 (see Webster, 1991:50). For the ﬁrst time, these labour law reforms, allowed the
formal recognition of trade unions for blacks within the oﬃcial industrial relations system
in South Africa. This provided an important boost to civil society. Trade unions had a
strong base at the lowest structures with strong shop-ﬂoor structures that could be used,
as argued by Valenzuela, to mobilise the labour force against the state. Furthermore, trade
unions developed close links with civic organisations in the black townships (see Webster,
1991:54-55). Towards the end of this phase (1989), 2 150 000 workers belonged to unions
and forty-one per cent of the workforce was unionised (Webster, 1991:50).
The unions focussed on important industries with large workforces. They met with par-
ticular success at multinational corporations that were vulnerable to international pressure
and especially the metal, textile, and chemical industries. As discussed in chapter three,
these were soon linked together into a trade union centre, which grew through mergers
and further organisation in 1979 into a national trade union body, namely FOSATU. With,
forty-ﬁve thousand members (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:217; Marx, 1992:195,198; Friedman,
1987:180-187)35 it emerged as the main union federation advocating transformation of the
polity, but maintained a strong non-racial position (Marx, 1992:195). This constituted an
important ﬁrst strategic step against the government’s new labour policy that emerged after
the Wiehann Commission’s report (Cooper, 1996:63-64). Once black workers were granted
statutory trade union rights under the Labour Relations Act, FOSATU’s membership rock-
eted to 95 000 by 1981 (Baskin, 1991:448). This de facto “united front” of union aﬃliates
sought to centralise and strengthen the new movement against the dangers inherent in gov-
ernment’s new strategy for labour, and it was an important move in countering the parallel,
white-led unions (Cooper, 1996:63-64).
Union membership doubled between 1979 and 1982, but the period between 1982 and
1985 experienced a slower, yet still substantial, growth in membership (Macun, 1983:48-
53; Marx, 1992:196). This was subsequently also accompanied by an increase in strike
action, demonstrations, stay-aways and mass actions to win union demands during this
35According to Baskin (1991:448), the ﬁgure is 20 000 workers organised within ten industrial unions.
258
Chapter 4
period (Cooper, 1996:65-66). In November 1984 FOSATU also formed an alliance with
community organisations in certain areas in order to organise a successful two day stay-away
in support of a wide set of student and community demands (Friedman, 1987:447); yet it
tried not to form alliances with political movements (Marx, 1992:196-197).
FOSATU made the strategic decision that its aﬃliated unions would apply for registration
in terms of the new labour legislation, albeit on a non-racial basis. They could also sign
on members regardless of the law, which denied union membership to migrants and foreign
workers. FOSATU’s decision to apply for registration thus opened up new possibilities.
Furthermore, oﬃcial legality - that is the right to exist and bargain as a union - would
bring a number of beneﬁts, such as the right to organise and recruit in factories, to sign
recognition agreements and to oppose victimisation of union members (Cooper, 1996:64-
65). The negotiation of recognition agreements, which set out the rights and duties of
shop stewards and trade unions in the workplace, was an important step in establishing the
“rule of law” on the shop ﬂoor - thereby contributing towards a culture of democracy. The
new unions organised themselves through signed-on membership and by elected workers’
committees, which in turn, was linked with the negotiation of union recognition agreements
at plant level (Cooper, 1996:65).
The legalisation of trade unions provided an important and eventually powerful grassroots
basis for the organisation and mobilisation of workers, not only on work related issues,
but also on societal and political issues. Most workers were exposed to the injustices and
violence of apartheid in their homes and their children’s schools and the FOSATU leadership
gradually adopted a sympathetic view towards the pressures experienced by their members,
particularly, in the townships (Cooper, 1996:65-67). Trade unions consequently engaged in
mobilisation and protest actions - such as community campaigns, strikes and general stay-
aways - in support of political demands, which both weakened the authoritarian regime and
broadened the scope of liberalisation (Seidman, 1990:12). The call for national liberation,
particularly by the ANC, yielded a positive response from many workers (Cooper, 1996:65-
67).
In addition to providing a framework for politicisation and mobilisation, unions also
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provided practical “education” in democratic principles in the structures and processes of
the relevant organisations. FOSATU, for example, provided educational programmes to
teach “democratic organisational procedures” (Marx, 1992:195).
A further consequence of the legalisation of trade unions was the creation of super-
federations, such as COSATU, which became a powerful bloc on the South African political
landscape. The mushrooming of new unions in the 1980s saw attempts to build unity within
one large federation. FOSATU became one of the central advocates of building a broad
unity among the emerging unions and helped in 1985 to engineer the creation of a “super-
federation,” the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest trade union
centre in South African history (Baskin, 1991:448; Innes, 1992:342).36 COSATU was born
in the ﬁght against apartheid but its formation was a diﬃcult process that highlighted the
struggle for leadership of the internal anti-apartheid movement. The principles on which
it was based and in particular dominance over civil society and control of the trade union
movement was important in this regard.
The Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) was formed in 1980 by a group of black
consciousness unions in opposition to FOSATU (Baskin, 1991:289). FOSATU accused CUSA
of using race to protect incompetent blacks, while CUSA accused FOSATU of using non-
racialism to protect white privileges (Marx, 1992:200). However, FOSATU and COSATU’s
adherence to non-racialism would eventually bring it in line with the principles of the ANC
Charter. CUSA used a top-down approach in the establishment of unions in contrast to FOS-
ATU’s approach of building unions “from a strong base of member participation” (Marx,
1992:195). However, most of the problems FOSATU encountered in constructing COSATU,
emanated from the “community unions” such as the South African Allied Workers Union
(SAAWU), and the General and Allied Worker Union (Cooper, 1996:66-67; Marx, 1992:199).
Community unions rejected registration and their organising style depended more on mass
rallies and mass action, than on a slow war of position in which workers’ committee structures
in each factory are built. Importantly, in 1983, these unions also aﬃliated with the national
coordinating political organisation, the UDF, which was linked to the ANC as stated infor-
36COSATU is by far South Africa’s largest trade union federation, with more than 1,2 million members
in the early nineties (Innes, 1992: 342). COSATU is to this day in alliance with the ANC and the SACP
and the leadership of these three organisations also overlaps to a considerable extent (Innes, 1992: 346).
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mally and these “community unions” increasingly clashed with FOSATU over the latter’s
rejection of overt alliances with political organisations (Baskin, 1991:289).
A solution began to emerge at the March 1984 meeting of progressive unions (Friedman,
1987:409) and by the time COSATU had been established in 1985, a strategic compromise
was already in the making between a signiﬁcant group within the FOSATU union leadership,
and the UDF/ANC leaders (Cooper, 1996:67-68; Marx, 1992:201-203). An important role in
this regard was played by Cyril Ramaphosa of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
who later became a negotiator during the negotiations as discussed in chapters ﬁve and
six (Marx, 1992:201). This compromise set the scene for the growing alliance between
COSATU, the ANC and the SACP, which was subsequently consolidated in March 1986 and
constituted an important victory for non-racialism and Charterism (Marx, 1992:201-204).
Thus, a signiﬁcant proportion of the unions accepted the leading role of the ANC at the
political level, and the need for unions to enter into broad-front political alliances and actions.
At the same time, the ANC recognised the vital role of the unions in organising workers
and respected their strategies in the struggle to some degree (Adler and Webster, 1994:8;
Cooper, 1996:67-68). COSATU was also successful in canvassing vast foreign donations that
amounted up to seventy-ﬁve per cent of its budget (Marx, 1992:202).
After the suppression of the UDF, COSATU, was drawn into the forefront of resistance
to authoritarian rule and the late 1980s saw successful mass action campaigns against the
Separate Amenities Act, and the Labour Relations Amendment Act, and many protest
actions (Innes, 1992:339-343).
Trade unions within the sphere of black consciousness and black African nationalism
tried to counteract the growing inﬂuence of COSATU by forming another super federation
namely the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) in October 1986 (Marx, 1992:206-
208). Likewise, some white trade unions continued to exist. Thus, rifts, which would deepen
around the issue of “non-racialism,” remained in the trade union movement.
From the above follows that trade unions became increasingly important in South Africa’s
transition to democracy. Apart from its usual function of looking after the interests of the
workers, their role had even wider ramiﬁcations. Economic and political factors were closely
261
Chapter 4
intertwined in the trade union movement of South Africa even at shop-ﬂoor level (Marx,
1992:194). Thus, the trade union movement became an important factor in mobilising the
masses, putting pressure on the government, educating the people and recruiting political
leaders. At the same time, it provided much needed opportunities for coordinating and
consolidating similar interests, thereby reducing the number of possible players in any future
political settlement.
Organised business and industry put pressure increasingly on the government to recon-
sider South Africa’s political dispensation as they were bearing the brunt of sanctions, trade
union activism, strikes and consumer boycotts (see Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:382-
400; 590-592). Furthermore, they felt that they were missing opportunities within the global
economy. Commerce and industry, thus, began to explore making contact with banned
organisations and in 1985, Mr Gavin Relly, at the time the chairperson of the giant Anglo-
America Corporation, led a delegation of business people on a visit to the ANC in Lusaka,
Zambia (Arnold 1992:189). This resulted in better understanding between the two sides
and helped to liberalise some conservative business perceptions. However, on their return to
South Africa, the government branded them as traitors.
There were also splits between conservative and liberal members of the Afrikaanse Han-
delsinstituut (AHI) and some joined the more liberal Association of Chambers of Commerce
and Industry of South Africa (ASSOCOM) (see Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:590-592)
In addition to the above, commerce and industry introduced a changing phase in apartheid
in South Africa by recruiting more non-white workers for positions other than unskilled
labour, sponsoring education and presenting shares to workers (see Race Relations Survey,
1988/1989:382-400; Arnold, 1992).
With regard to students, parents, teachers and civic associations, seething discontent
persisted through the 1980s. Consequently, school and consumer boycotts, strikes and stay-
aways, challenged the attempt at co-option, encouraging the rise of civic associations as well
as student and youth movements, which sought to mobilise dissent (Lawrence, 1994:4). Most
of the civic associations were aligned to the UDF, although their establishment seemed to
have been the outcome of a fairly spontaneous reaction to repression.
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The government also began to experience rebelliousness from Afrikaner nationalist stu-
dent leaders. In 1985, a number of Afrikaans students from the University of Stellenbosch
planned to visit the ANC in Lusaka, but the government acted by withdrawing their pass-
ports (Van der Merwe, HW). In March 1987, twenty-seven Afrikaans speaking academics,
from Stellenbosch, called on the government to abolish all apartheid laws (Race Relations
Survey, 1988/1989:688-689). This was particularly signiﬁcant since President Botha was the
Chancellor of that university. Internally black and white student leaders were beginning to
make contact.
In addition, sporting organisations continued to be an important factor in the political
arena. Those traditionally falling within the inﬂuence sphere of the state began to criticise
government policy and some such as the South African Rugby Board, met with the ANC in
exile (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:639-641).
Non-governmental organisations, such as IDASA, and other professional organisations,
increasingly pressurised government regarding its apartheid policies. IDASA organised a
meeting of mainly Afrikaners with the ANC in Dakar, Senegal in 1987. This event stimulated
much public debate in South Africa and probably contributed towards a new orientation in
white thinking in favour of talks with the ANC. The government again condemned such
“adventures” which were in fact, challenging apartheid policy (Van der Merwe, H W).37
In March 1989, the South African Law Commission published a 491-page working paper,
which called for a negotiated bill of rights and urged the government to put an end to all
discriminatory legislation (Race Relations Survey, 1988/1989:xxviii).
The mass media played a supportive role in the actions of civil society, but were also
important, as they had to provide the ordinary public with information. Although the
media was split between the pro-government and anti-government groups, both had the
important task of keeping its readers informed. Relative to the situation in other developing
societies, South Africa’s press has maintained a strong tradition of critical independence.
In that, way they have contributed to a value balance in the society and have served to
generate and sustain an environment that encourages the continued autonomy of civil society




(Price, 1994:189; Adam and Moodley, 1993:16, 35; Giliomee et al., 1994:196). Even the pro-
government media interviewed “rebels” within the camp of the ruling party and also met with
members of the ANC. Furthermore, Price (1994:191) was of the opinion that autonomous
media provided the social base for the maintenance of electoral competition and in this sense
the tradition of independent media would be invaluable in nurturing a culture of democracy.
Though civil society has the potential in a plural society to “crosscut” cleavages and
to moderate attitudes through crosscutting interactions and by inhibiting the formation of
“permanent allies and permanent enemies” (see Miller, 1983:735), this was not the situation
in South Africa. Civil society remained divided along racial lines and in terms of those that
supported the government and those that opposed it. However, there were indications of
shifts in those civil organisations supporting government because some organisations such
as the Dutch Reformed Church increasingly began to pressurise the government to address
the political aspirations of the politically excluded masses and to begin negotiations with
stakeholders in the struggle (see Guise, 1993: 57).
As discussed in the previous section, the anti-apartheid resistance exercised by civil soci-
ety in the 1980s was centred in the UDF. However, both pro-government and anti-government
civil society organisations pressurised the government. The government’s traditional sup-
port base began to either criticise the government’s reforms for being too much too soon
(hardliners) or being too little too late (the reformers). Thus, the government found itself
in an increasingly precarious position.
4.3.4 STATE - POLITICAL SOCIETY - CIVIL SOCIETY INTERAC-
TIONS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF REFORM
In the previous section, each domain of state - political society - civil society was analysed
separately. It is however, necessary to pay attention to how these domains interacted with
one another and how events in a particular domain aﬀected the other domains, as well as
what impact these interactions had on the South African political landscape. Thus, it is
important to take note of the strategic choices and interactions of organisations in political
and civil society, as well as the white minority government, and mass mobilisation in the
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light of the process perspective. “Elite-driven” or “from above” actions versus “mass-driven”
or “from below” actions are therefore important in this regard.
At this stage of South Africa’s transition, there were already two main contending plans
for a “just” political dispensation. On the one hand, the government contemplated a grad-
ual and slow ruling elite-driven evolution (i.e. reform from above) on the way towards an
open society in which power and wealth would be shared more equitably, but without en-
dangering the material interests and identity needs of the white community, particularly the
Afrikaners (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:223). As mentioned in section 4.3.1, the govern-
ment initiated a pragmatic reform programme in which it tried to reconcile apartheid with
democratic principles based mainly on the “consociational” principles of power-sharing and
cultural pluralism in an attempt to build broader consensus for NP rule (Taylor, 1990b:20).
Although the 1983-Constitution with its three chambers (the tricameral parliament) was the
primary act of reform, the government also identiﬁed the need to address the more obvious
discriminatory aspects of apartheid by repealing those laws that highlighted the inequalities
that resulted from race classiﬁcation (Taylor, 1990b:20).
However, the government’s reform programme was initiated in the context of near univer-
sal condemnation by the majority-based opposition movements from both political and civil
society. Many academics and journalists, on the other hand, believed in the viability and
future stability of an apartheid-free South Africa and therefore demanded the removal of the
government from its party-political agenda - by either force or moral persuasion (Giliomee
and Schlemmer, 1989:223). These mass driven sentiments clearly questioned the govern-
ment’s legitimacy, not only to rule but also to be in “control” of any reform or transition
(i.e. transition from below). However, there were also indications of moderation coming from
the opposition forces. In the words of Heribert Adam: “Shared languages, Christian reli-
gious culture and consumerism...should impart...faith and optimism for the future” (1989 in
Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:223). This implied that power politics and security anxieties
would not override shared values between whites and blacks.
There was however, a further emerging third stream embodied in those voices, for example
of Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989:222-235) who advocated a transitional, or “buﬀer” period
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of a government of national unity as a preferred alternative to either a long reform process, or
a sudden transition. Such a government of national unity obviously required “pact-making“.
At this stage in the process of transition, in spite of widespread criticism and serious diﬃ-
culties it encountered, the government remained committed to a political dispensation, which
would continue to be organised in terms of relations between the four statutory apartheid
race groups and the idea of political “autonomy” for each race and ethnic group. In its jus-
tiﬁcation of the 1983-Constitution, the NP relied heavily on consociational theory, because
it was believed that a deeply divided society such as the one found in South Africa, could
become stable and democratic through “pluralist” leadership (Taylor, 1990b:21). However,
the new dispensation rested more on co-optation than on consensus (Taylor, 1990a:157-166).
Despite the further alienation of the blacks, the government believed it had no alternative
but to co-opt Indians and coloureds into the parliamentary system while excluding blacks
(Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:133).
A consequence of the government’s reforms was the fomenting of opposition among, on
the one hand conservatives, particularly whites, and on the other hand, liberals and those
who were part of the struggle. In future, both sides who opposed the government’s reform
agenda would contribute considerably to compromising the legitimacy of the government, as
well as to regime breakdown.
Divisions between the hardliners and the reformers among the ruling elite became in-
creasingly important. These divisions became evident among those that exercised power,
but also among those sections of political society and civil society, that had traditionally
supported the government. Committed to reversing the limited reforms and re-establishing
the principle of partition for each South African group and race, the CP captured twenty-
two seats in the 1987-election (Taylor, 1990a:158). White extremism was a further source of
growing alarm. The extremist Afrikaner movement in the form of the AWB, for example, had
grown from a membership of 50,000 to 100,000 and disrupted several NP meetings (Arnold,
1992:43). At this stage, the ruling elite, still had the option of a complete withdrawal of
liberalisation, but events emanating from the anti-apartheid struggle would make this too
costly and therefore unlikely.
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On the other hand, the demands on and threats made towards the state were maximised
among civil society organisations in the anti-apartheid struggle. This was largely due to
the limited liberalisation and extension of participation in the government’s reforms in a
political society where many citizens had no access to power that would allow them to me-
diate their interests. The liberalisation initiatives, together with the limited nature of the
government’s reforms, particularly the exclusion of blacks from the franchise and parliamen-
tary representation, thus created both the space and incentive for greater opposition to the
regime (Anstey, 1992:2). Those from the anti-apartheid struggle looked beyond the limited
liberalisation and extension of participation in the government’s reforms. They recognised
the fact that the institutional weaknesses of the reformed political dispensation during the
1980s, had been built into it by political leaders who were simply not willing to jeopardise
continued white minority domination and who knew that the design of the institutions would
allow them to retain control indeﬁnitely without jeopardising the core of apartheid (Sisk,
1992:151). By moving away from the grand apartheid project of ethnic groups and segrega-
tion and by introducing concepts of power-sharing, cultural pluralism and consociationalism,
the government under PW Botha sought to build a broader consensus for NP rule through a
“pragmatic” reform programme (Taylor, 1990b:20). Thus, many saw reforms as an attempt
to safeguard white minority rule, and as an attempt to entrench NP rule. As a result, the
incremental reforms brought new impetus to the struggle.
As discussed, the UDF was established to oppose the 1983-Constitution and civil soci-
ety blossomed in the “open space” created by the government’s “liberalisation” measures.
Liberalising reforms thus stimulated demands for more far-reaching reforms and thus pre-
cipitated widespread domestic revolt, and subsequently, international opposition against the
South African regime in the mid-1980s. In September 1984, protests resulted in violence, and
the government-deployed troops in the townships (see Huntington, 1991:136). Discontent
persisted throughout the 1980s in the form of school and consumer boycotts, strikes and
stay-aways - all of which challenged the attempt at co-optation and encouraged the rise of
civic associations as well as student and youth movements, which sought to mobilise dissent
(Lawrence, 1994:4). Protests and violence against the state escalated and the government
ultimately responded with a state of emergency and mass detentions. The spiralling cycle
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of revolt and repression that accompanied reform without real change, in turn, broadened
the base of anti-apartheid opposition.
Sisk (1992:153) argues that PW Botha’s reform programme stopped at incremental re-
form, termed by critics “neo-apartheid“, in an eﬀort to forestall greater change. According
to Adam and Moodley (1992:40), PW Botha merely continued the reluctant liberalisation of
the conservative Prime Minister Vorster without being able to break with the racial paradigm
and anti-communist rhetoric.
Behind the government’s continued insistence on reform from above, was the belief that
the total strategy would work and that the ANC and the broad forces of the struggle would
be defeated. However, throughout the initial phase of transition, the leadership of both
the NP and the ANC made a unilateral attempt to impose their respective models of what
the political dispensation ought to be. This was demonstrated by their respective strate-
gies in describing their role in the conﬂict, namely “total onslaught” versus “people’s war”
(Slabbert, 1990b:5-6). It was a classic zero-sum view of the conﬂict, one in which the main
contenders, namely the NP and the ANC, believed that it could determine the parameters
of institutional choice and the future political dispensation unilaterally (Sisk, 1992:151; Sisk,
1995:70). However, neither side was able to impose its will on the other. The inability of
the challengers to overthrow the incumbents was countered by the incumbents’ inability to
eliminate the opposition or generate the necessary legitimacy. Thus, while neither side could
impose its will on the other, each was strong enough to frustrate the intentions of the other
(Slabbert, 1990a and b) and by the end of the 1980s, a perception of stalemate between the
main contenders, had developed (Marx, 1992:264; Anstey, 1992:3-4; and Welsh, 1992:15).
Seen historically, the ruling elite’s reform of the political dispensation was a failure. Its
fundamental ﬂaw was the continued reliance on the basic criterion of race, and the exclusion
of blacks. It appeared as if the government’s reforms were designed to improve and moderate,
but also to bolster the existing system by making it more acceptable to South Africans. It
thus seemed probable that the government did not want fundamental changes to the existing
political dispensation and did not intend to end white power. As reformer, the government
wanted to change but also to preserve the existing system (see Huntington, 1991:597-598).
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In addition, by adopting a policy of cautious reform of the apartheid system “from above,”
the government of PW Botha unintentionally destroyed any “claim” to the legitimacy of
white rule and the certainty that white supremacy would continue (Gutteridge, 1995:3).
As the failure of the apartheid policy and the ruling elite’s attempts at reform became
more and more apparent, the government’s perseverance with co-option and repression in
the face of growing black resistance became increasingly problematic (Giliomee, 1992b:112;
Sisk, 1992:68). Reform and revolt became locked into a vicious cycle of escalating mass
mobilisation and repression. At the same time, the government and PW Botha, in particular,
tried to deal with the conservative camp among whites by slowing reforms. This was clearly
evident from Mr Botha’s much anticipated “rubicon speech” on 15 August 1985. Prior to
the speech, the government hinted at radical policy shifts in the apartheid dispensation.
However, Mr Botha merely indicated that the government would continue with its reform
programme and that it would not be pressurised by the outside world and extremists. This
was widely interpreted as a conﬁrmation of the fact that the NP had tried to consolidate its
power through “reform apartheid.“
On the other hand, the government clamped down on the internal mass mobilisation
against apartheid and the government’s reform programme. Unable to justify its repressive
actions in terms of liberal democratic principles, the policy of the NP with regard to a just
political dispensation was rendered more or less bankrupt (Taylor, 1990a:158-159). In the
1987 election it received a mandate for a proposed multiracial statutory National Council,
but no serious black leaders were prepared to become involved in this body and it came to
nothing (Taylor, 1990a:158-159). Thus, increasingly, the government became more and more
isolated both internally and internationally.
The ANC, on the other hand, was clearly gaining a strong footing in spite of it being
banned. Unlike most of the other organisations in the struggle against apartheid, together
with its associates, such as the UDF the ANC was able to strengthen its position both
internally and internationally. Internally the stand-oﬀ between the ANC and Inkatha also
intensiﬁed and it was clear that even though Inkatha was able to mobilise much needed
support, it was unable to do so outside of its Zulu support base.
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At this point, a zero-sum confrontational situation between the regime and anti-regime
camps seemed inevitable. However, the political unrest made the government realise that it
would not be able to impose its will unilaterally on the majority of South Africans and that
it would possibly have to negotiate a future political dispensation for South Africa. On the
other hand, the government’s ability to clampdown on unrest also brought the realisation
that an end to apartheid would have to be negotiated. A number of factors appear to have
driven this political and philosophical change in the ANC. The gradual liberalisation of the
political language and programme of the ANC and its ally, the SACP, over the second half
of the 1980s, was important in this regard. Up to that point, these organisations had not,
been noteworthy advocates of multi-party democracy (Hirschmann, 1998:230-235). However,
during this phase any attempt to bring the various parties to the negotiating table could
merely be considered as exploratory.
The political problems were no comfort as the NP prepared itself for an election in
September 1989 in which it faced the tough challenge; of reformulating a position somewhere
between apartheid and democracy that would generate new hopes and expectations to all
(Taylor, 1990a:158-159).
Thus, towards the end of this phase, the reform process had slowed down and to some
it had even stalled, but it would gain new impetus after Mr PW Botha’s resignation and
replacement by Mr F W de Klerk (who had already been appointed leader of the NP in
January 1989) in August 1989. In addition, there were serious diﬀerences of opinion among
NP members and the Broederbond regarding the weakening support base of the government
and the importance of maintaining the initiative in any transition.
The various interactions in the domains of state - political society - civil society served to
level the playing ﬁelds between the government and the anti-apartheid struggle. The position
of the government was weakened, while civil society became a force, which the government
could not ignore.
The outcome of the dynamics of the initial phase of transition was a “mutual hurting
stalemate” between the incumbents and the challengers. Both sides realised that they were
unable to impose their will on the other. At the same time both sides experienced an internal
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power struggle between on the one hand the reformers versus the hardliners, and on the other
hand the moderates versus the radicals. Neither was thus in a position to “travel the ﬁnal
road” (see Adam and Moodley, 1992:41).
4.4 CONCLUSION
Challenges emanating from the macro-structural environment eventually induced the power
elite to liberalise the political landscape - and thus initiating the dynamics of system change.
The initial phase of transition of the period 1978-1989 was thus characterised, on the one
hand, by the government’s attempt at liberalisation and reform from above and, on the other
hand, by mass mobilisation through civil society organisations - a volatile balance between
improved liberalisation and mutually hostile confrontation. All of this took place within the
context of a macro-structural environment in which socio-economic, cultural, international
factors and a deepening of interdependence between the various race groups had an important
impact, while racial divisions continued to overshadow other societal divisions.
The ruling elite’s reforms from above failed to increase its legitimacy, but the govern-
ment’s reforms provided an important opening for democratisation. Thus this period saw
the necessary opportunity for democratic changes and the weakening of the authoritarian
regime became evident.
The driving force behind the government’s reforms came from internal factors, which
could be linked to external factors. Both sets of factors played a signiﬁcant role in under-
mining the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime, as follows:
∙ The incumbents experienced increasing divisions between the hardliners and the re-
formers, as well as in the pro-government political society and civil society.
∙ There was a weakening of the power base of the ruling elite.
∙ Maintaining the existing and increasingly complex political dispensation was becoming
too costly.
∙ The regime’s position deteriorated in general and it became necessary to contemplate
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a new era of democratisation that would see the eventual demise of apartheid through
negotiation.
A second focus of this chapter was thus the key actors that were involved in this liberali-
sation phase and who would determine how the movement for democracy developed, as well
as their strategies and contribution to the development of democracy over time. Hence, the
strategic choices of political and civil society organisations, and the white minority govern-
ment were analysed. Two strategies were important, namely the government’s “elite-driven”
or “from above” strategy and the mass movement’s “mass-driven” or “from below” strategy
- both in line with the micro-behavioural approach.
The information contained in the preceding paragraphs forms part of the argument that
both the structural and the behavioural approaches are important in an understanding of the
transition to democracy in South Africa. It was already clear at this stage that a number of
macro-structural factors could not be ignored as some proponents of the micro-behavioural
or process approach such as O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986) advocate. The actions of the
actors that were already involved and those that later became involved did not take place in
a vacuum - they were inﬂuenced by several macro-structural conditions in the environment.
There were factors that had a “push,” “pull” and “restraining” eﬀect respectively, on the
actions of the various actors. In some instances, the same conditions had all three eﬀects.
International sanctions, for example had a “push” eﬀect, instances of successful democratic
transitions had a “pull” eﬀect, while the Cold War had a “restraining eﬀect.”
Likewise, an understanding of the South African transition cannot be reduced to a sin-
gle theory within these broader approaches. For example, theories focussing on culture are
important but not to the exclusion of theories focussing on economic development and inter-
national pressure. Similarly, the transition should also be analysed within the wider context
of actions and interactions within the domains of state - political society - civil society.
In the case of South Africa, the domains of state - political society - civil society were
complex and had an extremely problematic proﬁle. Whites still had a monopoly on state
power; political society was racially divided and was for all practical purposes, open to the
white segment of the population only, or at best dominated by them. Civil society was
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racially divided and the anti-regime segment of civil society consisted mainly of non-whites.
Thus, the dualism of white - non-white remained important, because non-whites had very
little access to state power to mediate their interests systematically since these routes were
for all practical purposes blocked. Even though the government tried to reform access to
state power, such as in the 1983- Constitution, the new structures were still dominated
by the whites in general and by the NP in particular. An unintended consequence of these
events would be that consociationalism would become discredited as a viable option in future
negotiations for a democratic political dispensation.
Because of several factors that played a role in the creation and nurturing of groups in civil
society, South African civil society ﬂourished in the pluralism and robustness of autonomous
organisations, institutions, academic centres and the media in both white and non-white
communities. These organisations contributed to a value balance in the society and they
have served to generate and sustain an environment that encouraged the continued autonomy
of civil society. During the 1980s, the role of civil society, through mass-mobilisation, was
crucial in the struggle for a democratic political dispensation. It is questionable whether,
without persistent pressure from a powerful and well-organised civil society, transition to
democracy in South Africa would have continued. Civil society thus became an important
counter locus of power within the South African society. However, the actions of these
actors within the domains of the state - political society - civil society should, as said, not
be isolated from their macro-structural context. The actions and strategies of the various
actors during this phase therefore brought important changes to the political landscape and
the ground was laid for the next phase.
The transition from authoritarianism, thus, began as a process of liberalisation which was
initiated by the authoritarian rulers as is often the case in a process of liberalisation. This
period in the history of South Africa’s transition also provides important information on the
dilemmas a regime faces when liberalising. Important is the initiation of the democratisation
process by the authoritarian rulers, which provides the opening that could lead to further
regime breakdown - as was experienced by the government under Mr PW Botha. The ruling
elite still had the option of a complete withdrawal of liberalisation, but the actions coming
from civil society made such an option too costly. At this point, a zero-sum “mutually
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antagonistic confrontation” stage between the regime and anti-regime camps was reached.
Nevertheless, PW Botha’s government took an important step towards eventually changing
the situation from a zero-sum game to a non-zero-sum game between the white ruling elite
and the mainly non-white anti-regime movement in South Africa.
The era of reform “from above” under the leadership of PW Botha ended in deadlock
and to a large extent, the reform process slowed down and to some even stalled, towards the
end of his tenure. However, the reform process would gain new momentum after Mr FW
de Klerk replaced Botha as president in August 1989 amidst dramatic changes within the
international environment.
In chapter ﬁve an overview and analysis will therefore be provided of the structural





THE CRUCIAL PHASE OF TRANSITION: DEMOCRACY
THROUGH PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS (1989-1991)
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the “crucial phase of transition” (1989-1991), which was a critical phase
in South Africa’s transition to democracy, is analysed. During this phase, the threshold of
democracy was crossed and the attitude of the main actors changed from mutual antagonism
and confrontation to that of mutual beneﬁt and negotiation. It was a period characterised
by attempts by the main political actors to normalise the political landscape through pre-
negotiation - that is the ﬁrst tentative “talks” exploring a transition through negotiation
and setting the stage for such negotiations. The process of pre-negotiation and its political
implications will thus be analysed and assessed within the context of the internal dynamics
and changes in the domains of, the state - political society - civil society.
The crucial phase of transition commenced when, Mr FW de Klerk became president
after PW Botha’s resignation in August 1989.1 De Klerk’s new leadership position created
possibilities for new initiatives and the process of political change gained new momentum
under his leadership. During this phase, De Klerk delivered his path breaking speech of 2
February 1990, which would put South Africa ﬁrmly on the road to negotiation. This phase
1President Botha, who was at the same time leader of the NP, had resigned as leader of the NP in
January 1989. Mr FW de Klerk, who had been in Parliament for 17 years and had held a number of
ministerial portfolios as well as being chairman of the Transvaal NP, was elected leader of the ruling NP.
Botha initially remained president and tried to maintain the initiative for reform, but resigned as president
in August 1989. Mr de Klerk ﬁrst became acting president and was later inaugurated as president.
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ended with the conclusion of the National Peace Accord (the Accord) in September 1991.
In this chapter, the evolution of the process of pre-negotiation from the ﬁrst important
steps taken since August 1989 up to the Accord is discussed. Tracing this process reveals how
negotiations facilitated the institutionalisation of the newfound commitment to peaceful, co-
operative change in new rule structures through a series of transitional pacts, in a slow but
steady movement towards the Accord. The road to the Accord was by no means smooth as
would become clear in the discussion. Through gains, setbacks, breakdowns, unprecedented
levels of violence, mutual recrimination and blame, there was slow progress beyond the
preliminaries.
As explained in chapter two, in the body of literature that has emerged on transitions
to democracy and in which a number of case studies around the world was documented
(see O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), transitions from authoritarian rule has been found to
involve mainly three phases, namely the liberalisation, democratisation and consolidation
phases.2 South Africa continued to be in the liberalisation phase during the period 1989-
1991. As discussed, towards the end of the previous timeframe, a stalemate or deadlock was
reached and it was realised that negotiations were desirable if not a necessity, and an era of
pre-negotiation subsequently emerged.
5.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PRE-NEGOTIATIONS
The importance of pre-negotiations for negotiated transitions to democracy has been recog-
nised by a number of scholars, such as Karl (1991:175), Karl and Schmitter (1991:281),
Huntington (1991:160), Gillespie (1991:171-174), Sisk (1992:4; 1995:75-81) and De Villiers
(1993:231-235). A process of pre-negotiation3 can be important in bringing about a re-
assessment of a conﬂict and, particularly, a conﬂict that has become deadlocked as was the
2The liberalisation phase is the “process of redeﬁning and extending rights” and is characterised by
the opening up of political space, allowing former opponents of the regime to operate legally and without
harassment from the government of the day. The democratisation is the “processes whereby the rules and
procedures of citizenship are applied or expanded” and is characterised by the holding of democratic elections
based on a mutually agreed constitution. (see O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:7-8, Gill 2000:235).
3Also referred to as “negotiation about negotiation” or “bargaining about bargaining” or “talks about
talks” (see Du Toit and Gagiano, 1988), or the “diagnostic phase” (see Sisk, 1995:75; 85). A distinction is
sometimes made between “talks” to get the opposing actors to consider negotiations and then “talks” to
determine the conditions and rules for negotiations prior to the actual substantive negotiations - the ﬁrst
two stages are both regarded as part of pre-negotiations for purposes of this study.
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case in South Africa (Saunders, 1985:255-260; Stein, 1989:263-264; Welsh, 1994:81-98; Sisk,
1995:75). This is possible because pre-negotiation facilitates a “re-imaging” of the oppo-
nent as a party that is to some extent reasonable and trustworthy - that is the actors learn
about themselves and about each other and thus facilitate “nascent elite co-operation” (Sisk,
1995:87). This stage in the process of negotiation usually involves: a shared understand-
ing of what the problem is, a commitment to a fair (”good-faith”) negotiated settlement,
arrangement of the negotiations and the commencement of the actual substantive negotia-
tions (see Zartman, 1989; Saunders, 1985, Sisk, 1995:75, 82, 85-87). This is the stage where
participation, agendas, rules and tactics for negotiation are “negotiated”. Alliances are of-
ten important during negotiations, thus, the various participants try to position them by
exploring the possibility of forming alliances during the phase of pre-negotiation.
Pre-negotiation provides an opportunity for reassessing the stakes in the conﬂict. This
may bring the realisation that the potential beneﬁts outweigh the risks and costs involved
in the negotiation process, as well as the cost of continuing with a conﬂict (Fisher, 1989:213;
De Villiers, 1993:231). Pre-negotiations may narrow the diﬀerences between the various
adversaries and may construct a “contract zone” or a middle ground (Price, 1991:10; Du
Toit, 1992:2). Thus, both the incumbents and the contenders may develop a better un-
derstanding of the adverse consequences of a continued stalemate and the likelihood of an
impending crisis if agreement is not reached. Finally, it enables the contenders to assess the
conjunction of threat and opportunity aﬀecting the framing of the problem and the salience
of negotiation as a viable option for transforming the nature of the conﬂict (Stein, 1989:245;
Anstey, 1991a:121-123; De Villiers, 1993:231-232).
Pre-negotiation is the ﬁrst and most important stage in the process of compromise. This
is of particular importance when some form of power-sharing and consensual governance is
envisaged - only after all contending forces have agreed to bargain over their diﬀerences, is
power-sharing possible.4 Pre-negotiations can thus lay the basis for mutual trust by creating
familiarity among opposing groups and encourage the development of a more accommodating
political style among the contenders during the process of transition (Karl, 1991:175-176 in
4The possibility of a transitional government in which power would be shared was already an option




The following are factors often regarded as necessary for a successful outcome in negotia-
tions and which require attention during the phase of pre-negotiation (see Anstey, 1991a:124;
Price, 1991:10; Du Toit, 1990:1-3; De Villiers, 1993:233):
∙ A clear understanding of what issue/issues is/are to be negotiated;
∙ An intention by all parties to achieve a settlement;
∙ A willingness to reconsider a stated position;
∙ Resources of power which are suﬃcient to persuade, but insuﬃcient to force a particular
standpoint on the others;
∙ A clear mandate from a coherent constituency;
∙ Mutual recognition or accreditation as negotiating partners;
∙ Agreement on and adherence to the “rules of the game”;
∙ Acknowledgment of both the legitimacy of diﬀerences, and the existence of common
ground in the relationship - i.e. interdependence among the diﬀerent parties must be
established;
∙ A belief that negotiation is the best option available for the purpose of resolving dif-
ferences; and
∙ Suﬃcient resources to allow outcomes that do not discredit the use of the negotiation
process or those parties seeking to use it.
From the discussions further in this chapter, it would follow how the main actors dealt with
the above during the phase of pre-negotiation. In South Africa, this phase of the negotiation
process was characterised by (Sisk, 1992; Gastrow, 1995):
∙ Increasing, rather than decreasing political violence. It was often alleged that political




∙ The gradual compliance by the government of the preconditions set by the ANC in
particular, such as the unbanning of banned organisations, the release of political
prisoners, the return of exiles, and the ending of the state of emergency (see Harare
Declaration later in chapter);
∙ The further repeal of apartheid laws by the government (with the exception of the
1983-Constitution) with the aim of manoeuvring for competition in the new political
game;
∙ The intervention of domestic and foreign mediators, such as church and business
groups, as well as the OAU and other international actors. This was to resolve various
deadlocks in bringing the various parties to the negotiation table and to eventually
facilitate the conclusion and signing of the Accord;
∙ Intensive debates and planning over the central questions of institutional choice such
as that new political rules should replace the old ones.
Thus, the initial stage of De Klerk’s presidency was characterised by the formalisation of
pre-negotiation as a ﬁrst step in the process of negotiation.5 The onset of a process of pre-
negotiation signalled a change in the zero sum view of the conﬂict that had existed until
then, to the potential for a positive sum outcome (Sisk, 1995:85).
5.3 PRE-NEGOTIATIONS: THE MACRO-STRUCTURAL CONTEXT
During late 1989 and early 1990, a combination of domestic and international, political,
economic, and social factors all converged at a critical time, setting the conditions for the
move from a stalemate to negotiations (Sisk, 1995:85). Most of the factors as discussed in
chapters three and four remained similar, but a few events had a signiﬁcant impact on the
environment of transition, as well as the position and actions of the main actors. These
were the fall of communism, the end of the Cold War and the democratisation of Eastern
5This is not to say that De Klerk came to power as a reformer. In fact, De Klerk was from the more
conservative wing of the NP, and there was little in his background as an almost classic Afrikaner politician
and as the son of a leading NP politician to make one believe that he would quickly move to dismantle
apartheid. However, the leadership change at least opened up the possibility of a diﬀerent white negotiating
stance (see Herbst, 1998).
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Europe and Namibia; the Harare Declaration; the election of 1989; the release of Nelson
Mandela and the unbanning of banned organisations and people; as well as the escalation of
the conﬂict and violence.
5.3.1 THE FALL OF COMMUNISM, THE END OF THE COLD WAR
AND THE DEMOCRATISATION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND
NAMIBIA
Important international developments were the worldwide collapse of communism as symbol-
ised, particularly, by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent end of the
Cold War and the democratisation of Eastern Europe and Namibia (see Herbst, 1998:201).
The government under De Klerk understood that the failure of communism would have a
profound eﬀect on the ANC’s future plans as already alluded to in chapter four (see Arnold,
1992:1-5; Adam and Moodley, 1993:45-52). In his famous speech of 2 February 1990, De
Klerk for example analysed the changes in the world before turning to events in South Africa:
The collapse, particularly of the economic system in Eastern Europe, also serves
as a warning to those who insist on persisting with it in Africa. Those who seek
to force this failure of a system on South Africa should engage in a total revision
of their point of view. Southern Africa now has a historical opportunity to set
aside its conﬂicts and ideological diﬀerences and draw up a joint programme of
reconstruction (De Klerk, 1990, 1991:162; Herbst, 1998: 601).
He emphasised that the fall of communism created “a new scenario” which provided a
window of opportunity for South Africa and that it would be a major blunder not to take such
an opportunity. Indeed, the failure of communism gave De Klerk considerable conﬁdence
that the radicals had, in his words, been “castrated” (Herbst, 1998:602; see Arnold, 1992;
Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:xl;). The ANC, as a result, would be prevented from
engaging in some of the more radical policies with which it had always been associated, such
as nationalisation and radical redistribution - the latter would be moderated signiﬁcantly in
light of the new realities of the international economy, in which sanctions might not continue
(Friedman, 1993:11). In fact, while the commitment to socialism among ANC members
varied, there is according to Herbst (1998:602) no doubt that the fall of communism left
the ANC without a set of ﬁrst principles. Likewise, it also left the government without the
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necessary motivation for its ideology of “total onslaught,” while the USA and other Western
governments could no longer use the Cold War as an excuse for not exercising more pressure
on the South African government. Even the USSR favoured a negotiated settlement as a
mark of its commitment to end Cold War conﬂicts (see Arnold, 1992:126-131; Adam and
Moodley, 1993:45-52).
Furthermore, the democratisation of Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism and
the successful negotiation of Namibian6 independence from South Africa, were on the one
hand sources of encouragement, but on the other also sources of pressure and in particular
by the international community as discussed in chapters two, three and four.
5.3.2 THE HARARE DECLARATION
Due to the changing international environment and the government’s counter-revolutionary
strategy, there was a change in the strategy of the ANC as the main challenger. The ANC
realised that its previous notion of a revolutionary seizure of power was simply not possible.
This was evident from the changing international environment and the government’s contin-
ued ability to clampdown on the ANC’s actions. It was increasingly diﬃcult to conduct a
guerrilla war against the government (Shubane, 1992:203). A “people’s war” to destroy the
“apartheid state”, could not succeed in the short term.
The ANC realised that changes in the political environment made the possibility of
negotiating a transition both possible and feasible and negotiations was thus adopted as
a strategy for transition. This was demonstrated in the “Declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc
Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa: Harare, Zimbabwe: August
21, 1989” (Harare Declaration) (De Villiers, 1993 :341).7 Paragraph 14 for example states:
We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a demon-
6Elections for a constituent assembly was held in November 1989 and the principles adopted in the
constitution were similar to those adopted in the Harare Declaration (see next section). Namibia became
oﬃcially independent on 21 March 1990 (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:222).
7The Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa of the OAU - consisting of several Heads of State - adopted
a Declaration at its meeting in Harare on 21 August 1989, at the suggestion of the ANC. It then laid down
a statement of principles and modalities for negotiations. The Declaration was endorsed by the Movement
of Non-aligned States at its summit meeting in Belgrade, and formed the basis for the “Declaration on
Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa” adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on 14 December 1989 - Resolution A/Res/S-16/1. The UN however also committed the PAC and
other black consciousness organisations to its democratic principles (see Harare Declaration).
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strable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations
genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through
negotiations. Such an eventuality would be an expression of the long-standing
preference of the people of South Africa to arrive at a political settlement.
There was therefore a realisation and an acceptance that a change in the political dis-
pensation will have to be negotiated.
Paragraph 19 of the Harare Declaration, however, stipulated core preconditions for such
negotiations which included:
∙ The release and unbanning of all political prisoners without placing restrictions on
them;
∙ Lifting of restrictions and bans on organisations and people;
∙ Removing the army from the townships;
∙ The lifting of the state of emergency and the repeal of legislation restricting political
activity;
∙ Cease all political executions.
While the Harare Declaration (Sisk, 1992:278-279; Sisk, 1995:151-152) was primarily
aimed at setting the stage for negotiations, it also contained a brief section outlining the
ANC’s view of a future state. There was the acceptance that the transition will have to
be a change to a democratic political order. The document is important in the evolution
of the ANC’s thinking on constitutional issues because of the subsequent adoption of this
language in Resolution A/Res/S-16/1 by the UN General Assembly. The Harare Declaration
called for a process of negotiation, albeit tempered by the view that the bottom line of such
negotiations would be the ﬁnal dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a nonracial
democracy (Sisk, 1995:152).8 The outcome should not merely be the reform of apartheid but
a new constitutional order based on the following attributes (Harare Declaration, paragraph
16; see also Resolution A/Res/S-16/1):
8The principles adopted reﬂected those adopted by the ANC in July 1988 in the “Constitutional Guide-




∙ South Africa shall become a united, democratic and nonracial state.
∙ All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of
race, colour, sex or creed.
∙ All its people shall have the right to participate in government and administration of
the country on the basis of universal suﬀrage, exercised through one person, one vote,
under a common voters roll.
∙ All people have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided
that it is not in the furtherance of racism.
∙ All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, pro-
tected under an entrenched bill of rights.
∙ South Africa shall have a new legal system, which shall guarantee equality of all before
the law.
∙ South Africa shall have an independent and nonracial judiciary.
∙ There shall be created an economic order, which shall provide the advance and well-
being of all South Africans.
∙ A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty, and territorial integrity
of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneﬁcial co-
operation with all people.
The principles of the Harare Declaration, though vaguely drafted, indicated a shift in the
ANC’s position. It should be noted that the inclusion of a controversial clause on the
potential banning of parties pushing for an ethnic platform was dropped, but was applied
to parties that promoted racism (Sisk, 1995:152).
The Harare Declaration was furthermore important because it gave a boost to the ANC’s
moral standing internationally. This was at the expense of both the government and the




These changes in the strategy and position of the ANC as opposition reﬂected an underly-
ing change in the balance of power within South African society (Price, 1991). Furthermore,
the perceived weakening of the power of the authoritarian regime made negotiations more
attractive to the ANC because it made the realisation of their goals through negotiation, pos-
sible (see Adam and Moodley, 1993:46). Negotiations would thus require a re-organisation
of power relations in South African politics and society. Thus, both the NP’s failed attempt
to impose the terms of change, and the ANC’s failed attempt at insurrection and revolution-
ary struggle (as discussed in chapter four) provided the opportunities for negotiations, but
unfortunately also left legacies which would be diﬃcult to deal with in future negotiations
(De Villiers, 1993 :340; Slabbert, 1992a:72-77; Adam and Moodley, 1993:39-52).
5.3.3 THE ELECTION OF 1989
Prior to becoming President, Mr de Klerk was as leader of the NP already involved in the
election campaigns for the September 1989 election of Parliament. Yet, after Mr Botha’s
resignation De Klerk faced an election that would raise concerns about the constituency
of the NP. It was also the ﬁrst election which involved all three chambers of Parliament
simultaneously and the nationalists had to deal with calls to boycott the election and in
particular among coloureds and Indians (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:225).
The NP fought the 1989 elections under diﬃcult circumstances. The white electorate
had to deal with P W Botha’s resignation from the presidency and his televised attack on
his successor; the emergence of a new Democratic Party (DP) after the merging of the PFP
and the Independent Party; inﬂation that was running at over ﬁfteen percent per annum;
real white incomes which were static or declining; the possibility of having to pay school
fees; the government’s discussions with Nelson Mandela and other exiled members of the
ANC; and confusing statements with regard to the NP’s plans for the future (partly because
of confusion resulting from the PW Botha-Mandela meeting in July). Furthermore, the
state-run radio and television service adopted a more objective approach to the campaign
than in the past. This shift gave more exposure to the NP’s election opponents on both the
right and the left (Schrire, 1991:127). Debates on the place of blacks within the political
dispensation however placed the issue of “negotiation” ﬁrmly on the agenda (Guise, 1993:77).
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Thus the Nationalists waged their least conﬁdent campaign in decades and De Klerk had
diﬃculty ﬁnding a theme somewhere between white concerns and black expectations (Schrire,
1991:127).
An interesting feature of the election for the House of Assembly was the presence of a large
pre-election bloc of uncommitted voters who made up their minds only during the campaign.
All the opinion polls taken prior to the election showed an unusual ﬂuidity within the white
electorate (Schrire, 1991:127). The results are shown in Table 5.1, and the distribution of
voters among the parties is presented in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.1: 1989-Election Results for the House of Assembly
NUMBER OF SEATS BY PROVINCE
POLITICAL PARTY Cape Transvaal Natal Orange Free Sate Total
National Party 42(47) 34(45) 10(14) 7(14) 93(120)
Conservative Party 2(0) 31(22) -(-) 6(0) 39(22)
Democratic Party 12(8) 11(6) 10(5) 0(0) 33(19)
Herstigte Nationale Party 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0)
Other 1(0) (1) 0(0) 0(1)
Vacant 0(1) 0(2) 0(0) 1(0) 1(3)
Total 56 76 20 14 166
Source: Schrire, 1991:128; Race Relations Survey, 1989/90:547-550)
From the 1989 election results, it can be concluded that the NP began to weaken under
President Botha, and that President De Klerk reaped the harvest in the election. This was
interpreted as the consequences of President Botha’s reform policies, despite their limited
impact - see Table 5.2. The breakaway by the Conservative Party in 1982 gave conser-
vative Afrikaners a respectable political home to the right of the NP. Although the 1983-
Constitution did not entail genuine power-sharing or in any real way dilute Afrikaner power,
the uncertainties created by a softening of white domination, provided opportunities to the
CP to make gains on the NP. Furthermore, the political unrest that had prevailed since
1984 - ironically because of the liberalisation of the political scene - created fears, which
strengthened the support of the rightwing (Schrire, 1991:128).
Even though the NP had steadily lost support during the 1980s from 58 per cent of
the total electorate in 1981 to 48 percent in 1989, they remained in power due to an elec-
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TABLE 5.2: Voter Support by Party - 1987 and 1989
1987 1989
Votes obtained Seats won Votes obtained Seats won
Natioal Party 1,083,575 (53%) 123 1,053,523 (48%) 93
Conservative Party 549,916 (27%) 22 685,250 (31%) 39
Democratic Party 343,017 (17%) 19 451,544 (21%) 33
Herstigte Nationale Party 62,888 (3%) 0 5,536 (0.25%) 0
Total 2,039,396 2,195,853
Source: Schrire, 1991:128; Race Relations Survey, 1988/89:xxiv; 1989/90:547-550.
toral system that did not make provision for proportionality (Schrire, 1991:127-128; Botha,
1996:113). Furthermore, support for the DP on the left and the CP on the right appeared
to have reached according to Schrire (1991:127-128) a plateau.
Thus the ruling party’s support base among Afrikaners shrank. Economic adversity was
an additional factor in the alienation of the white working class, farmers and oﬃcials in the
government. The reform policies, apart from its direct costs, also produced a considerable
redistribution of beneﬁts from whites to blacks. Expenditure on black education increased
signiﬁcantly at a time when the government had announced its intention to introduce fees in
white schools (see Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:808-809). The substantial increase in
expenditure on the improvement of the infrastructure for urban blacks, although marginal
in comparison with the size of South Africa’s gross national product, did not go unnoticed
by the white electorate (Schrire, 1991:130).
The NP was furthermore unable to make gains among the English speaking electorate
(Schrire, 1991:130). A sizable number of them voted for the NP in the election of 1987.
However, in the 1989 election, most of them returned to the liberal fold by voting for the
new DP. A major reason for this switch was to protest the economic hardships imposed by
higher taxation (necessary in part to ﬁnance the costly reforms), the erosion in the value of
the currency, high inﬂation, and declining real standards of living (Schrire, 1991:130).
It was more diﬃcult to assess the gains made by the CP. Although widely regarded as
a “winner” in 1989, the party failed to make a decisive breakthrough among Afrikaners,
of which the majority continued to back the NP. The CP clearly stated its opposition to
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negotiations, power-sharing and the liberalisation politics of the NP (see Race Relations
Survey, 1989/1990:698-703). The CP’s short-term prospects for growth appeared to be poor
for its appeal to non-Afrikaners was limited and most die-hard conservative voters were
already in their camp. However, there was the long term prospect that a failure of De
Klerk’s iniatives, an increase in black-led protests and violence, and renewed international
pressure could beneﬁt the CP (see Nelan, 1992:34).
Thus, those among the ruling elite who were in favour of a negotiated settlement saw the
need to seize the opportunities provided by changes in the environment, while they still had
a majority in Parliament.
5.3.4 LIBERALISATION AND THE UNBANNING OF ORGANISA-
TIONS AND PEOPLE
With a new mandate from its supporters, the NP and De Klerk realised the danger of falling
behind the ANC in taking the initiative in negotiations. The ANC made important gains
with the Harare Declaration and De Klerk saw the need for the government to accept change
and to act sooner rather than later - “The time for reconstruction and reconciliation has
arrived” (De Klerk, 1990).
Since the 1989 election, the dynamics created by De Klerk’s public statements decisively
shifted towards a nonracial South Africa and seemed to start closing the curtains on white
politics. He stated that the country would never again hold an election without black
participation, although he promised whites a referendum on the new constitution when it
would emerge (see Nelan, 1992:34).
The government subsequently released eight long-term political prisoners, including Wal-
ter Sizulu and Ahmed Kathadra in October 1989. The unconditional release of the Rivonia
prisoners and the tolerance that followed their open political activity, provided an indication
that the new NP-government headed by President De Klerk, was ready to accept the ANC
in some form as a negotiating partner, in discussions about the future of South Africa. In a
statement issued on 2 December 1989, De Klerk indicated that Mandela would be released.
A meeting between De Klerk and Mandela followed on December 13. This led to heightened
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anticipation of how and when the government would ﬁnally release Mandela and permit him
to resume open political activity (Johns and Davis, 1991:309).
However, it was in his famous speech of 2 February 1990, delivered at the opening of
the ﬁrst parliamentary session as head of the South African government, that De Klerk
ﬁrmly placed South Africa on the road to a negotiated settlement (Race Relations Survey,
1989/1990:728). Indeed, De Klerk began this critical speech to parliament on a strikingly
diﬀerent note from PW Botha’s talk of a total onslaught seventeen months before. His words
were: “[there is] the growing realization by an increasing number of South Africans that only
a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population is able
to ensure lasting peace” (De Klerk, 1990; 1991:160; Herbst, 1998:601).
The announcements made in President De Klerk’s landmark speech accelerated the pro-
cess of liberalisation. By taking the “leap of reform” that so many had advised for so long,
he made a move that went beyond most public expectations, including those of the ANC.
De Klerk announced far-reaching decisions with regard to the most important obstacles in
the way of negotiation and he made signiﬁcant concessions to the demands made in the
Harare Declaration (De Klerk, 1990; Sisk, 1992:179; Sisk, 1995:83; Race relations Survey,
1989/1990:215-216). In order to normalise the political process in South Africa without
jeopardising the maintenance of the good order, he announced inter alia:
∙ The lifting of bans on proscribed and restricted organisations and most notably the
ANC, PAC and the SACP.
∙ The indemniﬁcation of returning exiles unless common law crimes against them were
pending.
∙ His intention to release political prisoners.
∙ The suspension of executions for both political and criminal oﬀences until Parliament
has taken a decision on new proposals regarding the death penalty.
∙ Eighty- three political prisoners on death row might be freed, and restrictions on 374
former detainees were lifted.
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∙ The lifting of bans on 110 listed communists and sixty-ﬁve ANC members (including
members of MK).
∙ The lifting of restrictions on the UDF, COSATU, and thirty other anti-apartheid or-
ganisations (and one white right-wing group, the Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging).
∙ The repeal of emergency regulations on education and the press although some televi-
sion controls remained.
∙ The state of emergency would be lifted as soon as circumstances justify it.
∙ Nelson Mandela would be released unconditionally (no date set).
∙ The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 40 of 1953 would be repealed during
the parliamentary session of 1990 (by Act No. 100 of 1990) and other apartheid laws,
which were said to be “obstacles.”
∙ Negotiations would be accorded the “highest priority,” with the aim being a “totally
new dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and
opportunity.”9
De Klerk’s speech was the turning point in the transition to democracy in South Africa.
His key messages in the speech outlined his views of the new rules to govern South Africa’s
transition, namely that the government was prepared to talk with leaders of all political
groups, even those involved in the struggle. The political playing ﬁeld was now open to all
potential contenders, and from the perspective of the NP, the justiﬁcation for the armed
struggle no longer existed and the stage for Mandela’s release on February 11 was set.
Thus, a new chapter in the seventy-eight-year struggle of the ANC to obtain full democratic
rights for blacks in the land of their birth was opened (Johns and Davis, 1991:309). The
most momentous quote from the speech summarised De Klerk’s new strategy for negotiation
which would replace the “total onslaught” paradigm (De Klerk, 1990; Sisk, 1992:179-180;
Sisk, 1995:84):
9Speech by the State President Mr De Klerk, at the Opening of the Second Session of the National
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town, 2 Feb. 1990 (De Klerk, 1990; Sisk, 1992:179-180).
289
Chapter 5
Walk through the open door, take your place at the negotiating table together
with the Government and other leaders who have important power bases inside
and outside of Parliament. Henceforth, everybody’s political points of view will
be tested against their realism, their workability and their fairness. The time has
arrived.
This new era of liberalisation was most notable by the release of Nelson Mandela who was
imprisoned for twenty-seven years because of his political activities (Race Relations Survey,
1989/1990:xli). Nelson Mandela, speaking before tens of thousands of supporters within
hours of his release, reaﬃrmed the aims and goals of the ANC emphasising its unchanging
commitment to majority rule, universal suﬀrage, and democratic rights in a unitary South
African state in which major economic reforms, including nationalisation, would be required
to redress the legacy of apartheid. He also reiterated the willingness of the ANC to enter into
negotiations with the NP-government, listing the conditions set in the Harare Declaration
while at the same time, repeating that the armed struggle and sanctions remained appro-
priate as additional weapons to challenge the government to end apartheid (Race Relations
Survey, 1989/1990:xlii, 729).
Additional liberalisation measures also followed. The state of emergency was eventually
lifted. In 1990 and 1991, many of the remaining apartheid laws were scrapped. The Separate
Amenities Act, the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts and the Population Registration Act10
were scrapped (Schrire, 1991:134). The passing of the Indemnity Act, No. 35 of 1990 in May
which could be applied to both those in jail or in exile, signalled another important step in
normalising the political scene and paving the way for negotiations (Race Relations Survey,
1989/1990:xli).
The importance of these liberalisation steps initiated by the government under De Klerk
could best be captured by the words of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:10):
[O]nce some individual and collective rights have been granted, it becomes in-
creasingly diﬃcult to withhold others. Moreover, as liberalization advances so
does the strength of demands for democratization.
The mentioned changes meant that signiﬁcant liberalisation preceded democratisation in
10Discriminatory Legislation Regarding Public Amenities Repeal Act No 100 of 1990; Abolition of Racially
Based Land Measures Act No. 108 of 1991; Population Registration Act Repeal Act No. 114 of 1991.
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South Africa. Van Zyl Slabbert (1992a:87) pointed out that: “Since 2 February 1990, the
process of transition in South Africa has largely been driven by the regime. The fact that the
“transfer of power to the majority” was not on the agenda is evidenced in the opposition’s
very commitment to negotiated transition”.
5.3.5 THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE
This phase of the transition was characterised by the proliferation and intensiﬁcation of vi-
olence. This was partly due to the new political space that was opened without access to
political power, but also due to the need for various organisations to position themselves on
the road to negotiation and to form alliances, or to prevent their adversaries from strength-
ening their positions.11 The two most prominent role players to emerge at this stage of
the transition were the NP-government and the ANC. Unfortunately, this was a source of
uncertainty and fears among organisations such as the IFP, PAC and CP. Thus, political
aspirations played an important role in violence (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:42). Vi-
olence, in turn, would become an important obstacle in bringing the various political groups
to the negotiating table.
Although 1990 began in a state of optimism, the new era was compromised by the year’s
end due to the escalation of violence. After De Klerk’s 2 February opening of political
space, a wave of factional violence erupted in the townships among supporters of the ANC
and members of the Zulu-based Inkatha (Sisk, 1995:89). The months following De Klerk’s
speech were in fact the bloodiest in South Africa’s conﬂict up to that point.
Within weeks of Mandela’s release intense ﬁghting broke out in Natal between sup-
porters of the ANC/UDF and Inkatha and in particular in the volatile Edendale valley
(Cooper, et al. 1990:250). The violence was initially limited to Natal (IFP stronghold), but
by midyear, it had spread to the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging-region (PWV) (Sisk,
1992:191; 1995:89).
Nevertheless, Mandela sought to bring peace to Natal (Sisk, 1992:192). Addressing an
estimated crowd of 100,000 in Durban in late February, shortly after his release, he said




(Sisk, 1992:192; 1995:89; Star, 26 February 1990):
My message to those of you involved in this battle of brother against brother is
this: take your guns, knives and pangas [hatchets] and throw them into the sea
If we do not bring a halt to this conﬂict, we will be in grave danger of corrupting
the proud legacy of our struggle. We endanger the peace process in the whole of
the country (Sisk, 1995:97).12
Mandela’s calls were however ignored and in March, the Edendale Valley erupted. Ob-
servers described the ﬁghting as a full-scale civil war and despite De Klerk’s attempts to
separate the role of the police from political objectives, elements in the security forces did
not comply (Sunday Times, 28 January 1990; Sisk, 1995:97:90).
According to the Race Relations Survey (1989/1990:238), between January and March,
695 people lost their lives in clashes in Natal alone. Overall, there was an increase of
more than 207 percent for the same period of the previous year (Race Relations Survey,
1989/1990:238). Murder and bloodshed claimed nearly one thousand victims between early
August and early September and undercut the possibility of mutual security formally agreed
to. During the course of 1990, more than ten people per day were killed in political violence
- the highest annual average death rate since the township rebellion in 1984. Even though
progress was made, the negotiation process began to unravel amidst mutual accusations and
mistrust as a direct consequence of an increase in the incidence of violence (Sisk, 1995:98).
There were allegations of hit or death-squads operated by the security establishment, the
ANC’s Operation Vula13 and the establishment of self-defence units in the townships (Race
Relations Survey, 1989/1990:242-243; 1991/1992:484, 495; Adam and Moodley, 1992:130-
132: Guise, 1993:91-92).14 Racial intolerance seemed to be increasing as well; white-on-black
violence - in part the result of organised ultra-right-wing attacks on blacks - reportedly rose
thirty percent in 1990 (see Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:487-489). Reporter Patrick
12In January he had allegedly told a gathering of top police commanders, “We will not use you any longer
as instruments to attain political goals...This is the responsibility of the politicians” (Sisk, 1995:90).
13Senior ANC operatives were inﬁltrating the country to establish a political and military presence, and
to facilitate eﬃcient and direct lines of communication between Mandela and Tambo. The operation had
been treated with such sensitivity that not even the NEC was aware of it; it was directly accountable only
to Oliver Tambo and, in his absence, Alfred Nzo, the ANC’s Secretary-General (Ebrahim, 1998).
14The existence of a covert organisation, the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), which operated under
the South African Defence Force, was a source of contention (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:244).
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Laurence (in Sisk, 1995:98), sums up the cause of the violence and its political fallout in
1990 in the following way:
A major generator of the violence...appears to have been a sense that power was
within the grasp of the black majority, it acted as a catalyst, bringing rivalries to
the surface and the rival forces into an arena where the stakes were the highest
on oﬀer: power (Star, 18 December 1990).
Thus, there was a perception that the apparent close relationship that developed be-
tween the NP politicians and the ANC, left others who feared for their interests, such as
elements within the security forces and the IFP, with the perceived need to foment violence
in order to prevent their exclusion from the negotiations. To them, the newly developing co-
operation between the ANC and the NP meant the real possibility of being sidelined (Sisk,
1995:95). Despite eﬀorts by Mandela to arrange a personal meeting with Inkatha leaders
and the KwaZulu chief minister, Mangosuthu Buthtelezi, to quell the ﬁghting between their
constituents - and forge a common African negotiating position vis-a`-vis the white minor-
ity government - outrage by ANC regional oﬃcials, particularly the Natal Midlands leader,
Harry Gwala, prevented him from carrying it through. During April 1990, the ANC was
working through the details of a ﬁrst round of talks, but the ANC suspended a proposed
meeting with the government in protest against police action in the township of Sebokeng
(PWV). At least eleven people were killed in Sebokeng when security forces opened ﬁre on
a crowd of demonstrators protesting against the high rent and poor living conditions in the
township (Sisk, 1995:90). The ANC reacted in a statement:
The ANC once again reiterates that the people of South Africa have a right to
assemble and demonstrate in support of their just demands as an inalienable
right, not as a favor conceded by the regime at its discretion (Sisk, 1995:90).
Despite the government and the ANC’s ability to work together, clashes between IFP
and ANC supporters, allegedly exacerbated by the role of the security forces, ﬂared up from
time to time. A major incident of violence extending beyond Natal was, once again, in
the volatile township of Sebokeng where on 22 July 1990, about 4,300 hostel-dwellers, who
were IFP supporters, raided a rival ANC-supporting hostel following an IFP rally at the
local stadium. Twenty-four people were killed in the ensuing violence, including nineteen
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members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) - a COSATU aﬃliate (Contreras,
1990:43). NUM oﬃcials blamed the attack on the IFP, the police and employers, noting that
those attacked were on strike at the time. Yet another cycle of attacks and counter attacks
left scores dead and injured (Sisk, 1992:197; 1995:93). Again, on Thursday, 26 August 1990,
hundreds of Zulus wearing distinctive red headbands stormed a Soweto train platform in a
gruesome attack on innocent commuters (Sisk, 1992:200). More than three hundred died
as IFP and ANC supporters clashed in the townships over that weekend. Alarmingly, the
violence had apparently taken on an ethnic dimension (Newsweek, 27 August 1990 in Sisk,
1995:95).
Political violence spoiled the emerging mutual trust that had developed between the
ANC and the government in 1990. The climate for negotiation, stiﬂed instead of improving
and the De Klerk-Mandela rapport that had worked to resolve a negotiation crisis in April,
apparently weakened (Sisk, 1995:96). Mandela pointed to the possibility of conspiracies to
disrupt negotiations and weaken the ANC’s position (Sisk, 1995:96-97):
The aims of those planning and directing this scourge of destruction are very
clearly to destroy the prospects of peace and derail our march to freedom....The
government’s aim is to reform apartheid out of existence while carrying over
into the future accumulated privileges and advantages of white monopoly on
power. The ANC on the other hand, seeks to attain the total eradication of
apartheid and overcome as quickly as possible its ravages on our people. These
basic distinctions account for the diﬀerent directions in which we are pulling.
The conﬂict was thus becoming more complex. Not only was violence partially a con-
sequence of the liberalisation measures of the government, but it also became a part of the
pre-negotiation agenda.
5.4 PRE-NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TRANSITION STRATEGY: THE
DYNAMICS IN THE DOMAINS OF THE STATE - POLITICAL
SOCIETY - CIVIL SOCIETY
5.4.1 THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS
As stated the two most prominent role players to emerge at this stage of the transition were
the NP-government and the ANC. They would dominate the events during pre-negotiations
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and it was largely as a result of their actions that South Africa arrived at the negotiation
table. This dominance and the favoured, but not always cordial, status that they accorded
each other clearly aﬀected the actions of others that held a stake in a future political dispen-
sation. In October 1989 Inkatha-leader, Mangosutho Buthelezi, for example claimed that
the MDM (see chapter 4) was established “to ensure that the ANC had the sole right to
determine the direction of negotiations” (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:714). However,
he indicated that all those that can mobilise support should be included in the negotiations.
The two major actors judged that their fundamental interests could be accommodated
through negotiations and that they would not do better through unilateral action. The ANC
noted for example in its critical Strategic Perspective document:
The leaders understood that their interests would best be served by co-operating
with one another and since this strategic evaluation came from the top, the
leaders would always be ahead of their followers during the transition.15 As a
result, both leaders would be ’in continual, dual negotiations both with their
followers and also with the other side’ (Herbst, 1998:603).
The transformation of the rules of the political game started by De Klerk’s opening move
in February, also entailed a realignment of South Africa’s political parties (Sisk, 1992:197;
1995:93). The same was true of black politics. The various actors on the political scene
during this phase could be grouped together in terms of their position on race. There was
the pro-white right, which claimed to represent the interests of whites and included mainly
the CP, HNP and AWB. A second grouping was those that mainly envisaged some form of
multi-racial or non-racial political dispensation and included the NP-government, the DP,
ANC, SACP and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). A third grouping was the pro-black politi-
cal organisations16 which favoured the surrender of power by the white government of which
the PAC, AZAPO and other BCM organisations were most notable (Race Relations Survey,
1989/1990:675-718; 1991/1992:14-59). Furthermore, several other political organisations on
the right and the left as well as those among homeland populations, coloureds and Indians,
played a varying role. All political organisations held various positions on whether negotia-
15 Both Mandela’s letter to PW Botha and De Klerk’s initial address to parliament unbanning the ANC
came as a surprise even to their close associates.




tions should be an option, what the preconditions for negotiations should be, and what the
format and the agenda of the negotiations should be.17 Opposition and scepticism towards
negotiations came mainly from the pro-white and the pro-black political organisations.
For purposes of this chapter the focus in this section would be mainly on the NP-
government and the ANC with some attention to the SACP and the IFP. It was mainly
through the actions of the NP-government and the ANC that a successful pre-negotiation
phase unfolded. The context in which the NP and the ANC adopted strategies of negotiation,
the factors that brought the ANC and the NP to the table and to involve other organisa-
tions, as well as their views on a future political dispensation are of particular importance.
In addition to the factors that inﬂuenced the two dominant participants the following factors
were instrumental in the actions of both (Sisk, 1992:182-184):18
∙ A “shared perception of stalemate.”
∙ Behind the scenes mediation and diplomacy that facilitated a process of communica-
tion.
∙ The realisation by both sides that the alternatives were too costly.
THE NATIONAL PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT
The position of the NP during pre-negotiations was not only that of a political party, but
also that of a government with an extensive institutional power network controlled by the
NP. Ottaway (1993:24) stated that the NP “had become the state as well”, for it not only
controlled Parliament and the cabinet, but also all public institutions (civil service), paras-
tatals, the education system, radio and television, Afrikaner churches and, with the help of
the Broederbond, some institutions outside of the public sector (Ottaway, 1993:24). This
17For example some organisations such as Inkatha refused to negotiate with the government, while leaders
like Mandela were still in jail, and the liberation movements were still banned. Furthermore, black leaders
who were prepared to negotiate with Pretoria usually lacked popular support (De Villiers, 1993:339). The
PAC, which had earlier been thought to be edging toward negotiation, rejected talks with Pretoria. Ne-
gotiation could be held only on the modalities of an immediate transfer of power, and the PAC’s armed
struggle (which, since the days of POQO had consisted more out of rhetoric than facts) would remain (Sisk,
1995:97). AZAPO, at its national conference, rejected any negotiations with the De Klerk government
whatsoever (Sisk, 1995:97).
18The fact that the leaders of both had for several years waited for the correct timing (Sisk, 1992:182-184).
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control became even more extensive through the National Security Management System
(NSMS) (Ottaway, 1993:24). Thus, it was only natural for the NP to assume a key role in
negotiating a transition.
As stated, two events in 1989 caused a fundamental change in the perception of some
whites of a minimally acceptable future, namely De Klerk’s succession of PW Botha and the
fall of communism (see Herbst, 1998:601). There was an important shift in the strategy of the
NP-government under De Klerk’s Presidency19 (Van Vuuren, 1992:6; De Villiers, 1993:340)
and after nearly eighty years as the voice of exclusive Afrikaner (and white) nationalism, the
NP opened its membership to all races in 1990 (Sisk, 1992:197; 1995:93).
The government was in a position to enforce its rule, but it was unable to ﬁnd a for-
mula conferring legitimacy on that rule. These are precisely the circumstances under which
a negotiated transition to democracy becomes possible. If, for a variety of reasons, the
authoritarian regime becomes too weak and the incumbents too divided to maintain the
status quo while the challengers are not powerful enough to replace the incumbents by force,
negotiations become an option. Thus, if a situation of stalemate ensues the authoritarian
government and their challengers will eventually decide to negotiate (De Villiers, 1993:339).
Incumbents may decide to negotiate because they believe that their position will deterio-
rate further as the authoritarian regime weakens. In addition, they may believe that by
initiating negotiations they can exercise a considerable degree of control over the process
of transition - thus using their position as government to obtain guarantees which protect
their vital interests, for example by means of pacts. Agreeing to negotiate thus ensures them
a role in determining the outcome of the process of transition. Generally, the challengers
agree to participate in a transitional process, because they realise that they cannot defeat
the authoritarian regime in a head-on confrontation. The challengers at the same time hope,
that after winning the ﬁrst free elections, they will be able to gain control of the process of
transition (De Villiers, 1993:340).
19De Klerk carried none of the baggage associated with PW Botha: he was from a later generation of
Afrikaners conﬁdent of their position and not scarred by the long battles with the English. Apparently, he
took a dim view of the security forces that PW Botha (a former minister of defence) had integrated into the




What brought the NP to consider negotiations? Sisk (1992:182-184) focussed on the
following reasons:
Domestic factors
∙ Apartheid had failed for practical, demographic and economic reasons, and therefore
dramatic action was necessary.
∙ The continuation and intensiﬁcation of the struggle compelled the regime to negotiate.
∙ The government faced a worsening economic scenario, and negotiations were seen as a
way to arrest the economic decline.
∙ Strains on the resources/performance of the SADF required the regime to change
strategies.
∙ The personal leadership characteristics of President De Klerk allowed negotiations to
take place.
∙ The moral condemnation of apartheid had taken its toll: psychological and moral
changes among the ruling elite were part of the reason for a change in strategy (Sisk,
1992:182).
International factors
∙ International pressure: sanctions had taken their toll on the government by creating
worsening economic conditions, which were exacerbated by government expenditure
and particularly a need for a steady supply of resources to the security establishment.
∙ International pressure: conservative western governments, particularly the UK Prime
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the US President, George W Bush, relayed to the




∙ The end of the Cold War made external conﬂict less relevant, especially in the light
of co-operation between superpowers to end regional conﬂicts in Africa, particularly
Southern Africa.
∙ The Soviet Union was no longer perceived as a threat, allowing the NP to point to the
decline in the superpower’s involvement in regional conﬂicts in Africa - thus easing the
perceived total onslaught against South Africa.
∙ The successful resolution of the Namibian conﬂict served as a precedent for the po-
tential resolution of the conﬂict in South Africa, because it demonstrated that black
enfranchisement would not necessarily lead to a winner-take-all outcome.
∙ The impact of the collapse of Eastern European communist governments in 1989 on
the regime was, “You could be next”.
In addition to the above, De Villiers (1993:343) lists township resistance, the “intra-state”
conﬂict between the securocrats and the NP, changes in the world balance of power and the
military setbacks in Angola as direct reasons for the changes in the strategy of the NP.
The NP leaders thus realised that it would be better to negotiate with the ANC from
a position of strength, before they were forced to do so by further deterioration of their
situation (Southall, 1990:496). President de Klerk acknowledged this when he remarked in
a speech in March 1990 (in De Villiers, 1993:344):
We have not waited until the position of power dominance turned against us
before we decided to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The initiative is in our
hands. We have the means to ensure that the process develops peacefully and in
an orderly way
The then head of National Intelligence, Niel Barnard, regarded the decision to start
negotiations as an act of volition on the part of the government - that is the government
decided to take the political initiative without being with its back to the wall (De Villiers,
1993:345).
The NP favoured a three phased approach to negotiations: a ﬁrst phase that involved the
removing of obstacles to negotiations; a second phase that dealt with the “how” of negotia-
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tions and who should be involved; and the actual substantive negotiations as a third phase
(see Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:561). The NP had long insisted that a precondition for
negotiations with the opposition forces was the renouncement of the armed struggle and the
commitment to a peaceful solution (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:730). However, the
ANC was not yet ready to abandon the armed struggle and this would increasingly become
an obstacle and a source of disagreement between the main players. In well-publicised visits
elsewhere in Africa and in Europe and North America, Mandela, in spite of exploratory talks,
made repeated appeals for the retention of sanctions until the full dismantling of apartheid
had been achieved.20
However, the Harare Declaration and the ANC’s proposals for a democratic non-racial
dispensation reduced the risks of negotiation for the NP (De Villiers, 1993:346).
Nevertheless, in the context of the above domestic and international realities, De Klerk
grabbed the initiative and since he aimed at negotiating from a position of strength estab-
lished a bottom line of minimum requirements:
∙ The establishment of strong and entrenched regional governments with adequate bud-
gets and “vested with wide and meaningful powers and functions”.
∙ Entrenched power sharing within the executive, including the cabinet.
∙ The right to private property.
∙ A senate to guard regional interests and a Bill of Rights enforced by a special consti-
tutional court (Herbst, 1998:602).
De Klerk also indicated very early in the negotiating process, that proportional represen-
tation was the only acceptable voting system, given that the white presence in parliament
would disappear if there were no arithmetical connection between votes and seats. Further-
more, De Klerk said, “I want to say here and now that this government will not be frightened
or threatened into making any concessions on principle with regard to these fundamental
matters” (Herbst, 1998:602).
20The ANC eventually suspended the armed struggle in April 1991.
300
Chapter 5
De Klerk was under pressure to inform whites in general, and his constituency in par-
ticular, of the detail on what the future would hold for them. While he was of the opinion
that the end of the Cold War presented whites with the opportunity for a soft landing, the
average white citizen (Herbst, 1998:602) did not necessarily share this view. Instead, the end
of the Cold War could have been viewed as an opportunity to crush the ANC, not negotiate
with it (Herbst, 1998:603). Indeed, De Klerk had a problem with his constituency when his
party lost several by-elections in late 1991. Thus, the government would have to negotiate on
two fronts namely with the challengers, as well as with the government’s traditional electoral
support base and the wider white constituency. This reality would become clear during the
unfolding of the pre-negotiation process.
The decision to launch the transition was thus a strategic choice made by De Klerk, as
leader of the NP and head of state and government. At this stage of the transition, the
exercise of a strategic choice, which entailed the adoption of a new policy of liberalisation
initiated by the incumbent government, became important. Another important aspect is
that challengers usually use the space and dynamics generated by such liberalisation to push
beyond the regime’s intended limits. However, there are limits as to what the challengers can
achieve. It is argued, for example by Przeworski (1986:63; 1988:80), that liberal democracy
would protect the economic order and may block any subsequent transition to socialism (Du
Toit 1990:2). Thus, negotiated transitions are “self-limiting” (Karl and Schmitter, 1991:274).
In his year-end address in 1990, De Klerk - perhaps playing to his own fearful constituency
alarmed by escalating violence - however sounded a hard line: “The time has come for the
ANC to decide what it wants. Is it really prepared to accept its leaders’ commitment to
peaceful and negotiated solutions, or does it want to return to the confrontations and conﬂicts
of the past?” (Sisk, 1995:98). Nevertheless, by the end of 1991, the government had met
most of the original preconditions for negotiation set by the ANC in the Harare Declaration.
Many of these issues were dealt within bilateral negotiations and accords or pacts between
the NP and the ANC (De Villiers, 1993:346) as would be discussed further on.
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THE ANC, SACP AND COSATU
As discussed in chapter three, the ANC was not established as a political party and until its
unbanning it did not function as such. Thus the unbanning of the ANC and the prospect
of a possible transition to democracy required of the ANC to transform itself from a mainly
liberation movement (in fact the liberation movement) to a political party which would be
one of a number competing for a share of the vote among the electorate (Ottaway, 1993:44).
This would prove to be a diﬃcult process and like the government, the ANC leaders would
have to negotiate on two fronts, namely with the government as their opposition and with
the other members and supporters who were indoctrinated with the ideals of the struggle
(Ottaway, 1993:43-45). The SACP, in turn, was relaunched as a political party in July
1990 (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:xlii). Though the SACP was an important ally,
the relationship with the ANC during pre-negotiations would often become strained and
gave rise to many predictions of an eminent break-up.21 Furthermore, the ANC was also
dependent on COSATU for support and being able to organise itself within South Africa.
In the changed setting of freedom and legality for the ANC, Mandela, Sisulu and other
ANC leaders worked simultaneously to broaden the anti-apartheid movement linked with
the ANC and to pressurise the government to release political prisoners, give amnesty to
exiled ANC members, and end the state of emergency. Thus, what brought the ANC22 to
consider negotiations? According to Sisk (1992:182-184) the following was important in this
regard:
Domestic factors
∙ The armed struggle had failed to bring the result that was intended; the ANC could
not win in the military arena.
∙ The human costs of the struggle became too high.
21It is not clear how these predictions fuelled the government’s willingness to negotiate.
22The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), which included the UDF and COSATU continued to co-




∙ ANC cadres in exile were becoming weary of conditions there, and were urging a change
in strategy.
∙ The ANC had a historic desire for a peaceful settlement (Sisk, 1992:183).
International factors
∙ International pressure from allies: the Frontline states were unable to withstand South
Africa’s destabilising policies and put pressure on the ANC to seek a negotiated set-
tlement.
∙ International pressure: withdrawal of political, psychological and material support
from the Soviet Union to liberation struggles in Africa.
∙ The likely absence of future support from Eastern Europe in the liberation struggle
indicated a further decline in its international resource base.
∙ Co-operation between superpowers to end regional conﬂicts in Africa, particularly
Southern Africa.
De Villiers (1993:346) also indicated that the government’s liberalisation initiative reduced
the risks of negotiation for the ANC.
The jailed ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, reportedly initiated a meeting with De Klerk
which took place on Wednesday, December 13 - just four days after the Conference for a
Democratic Future - representing the internal players in the struggle - had adopted the
guidelines of the Harare Declaration (Sisk, 1992:176).
Despite the mounting violence and the still unmet demands of the Harare Declaration,
the ANC agreed to the establishment of one of the many joint committees that would serve
as one of the new institutions of the negotiation process, namely the Steering Committee
that included government and ANC representatives. Its main function was to steer the “talks
about talks”,23 and it was thus tasked to prepare for a formal meeting between the govern-
ment and the ANC. The preparations were held under a veil of secrecy (Ebrahim, 1998:39;
23It dealt for example with all the preparations for both the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes.
303
Chapter 5
Sisk, 1995:89-90). The committee was set up in behind-the-scenes talks in the weeks follow-
ing De Klerk’s speech and consisted of government and ANC representatives. ANC members
Jacob Zuma (ANC head of intelligence), Matthews Phosa, and Penuel Maduna were secretly
allowed to enter the country from exile to prepare for talks (Waldmeir, 1997:158; Ebrahim,
1998:39). Together with Curnick Ndlovu, Ahmed Kathrada, and other ANC members they
were the ANC members on the Steering Committee (Ebrahim, 1999:39).
With the support of the National Executive Committee, Mandela led an ANC delegation,
comprised of long-time exiles (including military leaders and communists), former prisoners,
representatives of the UDF, trade unions, and churches - representing all of South Africa’s
racial groups - in a meeting from 2-4 May with President de Klerk and cabinet ministers
at the presidential residence, Groote Schuur. This was the ﬁrst formal meeting between the
ANC and the head of the white government (see next section).
In this volatile environment, the ANC held its ﬁrst party conference inside South Africa
since it had been banned in 1960 (Sisk, 1995:97)24 on 16 December 1990. Due to read-
justment diﬃculties, it was dubbed not as a full national conference, but a consultative
conference. At the conference, deep divisions emerged within ANC ranks over whether to
continue negotiations with the regime - a debate strongly fuelled by the mistrust generated
by violence. Diﬀerences emerged between the older generation of recently released internal
leaders and the younger and exile-based leaders. Many of the latter sought an immediate
end to the process of negotiations and a return to the armed struggle. At the end of the
internal wrangling, the old guard emerged with its negotiation policies somewhat tarnished
but still intact. A resolution passed at the conference stated, “Our patience with the regime
is running out” (Sisk, 1995:97).
The conference resolved the following (Sisk, 1995:97-98):
∙ A deadline of 30 April 1991 was set at which time talks would be suspended if the
agreements made concerning exiles and political prisoners had not yet been met.
∙ There would be no more secret meetings between the ANC and the government leaders.
24The PAC and AZAPO held their ﬁrst party conferences inside the country since their unbanning during
this period (Sisk, 1995:97).
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News reports, alleged that De Klerk and Mandela had met secretly in the previous
weeks.
∙ Other aspects of the resistance, such as international sanctions, the creation of parallel
institutions, and mass action, or peaceful protest, would continue.
∙ Further eﬀorts would be made to re-establish the organisation’s internal structures.
The organisation would step up eﬀorts to work with other liberation forces such as the
PAC and AZAPO, in a Patriotic Front.
∙ The MK would be used to defend ANC supporters in the townships (Declaration of
the 1990 ANC Consultative Conference, ANC Representative).
However, Mandela conﬁrmed that conﬁdential meetings would continue. In his closing ad-
dress he said that ANC members who opposed them “did not understand the nature of
negotiations” (Star, 22 December 1990; Sisk, 1995:98). In fact, De Klerk, Mandela and a
number of aides met again soon after the ANC’s Consultative Conference.
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY
Inkatha (see chapter three) already indicated in February 1990 that it was ready for negoti-
ations (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:714). Inkatha functioned as a Zulu-based cultural
movement until July 1990 when its leader, Mangosutho Buthelezi, announced that the move-
ment would become a national political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Buthelezi
was posturing for a role in the quickly changing political environment. The IFP’s inﬂuence
immediately began to extend its constituency beyond KwaZulu and Natal, into the PWV.
It aimed at mobilising hostel dwellers and gaining white supporters. The ANC viewed this
as a threat to its perceived strongholds - adding fuel to the existing rivalry between the IFP
and the ANC (Sisk, 1992:197; 1995:93).
In March 1990 Buthelezi unveiled “The 1990 Inkatha Declaration” as an alternative to
the Harare Declaration. In the declaration, attention was paid to basic principles for a





The DP was the third most important party represented in Parliament. Though there were
diﬀerences among its members with regard to its place in the political spectrum and though
its aims overlapped with both the NP and the ANC, the party did manage to establish a
separate identity as a liberal centrist party that could mediate between the ANC and the
NP (Ottaway, 1992:81-82). The DP favoured a federation with no special “niche” for whites
and an economy based on capitalism (Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:705).
5.4.2 PRE-NEGOTIATIONS: KEY EVENTS
During the course of 1989 several meetings took place between the NP-government and
the ANC which prepared the way for the pre-negotiation process. An important meeting
was held between De Klerk and Mandela during December 1989 (Race Relations Survey,
1989/1990:731). After Mandela’s release in February 1990, the scene was set for further
“talks”, - initially behind the scenes. Friedman, (1993:14) states that initially the main
actors realised that there was no alternative to a negotiated settlement, but compromise was
seen as a “new means” of “achieving old goals” and not a “preferred option”. This introduced
a volatile period in the history of South Africa’s transition to democracy. Rivalry, mistrust,
mediation, breakdowns and intensiﬁcation of the conﬂict was characteristic of this period.
However, there were major accomplishments in terms of co-operation among the dominant
actors which eventually set the stage for the next phase of substantive negotiations. In this
section, the focus will be on these milestones and the dynamics involved.
THE TUYNHUYS MEETING OF APRIL 1990
The government and the ANC reached agreement at the end of March 1990 to hold formal
discussions The Steering Committee (see section 5.4.1) was tasked with the arrangement
of the ﬁrst round of direct discussions and it dealt with the details of possible agreements
that would clear the remaining obstacles in the way of negotiation. Some of the issues that
required immediate attention included the deﬁnition of the term “political prisoners” and the
basis for granting indemnities to returning exiles. In these preliminary talks, held beyond the
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eyes of the press, the details of public talks - the agenda, location, size and composition of
the delegations, security and related procedural issues - were dealt with. The government’s
top constitutional adviser, Fanie van der Merwe, and the ANC’s Jacob Zuma (Sisk, 1995:90),
led these preliminary talks.25 The date was set for 11 April but with a secret venue (Sisk,
1995:90).
Following the disagreement on the continuation of violence, particularly, in Sebokeng,
the scheduled meeting was cancelled and De Klerk, Mandela and three senior ANC oﬃcials
met on 5 April at the presidential residence in Cape Town, Tuynhuys,26 to try to establish
common ground. De Klerk assured Mandela that the Sebokeng events would be investigated
and the police would be restrained. Agreement was reached on a new date for the talks,
namely 2-4 May 1990. In this initial period, De Klerk and Mandela emerged as the two
personalities that would dominate the pre-negotiation phase. The De Klerk-Mandela rap-
port, based on the personal trust between them, would on various occasions turn crises into
breakthroughs (Sisk, 1995:90).
THE GROOTE SCHUUR MINUTE OF MAY 1990
The ﬁrst formal meeting between the government and the ANC was thus held on May 2-4
at Groote Schuur, Cape Town. The return of the exiled leadership was widely perceived
as a remarkable historical breakthrough. At the opening of the meeting, De Klerk and
Mandela, appeared together before a crowd of two hundred local and international media
teams, both speaking conﬁdently of the ability to reach agreement through dialogue. The
talks were surprisingly cordial; the spirit at Groote Schuur reﬂected the general euphoria
of South Africans and the world that fundamental peace is on the horizon in South Africa
(Sisk, 1995:91; Ottaway, 1993:173-174).27
25Even after the ﬁrst round of formal pre-negotiations, the Steering Committee continued to serve as a
mechanism for resolving deadlocks in other negotiating forums.
26Where Mandela and PW Botha had met some nine months earlier.
27The delegations at Groote Schuur were for the government: President FW de Klerk, Foreign Minister
“Pik” Botha, Minister of Constitutional Development Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Energy and Water Aﬀairs
Dawie de Villiers, Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee, Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, Law and Order
Minister Adriaan Vlok, Education and Training (black education) Minister Stoﬀel van der Merwe, and
Deputy Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer. For the ANC: Nelson Mandela, Alfred Nzo
(head of ANC mission in exile), SACP Secretary General Joe Slovo, MK Commander Joe Modise, Director of
International Aﬀairs Thabo Mbeki, UDF leader Natal Archie Gumede, Beyers Naude (theologian), national
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After three days of bargaining, the delegations again appeared before the press. Mandela
summed up the mood of the talks as “a realization of a dream” for the ANC, but said,
“at the end not only are we, the government and the ANC, closer together, but we are all
victors - South Africa is the victor” (Sisk, 1992:195; 1995:91). Both signed a joint document,
the Groote Schuur Minute, in which it was agreed that the commitments contained in the
document should be achieved as early as possible (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:512).
Following a commitment to the resolution of the climate of violence, as well as a peaceful
process of negotiations, the government and the ANC agreed to (Groote Schuur Minute,
Race Relations Survey, 1989/1990:731-732; 1991/1992:512; Sisk, 1995:92):
∙ Establish a Working Group on Political Oﬀences28 (the proceedings of which would
be conﬁdential) to work out an operational deﬁnition of political oﬀences and the
mechanisms and time frames for the release and indemniﬁcation of prisoners or those
in exile convicted or accused of political crimes; 21 May 1990 was set as deadline.
∙ Grant temporary immunity for political oﬀences to key ANC oﬃcials to enable them
to return to South Africa to assist in the establishment and management of political
negotiations.
∙ Review existing security legislation in order to ensure normal and free political activi-
ties.
∙ Work towards the lifting of the state of emergency.
∙ Establish channels of communication between the Government and the ANC in order
to curb the violence and intimidation from whatever quarter eﬀectively.
The government thus agreed to meet the central demands of the Harare Declaration, namely
the release of all political prisoners, the return of exiles under conditions of immunity, a
review of security legislation and the state of emergency. While not explicitly pledging to
executive members Ahmed Kathrada and Ruth Mompati. Intelligence chief Jacob Zuma, UDF members
Cheryl Carolus and Curnick Ndlovu, and attorneys Penuel Maduna and Matthews Phosa (Sisk, 1992 :194).
28The ANC nominated as its representatives on the working group, Messrs Zuma, Maduna, Nhlanhla,
Pahad, Phosa and Ndlovu (its members on the Steering Committee). The Government nominated as its
representatives Minister Coetsee, Deputy Minister Meyer and Messrs Van der Merwe, Swanepoel, Louw and
Viall, Major General Knipe and Brigadier Kok.
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end the armed struggle, the ANC agreed to conditions that eﬀectively limited its ability to
take up armed action while the negotiation process was in place (Sisk, 1992:195; 1995:91).
Mr Slovo of the SACP also tried to assure the government during the talks that the SACP
had no “hidden agenda” (Adam and Moodley, 1993:97).
The Groote Schuur Minute was the ﬁrst in a series of agreements between the govern-
ment and the ANC, in the run-up to the Accord. It is thus understandable that its aims
were modest and consisted mainly of a set of promises. It was however during this stage
that the Steering Committee would evolve as an institution that would guide the transition
(Sisk, 1995:92). This was where the regularised rules for the transition originated and new
institutions evolved out of the need to escape common problems.
The most important result of the Groote Schuur meeting was the belief by both the regime
and the opposition that concessions would be reciprocated by the opponent - resulting in a
very successful initial pact from the government’s point of view, namely one that justiﬁed
tolerance of the opposition (Marks, 1992:413; Sisk, 1995:92). However, organisations such
as AZAPO condemned the talks as merely legitimising the government (Guise, 1993:91).
The CP, in turn, later indicated that it would not participate in negotiations for it would
legitimise the ANC (Guise, 1993:92)!
While the ﬁrst round of formal talks was successful, the ANC continued to press its
demands publicly for the return of the exiles and the immediate release of political prisoners.
Later in May, Mandela, addressing a crowd of 60,000, threatened to stop negotiations unless
the government facilitated the immediate release of political prisoners, the ending of political
trials, lifting of the state of emergency and the withdrawal of the SADF troops from the
townships. In the end, the Groote Schuur process brought about concrete results for the
ANC. Shortly following the talks, thirty-eight top ANC exiles were indemniﬁed, including
the commander of MK, Chris Hani and the then Director of Intelligence, Jacob Zuma (Sisk,
1992:196; 1995:92). By late May, Parliament had passed an Indemnity Bill for political
oﬀenders (although the responsibility for deﬁning such oﬀences fell upon the working group),
and in June, De Klerk lifted the state of emergency in all parts of the country except for the
strife-ridden Natal (Sisk, 1992:196; 1995:92).
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PRETORIA MINUTE OF 6 AUGUST 1990 AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Pretoria Minute, which was entered into on 6 August 1990, was the second important
agreement between the government and the ANC. Delegations from both sides met at the
Presidensie in Pretoria, for a ﬁfteen-hour marathon session of hard bargaining that started
at nine o’clock in the morning and which gave birth to the Pretoria Minute, an agreement
that all the obstacles identiﬁed by the ANC as obstructing negotiations would be removed
or addressed (Ebrahim, 1998:61). Despite more diﬃcult negotiations than at Groote Schuur,
concessions were made, and once again, a joint declaration signed by both parties emerged
from the closed-door discussions. At a news conference, at one o’clock in the morning, on
7 August 1990, a joint statement, the Pretoria Minute, was released (Sisk, 1995:93). Key
points in the Minute were (Pretoria Minute; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:513-515):
∙ A commitment by both government and the ANC to the Groote Schuur Minute.
∙ The acceptance of the ﬁnal report of the working group on political oﬀences.
∙ The suspension of armed action by the ANC - with immediate eﬀect.
∙ An undertaking by the government to release all political prisoners by the 30th April
1991 and allow all exiles to return home.
∙ The intention to form national, regional and local structures to address situations of
conﬂict.
∙ The establishment of a Working Group to deal with all outstanding issues and the
implementation of the suspension of armed action.
∙ The expression of concern about the violence in Natal by both parties, noting that
“problems can and should be solved through negotiations”.
∙ The creation of mechanisms at both the local regional and national levels to enable
the communication of public grievances to the appropriate authorities.
As mentioned the parties accepted the report by the Working Group on Political Oﬀences
established at Groote Schuur and which formulated an operational deﬁnition of a “political
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oﬀence” and a “political prisoner” in order to facilitate the release of such prisoners and
the indemniﬁcation of those charged with political crimes. The provisions for the release
and indemniﬁcation extended not only to the ANC, but to “all organisations, groupings or
institutions, governmental or otherwise, who committed oﬀences on the assumption that
a particular cause was being served or opposed” (Pretoria Minute; Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:513; The Argus, 7 August 1990 in Sisk, 1995:94).
Both the government and the ANC, thus again, committed themselves to do everything
in their power to bring about a peaceful solution as soon as possible. The Pretoria Minute
further established the institutional structures for the transitional process, which would even-
tually satisfactorily resolve the conditions for substantive constitutional talks. Both sides
made major concessions and committed themselves to the normalisation and stabilisation
of the socio-political situation in South Africa (Pretoria Minute; Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:514). The government on the one hand, agreed to an ongoing review of security
legislation in order to promote free political activity by the ANC and its allies. The govern-
ment also made a commitment to consider lifting the state of emergency in Natal as soon as
circumstances permit. The ANC, on the other hand, announced that it would suspend all
armed action with immediate eﬀect (Sisk, 1995:94). To give eﬀect to the way in which such
armed action was to be “suspended,” the Minute established another working group,29 the
Armed Action Working Committee, headed by Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok for
the government and MK Chief of Staﬀ Chris Hani for the ANC (Sisk, 1995:94).
The Pretoria Minute was an important pact concluded between the government and
the ANC to pave the way for a negotiated transition during which both would respect each
other’s role as indispensable. The pact however did not signal a political alliance between the
two players for at the press conference announcing the signing of the Minute, Mandela and
De Klerk clashed over alleged police violence with Mandela saying, “Until the government
has tamed the police, we will continue to be dissatisﬁed” (The Argus, 7 August 1990 in Sisk,
1995:95).
29Its activities led to the D F Malan Accord.
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However, murder and bloodshed claimed about one thousand lives between early August
and early September and undercut the possibility of mutual security formally agreed to in
the above pacts and strained the cordial relations between De Klerk and Mandela (Sisk,
1995:96).
De Klerk and Mandela met again at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on 27 November
1990, but the meeting was inconclusive and a brief joint statement released afterwards simply
noted a vague commitment to the process of peaceful negotiations.30 No mention was made
of the burning issue of violence and the implementation of the agreement on exiles and
political prisoners as stated in the Pretoria Minute (Star, 29 November 1990; Sisk, 1995:96).
There was a growing concern among ANC supporters that an aged Mandela was being
trumped by a younger De Klerk and particularly on the questions of violence and political
prisoners. At a meeting on 8 December 1990 to discuss the issue of violence speciﬁcally,
they only decided on the activation of the Armed Action Working Group (Sisk, 1995:96). A
few days later, at a rally in Johannesburg, a disillusioned Mandela announced that the ANC
would suspend its participation in the Working Group on Political Oﬀences and set unilateral
deadlines for the implementation of the agreement on exiles and political prisoners. He also
pointed to conspiracies to disrupt negotiations and weaken the ANC (Sisk, 1995:96-97).
THE ANC-IFP AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 1991
Violence continued and remained a threat to the aim of engaging the various stakeholders in
negotiations, but the ANC took serious steps during 1991 to address the continuing violence
and to pay attention to its relations with other organisations and in particular the IFP.
They called for an all-party conference on constitutional negotiations (which the government
welcomed), formed a joint liaison committee with the PAC, held a joint rally for peace at
Bekkersdal31 where attendees were addressed by the leaders of the PAC, AZAPO and the
IFP (see Sisk, 1995:99; Hari, 1994:75; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:72-73,35).
30Unlike other 1990 meetings, De Klerk and Mandela did not appear together to issue the statement.
(Sisk, 1995:96).
31Top oﬃcials from the ANC, AZAPO, the PAC and IFP appeared at a joint rally to appeal to the
warring factions in Bekkersdal to make peace. (In the area at least 11 people have died in political violence
in the preceding days.)
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Of particular signiﬁcance was the meeting on 29 January 1991 between delegations of the
National Executive Committee of the ANC and the IFP, led respectively by Mandela and
Buthelezi (see Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:519). This was a historic32 meeting and
the situation was extremely tense when they met at the Royal Hotel in Durban amidst tight
security (Sisk, 1992:206; 1995:99-100). Many in the ANC had come to regard Buthelezi as a
“sell-out”, because of his “collaboration” with the government in the discredited apartheid
homeland system. They suspected him of fomenting violence to prevent the IFP from be-
ing marginalised (see Hari, 1994:75; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:482-484). Despite a
long history of hostility between the two organisations, which eventually changed into per-
sonal hostility between Mandela and Buthelezi, the seven-hour meeting was described as
good-natured and the two delegations managed to reach an agreement to end the violence
between their respective organisations (see Sisk, 1992:206; 1995:100; Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:519-521).
The purpose of that meeting was to bring the violence to an end. The joint peace strategy,
which emerged, was seen as a positive development and is regarded by Sisk (1995:100) as
an “archetypical elite pact”. A positive sign was the agreement by the two leaders that the
two groups could co-exist peacefully, as Mandela said, the two organisations “had no choice
but to coexist” (Hari, 1994:75).
Both organisations called upon their members to end the violence, promote the quest for
peace and undertake to commit themselves to political tolerance and freedom of political
activity free of intimidation, recognising each side’s right to exist “with its own policies
and programmes”. They stressed the importance of the security forces in peace-keeping
and called upon the security force to act without political bias (Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:520). Signiﬁcantly, it was agreed that the two leaders would jointly tour the
violence-aﬀected areas and that structures would be set up to convey the strategy at the
grassroots level and to work towards the rehabilitation of stricken families (Hari, 1994:76).
32It was the ﬁrst meeting between them in 28 years. The ANC and IFP senior members had met a couple
of times before, but there was pressure from both inside and outside of South Africa for Buthelezi and
Mandela to meet (Sisk, 1992:206). Buthelezi for his part had frequently called for such a meeting, insisting
on meeting Mandela on an equal footing, not as the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Government, but as the
President of the IFP.
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It was furthermore agreed that a reconstruction and development programme should
simultaneously be undertaken to reduce the potential for violence, particularly in Natal
and around the hostels in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region (Hari,
1994:76; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:519-521). The development programme should
be above partisan considerations and be designed to meet the needs of all people irrespective
of their aﬃliations. Perhaps the most important aspect of this strategy was Principle 3 of
the agreement which stipulated that the resources available to any single organisation for
reconstruction work should be made available to a trust fund to be jointly administered
(see Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:521). Thus the two leaders had vowed to “ﬁght for
peace”.
Buthelezi praised the agreement as the most signiﬁcant political event since February 2,
1990 and he said that it represented “a triumph of ANC moderation and political decency”.
The IFP leader was full of praise for Mandela, whom, he said, “attempted to, in some
measure, match the boldness of De Klerk’s leadership in tackling a thorny issue” (Hari.
1994:76).
The ANC and the IFP moved fast after the meeting. A peace committee, consisting of
twenty-four persons from each organisation, was established to analyse the violence crises
and to delegate authority to smaller groups to establish regional reconciliation committees.
The peace committee held several meetings, while Mandela and Buthelezi began to speak
to each other on the telephone, which resulted in another summit on 30 March 1991.
Despite these important developments, the Mandela-Buthelezi rapport did not bring the
expected decrease in violence and peace continued to elude the violence-ridden regions. On
31 January 1991 ten people were killed in Umgababa in Natal, followed by the massacre of
seventeen people on February 10 (Hari, 1994:76).
These two clashes were said to have occurred between IFP and ANC supporters. A
shocked Mandela met the chairman of the IFP, Dr Frank Mdlalose, who was unhappy that
the ANC had accused the security forces and the IFP of conspiring to kill ANC supporters.
He accused the ANC of bringing the country to the brink of civil war and of aiming to wreck
the negotiation process and of setting the stage for seizing power. Once again, relations
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between the ANC and the IFP were strained (Hari, 1994:76). While politically motivated
fatalities declined from 169 in January to 93 in February it rose to 277 in March and remained
high throughout the year (Hari, 1994:77). The situation seemed to be deteriorating fast and
on 13 April, it was reported that the ANC was forming self-defence units in the townships
(Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:484). A spokesperson for the South African Police was
quoted, the same day, as saying that the establishment of private armies was “a recipe for
civil war.” A few days later, it was alleged that MK was seen providing advice on community
defence tactics (Hari, 1994:76-77).
In spite of the agreement between the ANC and the IFP, violence involving supporters
of the ANC and of the IFP thus remained a challenge and a hurdle in bringing all relevant
parties to the negotiation table. However, the deteriorating conditions on the ground made
negotiations a necessity and provided many opportunities for “pact making”, but the slow
pace of progress in this regard would soon necessitate the involvement of actors from civil
society.
THE DF MALAN ACCORD OF FEBRUARY 1991
After the Groote Schuur Minute and the Pretoria Minute, the government and the ANC
deadlocked on security issues in the Armed Action Working Committee and progress in
this regard was delayed. The government and the ANC met secretly at DF Malan airport,
Cape Town, on 12 February 1991 and ﬁnalised the report resulting in the DF Malan Accord
regarding the ANC’s suspension of the armed struggle. There was again a commitment
to the content of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes (Sisk, 1995:102; Race Relations
Survey, 1991/92:xxxiv, 27, 516-518).33
There were several main features of the DF Malan Accord (Relations Survey, 1991/1992:516-
518). There was an undertaking by the ANC to stop:
∙ attacks by means of armaments, ﬁrearms, explosives or incendiary devices;
∙ inﬁltration of men and material;
33The working group was initially tasked to bring out a ﬁnal report by 15 September1990. Having been
unable to do so an interim report was released on 13 September 1990.
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∙ creating underground structures;
∙ inciting violence;
∙ threatening with armed action; and
∙ military training inside the country.
It was also agreed that (Relations Survey, 1991/1992:516-518):
∙ All political parties and movements have to participate in the process peacefully.
∙ Private armies of political parties would not be allowed.
∙ MK is no longer an illegal organisation and membership of MK is not in violation of
the Pretoria Minute.
∙ It would be noted that it is a historical fact that MK placed arms and caches within
our country.
∙ A phased process of demobilising cadres would be initiated.
∙ Weapons will be licensed in terms of existing legislation.
∙ The security forces will take cognisance of the suspension of armed action and related
activities and all unauthorised activities by them will be addressed.
It was furthermore agreed that the population has the right to peaceful demonstrations as a
legitimate form of protest, but that violence accompanying mass action should be eliminated.
In addition, a liaison committee was established to deal with the implementation of the
DF Malan Accord. Though the Liaison Committee met on several occasions, progress was
slow. Again, the actors involved, were limited to the government and the ANC, but this
should still be seen as an important step on South Africa’s road to substantive negotiations.
THE ANC ULTIMATUM, DEADLOCK AND CIVIL SOCIETY INTERVENTION
The Pretoria Minute set 30 April 1991 as a deadline for the release of political prisoners. The
ANC was however unhappy with the government’s progress in this regard and in reducing
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violence. The ANC became of the opinion that the government had no intension to relinquish
power and decided to adopt a hard line stance against the government. On 5 April 1991,
the ANC announced that, unless the government met a seven-point ultimatum before 9 May
1991, it would suspend all negotiations with the government about an all-party conference
and a new constitution. The ultimatum demanded (see Sisk, 1992:213; 1995:104; New
Nation, April 12, 1991; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:68):
∙ The dismissal of Defence Minister Magnus Malan and Law and Order Minister Adriaan
Vlok, as well as action against the allegedly still functioning Civil Co-operation Bureau
(CCB) hit-squads.34
∙ The visible public dismantling and disarming of counter-revolutionary units in the
SADF, such as Battalion 32 (mercenaries) and Koevoet (formerly used in Namibia).
∙ The suspension of all police who were involved in the March 1990 Sebokeng shootings
and an investigation into police shootings reported in Daveyton (PWV) on 24 March
1991.
∙ Assurances that the SADF would use civilised methods of crowd control.
∙ Action by the government to outlaw the carrying of cultural weapons such as spears,
shields and knives that were often used in township violence.
∙ The establishment of an independent commission to hear complaints about security
related issues.
∙ The phasing out of single-sex hostels and their transformation into family unit housing.
At a press conference, Mandela blamed the government and security forces of apathy or
even complicity in the deaths of thousands in the factional strife of the previous years. The
ANC believed that if the government met the demands of its ultimatum, violence would be
signiﬁcantly curbed. The ANC also refused to participate in any further meetings of the
working group on the procedural issues relating to an all-party conference. Other working




groups, however, would continue to function. Perhaps more important than its withdrawal
from the working group (which had not made much progress), was the call for a two-day
general strike, mass protests on 15 June (the day prior to the commemoration of the 1975
Soweto-uprising), a consumer boycott, and a day of fasting in support of political prisoners
on 22 May. If these demands were not met, the ANC warned that it would act on its threats
by May, 9. Other groups, notably the PAC and COSATU, backed the ANC’s move (Sisk,
1992:213; 1995:104).
All eyes were now on President de Klerk to see whether and how he would respond.
His response to the ANC ultimatum was slow, and in the ﬁnal analysis, was completely
inadequate. In Parliament, the DP urged President de Klerk to intervene decisively by
calling a peace summit of leaders reﬂecting all interests and sectors in South Africa. However,
De Klerk refused to dismiss the said ministers and, instead, on April 18, announced in the
whites-only chamber of Parliament the creation of a Standing Commission of Inquiry into
the violence and the holding of a summit on violence in Pretoria on 24-25 May - well after
the ANC deadline (Citizen, April 19, 1991; Sisk, 1992:213-214; 1995:105; Race Relations
Survey, 1991/1992:68). It was obvious that the ongoing political violence could wreck the
chances of constitutional negotiations unless an eﬀective intervention took place.
Political, church, and community leaders would be invited to discuss the violence and
intimidation that had taken place. With the exception of the white CP, parliamentary parties
as well as the IFP welcomed the initiative (Sisk, 1992:213-214).
Two points concerning De Klerk’s initial reaction to the ultimatum are important. Firstly,
he did not address the principle concerns of the ANC, namely the role of the police and
security forces in the continued violence. On the contrary, he called for an enhanced role for
the police and SADF in the townships. At best, he said, allegations of police misconduct
should be channelled through the judicial commission and through the normal institutions
of the state (Gastrow, 1995:19-20). Secondly, the measures were announced unilaterally
and with little consultation with the ANC - De Klerk had informed Mandela beforehand of
the plans (Sisk, 1992:214; 1995:105). The ANC argued that an independent party should
convene such a summit and they viewed national initiatives undertaken unilaterally by De
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Klerk with great caution and suspicion. He was, after all, their main political opponent. The
ANC was, particularly, suspicious of the planned peace summit, regarding it as inappropriate
for De Klerk, as one of those responsible for political violence, to convene and host such an
important event (Gastrow, 1995:19-20).
The ANC, not surprisingly, rejected participation in both the commission and the pro-
posed summit for neither went far enough (Sisk, 1992:214; 1995:105). Opposition to De
Klerk’s planned peace summit was more widespread than many had anticipated. At May
Day rallies throughout South Africa, leaders of COSATU, as well as ANC leaders, reiterated
their rejection of the government’s peace summit. Speakers described De Klerk as partisan
on the issue of violence and said that he should not have called such a summit (Gastrow,
1995:19-20).
The ANC demanded in their ultimatum the outlawing of “cultural” or “traditional”
weapons such as spears of various kinds, axes and ceremonial clubs, particularly the carrying
of such weapons by the Zulus in general, and IFP members in particular. Furthermore, the
police ought to be empowered to conﬁscate them. The issue was important, not just because
of the damage that could be meted out with these weapons, but also for their symbolic
value (Sisk, 1995:105). The IFP and Buthelezi ﬁercely defended their stance on the issue
and argued that the carrying of cultural weapons was a part of Zulu national heritage.
They claimed that more people had died in the townships from “sophisticated weapons” like
AK47s, than from traditional weapons (Sisk, 1995:105).
De Klerk tried to persuade the IFP to accept restrictions on cultural weapons and,
following several shuttle diplomacy meetings and a direct meeting at Tuynhuys, he secured
a deal with Buthelezi hours before the ANC deadline. It was a compromise deal, which called
for Zulu traditional weapons to be carried only at “cultural” functions. However, the issue,
together with the issue of Zulu-dominated single-sex hostels, was ﬁnally resolved at a meeting
between De Klerk and the IFP leaders in KwaZulu (Sisk, 1992:215-217; 1995:106-107).
The deadline of the ultimatum was rapidly approaching and public anxiety grew as it
became obvious that President de Klerk had no intention of meeting all the conditions the
ANC had set, and that the ANC opposed the peace summit proposed by the government
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(Gastrow, 1995:20). Due to a ﬂood of indemnity applications, just prior to the April 30
cut-oﬀ date, it was clear that the government would be unable to meet the deadlines set by
the ANC, as well as in the Pretoria Minute (Sisk, 1992:215; 1995:106).
De Klerk argued that he felt compelled to call the summit because he and the govern-
ment had the ultimate responsibility for maintaining law and order and he asked the ANC
to reconsider its position (Gastrow, 1995:20). Many outside the ANC found its stance un-
reasonable and actively mobilised public support for the peace summit. The IFP in turn
continued to be concerned about its own position. While this standoﬀ among the major
players continued, political violence took its toll in many townships. During the last week-
end of April alone, ﬁfty persons were reportedly killed in Natal and in the PWV-region, with
close to two hundred injured (Gastrow, 1995:19).
It was against this background that organisations from civil society and most notably reli-
gious and business organisations began to intervene and tried to mediate between the various
actors. Signiﬁcant was the emerging co-operation between the historically pro-government
organisations and “opposition” organisations.35 These organisations had already begun to
explore a basis for co-operation prior to the crisis caused by the ANC’s ultimatum. To
understand the unfolding involvement of civil society in pre-negotiations it is important to
have a brief look at how this evolved.
The way for church involvement in the process of negotiations had been paved during the
previous months. Signiﬁcant strides towards unity were made at the inter-denominational
National Conference of Church Leaders in South Africa (Rustenburg Conference) which was
held at the town of Rustenburg, during November 1990.36 All South African churches and
Christian religious groups and a number of individuals were invited.37 Only two, churches
35For example, during the previous six decades, Afrikaner churches had provided theological justiﬁcation
for apartheid until, in 1986; they rejected apartheid and ﬁnally, in 1990, declared it a sin. Before 1990,
deep theological and political diﬀerences among churches kept them from taking a united stand on many
important social and political issues. During the apartheid years, deep diﬀerences existed between the
Afrikaner churches and those represented by the SACC, such as the Methodist and Anglican Churches. The
latter had been strong critics of apartheid. Between 70 and 80 percent of South Africans profess to be
Christians. Thus the potential inﬂuence of the churches, if they could act together, was therefore not to be
underestimated (Gastrow, 1995:15-16).
36In December 1989, President de Klerk called for such a meeting but the involvement of the state in
such a meeting was opposed and the idea was thus shelved (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:95).




(both whites-only), refused the invitation (Race Relations Survey 1991/1992:96). The con-
ference was historic because representatives from the major Afrikaner church, the Neder-
duitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), publicly confessed guilt about apartheid and its own
involvement and participation in a system of discrimination. A mood of reconciliation was
reﬂected in the statement issued by the conference, entitled the Rustenburg Declaration
(Gastrow, 1995:19; Race Relations Survey 1991/1992:96-97). The declaration denounced
apartheid, called for a democratic constitution and a more equitable distribution of wealth,
and urged churches to condemn all forms of violence. Among the many other provisions of
the Rustenburg Declaration was the establishment of a committee that would coordinate
church strategies and organise a peace conference to bring together leaders who could assist
in ending violence, as well as facilitate communication between the churches and encourage
them to support the implementation of the Rustenburg Declaration. It was headed by the
Reverend Frank Chikane, the general secretary of the SACC, and Louw Alberts, a natural
scientist with interdenominational experience and direct access to the white Afrikaner power
establishment (Gastrow, 1995:19; Race Relations Survey 1991/1992:96-97). Both Chikane
and Alberts later played key roles in the peace process. For the ﬁrst time in decades, the
churches were collectively addressing important socio-political issues in South Africa (Gas-
trow, 1995:19).
At the time of the SACC’s call for church intervention, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of Cape
Town (a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize), made a passionate appeal to black politicians for
renewed realism in their ﬁght against violence (Sunday Times, March 31, 1991; Gastrow,
1995:16). This happened a few days before Mandela and Buthelezi met for an “Easter crisis
summit.” The calls from the churches did not seem to aﬀect either side at the meeting
and Buthelezi launched an attack on “naive” churchmen, referring speciﬁcally to Chikane.
He said that the call for peace by some churchmen, unfortunately suggested that leading
churchmen were actually busybodies who tried to be important in the eyes of the world by
stepping in and trying to take charge of the peace process (Gastrow, 1995:16).
Buthelezi had regarded the SACC as favouring the ANC and its supporting organisations
(see Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:99). His attack on Chikane and others was, therefore,
nothing new. It was important because it sent a clear message to the churches that not all
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political groups found them acceptable as facilitators in the peace process. There were also
those who believed that some churches actually contributed to the escalation of the violence
by sanctifying the struggle against apartheid (see Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:100).
This raised the question that if the churches were not acceptable facilitators, who else would
be? Who else would be able to bring together opposing political groups such as the governing
NP, the PAC, the ANC and the IFP in order to address the issue of political violence
and the future of South Africa jointly? (Gastrow, 1995:17). The Rustenburg Committee
therefore went out of their way to promote an image of representing a broad spectrum of
ideas and religious interests and that they were politically neutral (see Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:99).
In March, the SACC stated that there was an urgent need for the church to intervene in
an attempt to stop the violence that was escalating despite peace talks between rival politi-
cal parties (Gastrow, 1995:17). Members of the committee met on 14 March 1991 with the
government to discuss the Rustenburg Declaration and it was found to be constructive (Race
Relations Survey, 1991/1992:97-98). In April 1991 a meeting took also place between the
ANC’s National Executive Committee and a Rustenburg Conference delegation of church
leaders under the leadership of Chikane and Alberts. It briefed the ANC on the Rustenburg
Declaration and listened to an ANC presentation on violence. At the close of the meeting,
the ANC rejected the government’s call for a multi-party conference and told a press confer-
ence that it was a “propaganda ploy” in preparation of De Klerk’s planned visit to Europe
(Gastrow, 1995:19). The committee also met with the IFP and the former was informed
that the violence was more complex than spelled out by the Rustenburg Declaration.
In addition to the involvement of the churches, a section of the business sector also
started moving in the direction of involvement in the negotiation process. The Consulta-
tive Business Movement (CBM), which was a voluntary organisation of more progressive
senior South African business leaders who acknowledged and supported the need for the
constructive transformation of the country’s political economy, was exploring ways to deal
with the ongoing political violence during this period (Gastrow, 1995:17). CBM concluded
that the violence was destructive to the negotiation process, the economy, and people’s per-
sonal lives and that it ought to investigate the violence to formulate an informed response
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from business leaders. CBM foresaw the possibility that it would act as a facilitator and
therefore proceeded with a lengthy process of consultations with political and labour groups
and individuals who were either involved in or relevant to the political violence (Gastrow,
1995:18).
By March 1991, CBM had prepared a memorandum on the violence, focusing mainly
on the PWV region. By this time, political violence had moved to the top of the country’s
agenda, and as business was also viewing the violence as a major concern, CBM decided
that its memorandum and its concerns should be taken directly to the major players. It
held meetings with a delegation of senior cabinet ministers in Cape Town on March 26,
1991, and the ANC, SACP and COSATU on March 27, while a third meeting took place on
May 7, with Buthelezi and the Central Executive Committee of the IFP. Although nothing
concrete emerged from these meetings, CBM had placed itself on the map as an organisation
deeply concerned about the violence and prepared to play a facilitating role in dealing with
it (Gastrow, 1995:18).
The much larger and more representative umbrella organisation representing commerce
and industry nationwide, the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), followed a more
conventional approach, focusing on the narrower interests of the business establishment. It
tried to avoid controversy from either the government or its membership (Gastrow, 1995:17).
Thus, as the deadline of the ultimatum approached, the talks faltered and the violence
ﬂared up, groups from civil society stepped in. Organised commerce and industry called for
a nation-wide support of De Klerk’s proposed peace summit and SACOB placed a prominent
press advertisement to this eﬀect (Business Day, May 7, 1991; Gastrow, 1995:19). Likewise,
a group of religious leaders, which included clerics from the Anglican, Roman Catholic and
Dutch Reformed Churches, as well as Jewish and Muslim organisations, under the leadership
of Dr Frank Chikane, intervened in a ﬁnal attempt to break the deadlock.38 They feared
that the violence would escalate if the ANC deadline were allowed to lapse (Sisk, 1992:215-
38he church delegation consisted of: the Rev Dr Frank Chikane, the SACC; Dr Khoza Mgojo, President of
the SACC; Prof Johan Kleynhans, Deputy Moderator of the NGK (Dutch Reformed Church); Sheik Nazeem
Mohammed, President of the Muslim Judicial Council; Bishop Reginald Orsmond, Deputy President of the
South Africa Catholic Bishops Conference; Archbishop Laurence Henry of the Catholic Church; and Rabbi
Arthur Seltzer of the Cape Town Hebrew Congregation.
323
Chapter 5
216; 1995:106). They embarked on low-key conﬁdential meetings with both Mandela and De
Klerk, hoping to avoid a serious confrontation between the parties and to discuss the political
violence in the country (Sisk, 1992:216). The church delegation ﬁrst met with Mandela on
May 3, and the following day with De Klerk, against the backdrop of a bloody week on the
Witwatersrand, where ninety-seven people had been killed in clashes between rival groups.
Dr Chikane said:
We do not pretend to be mediators. Our duty is to encourage the diﬀerent
parties...to come together and talk so that we do not land up in a tragic situation.
Once the threatened deadlock is resolved, then the politicians should meet to
work on the details of how to go into the future. It is not our role to determine
how they should do this. We have come in because of the crisis that we feel
has serious implications for the country and all South Africans (Sisk, 1992:216;
1995:106).
Thus, at this point South African religious leaders intervened in what seemed to be a
scenario of worsening political violence and instability. While the SACC did not represent
all the churches in South Africa, they intervened at a time when the country’s churches as
a whole, were closer to each other on the issue of violence than they had been for many
decades (Gastrow, 1995:15).
The mission of the church leaders gained a heightened sense of urgency as violence con-
tinued unabated in many townships. By the end of the ﬁrst week in May, over a hundred had
died in the violence, eighteen on May 5 alone (Sisk, 1992:216). The bishops of the Methodist
Church of Southern Africa released a statement, which summed up the dire mood (Sisk,
1995:107):
[The violence] is an indictment of the government, political movements, and the
churches... people are not convinced that all leaders are utterly committed to
ending violence... people are not satisﬁed that political leaders or security forces
are impartial (The Argus, 6 May 1991 in Sisk, 1995:107).
Violence between ANC and IFP supporters continued and to make matters worse, on May
6, an IFP spokesperson in Johannesburg, Muza Myeni, threatened that it would deploy 250
000 armed ﬁghters from rural Natal in the townships in order to protect the Zulu hostel
dwellers (Cape times, 6 May 1991; Sisk, 1995:107). The church leaders continued their
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shuttle diplomacy in a bid to break the impasse and suggested that a neutral party convene
a national peace conference. By mid-week, with the deadline looming, De Klerk’s cabinet
and the ANC’s National Executive, along with COSATU and SACP leaders, were locked in
tense meetings trying to develop a response to the crisis (Sisk, 1995:107).
Some successes were achieved. Just in time to avert a crisis, the ANC and the government
met in top-level talks on the day of the deadline May 9. After a gruelling six-hour session
in which De Klerk and Mandela conferred on a broad range of issues, a draft agreement was
reached (Sisk, 1992:217; 1995:107). The government agreed to act legislatively on the issue
of cultural weapons and to step up the speciﬁc measures to curb violence in the townships.
Most importantly, it was agreed to continue talking - through the working groups - about
the issues regarding the return of exiles and political prisoners, and armed action (Natal
Mercury, 21 May 1991; Sisk, 1992 :217; 1995:107). Despite reports that the ANC had taken
a hard line in the discussions, De Klerk refused the remaining demands, particularly, the
call for the resignation of the two cabinet ministers. The ANC announced on May 20 that
it would pull out of the constitutional talks (they had, after all, not yet started), but the
mechanisms through which the talks could go forward, remained in place (Sisk, 1992 :217;
1995:107).
Although the joint statement released after the discussion made no mention of the gov-
ernment’s plan to hold a conference on violence, it was quietly understood that the ANC
would boycott such a conference. The idea was to hold a conference by neutral players at a
later stage - in which religious leaders would play a facilitating role (see Gastrow, 1995:20).
Chikane, general secretary of the SACC, announced on the day the ultimatum expired that
church leaders were planning a national peace conference, that is if all parties did not attend
President de Klerk’s “peace summit” later in the month. He said that a conference of “af-
fected communities” would not include the government and that an attempt would be made
to establish a code of conduct and violence-monitoring mechanisms - “We hope that out
of that we will engage government” (Gastrow, 1995:20). Mandela welcomed the abovemen-
tioned peace summit proposed by the SACC when he addressed 107 of South Africa’s most
prominent business people in Johannesburg on May 16 at a meeting, held under the auspices
of the CBM (Gastrow, 1995:21). He urged the business people to help end political violence
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and appealed to De Klerk not to go ahead with the government’s proposed multi-party con-
ference on violence, but business was not persuaded to exert pressure on De Klerk to cancel
the conference on violence (Gastrow, 1995:21). CBM immediately took up this challenge
and decided at an emergency meeting held the next morning that the critical situation made
it necessary for the business community (CBM and SACOB) and the churches to explore
jointly how to keep the negotiation process on track (Gastrow, 1995:21).
On May 21, President de Klerk met a delegation of church and business leaders. De
Klerk was rather unaccommodating and stressed that the government did not need the help
of facilitators, because it was in direct communication with all the relevant parties. He did
not regard the churches and business sectors as having a mandate from the government to
convene a peace conference; this remained the government’s responsibility. The meeting left
no doubt that De Klerk’s “peace summit” would proceed as planned (Gastrow, 1995:24).
However, the shuttle diplomacy involving church, political, and business leaders appeared
to have won the day, for to the relief of many, none of the major political parties made an
issue of the ultimatum after May 9 (Sisk, 1995:107). Thus, civil society began to play an
important role in ensuring that the process of change would continue. It is particularly
important to note the emerging role of business as a facilitator - a role often ignored in
transitions (see Charney, 1999:182-184).
THE CONFERENCE ON VIOLENCE OF 24-25 MAY 1991
The two-day peace conference called by the government and scheduled for 24-25 May 1991
remained an issue. However, about two hundred delegates attended. There were represen-
tatives from the government, business, churches, trade unions, the IFP, homeland leaders,
parliamentary parties and independent institutes, but important players such as the ANC,
SACP, COSATU, AZAPO, PAC and the SACC did not attend (Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:68-69, 467). Representatives from SACOB and CBM also attended (Gastrow,
1995:24). The explanation provided by most of those who did not attend, was that someone
nonpartisan should call such a summit.
On the ﬁrst day of the conference, delegations delivered opening addresses to spell out
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their positions on political violence and to suggest possible solutions. Buthelezi, for example,
called for peace and stressed that the peace process in South Africa would remain ﬂawed
unless relations between the IFP and the ANC were normalised. He proposed a national
campaign for peace and the establishment of a peace secretariat that should set up regional
and local peace action groups throughout the country. These “peace action groups” should
bring peace to troubled areas, counter rumours, provide channels of communication, and
consult local leaders to facilitate peace moves (Gastrow, 1995:24).
At the conference, it was agreed that there should be a code of conduct for the security
forces, restrictions on the carrying of traditional weapons and programmes for general social
upliftment (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:68-69). At the end of the conference, Dr
Louw Alberts, co-chairman of the Rustenburg Conference, was appointed to act as a one-
man facilitating committee with a mandate to include other members with the purpose of
convening a second and more representative peace conference. He was appointed because
he was not an oﬃcial church leader and because he was acceptable to De Klerk. The
appointment of Alberts received widespread support from most of the organisations that had
not attended (Gastrow, 1995:25). The facilitating committee subsequently met with various
organisations, including the ANC, PAC and IFP (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:467).
The ANC welcomed these developments and said it regarded the peace process as being back
on track. It stated that the process envisaged by the summit was in line with what the ANC
had proposed (Business Day, 25 May, 1991; Gastrow, 1995:25).
As a venture in peace making, it was a start, not much more, but it was a success in the
sense that it laid the basis for a further conference on violence, involving a greater range of
participants (Gastrow, 1995:25).
The dynamics of the ANC’s ultimatum and the government’s peace summit demonstrated
attempts by both the ANC and the government to dominate the process of transition, while
the IFP tried to get greater acknowledgment as a key actor in any negotiations for a future
political dispensation. It thus became obvious that no single actor would be in a position to
determine South Africa’s future.
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5.5 THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD AS A PACT WITH MUTUAL
GUARANTEES
The National Peace Accord (the Accord) of 14 September 1991 was a multi-party and multi-
faceted pact, which constituted the beginning of a transition from purely exploratory talks
to the actual negotiations as will be discussed in chapter six. It represented a move, from
convincing the key actors of the necessity of negotiations and the necessary preconditions,
towards agreement on a basic structure and principles for substantive negotiations. With
its main aim to bring an end to politically motivated violence, it included mechanisms for
dispute resolution, a new set of judicial procedures and measures to ensure compliance (Sisk,
1994:50-51).
An increase in violence, which was, as discussed, nurtured by the process of liberalisation,
played an important role in the dynamics of the run-up to the Accord. Violence often took
the form of ethnic conﬂict, mainly between the supporters of the ANC and the IFP. In order
to address this problem, a behind the scenes conference, led by Dr Alberts, was held in
June l99139 at which occasion religious and business groups and various organisations from
civil and political society met to arrange a national peace conference which all parties would
attend. Religious organisations and business thus again played a “stabilising” role in South
Africa’s transition largely because they interacted with a large section of the population and
were not seeking power for themselves (see Charney, 1999:182-184; Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:69-70). The Preparatory Committee on which three members each of the NP,
ANC and IFP, as well religious and business leaders served, was formed. This became
known as the National Peace Initiative and constituted the beginning of the process that
would lead to the Accord (Sisk, 1995:108-109).
The Preparatory Committee of the National Peace Initiative met two days later, on 24
June and elected a business leader, John Hall, as chairperson40 (Charney, 1999:182; Ball,
1997:2-3). It was also decided to establish ﬁve working groups that would look at the
following issues that were identiﬁed as important in ending the violence (Gastrow, 1995:32):
39It was attended by representatives from parliamentary parties, the ANC, SACP, AZAPO, IFP and
trade unions, including COSATU (see Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:70).
40In mid-1991 it was co-chaired by Bishop Desmond Tutu of the Anglican Church.
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∙ Group 1: Code of conduct for political parties.
∙ Group 2: Code of conduct for security forces.
∙ Group 3: Socioeconomic development.
∙ Group 4: Implementation and monitoring.
∙ Group 5: Process, secretariat, and media
Each working group was to consist of three members from the NP-government, three mem-
bers from the IFP, three members from the ANC-led alliance, one religious leader, and one
business representative from the Preparatory Committee. During the weeks that followed,
each working group met on several occasions in an eﬀort to produce a consensus document
on the issues assigned to it (Gastrow, 1995:32).
The secretarial backup and coordination of this process was assigned to the CBM, while
the government department responsible for constitutional development provided the ﬁnancial
resources. Each working group produced draft documents that were referred to the various
principals for approval, before being returned to the negotiators to seek further consensus
for a next draft. It was decided that an inclusive peace agreement, speciﬁcally designed
to stabilise the turbulent environment would be “negotiated” at a proposed National Peace
Convention (Sisk, 1992:226). Taking into account the progress made, the Preparatory Com-
mittee set Saturday, 14 September 1991, as the due date for the reports from the ﬁve working
groups, as well as the date for the National Peace Convention (Gastrow, 1995:32).
The National Peace Convention was planned as a high-proﬁle leadership and media event
to be held in the Carlton Hotel, Johannesburg. Leaders from government, political and
civil society were invited (Gastrow, 1995:32). Bilateral meetings between the three main
protagonists, namely the government, ANC and IFP were arranged to iron out last minute
disputes over procedures and the draft text (Sisk, 1995:113).
The days before the National Peace Convention, however, were characterised by some of
the bloodiest violence of the year in the townships of the troubled East Rand. Forty-two
died and at least ﬁfty were wounded in a single day - “Bloody Sunday” (the second day
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to earn such a name that year) (Sisk, 1994:53). On 8 September IFP-loyal, hostel dwellers
from Thokoza, on the East Rand, were sprayed with gunﬁre from unknown assailants while
marching to a “peace rally” at a local stadium (Sisk, 1992:226; 1995:113). Eighteen were
killed, and fourteen wounded, but retaliatory attacks and pitched street battles spread to the
nearby townships of Katlehong and Tembisa and into the Johannesburg city centre (Sisk,
1992:226; 1995:113). By week’s end, 121 had died and some 550 had been wounded in what
the press called “random, senseless terror attacks” (Weekend Argus, 14 September 1991;
Sisk, 1995:113). Furthermore, problems between the ANC and the IFP arose on the still
problematic issues of “cultural weapons” and “private armies.” The IFP was ﬁghting a ban
on the former, the ANC a ban on the latter (Sisk, 1992:226; 1995:113).
In spite of the violence, the facilitators of the National Peace Initiative continued with
their work and aimed at settling the remaining disputes. Under great pressure, and with
only a few hours left before the National Peace Convention were to commence, consensus
was reached on the reports from the working groups and collated to form what was from
then on referred to as the National Peace Accord. Last minute problems relating to the
issues of cultural weapons, private armies (including Umkhonto we Sizwe -MK), and a code
of conduct for security forces could not be resolved and were therefore left vague or out of
the Accord (Gastrow, 1995:32-33).
The National Peace Convention was a remarkable occasion, which was attended by almost
all of the national leaders of political groups except for the CP and HNP.41 The leaders of
self-governing and independent states were there. So were leaders from various religious
denominations, trade unions, and the business community, as well as the diplomatic corps,
Zulu king Goodwill Zwelithini, traditional chiefs, and newspaper editors. The symbolic
signiﬁcance of such a gathering was powerful, something that the media conveyed with
full fanfare (Gastrow, 1995:33). This had never happened before and the National Peace
Convention represented a major breakthrough for South Africa (Sisk, 1994:53-54). It clearly
demonstrated that the deep-seated diﬀerences that existed would not prevent the various
41The CP, HNP and AWB boycotted the peace process altogether. They had been invited to attend,
but declined because they saw the meeting as a capitulation to the ANC and its allies. They regarded the
ANC and the SACP as terrorist organisations that were responsible for the violence and with whom one
should deal, therefore, by means of tough law-and-order methods (Gastrow, 1995: 33). The occasion was so
overwhelming that little thought was given to these three right-wing groups which were absent.
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parties from speaking to each other about common interests.
The conference was, however, a tense aﬀair that appeared at risk when the three hundred
delegates found, on their arrival, thousands of armed IFP supporters staging mock battles
in the streets outside the venue. Only after a direct appeal by President de Klerk to the
IFP leader, Buthelezi, did the impis (warriors) reluctantly disperse. However, Buthelezi’s
uncertainty about the Accord was evident throughout the daylong proceedings. The IFP
expressed a series of reservations about the contents of the Accord, raised objections to,
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chairing the proceedings, and asserted that cultural weapons
were not dangerous, but were “traditional accoutrements” of Zulus (Sisk, 1992:229; 1994:53;
1995:114; Argus, 16 September 1991). Mandela, too, had words that signalled the limitations
of the Accord when he announced that MK would not be disbanded, nor considered a “private
army.”
After numerous speeches in which various organisations pledged themselves to the Accord,
and a reserved press conference by De Klerk, Mandela and Buthelezi (the “big three” leaders),
who were obviously uncomfortable with sharing a common platform, the day ended with the
Accord intact and signed in a highly publicised ceremony. Delegations from twenty-seven42
political, trade union and government organisations eventually signed the agreement.43 The
PAC and AZAPO attended the conference but refused to sign the document. They however
declared their support for the spirit and objectives of the Accord, but declined to sign it
because their strong non-collaborationist stance prevented them from being part of any
structure in which the government was represented. They did declare themselves in favour
of peace and undertook to promote it (see Gastrow, 1995:32-33; Sisk, 1992:229; 1994:53;
1995:114).
The Accord was a comprehensive document, divided into ten short chapters, which set
42According to some sources 26, others 29 (see Camay and Gordon, 2000:7; Sisk,1995:115; but Sisk,
1994:53 states 27).
43Some of the signatories were: ANC, Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of South Africa,
Confederation of Metal and Building Unions, Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa),
COSATU, DP, Dikwankwetla Party / QwaQwa government, Federation of Independent Trade Unions,
Ximoko Progressive Party / Gazankulu government, IFP, Intando ye Sizwe Party, Inyandza National Move-
ment / KaNgwane government, KwaNdebele government, KwaZulu government, Labour Party of South
Africa, Lebowa government, United People’s Front, Merit Peoples’ Party, National Forum, NP / Govern-
ment of South Africa, National Peoples’ Party of South Africa, Solidarity Party, SACP, United Workers’
Union of South Africa (Camay and Gordon, 2000:7)
331
Chapter 5
out a vision for a new democracy, peace and stability and provided for the establishment of
a nationwide network of peace committees and other structures to realise these objectives
(Gastrow, 1995:43-44). In addition to the Preamble, the Accord contained a set of democratic
based principles, codes of conduct for both political parties and the security forces (the police
in particular), measures for socio-economic development, the aﬃrmation of the Goldstone
Commission which was appointed to investigate political violence, mechanisms for peace
which included a national peace committee and secretariat, as well as regional and local
dispute resolution committees. Furthermore, provision was made for the enforcement of
the agreement (see Haysom, 1992:33-34; National Peace Accord; Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:522-556).
There are a number of important stipulations of the Accord, which are discussed in the
various chapters of the Accord and which should brieﬂy be noted. 44
PREAMBLE
In the preamble the Accord was linked with the overall process of democratisation, socio-
economic reconstruction and development, codes of conduct for political organisations and
the police, as well as mechanisms to deal with political violence and the implementation of
the provisions of the Accord (Sisk, 1994:54).
PRINCIPLES
In the chapter on basic principles (chapter 1) it was implied that the common goal of a
multi-party democracy would be impossible to attain in a climate of violence, intimidation,
and fear and that certain fundamental rights needed to be recognised and upheld to ensure
democratic political activity. Universally accepted fundamental rights such as freedom of
conscience, speech, association, and assembly and free participation in peaceful political
activity were spelled out and endorsed (Gastrow, 1995:43-44). This largely constituted a
pact on some fundamental and substantive principles that would guide a future political
dispensation. By signing the Accord, the NP and the government conﬁrmed the end of an
44It should be noted that these apply to the content as adopted at the signing of the Accord.
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apartheid based political dispensation. For these reasons, the Accord could be regarded as
a watershed in South Africa’s transition to democracy.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS
Political intolerance was regarded by many as one of the prime underlying causes of the
violence. South Africa had never experienced free political activity and a code of conduct
for political parties was therefore not a mere nicety, but was regarded as absolutely essential
for setting norms and standards where none existed. The code promoted political tolerance
and called on all parties to condemn political violence publicly and to conduct themselves
in accordance with the principles of democracy (chapter 2). Detailed instructions were
provided to regulate the relations between political groups at national, regional and local
level, as well as those between political groups and various authorities such as the police or
local authorities (Gastrow, 1995:43-44; Sisk, 1994:54).
SECURITY FORCES: GENERAL PROVISIONS, AND A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
POLICE
The security forces in general were dealt with in chapter three and a ban was also placed on
weapons at political rallies, while private armies were outlawed. Chapter four contained a
code of conduct for the police (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:528-539).
The security forces, particularly the South African Police, had become a controversial
factor in the violence that plagued South Africa over many years. A record of suspicion and
distrust, primarily from black South Africans, had built up and severely damaged relations
between black communities and the police. This distrust undermined the ability of the police
to maintain law and order and to deal eﬀectively with political violence. The police were seen
by many as the implementers of apartheid and therefore biased (Gastrow, 1995:44; Charney,
1999:187-188).
Despite this history, the signatories to the Accord envisaged a key role for the police in
peacekeeping eﬀorts and in maintaining law and order. The aim of the code of conduct for
the police was to promote sound policing practices and establish a co-operative relationship
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between the police and communities, “We protect and we serve” (Race Relations Survey,
1991/1992:539). Concepts such as the minimum use of force and the equal treatment of all
citizens were elaborated on in the code of conduct. Political neutrality was stressed and
guidelines were provided for police involvement in the structures to be set up under the
accord. A similar code of conduct for the South African Defence Forces was attempted but
could not be ﬁnalised and therefore did not form part of the accord (Gastrow, 1995:44).
In chapter three (paragraph 3.3) provision was also made for the establishment of a
Police Board consisting of equal representation by civilian and police representatives to
look, in particular, into the issues of police training and community policing (National Peace
Accord, 1991:12-13; Sisk, 1994:54). The main objective of the Police Board was to promote
more eﬀective policing and better relations between the police and communities and it was
therefore composed of members of the public and police oﬃcers in equal numbers. It had
no executive powers and made recommendations to the minister of law and order on policy
issues. The members of the public were nominated by the National Peace Committee (NPC)
to ensure broad political representation (Gastrow, 1995:46).
MEASURES TO FACILITATE SOCIO-ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DE-
VELOPMENT
To contribute to peace building, provision was made in chapter ﬁve for the socioeconomic re-
construction and development at grassroots level, particularly, of communities detrimentally
aﬀected by political violence. It also aimed at potential ﬂashpoints such as squatter settle-
ments, to defuse tensions and prevent violence. In many areas aﬄicted by political violence,
homes were damaged or destroyed, and ﬂeeing residents became refugees. The premise of
the Accord was that assistance with the reconstruction of homes and basic facilities in such
cases would contribute to peace building. Communities became involved in development
tasks through subcommittees that linked with the Regional Dispute Resolution Commit-
tees (RDRCs) and Local Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRCs) in the area (see chapter
7 of the Accord; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:540-542). The Accord envisaged that
socioeconomic development with community involvement would lead to a measure of sta-
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bility. Normal developmental work would remain the government’s responsibility (Gastrow,
1995:46).
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC VIO-
LENCE AND INTIMIDATION (THE COMMISSION)
Popularly known as the Goldstone Commission after its chairman, Justice Richard Gold-
stone, this commission was established by an act of Parliament, namely the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation Act No. 139 of 1991. Reference to this Commission in
chapter six of the Accord is signiﬁcant because the signatories thereby endorsed the nature,
terms of reference, and composition of the Commission, but it was mentioned that the said
act could require amendment (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1992:543-547). Wide consulta-
tion with political and other interest groups took place before the members of the Goldstone
Commission were appointed.
The function of the Commission was to inquire into incidents of political violence, their
nature and causes and to establish who were behind the violence, as well as to make its
ﬁndings and recommendations public (Sisk, 1994:55). The Commission was also tasked
to recommend steps that would prevent public violence and intimidation and it indeed
undertook a series of important investigations and ﬁndings into security force activity. It
was equipped with legal powers such as the power to subpoena witnesses and to enter
premises (Gastrow, 1995:46). The Goldstone Commission also succeeded in preparing a set
of guidelines for public demonstrations, which became the standard document on the basis of
which the various parties jointly planned the control and security of public marches and rallies
(National Peace Accord, 1991:12-13: Sisk, 1994:54; Race Relations Survey, 1992/1992:543-
547).
NATIONAL PEACE SECRETARIAT, REGIONAL AND LOCAL DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION COMMITTEES
Chapter seven of the Accord made provision for the establishment of a National Peace




The National Peace Secretariat
The National Peace Secretariat was a permanent and full-time institution, but was smaller
than the National Peace Committee (chapter 8 of the Accord). It consisted of at least four
representatives45 nominated by the National Peace Committee, and one representative of the
Department of Justice (see Camay and Gordon, 2000:11). The National Peace Secretariat,
as opposed to the National Peace Committee, became the actual workhorse at this level and
the Secretariat was responsible for the establishment and co-ordination of the RDRCs and
the LDRCs (National Peace Accord, 1991:26; Camay and Gordon, 2000:11; Race Relations
Survey, 1991/1992:548).
Regional Dispute Resolution Committees (RDRCs)
The aim was to divide the country into regions with a RDRC (later known as regional peace
committee) established by the National Peace Secretariat within each region (chapter 7 of
the Accord). The legitimacy of these committees was vital and therefore it was stipulated
that these committees should be composed of regional representatives from political organ-
isations, the church, trade unions, commerce and industry as well as representatives from
local and tribal authorities, the police and the defence forces (National Peace Accord, 26-
27). The task of the RDRCs, in turn, was to establish and maintain LDRCs (later known
as Local Peace Committees) in communities throughout the area they served, and to inter-
vene and peacefully resolve disputes and conﬂicts (Gastrow, 1995:45). The role played by
representatives from civil society and in particular religious organisations and business was
important.
45The four representatives later appointed were from the ANC, NP, IFP and DP respectively with the
Secretariat being chaired by Dr Anthonie Gildenhuys.
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Local Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRCs)
The Accord made, as mentioned above, provision for the establishment of LDRCs to re-
solve local conﬂicts, build trust, reconcile diﬀerent sectors of the community, and mediate
agreements between local role-players in respect of marches and rallies (National Peace Ac-
cord:27). In addition, provision was made for Justices of the Peace to promote the peace
process at grassroots level (National Peace Accord) and the LDRCs were also tasked to
assist with the appointment of these Justices of the (National Peace Accord, 1991:28; Race
Relations Survey, 1991/1992:550).
NATIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE (NPC)
In chapter eight of the Accord provision was made for the establishment of the NPC which
was tasked to monitor its implementation. At the national level, the political organisations
and parties represented on the Preparatory Committee were to constitute the NPC together
with representatives from the other signatory parties. It was, interestingly, stipulated that
its chairperson and vice-chairperson should come from the religious and business community
and it was thus subsequently chaired by John Hall (business) and Bishop Stanley Magoba
(Camay and Gordon, 2000:11).
In practice, the NPC consisted of approximately sixty individuals. It had the task of
monitoring the implementation of the Accord, resolving disputes over interpretation, as well
as contraventions of the code of conduct for political parties.
Decisions were made by consensus, a requirement that made it diﬃcult to deal with con-
tentious issues, but encouraged smaller parties to remain part of the committee. These issues
frequently revolved around political diﬀerences and were only resolved through lengthy dis-
cussions and compromises (Gastrow, 1995:44-45). The NPC was thus charged with handling
alleged breaches of the code of conduct for political parties. Matters that the NPC could
not resolve had to be referred to an arbitrator with legal skills, appointed by the relevant
parties by consensus, failing which the arbitrator had to be appointed by the NPC within




ENFORCING THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES
In chapter nine of the Accord, provision is made for the appointment of justices of the peace
and for mechanisms to deal with breaches of the Accord. Where possible, disputes had to
be settled at grassroots level where breaches of the provisions of the Accord were to be dealt
with by the parties themselves through “mediation, arbitration and adjudication” (Gastrow,
1995:47). Disputes that could not be resolved had to be referred to an arbitrator as discussed
above and who would submit a report to the NPC.
SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURTS
In chapter ten, provision was made for the establishment of special criminal courts by the
Department of Justice and the Law Society to expedite the investigation into, and prosecu-
tion of persons suspected of performing acts of political violence (National Peace Accord:33;
Sisk, 1994:55). Preference had to be given to such courts in areas where their services were
most urgently needed. Special procedural and evidential rules had to be applied if these
courts were to be successful (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:556).
Logistical support to the peace structures on all levels were to be provided by the Direc-
torate: Internal Peace Institutions, which consisted of staﬀ, seconded from the Department
of Justice. It was initially headed by Advocate Deon Rudman and later by Advocate Nic
Grobler (Camay and Gordon, 2000:19).
The Accord was the product of intense pre-negotiations stretching over eighteen months.
The critical issues revolved around matters of security and the conclusion of, what could be
regarded in Dahl’s terminology (1970:13-16), a “mutual security agreement” (Sisk, 1992:242).
The contents of the Accord were quite remarkable, not only for the breadth of issues covered,
but also for the binding mechanisms for arbitration of disputes to which the parties agreed
(Gastrow, 1995:43-44). Of great signiﬁcance was the acknowledgement of the important role
that organisations from civil society had to play in South Africa’s transition to democracy.
A number of reasons have been put forward in an attempt to explain the successful ne-
gotiations that led to the establishment of the Accord. One argument is that the ongoing
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violence of the period was threatening the viability of the wider process of constitutional
negotiations and that it was an attempt by the negotiating parties to show their supporters
that this process would bear fruit. The general feeling amongst people, who later became
involved with the peace structures, was that the Accord’s purpose was to show their con-
stituencies that the negotiators were sensitive to their suﬀering and expectations. Cawthra
(1994) on the other hand argues that the reason for the ANC’s endorsement of this conﬂict
management process was a desire on the part of its leaders to restrain the South African
Police by bringing them under multi-party control. Signiﬁcantly, this was a time when
allegations and evidence indicating police involvement in the violence were on the increase.
The signing of the Accord was signiﬁcant in many respects. Sisk (1992:239-240) for
example writes that the signing of the Accord was an acknowledgement on the part of the
various political elites that the South African conﬂict needed to be transformed from one of
ongoing violence into one which saw them accepting responsibility for its joint management.
The Accord not only set the rules of the game, but also legitimised the creation of grassroots
structures and third party intervention as a means of ensuring that community conﬂict did
not escalate into violence. In this sense, Sisk (1992:237) regards the Accord as an example
of a security pact reached between the contending political elite. It was thus a deliberate
attempt to create a non-aggression pact between South Africa’s political heavyweights and
can be seen as an example of a partial security or military accord (Sisk in Du Toit, 1992:5).
Likewise, Gastrow (1995:33-34) is of the opinion that, with the signing of the Accord,
an important stage had been reached in the process that aimed at creating peace. South
Africa’s leaders, with the exception of elements on the extreme right and left, thus signed
a contract to pursue this objective jointly. The document was at that stage one of the few
consensual documents to have emerged in South Africa and therefore had the potential of
eﬀectively addressing the violence (Gastrow, 1995:33-34).
The signatories thus recognised that political violence was threatening democratisation
in South Africa. They committed themselves to end the political violence and to make the
country one in which all could live, work, and play together in peace and harmony (Gastrow,
1995:43-44). Thus, the Accord was signiﬁcant in that it showed for the ﬁrst time that South
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Africans from across the political divide, were capable of agreeing to a set of common values
to guide their interactions with one another. The working sessions, which culminated in
the document, were also characterised by a problem-solving orientation between the parties,
rather than the positional bargaining that characterised the CODESA process (see chapter
6). The document reinforced the national negotiations at a regional and local level by
involving the constituencies of all the negotiating parties.
The fact that the Accord was an agreement entered into by the signatories and not a
document that could be enforced by law, had rendered the enforcement provisions of the
Accord ineﬀective as a sanction, something that had continuously hampered the NPC in
acting against transgressors of the code of conduct (Gastrow, 1995:47).
Unfortunately, violence continued. The ﬁrst weeks after the signing of the Accord in fact
saw an increase in the rate of political violence. Researchers participating in a project seeking
to determine the causes and nature of community conﬂict in South Africa, overheard residents
saying: “This is not a Peace Accord, it’s a killing accord” (Bremner, 2001:396). However,
the ground was prepared for co-operation between white and non-white in a quest for a
mutually acceptable future political dispensation. This co-operation was markedly easier to
achieve in civil society among business, religious, intellectual, cultural leaders than among the
political and military elites, where government and opposition supporters remained locked
in confrontation (Charney, 1999:188).
5.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter the discussion focussed on the crucial phase of South Africa’s transition
during which pre-negotiations was important in providing an appropriate setting for the
next phase of substantive negotiations which will be discussed in chapter six. The threshold
for a negotiated transition was crossed during this phase. The crucial breakthrough came
with President de Klerk’s speech on 2 February 1990 and the unbanning of the ANC, PAC,
SACP and thirty-three other organisations, as well as the release of Nelson Mandela. This
bold step indicated that the NP-government was willing to move away from apartheid and
all that it implied. A new phase in the history of South Africa’s transition was thus entered.
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The events were analysed against the background of the politics of liberalisation and
in the context of a transitional opening, where the various contenders began to position
themselves and determine their strategies, while the transition process began to develop its
own dynamics. The behaviour of the elites were also analysed within the context of several
macro-structural factors, which inﬂuenced their behaviour. Furthermore, it was indicated
how the choices made by the various contenders, impacted on the strategies adopted by
each within the context of the domains of, state - political society - civil society. Important
strategies in this regard were the formation of alliances, mass mobilisation and peaceful
strategies, such as compromise. Unfortunately, violence, or the threat thereof, was often
used by the various role players to position themselves strategically. However, at the same
time this necessitated the need for co-operation and compromise as was clearly demonstrated
by the series of pacts, which culminated in the adoption of the National Peace Accord.
Initially, the main actors to emerge were the government and the ANC in which President
de Klerk and Nelson Mandela initially dominated the scene and even tried to out manoeuvre
each other. However, as a deadlock was reached between the main actors, the possibility of
a single actor dominating the transition became highly unlikely. As discussed, the deadlock
required the intervention of non-political actors coming from civil society and in the ensuing
events the playing ﬁeld became enlarged and included all willing actors from political society,
as well as several from civil society and particularly from religious and business organisations.
Thus, the government and leaders from, for example the NP, the ANC, the SACP, the IFP,
as well as from church, trade union and grassroots democratic movements, were willing to
work towards a new negotiated dispensation, for they shared the common goal of creating a
“new South Africa”. At this stage, the reform process still ran the risk of being jeopardised
by a minority of right-wing extremist whites and radical left wing black organisations, as
well as a lack of tolerance. Neither could a peaceful development of a political, economic
and social order towards a democratic post-apartheid stage, be guaranteed.
Apart from the government, state institutions such as the security forces also emerged as
important actors. However, there were divisions among members of the security forces with
rogue or hardliner elements often blamed for fomenting violence and even endangering the
pre-negotiation process - talks were for example suspended by the ANC as a consequence of
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the continuing violence which it blamed on security force actions or inaction. The actions
of the security forces would in future require negotiated concessions on amnesty for human
rights abuses.
Nevertheless, the mutual changes regarding the traditional perceptions of threat on the
part of both the white minority and the black majority and, as a consequence, the end of
institutionalised racial segregation and the common will to engage in political co-operation
were important milestones accomplished during this phase of the transition.
During pre-negotiations, the commitment to compromise soon emerged. As discussed,
a series of important pacts were made in this regard, namely the Groote Schuur Minute
which was a bilateral agreement signed in May 1990; the Pretoria Minute, where the ANC
agreed to the suspension of the armed struggle, and where the release of political prisoners
and the granting of indemnity to aﬀected persons were settled; the D F Malan Accord
of early 1991 further strengthened these agreements; and a multi-lateral attempt at trust
building culminated in the signing of the National Peace Accord in September 1991 following
a multi-party conference. Major non-signatories were the PAC and the AWB. The Accord
was according to Sisk (1995) up to that point the most comprehensive attempt to construct
a non-aggression pact between the major national political players inside South Africa.
The dynamics of pre-negotiations during this phase demonstrated how conﬂicting inter-
ests of various stakeholders and particularly those from political society can converge in a
process of negotiation with the aim of changing an existing but discredited political dispen-
sation. Thus, the major actors, who perceived themselves to be in a mutually damaging
stalemate, began to realise that the beneﬁts of a positive sum outcome to the conﬂict were
greater than the costs of continued confrontation in an environment not governed by com-
mon rules. Understandably, the main stakeholders followed diﬀerent agendas and strategies,
yet these were all aimed at achieving a common goal. The immediate purpose was to end a
stalemate in an intractable social conﬂict, which at the time prevented movement towards
a just and legitimate political dispensation (that is the creation of a jointly determined set
of institutions to govern a future common society). This was the ultimate goal and the




The South African experience during the crucial phase of transition thus provides some
clues to the important question of how democratic institutions can emerge in a deeply di-
vided society, even when the conditions for democratic development are not regarded to be
favourable. This is important not only for South Africa, but for all those divided societies
around the globe that wish to democratise. It was for example believed in the mid-1980s
that only a miracle could save South Africa from civil war, but by late 1991 it was said that
only a civil war could prevent a miracle.
However, it is important to take note of the particular macro-structural conditions that
existed for pre-negotiation within the South African context. Thus, what applied within the
South African case may be valid in the case of other societies with similar contexts, but not
necessarily of those with diﬀerent contexts. Of particular importance in this regard was the
role that a multitude of organisations from both political society and civil society played
during pre-negotiation. The mediating role of civil society, particularly, those from religious
and business groups, as well as how this was embedded in the Accord, was signiﬁcant.
Thus during this phase the process of democratic transition in South Africa made sig-
niﬁcant progress in terms of redeﬁning the rules of the political game. The NP-government
could no longer dominate the process of transition. It became one of several stakeholders








The focus of this chapter is the “maturity phase of transition” (1991-1994) which covers
the period from the signing of the Accord in September 1991 up until the inauguration of
South Africa’s ﬁrst black president on 10 May 1994. It was during this last phase that South
Africa’s “small miracle”1 was negotiated through multi-party negotiations.
The successful outcome of this phase eventually led to an interim constitution, South
Africa’s ﬁrst nonracial elections and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the ﬁrst non-
white President of the Republic of South Africa, merely days after De Klerk, addressed the
NP, urging it to accept an election result that would relegate him to a lesser position. Thus,
this was a transition where a ruling racial minority peacefully handed over power to a new
order - and with both vowing to work together (see Guise, 1993:541; Adam and Moodley,
1993:40; Waldmeir, 1997:xiv).
As mentioned in chapter ﬁve, the year 1991 was a precarious period during which the
two major players, namely the NP-government and the ANC sized each other up against a
background of continuing unrest. On 20-21 December 1991, in fulﬁlment of the Mandela-De
Klerk proposals, several stakeholders met at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park in
1Mr Mandela had earlier described South Africa’s transition as a “small miracle”.
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what came to be known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) (Dav-
enport, 1998:10; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:xlviii). It was attended by a delegation
from the government, representatives of eight mainstream political parties, including the NP
and IFP (without Buthelezi), and by most homeland administrations, but by none of the
white ultranationalists, such as the CP and HNP, or by black ultranationalists, such as the
PAC. The CP and HNP, thus, claimed that a minority of whites was represented at the
convention (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:il-l). The multi-racial character of the event
was notable. The white chief justice, Michael Corbett, opened the occasion and two other
judges, from diﬀerent cultural backgrounds, namely Piet Schabort and Ismail Mohamed
(ﬁrst non-white judge) presided over the events (Friedman, 1993:21). Christian, Jewish, and
Muslim religious leaders oﬀered prayers, after which the parties and other public ﬁgures
present made formal statements in an agreed sequence (Davenport, 1998:10).
President de Klerk gave CODESA a positive endorsement during the opening of Parlia-
ment on 24 January 1992, but stressed that any major changeover would require a referen-
dum - thus, acting as if the NP would remain in power. However, the divide between the
incumbents and the challengers was wider than suggested by the events at CODESA (see
Davenport, 1998:11). Walter Sisulu of the ANC was addressing a “Parliament of the People”
in Cape Town, while De Klerk was speaking to Parliament. Sisulu urged the crowd to avoid
co-optation into a “Parliament of the Boers”. Furthermore, the leader of the PAC, Clarence
Makwetu, insisted that a simple democratic election to establish a constituent assembly was
the only alternative to the “monster” CODESA (Davenport, 1998:11).
Early 1992 also witnessed a partial realignment of political forces. The Labour Party lost
control of the House of Representatives (coloured) to the NP after a number of defections.
The NP thus gained control over the tricameral parliament (see Race Relations Survey,
1992/1993:34; Guise, 1993:341; Ottaway, 1993:341). On 28 February 1992, De Klerk issued
a special proclamation for “the last exclusively white referendum” to be held on 17 March
1992 (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:418).
At the time, the referendum seemed to be a risk, but in the end proved a major watershed
in the process of transition - despite the hostility it aroused among some blacks. The more
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than two-thirds majority in favour of the continuation of the reform process, without any
clear deﬁnition of what was involved nor what the outcome would be, provided a clear
indication to the incumbents that whites would support a negotiated change of South Africa’s
political dispensation. The result gave the government an opportunity to press its own
agenda with greater conﬁdence, while the lack of support the hardliners was able to mobilise
reassured the moderates among the challengers. The events surrounding the referendum
underscored the political skill of both De Klerk and Mandela (see Davenport, 1998:11-12;
Sarakinsky, 1995:73).
However, negotiations and particularly compromises were not easy. There was often
a lack of trust amid continuing violence and allegations of hidden agendas. Furthermore,
in the negotiation forums premature attention was paid to detail before the willingness to
compromise existed (Ottaway 1993:153, 175-178). This resulted, in repeated breakthroughs
and deadlocks, but in spite of the breakdown of negotiations at CODESA, compromises
and negotiation through the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) led to consensus on
democratic transition and a package of agreements, which included an interim constitution
(Sisk, 1995:200-248; Davenport, 1998:50-64). The interim constitution that was produced at
a plenary session of the Negotiating Council on 17 November 1993 was formally adopted by
Parliament as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 of 1993. A ﬁnal
constitution would have to comply with the constitutional principles contained in schedule
4 of the act (see, Kotze, 1996:37-42).
In this chapter, the focus is, thus, on the negotiation process that eventually led to the
transition, the position and role of the major actors in the negotiations, and the ideological
orientation and interest base of the major stakeholders with reference to their preferences re-
garding the institutions of a post-apartheid political dispensation. An analysis of the politics
of institutional choice, particularly the power relationships, is also made. An understanding
of the various institutions that were preferred to guide the transition - that is whether for
example a “constituent assembly” or a “multi-party negotiating forum” would draft the new
constitution - requires a prior understanding of the preferences of each stakeholder. The
ideologies, interests, strategies and institutional choice preferences of the political actors
therefore must be considered prior to their preferences for the institutions to guide the for-
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mal negotiations and ﬁnal transition, as well as the content and institutionalisation of the
new political dispensation. The chronological trail leading to formal constitutional negotia-
tions will be followed in order to demonstrate the linkages between the process of negotiation
and its outcomes and to map the concessions that led to the democratisation pact in late
1993. Thus, the strategy of transition of the various South African political actors and the
logic of negotiation during the maturity phase of transition will be described and analysed.
The macro-structural factors remained important during this phase, particularly the
continuing violence, and the international environment. There was conﬂict between black
and white, as well as black-on-black violence. These conﬂicts often became obstacles in the
negotiation process as would become evident in the discussion. However, the lifting of some
sanctions and the readmission of South Africa to international sport served as encouragement
to the incumbents and their constituents by exposing them to some beneﬁts of political
change. Furthermore, international actors played an important role in facilitating progress
in the transition process. However, in the discussion, these macro-structural factors will not
be discussed separately but will be integrated in the analysis of the actions of the major
actors as the process of the transition unfolded.
6.2 LOGIC OF THE MAIN POLITICAL ACTORS WITH REGARD TO
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES FOR A NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM
A characteristic of the maturity phase is the role that political society played in the pro-
cess of negotiation that eventually led to the actual transition to a democratic dispensation.
Furthermore, the unbanning of various, mainly non-white, political organisations during the
crucial phase of the transition, together with the lifting of important prescriptions with re-
gard to membership, gave political society a more nonracial character and openness - there
was no longer the need for secrecy and covertness. However, the former banned liberation
organisations faced the problem of having to adapt to the new environment and transform-
ing themselves from liberation movements (often with military wings) to political parties.
Likewise, the mainstream political parties associated with the apartheid dispensation had to
adapt to an environment with multiple role players (see Schrire, 1991:142). Thus, the road
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to negotiations was not always easy.
The Accord, discussed in chapter ﬁve, was a watershed between the pre-negotiations of
the crucial phase and the substantive negotiations of the maturity phase. It was here that the
foundations for multi-party talks were laid (Friedman, 1993:16). To move from the initial
stages of substantive negotiations to the actual writing of a post-apartheid constitution,
the various participants had to solve the problem of how to get to the constitution-writing
phase and how to legitimise and implement the rules of the process (Sisk, 1995:166). This
is a critical stage in negotiated settlements, for as Friedman (in Sisk, 1995:166) notes, an
important aspect of transition is that there is no real distinction between the forum that
enacts a new constitution and the nature of the new constitution. Thus, the distinction
between the choice over the rules to arrive at the new political dispensation and the nature
thereof is a non-issue.
If you have a constituent assembly that is elected on a universal franchise and
[it] takes decisions by simple majority rule, then you have a majority rule consti-
tution...On the other hand, if you have a negotiating forum that has ten ethnic
blocks, each of which has a veto over the outcome, then you have group rights.
So the point...[is] that it is virtually impossible to negotiate the forum without
negotiating the broad principles behind that forum (Friedman in Sisk, 1995:166).
Furthermore, the process is also critical to the ultimate viability of the new political
dispensation and if the process is not perceived as legitimate, its outcome will lack legitimacy
- thus, the process is critical if a settlement is to be reached.
As mentioned above, the “formal” inclusion in political society of various political or-
ganisations, that were previously proscribed, resulted in several changes in the conﬁguration
of political society and the actors had to position themselves within the new political en-
vironment. Also important in this regard are the interactions among various organisations
of political society as well as political society’s relations with the domains of state and civil
society.
In her analysis of South Africa’s party system, Botha (1995:106) writes that the party
system in South Africa in the past was multi-faceted. She identiﬁes at least three diﬀerent
types of “party systems”. Firstly, a dominant party-system (the incumbents) organised and
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represented the white electorate for parliamentary purposes. It established its hegemony
over the other “party systems”. Secondly, a number of party subsystems catered exclusively
and legally, but within an arena prescribed by the dominant party-system, for the “quasi-
enfranchised” (e.g. homeland legislatures). Thirdly, a quasi-party system, associated with
the struggle (the challengers), catered for the majority of the unenfranchised separately, and
existed parallel to the dominant party-system. These various “party systems” interacted
with one another and inﬂuenced the development of a new party system during the maturity
phase of the transition, as well as the development of, and within the political system as a
whole (see Botha, 1995:111).
Each “party system” had its own ideological diﬀerences. As discussed in chapter three,
race was important in party ideology and particularly in the dominant party-system, as well
as to some extent in the “quasi-party system”. Overall, the ideological divisions centred on
the pro-apartheid ideology and its opposites, the liberal pro-integration ideology, as well as
the pro-black ideologies. When the party system as a whole is considered, it is clear that
race was an important factor, but that the classic divide between socialist and more liberal-
capitalist ideologies was less pronounced. NP ideology however reﬂected strong socialist,
though anti-communist, tendencies (Botha, 1995: 111).
In the quasi-party system the most important diﬀerences centred on the place and role of
whites after liberation. The ANC favoured non-racialism, while organisations like AZAPO
had a pro-black standing and the PAC adopted an anti-settler (i.e. an anti-white) position.
Ideological diﬀerences regarding the economy centred on various models of socialism and
communism (Botha, 1995:111).
Though political parties were often classiﬁed on a left-right scale, this in reality reﬂected
the various parties’ position on racialism. Thus, with the advent of negotiations, the left
(AZAPO, PAC) was pro-black, the ANC and DP (and its predecessors) occupied the centre
with its non-racial standing, the right was occupied by the pro-white parties with the NP as
the most moderate followed by the less moderate CP and the HNP (Botha, 1995:111-112).
In dividing the actors of political society into “incumbents” and “challengers”, the above
conﬁguration has to be considered. For this reason, some refer to the actors associated with
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the dominant party-system and subsystems as “system” actors, while those of the quasi-party
system are regarded as “non-system” actors that are usually associated with “the struggle”.
For purposes of the analysis in this chapter, the former will be referred to as the “regime
camp”2 and the latter as the “anti-regime camp”.
During the negotiation process, trust was not automatic and often was hard earned.
Mattes and Gouws (1998:126) are of the opinion that even though it is diﬃcult to portray
the world view of any group, it seems fairly certain that many whites would have had at
least a fairly conservative view of political change, seeing moves toward racial equality as a
threat to their interests.
Media depictions of the principal proponents of the struggle against apartheid, the ANC
and the PAC, often created a negative perception among whites. They saw these organisa-
tions as communist-aligned and bent on achieving black domination through a combination
of international sanctions and a terrorist war of violence - the classic total onslaught mind-
set. Furthermore, it was believed that these organisations favoured the radical redistribu-
tion of wealth. Thus, it is understandable that whites, even though, they supported change
would demand certain safeguards. The IFP, the nominally governing party of the KwaZulu
homeland, was in turn portrayed as being more capitalist, with a conservative interest in
maintaining traditional values, and thus more likely to co-operate and engage in negotiations
with the government (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:126). However, the IFP felt itself a major
player that was often marginalised and this severely aﬀected its strategy (see Sarakinsky,
1995:70).
On the other hand, the ANC and the PAC was convinced of their support base, but at
the same time resented the possibility of the NP being a player and a referee at the same
time and thus favoured a process with a more equal playing ﬁeld (see Sarakinsky, 1995:70).
Most political parties and organisations articulated well-deﬁned institutional choices for a
post-apartheid political dispensation (Sarakinsky, 1995:69). Each party based its choices on
a thorough assessment of its ideological orientation and interests, its review of alternatives,
and its perceived power vis-a`-vis other parties. The diﬀerences in the models outlined by
2They are also sometimes referred to as the “establishment”.
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the parties were substantial, particularly considering that a signiﬁcant minority - the white
right wing - did not accept the basic premise that South Africans shared a common political
future (Sisk, 1995:127).
At this point, it is necessary to consider the positions and preferences of each of the
major political actors and the criteria on which these choices were based at the time. Thus,
the following is important in this regard (see Sisk, 1995:127):
∙ The ideological orientation of the party;
∙ The interests the party represented, the forces in civil society with which it was allied
and the support it enjoyed;
∙ Its goals, position and strategy in the negotiations; and
∙ The party’s institutional choice preferences for the transition and post-apartheid po-
litical structures, as well as changes in its position in this regard.
Towards the end of this phase the various parties to the negotiations were faced with the
dilemma that as, the reality of elections appeared on the horizon, they had to negotiate on
the one hand, while on the other hand they also had to run an election campaign. This also
aﬀected negotiations because of uncertainties concerning the reaction of their supporters
to compromises that were necessary during negotiations. Thus, political parties had to
settle the negotiations through compromises, retain their supporters while canvassing for
new support.
Classifying the various actors in terms of their position to transition was not straight-
forward. For purposes of this discussion the NP, DP and ANC were found to be in favour
of reaching a new dispensation trough multi-party negotiation. They continued to form
the centre of the negotiations, particularly the NP and ANC, but the DP often acted as a
mediator between the two. The IFP for a very long time had followed a “reform” position
between the NP-government and the ANC. However, as the transition unfolded its position
often became more hard line and it chose to align itself - perhaps more out of necessity than
conviction - with the more hard line actors such as the CP in for example the Concerned
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South Africans Group (COSAG).3 Thus, the softliners and moderates were those who carried
the process of reform forward and together constituted the centre forces of the transition; the
hardliners (CP, HNP and IFP) were those that preferred some elements of the status quo or
at least tried to delay the process of transition. On the other hand, the radicals (PAC and
AZAPO) opposed a negotiated transition and demanded a transfer of power to the majority.
In this section, attention will be paid mainly to those actors who dominated, for whatever
reason, this phase. Thus, smaller parties such as the HNP of the white right and AZAPO
on the black left will not be discussed since their actual role in the transition was rather
small. Likewise, at the time of the elections in 1994 several new parties saw the light and
even participated in the elections even though they did not participate in the negotiations.
6.2.1 SOFTLINERS OF THE REGIME CAMP
NATIONAL PARTY
The role of the NP during negotiations should be seen within the context of it also being
the ruling party that was in control of the state apparatus and Parliament - both of which
would continue to function and facilitate the transition. Furthermore, De Klerk was both
leader of the NP and State President. During the negotiations, both the government and
the NP, with separate delegations, were present (Marais, 1994:9), but the dividing lines on
policy, were often vague.
The inﬂuence of the reform faction (verligtes) of the NP, under De Klerk’s leadership,
continued to grow and it was realised that the status quo was no longer an option (see Schrire,
1991:141-142). This resulted in the transformation of NP ideology, particularly, its emphasis
on statutory deﬁned race groups. The initial and crucial phases of the transition already
witnessed a paradigmatic shift (but not a break) in the NP’s ideology and of particular
importance in this regard were the end of the principle of racial classiﬁcation and the idea
of total onslaught (see Schrire, 1991:131-133; Davenport, 1998:7-10). Instead, the principles
of common citizenship, self-deﬁning groups (and an open group), an “own community life”,
3On 7 October 1993 COSAG formalised its co-operation with regulat and structured meetings and re-
named it, the Freedom Alliance (FA). It consisted of the Afrikaner Volksfront (Afrikaner People’s Front
- AVF), CP, IFP, Afrikaner Volksunie (Afrikaner People’s Union - AVU), and the governments of Bo-
phuthatswana and Ciskei (Sisk, 1995:237; Van Rooyen, 1994:90; Sarakinsky, 1994:81).
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and power-sharing, as well as the idea of a New South Africa were embraced. Thus, the
ideological underpinnings of the tricameral parliament were compromised and it became
obvious that the NP was beginning to think beyond the tricameral parliament (see Sisk,
1995:134).
These were critical changes in the ideological position of the NP. As Dahl (1989:124; Sisk,
1995:134) notes, voting rights in a democracy follow from citizenship rights and the “logic
of political equality”. However, the NP tried on the one hand to move away from a group
based (whether race or ethnic) dispensation, but on the other hand accepted that the desire
of others to retain such a dispensation must be respected. The NP stated that, “If groups
are no longer to be essential building blocks of the constitution, of the whole system as such,
it should nevertheless remain available as one option for those requiring its protection” (Sisk,
1995:135). This was a problematic position and the question arose as to how groups should
be deﬁned if some want it while others do not. Thus, the viability of the principle of group
rights and of “own aﬀairs” and “general aﬀairs”, in the long term was questionable (see Sisk,
1995:135; Ottaway, 1993:93-99; Giliomee, 1994:46; Guise, 1993:104).
Based on a shift in expectations and strategy, the NP made a more important shift when
it replaced the idea of group rights with a more proactive “nation-building” approach that
would stretch across the racial divide (Sisk, 1995:135). The NP saw an opportunity in the
ANC’s diﬃculty in transforming itself from a revolutionary liberation movement in exile
to an eﬀective, streamlined domestic political organisation that was suﬃciently coherent
to negotiate diﬃcult compromises while the government remained in control of power (see
Friedman, 1993:13). The NP nurtured the idea that although it would not win an outright
majority in an election, it would be able to mobilise suﬃcient support as a multi-racial
political party and do well enough in an election to be a credible power-sharing partner
through alliance building across the racial divide. It was aware that this would not be possible
if it restricted itself to deﬁned groups and particularly minority groups (Sisk, 1995:135-136;
Greenwald, 1991:56). Instead of talking about groups, it now stated:
We commit ourselves to the creation of a free and democratic political system...in
which ...the rights of all individuals and minorities deﬁned on a non-racial ba-
sis shall be adequately protected in the constitution and in a constitutionally
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guaranteed and justiciable bill of rights (Kotze, 1995:9).
Although the NP, because of its changed ideology, aspired to broaden its constituency
to cut across racial divides, it continued to represent the interest of mainly whites and
particularly Afrikaners (see Davenport, 1998:39-40). Its ideological shift moved the NP into
the support base of the DP and it was thus able to draw support from English speaking
South Africans as well (see Guise, 1993:102; Sisk, 1995:137). However, as its performance
in the 1989-election indicated it faced a shrinking constituency among whites, but its policy
was not to divulge membership ﬁgures (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:482). Its support
came mainly from the middle and lower income white sections of the population - only twenty
per cent of its support came from the upper-middle income groups (see Schrire, 1991:91). It
furthermore enjoyed support from civil society organisations sympathetic to the cause of the
Afrikaner, but these were increasingly exercising pressure for change, as was the civil society
organisations aligned to the English speaking population.
The NP portrayed itself through the media as the only party able to safeguard the
interests and values of whites, and resist attempts at a violent takeover by communist-
aligned black power proponents, while simultaneously steering the country towards a new
political dispensation (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:127-128). Opinion polls towards the 1994-
election indicated that the NP was quite successful in portraying itself as a transformed
multi-racial party (Giliomee, 1994:53-54; Lodge, 1994:29). In its election strategy it was
looking towards the future, “We’re builders not destroyers” (Barnard, 1994:131), but its
campaign relied heavily on the person of De Klerk and it was diﬃcult to campaign among
black voters (Barnard, 1994:131).
The changes in NP thinking had important implications for their constitutional model of
which some of the components were already spelt out in September 1991. The goal of the NP
remained the protection of minorities through minority parties - no longer statutory deﬁned
groups. For this purpose, it favoured the diversiﬁcation and diﬀusion of power through a
complex set of regional and local authorities with each tier enjoying original and entrenched
powers with which the other tiers may not interfere (Giliomee, 1994:47; Sisk, 1995:139).
There were several important elements concerning its initial preferences. Firstly, on the
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ﬁrst tier, it favoured a unitary state with strong federal characteristics (which required the
reintegration of the TBVC states). Secondly, on the second tier, nine regions each with its
own government - each region would have autonomy over certain matters and have its own
tax base, but would have no racial or ethnic base. Thirdly, the third level would consist
of municipalities with strongly devolved powers with legislative, executive and ﬁscal powers
(Kotze, 1995:9). Fourthly, a bicameral legislature in which the ﬁrst house would be elected
on a proportional basis and the second house would be composed of representatives from
parties in the regional legislatures (Sisk, 1995:140). Fifthly, an “executive college” in which
the leaders of three or four of the strongest parties would take decisions based on consensus.
Other elements included proportional representation, a bill of rights, the principle of judicial
review, and judicial independence (Sisk, 1995:140). This proposed model of the NP was
clearly a mixture of federal and consociational elements (Kotze, 1995:9). Although the NP
did not initially use the concept of federalism, it was openly acknowledged by late 1992
that this was the regime model they were advocating. It should be noted that although the
NP favoured proportional representation, it was not regarded as suﬃcient to guarantee the
political inﬂuence of minorities (Adam and Moodley, 1993:67)
This model was approved by the provincial congresses of the NP, but the party leader-
ship would steadily, as the need for compromises unfolded, move away from some of these
preferences (Giliomee, 1994:47).
At CODESA the NP-government continued insisting on strong regional powers because
this was seen as protection against a simple majority government. Furthermore, they argued
that the powers granted to the various levels of government could only be performed with
the “necessary ﬁnancial capability” or “ﬁscal competency” (Friedman, 1993:66). However,
diﬀerences of interpretation, especially between the government and the ANC, created the
impression that the government did not defend regional autonomy strongly enough (Kotze,
1995:9-10).
In response to a growing concern among its own supporters and homeland allies that
it was indeed abandoning its preference for a policy of regionalism, the NP organised a
conference in September 1992 on various aspects of federalism. Although it was part of the
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NP’s negotiating agenda at CODESA, the party had not properly given any real content to
its policy of regionalism (Kotze, 1995:9-10). In fact after ruling a highly centralised state
for more than four decades, it seemed as if it did not know what the concept of federalism
entailed (Waldmeir, 1997:242). It seemed that the NP, on the advice of Mr Roelf Meyer,
Minister of Constitutional Development at the time, was in favour of adopting a system of
“unitary federalism”. In such a system, the federal government still has greater powers than
in classic federal systems (Kotze, 1995:9-10). Thus, the NP failed to “ﬁght” for devolution
to the regions when it was still in a position to do so (Waldmeir, 1997:242).
For the actual transition, the NP favoured a one-phase but a slower and much lengthier
transition process (Ottaway, 1993:172). It favoured decisions by an all-party forum where
it would retain inﬂuence. All interested parties should agree on a constitution (Sarakinsky,
1995:70; Marais, 1994:15).
The NP’s strategy for negotiation was often questioned (see Friedman, 1998:74-76). Al-
though the government was increasingly acting independently of the NP, there was no clear
dividing line between the government and the NP with the result that the government dom-
inated the NP during negotiations. Furthermore, the government and NP steered clear from
forming any overt alliances, which could have strengthened its position at the negotiation
table. Jeremy Cronin of the SACP mentioned that the NP’s potential allies were seldom
quite sure where the government stood on certain issues (Friedman, 1998:75).4 However,
there were various allegations of assistance that were covertly provided to the IFP and even
to some right-wing groups.5
The NP clearly felt conﬁdent about its own ability to “go it alone” and preferred not to
compromise its own position by forming alliances that could restrict its options and room
for compromise.
4Whether this was a deliberate strategy is not clear for some strategic choice models focus on decision-
making in the absence of knowing what the opponent is planning.
5Direct government involvement remain contested and renegade members of the security forces are usually




The DP was the youngest of the major white political parties on the South African scene
as it was launched only in April 1989 as a united front of NP-opposed white liberals (see
section 4.3.2) in time to contest the 1989 elections. Parliamentary politics was not the sole
aim of the DP. Indeed, one of its primary goals was to bridge the divide between the system
and the struggle and for this purpose, the DP pledged to work toward direct negotiation
between the ANC and the NP-government by bringing their thinking closer to each other -
that is “convergence” (Welsh, 1994:109; Sisk, 1992:261; Sisk, 1995:141).
The DP did not divulge membership, but as discussed in chapter ﬁve captured only
twenty percent of the vote in the 1989-election (Taylor, 1990a:163-166). It mainly enjoyed
support from English-speaking whites (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:128). Of the traditional
white parties, it enjoyed the most support among upper-middle class whites - thirty-eight
per cent of its supporters (see Schrire, 1991:91). However, it experienced NP encroachment
into its traditional support base, and in April 1992 saw the defection of ﬁve of its Member’s
of Parliament to the ANC. This was followed by an increased drive to recruit members and
supporters from all races (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:478-479).
The DP’s need to choose a direction to reach out for constituency support led to faction-
alism within its ranks. Three important factions could be identiﬁed. First, because of the
realignment of South African politics in the De Klerk era, conservative DP members, urged
the party to form an alliance with the NP or at least to create a political party to the right
of the ANC. Second, other members favoured an alliance with the ANC (Sisk, 1995:142-143;
Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:479). The third faction perceived an independent role for
the party as a facilitator between the ANC and the NP in the short term. It would form
temporary alliances in order to pursue particular political goals, provided that it will not
eﬀect the independence of the party (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:479-480). In the
longer term, it could form a liberal opposition to an NP-ANC coalition and the core of a
future black-led liberal party. The DP found itself on the “knife edge of the centre of South




The guiding ideology of the Democratic Party was liberalism, an ideology that has a
strong tradition in South African culture as was discussed in the previous chapters. Thus,
the DP favoured individualism, universal franchise exercised in free and open elections,
limitations on the power of government, the rule of law and demanding the protection of
minorities, individuals, and nongovernmental entities like the press (Butler, Elphick, and
Welsh, 1987:3; Sisk, 1995:141). It also identiﬁed a need for national reconciliation and
nation building. To give political expression to these ideas, the DP focussed on federalism
in its constitutional platform.
Zach de Beer explains the link between the DP’s ideological orientation and its constitu-
tional proposals:
The purpose of a constitution is to limit the powers of government over and above
the individual. The aim is the creation of procedures with a view toward pro-
tecting the freedom of individuals. That is why we so strongly favour federalism
- not just because of its administrative eﬃciency, but because it better protects
the dignity of the individual (Sisk, 1995:142).
In the initial stages of the transition, only the DP proposed a federation as a constitutional
model (Kotze, 1995:10-11). The DP’s proposals for a federation consisted of a united South
African territory into which the TBVC states would be reintegrated. It favoured eight
to twelve (later it decided on 10) federal states, each with its own government and with
the powers of the constituent states deﬁned explicitly in the constitution, “The powers
must be clear, ﬁxed, and constitutionally entrenched” (Sisk, 1995:143). This required a
bicameral parliament with equal powers for both houses except in respect of appropriation
and ﬁscal issues (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:479). It also called for disproportional
representation of the constituent states in the second chamber (Sisk, 1995:143). A key
aspect of the DP’s regime model was the call for proportional representation at all levels of
government
Furthermore, the DP’s model included a directly elected president,6 and a cabinet drawn
from all parties that have received more than ten per cent of the vote, but in October 1992,
it called for a cabinet that would represent all political parties that have obtained at least
6The DP was the only party that speciﬁcally called for a directly elected president.
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ﬁve per cent of the vote. This should be for a period of four years. Amendments to the
constitution should require a two-thirds majority in both houses and a simple majority in
three-quarters of the regional legislatures (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:479).
Its strategy to bridge the divide between the NP-government and the ANC aﬀected its
own identity and position in a post-apartheid South Africa.
6.2.2 MODERATES OF THE ANTI-REGIME CAMP
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
The ANC was the oldest of the political organisations and in October 1992 it claimed a
membership of at least 868 000 members (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:474). The key
to understanding the ANC’s institutional choice is to recognise its emphasis on populism.
Furthermore, it believed that it enjoyed the support of the majority - thus it had nothing
to fear from democracy. Its support was conﬁrmed by several opinion polls. A June 1991
Markinor poll revealed that seventy-one percent of blacks supported the ANC, and another
study reported that sixty-two percent of township blacks in the PWV-region supported the
movement (Sunday Times, 16 June 1991 in Sisk, 1995:153).7 Thus, the ANC outbid its rival,
the PAC, in establishing a public reputation for ﬁghting and winning the struggle against
apartheid. This was due to its long history of campaigning for the rights of non-whites,
its ability to maintain a continued physical presence in black townships and its strong links
with internal allies such as the UDF and allied labour unions (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:129).
However, its support came overwhelmingly from blacks even though it enjoyed some support
amongst coloureds, Indians and a few whites (see Mattes and Gouws, 1998:131, 133; Adam
and Moodley, 1993:76).
As discussed in the previous chapters the ANC had a long-standing association with
the SACP and a nearly decade-long co-operative working relationship with the emerging
trade unions and COSATU through the UDF. Even though COSATU formally adopted an
7A July 1990 poll by Market Research Africa also found that sixty-two percent of the overall black
community lined up behind the ANC (Sisk, 1995:153). The ANC also commissioned extensive surveys
during 1992 and 1993 that conﬁrmed its support, yet cautioned against taking an overwhelming majority
for granted (Lodge, 1994:28).
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alliance with the ANC and the SACP in April 1990, it maintained a somewhat independent
stance. However, COSATU’s tight national, regional, and industry-based organisational
structure, with some 1,5 million members, was one of the ANC’s most important assets
(see Sisk, 1995:153; Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:331, 487). Likewise, the SACP was
an important partner and even though the two organisations were integrated, the SACP
functioned quite independent from the ANC and there were even speculation that after the
ANC comes to power the SACP would go it alone (Sisk, 1995:154; Race Relations Survey,
1992/1993:487). However, in April 1993 the SACP suﬀered a setback when white right-
wingers assassinated its general secretary, Chris Hani (Sarakinsky, 1995:79).
Thus, co-operation in the alliance also involved negotiation and compromise - provid-
ing the ANC with important experience in this regard. The Natal Indian Congress (NIC)
and the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) also aligned themselves with the ANC (Friedman,
1998:39). In February 1992, the Patriotic Front (PF) consisting of anti-apartheid organisa-
tions (excluding the IFP) was launched under the leadership of the ANC, but it was not
eﬀective (Hamilton and Mare´, 1994:79). In spite of its long association and co-operation
with the formal alliance partners, most actions were under the banner of the ANC only (see
Lodge, 1994:30).
For decades, the ANC focussed on its primary task of ﬁghting apartheid and paid little
attention to the speciﬁc constitutional model that would be created after the end of white
minority rule (Sisk, 1995:149). However, as the prospect of direct negotiations with the
South African government loomed it paid more attention to proposals in this regard and
an internal debate on constitutional issues was launched. Its proposals, was simplicity itself
and though it could be traced to the Freedom Charter of 19558 little changed in terms of its
basic principles (Ottaway, 1993:99-100). Its basic principles and particularly its commitment
to the principles of a unitary state, majoritarianism, non-racialism and inclusive democracy
were well rooted in Western democracies (see Ottaway, 1993:99-101; Sisk, 1995:150).9 Later
this was followed by a bill of rights with wide ranging provisions (Race Relations Survey,
8Oﬃcially adopted by the ANC in 1956 (see Sisk, 1995:62).
9Reﬂecting the diversity of opinion of those who drafted the Freedom Charter, in addition to the pro-
tection of individual rights the document contains elements of socialism, with its call for nationalisation and




1991/1992:81). Special emphasis was placed on the bill of rights, to be protected by an
independent judiciary, guaranteeing equal treatment through the law. In the development
of its proposals the ANC realised the importance of addressing “white fears” and a bill of
rights was important in this regard (Mufson, 1991:120-122). Mandela for example said:
In the document I sent to President P. W. Botha in March 1989 I speciﬁcally
raised the question of allaying the fears of the whites; this was one of the questions
the ANC and the government would have to address because that fear is genuine.
It is mistaken but it is genuine We are not in favour of black majority rule. We
are in favour of majority rule... But it may well be that we have to consider
very carefully how the principle of one person, one vote should be applied in the
light of our situation, especially in the ﬁrst few years of a democratic government
(Star, 18 July 1991; Sisk, 1992:279; Sisk, 1995:152).
Mandela consistently emphasised this theme, to the consternation of many radicals within
the ANC. (Sisk, 1992:279). However, exclusiveness based on race, ethnicity or region was
not allowed (Sisk, 1992:277), but in August 1992 it indicated that it would be prepared to
consider proposals for a “Volkstaat” for whites provided that it would not be accompanied
by discrimination or forced removals (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:476).
In essence, the ANC called for a non-racial democracy in a unitary state. Fearing that
federalism could be used as an excuse for homelands, it was rejected, but the importance
of decentralisation and elected regional governments were acknowledged - thus also opt-
ing for a three tiered, but unitary structure (Ottaway, 1993:100; Race Relations Survey,
1992/1993:476). Its strong support for a unitary form of government must be read in con-
junction with its opposition to group rights. To the ANC federalism was reminiscent of four
decades of apartheid. It feared that a federal form of state would negatively aﬀect its ability
to control government at the centre (Waldmeir, 1997:241). Although the ANC welcomed
cultural diversity, the organisation did not want an emphasis on ethnic diﬀerences to become
the motivation for a form of government with strong regional powers. It believed that to
transform South Africa radically a strong centralised state was required. A single nation
had to be built at all costs (Kotze, 1995:8; Kotze and Greyling, 1994:56).
Furthermore, it stood ﬁrm on the issue of one person, one vote in a non-racial franchise,
and majoritarianism. It is important to note that the ANC did not support a statutorily de-
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ﬁned one-party state so typical of post-independence African regimes. Instead, the guidelines
demonstrated the ANC’s support for multi-party democracy, guaranteed in a bill of rights,
and a system of democratic accountability that would apply at all levels (Sisk, 1992:276-277;
Ottaway, 1993:100; Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:476). Furthermore, preference was
given to a presidential system of government, preferably elected by the National Assem-
bly, a bicameral parliament and proportional representation (Sisk, 1995:158; Race Relations
Survey, 1992/1993:476).
The economic policies of the ANC and a future economic dispensation were a dilemma
for the ANC. On the one hand, the SACP had an important inﬂuence on the ideological
thinking of the ANC. On the other hand, the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold
War left the ANC with a dilemma concerning a future economic policy (Adam and Moodley,
1993:71-103). The reconstruction of South Africa would require capital and extreme socialism
would be an obstacle. However, a moderate policy could alienate some of its more radical
supporters. It chose to publicly continue its socialist rhetoric, but at the same time it was
courting more capitalist economic principles (Adam and Moodley, 1993:71-103).
The guidelines reﬂect the ANC’s ﬁrst preferences, not yet mitigated by the dynamics
of direct negotiations. There were however problems within the ANC, such as competing
internal agendas and objectives, and competition within its ranks for positions, but the most
basic problem was the need to transform itself into a political party that had to deal with the
practicalities of “horse-trading” in the negotiations (Schlemmer, 1991d:9). It was therefore
understandable that the ANC had operated at two levels, that is in a negotiation mode on
the one hand, and in a pressure mode on the other. While this dual strategy continued, it was
understandably diﬃcult for it to achieve and maintain strategic unity and coherence within
its own ranks (Schlemmer, 1991d:9). Thus, the ANC felt a need for a transition sooner rather
than later in order to curb the power of the NP-government (Ottaway, 1993:173). For the
actual transition it favoured early elections for a constituent assembly and the establishment
of an interim government in which the ANC would be a major player.
The logic was simply that as a major player it would be able to strip the NP of the credit
it was getting for successive socio-economic reforms and because De Klerk had no mandate
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to hand over power, he was most unlikely to do so while the NP was becoming stronger
(Schlemmer, 1991d:9). Thus, the ANC favoured a two-phased transition. It proposed that a
constituent assembly be elected as soon as possible; that an interim government be instituted
to rule until elections were held for a legitimate government; and that the elected constituent
assembly be tasked with the writing of a constitution (Sarakinsky, 1995:70; Marais, 1994:13).
It was not in favour of the NP’s proposal of a co-opted all-party forum, fearing that the NP
would try to dominate such a forum.
In terms of strategy, it kept close relations with its allies and was sensitive to the position
of its constituency, and took care not to alienate potential supporters (see Lodge, 1994:35-
37). It also ran a well-planned election campaign in which Mandela played a pivotal role
(see Barnard, 1994:120-122; Lodge, 1994:29).10
6.2.3 HARDLINERS OF THE REGIME CAMP
CONSERVATIVE PARTY
The CP, as a breakaway from the NP and as oﬃcial opposition in the white House of
Assembly was accustomed in dealing with the NP and was familiar with some of the internal
debates of the NP - thus, challenging its choice for negotiation and its call for power-sharing
and nation-building (Sisk, 1992:305).
Initially it was a fast growing political party, but it soon reached its ceiling as was
demonstrated by the outcome of the whites’ only referendum - thus ﬁnally shelving the
idea of the CP as a “government-in-waiting” (Van Rooyen, 1994:90; Adam and Moodley,
1993:152). It also did not reveal its membership, but a Human Sciences Research Council
(HSRC) poll put the support for the CP among white respondents at only twenty-one percent
overall (Kotze and Sisk, 1991).
Its support base was among whites who believed in the beneﬁts of Verwoerdian grand
apartheid. Although the CP tried to draw support from English speaking whites, its con-
stituency was mainly among the more traditional, rural and conservative members of the
10It enlisted two of the architects of former President Bill Clinton’s election, namely Stanley Greenberg
and Frank Greer (Lodge, 1994:29).
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white population and particularly the Afrikaners (Sisk, 1995:131; Schrire, 1991:90-92). Its
support base came mainly from middle and lower class whites, with less than ten per cent of
its supporters coming from the upper-middle income group (see Schrire, 1991:91). Uneasi-
ness about the prospects of employment under majority rule pushed some members of the
civil service, SADF and SAP into CP ranks (Sisk, 1995:131). The CP also garnered support
among white immigrants, including Portuguese speakers who ﬂed to South Africa following
independence in Angola and Mozambique. The party enjoyed virtually no backing from two
important pillars of the white society, namely big business and the established media - and
even the party mouthpiece, Die Patriot, had limited circulation (Sisk, 1995:131).
The CP held the most advanced view of all the “white” parties and organisations on the
establishment of an ethnic state for Afrikaners (Adam and Moodley, 1993:151-152). They
believed that to be free each “nation” had to be sovereign. A CP Member of Parliament
commented for example on the CP’s choice for a separate Afrikaner state:
... it is the interest of my people. The other side of the coin, it’s the genocide of
my people that will be at stake One could say we are looking to protect interests,
and these interests in the ﬁnal analysis one could only protect amongst your own
(Sisk, 1995:130).
Those who do not wish to be free and sovereign, can get together through power-sharing
or integration if they want someone to oppress them (Sisk, 1995:129). The CP further be-
lieved that blacks are not a coherent phenomenon, instead they consist of various peoples, or
nations, of which the three largest are the Zulus, the Xhosas and the Tswanas. These “na-
tions” were in the CP’s view, fundamentally irreconcilable in a single state (Sisk, 1992:306;
Sisk, 1995:129).
The breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into “ethnic” states provided
new justiﬁcation for the beliefs of the CP. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the international
political tide did not favour the ideological position of the CP. However, it perceived the tide
to be changing in its favour in the post-Cold War era and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism
bolstered arguments for Afrikaners to assert national self-determination. It was thus of the
opinion that an Afrikaner state was possible and feasible (Sisk, 1995:128-129). However, it
was debatable whether its supporters would favour a white ethnic state, if conditions within a
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new political dispensation would provide positive outcomes for whites. Thus, support for an
ethnic state was often the manifestation of fear and not the result of ideological preferences
(Adam and Moodley, 1993:149-165).
The CP’s worldview thus, was one of organic nationhood for themselves and for all others:
In the CP, we see the nucleus of our nation as Afrikaners. But what is the basis
for a common nationhood? A nation has the same values, same ideas, and a
common past. We accept as members of our nation all of those that have the
same values, and choose to associate with us (Hartzenberg, in Sisk, 1995:129).
Thus, in principle, the CP did not regard “its nation” as necessarily white, but in practice,
it favoured white racial exclusivity in all the important spheres of life. Some respected
scholars claimed that the white right was motivated by ethnic survivalism, not by racism,
“We believe...that the label racist captures neither the fundamental nature nor the underlying
intention of the rightwing movement” (Sisk, 1995:130). However, its focus on “white fear”
in the mobilisation of its supporters was not in line with the intellectual discourse on the
concept of nation and the right to self-determination. CP leadership became even more
hardline when Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg became its leader following the death of Dr Andries
Treurnicht.
The CP perceived the trends in the negotiation process as not in the interest of whites in
general, and the Afrikaner in particular. It was therefore a reluctant participant in the nego-
tiation process and eventually boycotted the elections of 1994. The CP sought allies among
the more conservative and traditional groups and was a member of the multi-racial COSAG
and FA,11 but also of the AVF. The latter was established in May 1993 under the leadership
of Constand Viljoen, to provide a united front for the white right (Van Rooyen, 1994:90).
However, co-operation between the various members in both alliances were complex and
diﬃcult. In the AVF the hardliners and the more pragmatic factions within the alliance
found it diﬃcult to agree on common goals and a common strategy (see Adam and Moodley,
1993:152-154). Eventually these diﬀerences led to the breakaway of the pragmatists under
Viljoen and the formation of the Freedom Front (FF) only weeks before the 1994-election
(Van Rooyen, 1994:90-98).




Thus, the boycotting stance and reluctant participation of the CP in negotiations gave
life to the FF. The FF subsequently became the most appropriate defender of the values
and interests of conservative Afrikaners, who favoured self-determination (see Mattes and
Gouws, 1998:127-128). Thus, the CP was not very successful at the negotiation tables and
in the ﬁnal stages of the transition it had little importance.
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY
As already mentioned the IFP had an enigmatic character and portrayed a contradictory im-
age during negotiations. It was in control of the KwaZulu homeland government and earned
the label of “collaborator” for its participation in the apartheid dispensation. However, it
also opposed the apartheid system and consistently refused independence for KwaZulu and
was thus an important obstacle to the success of apartheid. There were serious disagree-
ments with the ANC, yet, for most of its history, the IFP was unwilling to negotiate with
the government until it released Nelson Mandela and legalised the ANC (Sisk, 1995:144).
The size of the IFP’s constituency was a largely unknown factor in South African politics.
Its support came mainly from the Zulu-speaking rural areas, but it also had a foothold in
the populous PWV region. It had support among members of the African petit bourgeoisie,
including traders, members of the business community, administrators, and teachers. It also
had the United Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA) as its trade union arm (Sisk,
1995:146).
It, however, aspired to become a non-racial and national party and its anti-communist
stance gave it increasing appeal among white South Africans.12 Behind the declared, non-
racial, national political party was a long history of a Zulu-based cultural organisation and
a distinct set of beliefs that focused on “liberation through culture” - which it shared with
the white right and the CP in particular.13 There was evidence that Zulu tribal chiefs, who
were automatic members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, used their coercive powers
to entrench the IFP in their territory. A common allegation of the ANC was that IFP dues
12It was claimed that the IFP had some 40,000 white members in the Transvaal alone. This paralleled
considerable sympathy for Inkatha from the NP and DP rank-and-ﬁle (Schlemmer, 1991d: 8-9).
13In COSAG the only vision shared by the IFP and the white right-wing groups was that of strong
regional autonomy (Kotze, 1995:11).
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had long been a form of tribal levy in many rural areas of KwaZulu. It was also alleged
that membership of the Inkatha Youth Brigade was compulsory in many schools in KwaZulu
(McCaul, 1988:150; Sisk, 1995:146). The IFP thus also had to reform itself from a culturally
based organisation to a modern political party.14 It claimed to have the largest paid-up
membership of any political party, yet consistently registered surprisingly low in sample
surveys (Brewer, 1985; Sisk, 1995:144).15
The IFP, like its predecessor, Inkatha, always endorsed negotiations, but the focus on
cultural liberation was prominent during the process of negotiation. Though the IFP par-
ticipated in negotiations, its leader Buthelezi initially refused to participate because King
Goodwill Zwelithini of the Zulus was not invited to represent the Zulu people (Race Rela-
tions Survey, 1992/1993:480-481). For a period after the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and
the SACP, it seemed as if the IFP was losing political ground. Some observers suggested
at that stage that the IFP might be sidelined by the major players (Schlemmer, 1991d:8).
Thus, Buthelezi as a skilful politician alternately used the promise of participation and the
threat of non-participation to win concessions during negotiations (Sisk, 1995:145).
The possibility of being marginalised is often perceived as a reason for the IFP’s alleged
involvement in inter-factional violence in KwaZulu and the PWV region. On the one hand,
the mobilisation of the masses by the ANC, created a threatening climate of political com-
petition in black communities. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that the reaction
of IFP-linked groups were so intense, destructive of life and property and threatening to
local formations of the ANC, that further counter-reaction were unavoidable (Schlemmer,
1991d:8). The actions of the IFP demonstrated an important principle of conﬂict-resolution
14The party’s own behaviour reinforced the view that it was, above all else, a Zulu ethno-nationalist entity.
Buthelezi, less than a month after declaring that the IFP would be a national, non-racial political party,
told a gathering of tribal chiefs that calls for the dissolution of the KwaZulu homeland “do not understand
the depth of the commitment that we have to each other as Zulu brothers born out of Zulu warrior stock”
(Sisk, 1995:148). Again, two weeks later, he told a group of ten thousand Zulus that those criticising him
“know that there is something in the Zulu character which is beginning to show now as Zulus draw together
and say enough is enough” (New York Times Magazine, 17 February 1991; Sisk, 1995:148).
15The director of the Inkatha Institute, Gavin Woods in an interview with Timothy Sisk, outlined the
party’s expectations regarding its core Zulu support base and its perceived ability to mobilise support along
ethnic lines: “Inkatha accepts that its support is not 51 percent of the population[it] has around 2 million
members - it signs up 100,000 per year... If we were to have a very intense and competitive election, then
Inkatha will probably monopolize the [Zulu] ethnic vote, which is the biggest ethnic group; it will get its
chunk of Sothos and whites. [The IFP] knows it has a base to rely on, a base big enough to always make it
a serious and eﬀective player” (Sisk, 1995:146).
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in deeply divided societies, namely that in addition to size and scope, intensity of interests
had to be taken into account. The intensity of the IFP’s interaction in the political process
clearly signalled the potential costs of excluding it, or reducing its leverage in negotiations
(Schlemmer, 1991d: 8-9).
Due to its control of the KwaZulu homeland administration, and its proven support base,
it was an important actor, but its participation in the negotiation process was, as alluded to
above, diﬃcult and it often was expected to rubber stamp “agreements” reached between the
government and the ANC (see Hamilton and Mare´, 1994:81). Both the government and the
ANC’s reaction to the IFP’s publication in October 1992, of the “Constitution of the State of
KwaZulu/Natal”, which provided for a federal republic, was to acknowledge the IFP’s right
to put forward constitutional proposals, but criticised the fact that the draft constitution
had been released as a fait accompli (Kotze, 1995:11). Thus, it is not surprising that the
IFP’s performance at CODESA was often erratic and its role in negotiations characterised
by on-oﬀ bilateral talks with the government and the ANC (Kotze, 1995:11).
The IFP clearly was in favour of a well-deﬁned federal form of government (with a
suggested ten regions) and in the early stages of the transition process, Buthelezi adopted
the view that KwaZulu had to be part of any new government as a region with veto powers
(Kotze, 1995:11).16 Thus, the IFP wanted a federal state where the regions would have strong
powers, similar or even stronger than the constituent states in the USA (Waldmeir, 1997:241).
Furthermore, the IFP was in favour of universal suﬀrage, proportional representation, a
bicameral parliament at national level, the retention of cultural rights, with the qualiﬁcation
that group domination should not be possible in such a system (Race Relations Survey,
1992/1993:480-481). For the actual transition, like the NP it preferred a one-phase transition.
The IFP continued with its participating and non-participating strategy. Its participation
in the elections was secured after mediation and its name was placed on the ballot papers
just in time for the election (Hamilton and Mare´, 1994:82).
16As discussed in chapter four, the most notable proposals about regional autonomy as an option for
South Africa were undoubtedly those thrashed out in the Natal/KwaZulu region in the 1980s. In terms of
its proposals, Natal would assume special autonomous status in relation to the rest of the country and it
was suggested that it should be the ﬁrst unit of a South African federation (Kotze, 1995:11).
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6.2.4 RADICALS OF THE ANTI-REGIME CAMP
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS
The UN recognised the PAC and the ANC as the legitimate representatives of the black ma-
jority in South Africa.17 However, the PAC was a liberation movement that was plagued by
factionalism, leadership diﬃculties, lack of funds and complex, if not ambiguous, ideological
formulations as was discussed in chapter three (see Cooper, 1994:117-118). According to the
PAC, only “Africans” had a right to South Africa, “Those who are not Africans are settlers,
[who ‘stole’ the land from the indigenous people] and who do not belong in a future South
Africa, to be renamed Azania” (Sisk, 1995:159). All those who considered themselves to
be Africans in terms of loyalties, cultural habits, and attitudes were regarded as Africans.18
The question was however whether whites could be regarded as “African” in this sense par-
ticularly in the PAC’s emphasis on “Africanness”, which it claimed was neither racial nor
ethnic, but cultural. Its slogan, “one settler, one bullet” created the impression that it fos-
tered racism - at best it could be regarded as being pro-black without being anti-white (see
Sisk, 1995:159). Return of the land to the indigenous African people, landownership and
African-socialism were central to the PAC’s ideology (Sisk, 1992:294; Sisk, 1995:159).
In contrast to the ANC, the PAC never had the chance to organise eﬀectively within South
Africa (see Mattes and Gouws, 1998:129) and after it was unbanned, it struggled to relate
to the masses. Estimates of membership ﬁgures varied widely. The PAC claimed a member-
ship of 750 000,19 but some observers (Kotze and Greyling 1991:167; Sisk, 1995:160) put the
ﬁgure closer to 25,000, but it was diﬃcult to conﬁrm or dispute either ﬁgure. Nevertheless,
several basic support groups were behind the organisation. It claimed strong support in the
Western Cape, Transvaal, Free State and the Eastern Cape, as well as among the youth and
particularly in Soweto - the youth wing (Azanian National Youth Unity) was an important
constituency for the party (Sisk, 1992:295). It also enjoyed some support among community
17When the ANC crafted the 1989 Harare Declaration, which was adopted by the OAU and referred to
the UN General Assembly for its aproval, the UN insisted that its resolution should reﬂect the united views
of both organisations.
18It e.g. supported the democratic principle through political and constitutional participation by all
Africans,
19This ﬁgure diﬀers from that of its spokesman, Benny Alexander who put the membership at 200 000 in
1991 (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:44), but at 500 000 in 1992 (Race Relations Survey, 1992/1993:494).
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based organisations and trade unions. The PAC’s primary trade union base was the Na-
tional Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), a federation with 250,000 mainly black members
who divided their loyalties between black consciousness and Africanism (Sisk, 1992:296).
Furthermore, the Pan-Africanist Students’ Organisation (PASO) was an allied organisation,
while its women’s league, African Women’s Organisation, provided an additional source of
support (Sisk, 1995:160).
Despite these core constituencies, surveys indicated that the PAC did not enjoy a broad
support base - support was estimated to be as low as three per cent, and even the most
positive estimates limited it to twenty per cent of the population (Schlemmer, 1991c:10;
Sisk, 1995:161). However, the organisation claimed that it was growing strongly since its
unbanning, but it also had to compete with the other black consciousness organisations to
the left of the ANC (such as AZAPO) for support.
The PAC positioned itself to the left of the ANC. It favoured a populist, majoritarian
political system; universal franchise on a common voters’ role, an executive president voted
for by the ruling party, a unicameral legislature20 and regarded proportional representation
as “the most democratic framework”, but it opposed power-sharing, devolution and any
form of protection of minorities - thus its model was even more majoritarian than that of
the ANC (see Sisk, 1995:161; Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:81). The Harare Declaration
committed the PAC to generally deﬁned democratic principles, qualiﬁed multi-partyism and
a bill of rights (Sisk, 1992:298). PAC spokespersons appeared to commit themselves, at least
nominally, to these principles.
The PAC initially opposed negotiations for in its opinion power should be handed over
to Africans. However, in 1992 it held bilateral meetings with the government and agreed to
a new multi-party forum to determine the creation of a constituent assembly, a transitional
authority and to the role of the international community in facilitating the transition (Race
Relations Survey, 1992/1993:495).
The PAC was a viable alternative to the ANC for the black majority, but its actual
and potential support was unknown. Its leftist position created the dilemma that, should
20It regarded multiple chambers as a mechanism to divide society.
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it negotiate with the government, it could lose the advantage of outbidding on the ANC’s
left, but if it refused to participate in talks, it risked being sidelined and excluded in the
post-apartheid order.
In conclusion, as the elections became a certainty, the main political parties had to ne-
gotiate and campaign simultaneously. At the same time a number of new national and re-
gional (provincial) political parties, such as the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)
emerged - each with their own ideas for a new political dispensation to be decided after the
elections of 1994.
6.3 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW POLITICAL DISPENSATION
South Africa’s transition to democracy was the outcome of eﬀective negotiations. Of partic-
ular importance in this regard are the multi-party negotiations namely CODESA I and II,
and the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP). However, there were numerous bilateral
negotiations involving most of the main and even some of the minor stakeholders. Both
types of negotiations were vital to the eventual transition and provided parallel forums for
negotiations. Diﬀerences and disagreements were often dealt with at a bilateral level, while
multi-party negotiations were important to establish wider agreement on, and legitimacy to
the proposals that resulted from negotiations. Thus, this section will focus on the process of
negotiations, with a particular emphasis on multi-party negotiations. However, these sub-
stantive negotiations should be seen as a continuation of the process of negotiations started
with the pre-negotiations that led to the Accord, as discussed in chapter ﬁve.
6.3.1 MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS: CODESA
South Africa entered a crucial stage in the process of a transition to a new and democratic
political and constitutional dispensation with the commencement of CODESA on 20 Decem-
ber 1991. The leader of the DP, Dr Zach de Beer, chaired the steering committee tasked with
the ﬁnal arrangements for CODESA.21 It was decided that each delegation could send twelve
21The parties who attended the preparatory meeting that was held in Johannesburg on 29-30 Novem-
ber 1991, included: the administrations of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, KanNgwane, KwaNdebele, Lebowa,
Qwaqwa, Transkei and Venda; the ANC; the NP; the DP; the Labour Party; the IFP; the National People’s
Party; the PAC; the SACP; Solidarity; a joint delegation of the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses
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representatives and that the agenda would include: how the decisions at CODESA would be
implemented; the creation of a mechanism for constitution making; an interim government;
the future of the homelands; and the role of the international community (Marais, 1994:9).
CODESA was a gathering of the broadest ever cross-section of leaders and organisa-
tions from political society and it signalled a widely published spirit of hope and optimism
(Ottaway, 1993:157; Friedman, 1993:22-23). However, not everything was perfect. The
opening of CODESA witnessed the altercation between De Klerk and Mandela.22 Further-
more, it witnessed the absence of Dr Buthelezi,23 the CP as the oﬃcial opposition party, and
the PAC24 as a prominent liberation organisation, as well as AZAPO (Ottaway, 1993:157;
Marais, 1994:9-11; Relations Survey 1991/1992, 1992:xlviii). Despite these obstacles, and
the apparent deterioration in the personal relationship between Mandela and De Klerk, the
negotiation process gathered momentum and was set to continue (Devenish, 1997:612).
Considering the diﬀerences in beliefs and strategies discussed in section 6.2, it was to be
expected that the principal players would approach the process of negotiations embodied in
CODESA with widely diverging views of what the outcomes should be. There were profound
diﬀerences concerning the form of state, the question of executive power sharing, the extent of
government involvement in the economy, and the protection of private property (Devenish,
1997:612). In essence, the ANC was committed to majority rule within a unitary state,
whereas some of the other parties, particularly more culturally and ethnic based parties,
were determined to secure protection against simple majoritarianism. Such protection could
be secured by a variety of mechanisms such as a geographical federation, a bill of rights and
elements of consociational democracy (Devenish, 1997:612). However, the various parties
managed to reach an agreement on formal broad principles, which were encapsulated in the
Declaration of Intent issued by CODESA on 21 December 1991.
Seventeen of the nineteen delegations signed the, Declaration of Intent. Some of the
(TIC) and (NIC), and the South African Government (SAG). The parties which declined the invitation
were: The PAC AZAPO; the AWB; the Herstigte National party, and the CP (Marais, 1994:9; Relations
Survey 1991/1992, 1992: xlviii). Both the SAG and the NP sent delegations.
22De Klerk “accused” the ANC of not honouring an earlier undertaking to end the armed struggle and
disband MK (Friedman, 1993:24).
23The IFP attended, but Buthelezi was of the opinion that the Zulu-monarchy was also entitled to a
delegation (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:il).
24The PAC requested a conference outside of South Africa under a neutral chair (Marais, 1994:9-10).
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key points that were endorsed are (see Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:xlviii-il, 557-558;
Marais, 1994:11-12):
∙ an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship, patriotism
and loyalty;
∙ a constitution that would be the “supreme law” which would be guarded over by an
independent judiciary;
∙ an entrenched bill of rights and equality before the law to protect universally accepted
civil liberties;
∙ a multi-party democracy based on universal suﬀrage on a common voters’ roll and an
electoral system based on proportional representation;
∙ the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with appro-
priate checks and balances;
∙ the healing of the divisions of the past;
∙ the improvement of the quality of life of the people through economic growth and
human development;
∙ the acknowledgement of the diversity of languages, cultures and religions of the people
of South Africa; and
∙ the elimination of violence in order to create a climate conducive to free political
activity and peaceful constitutional change.
The signatories also undertook to “take all such steps as are within our power and
authority” to realise the implementation of the agreements reached, as well as to establish a
mechanism that would, in co-operation with government, draft all legislation required in this
regard (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:il). Important was the acceptance that Parliament
would remain sovereign for as long as CODESA continued (Friedman, 1993:26). CODESA’s
Declaration of Intent thus suggested that the principal political contenders in South Africa
were already committed to a negotiated transition to democracy (De Villiers, 1993:351).
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The delegation from Bophuthatswana refused to sign fearing that the homeland would
be abolished. Likewise, the IFP objected fearing that it did not provide for a federal option,
but later signed on condition that it was not committed to a unitary form of state (Race
Relations Survey, 1991/1992:il).
The hardliners and the radicals both condemned CODESA and predicted that it is
doomed to failure. The CP said that it was unrepresentative of the interests of whites, while
the PAC claimed that it was stage-managed by the ANC and the government. AZAPO also
claimed that it did not represent all the blacks (Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992:l-li).
CODESA further established ﬁve working groups to further the negotiation process until
the next plenary session (CODESA II). A working group consisted of two delegates and two
advisers from each negotiating party. They were responsible for reaching agreement on the
issues assigned to them and compile a report to the next plenary session, since they needed
to be ratiﬁed by the full convention (Friedman, 1993:32). The working groups, most of which
consisted of several subgroups, were (Friedman, 1993:34-135; Marais, 1994:16-27):
∙ Working group 1 (WG1): Tasked to create a climate for free political participation and
to determine the role of the international community.
∙ Working group 2 (WG2): Tasked to reach agreement on a set of constitutional princi-
ples and a mechanism for arriving at a constitution.
∙ Working group 3 (WG3): Tasked to reach agreement on transitional arrangements.
∙ Working group 4 (WG4): Tasked to determine the future of the TBVC-states (i.e.
independent homelands).
∙ Working group 5 (WG5): Tasked with the formulation of a working plan and time
frames which would ensure the implementation of all agreements.
Due to complaints that women constituted a majority, but was underrepresented, a
Gender Advisory Committee was also established (Friedman, 1993:129-137). In addition a
daily management committee was established to manage the convention as a whole, while
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the working groups selected steering committees. The widely criticised principle of suﬃcient
consensus applied to decision-making in the working groups (Marais, 1994:12-13).25
The activities of the working groups began in earnest in the beginning of 1992. Thus,
the process of substantive negotiations began with the convening of CODESA’s ﬁve working
groups at the World Trade Centre at Kempton Park (Marais, 1994:14). These working
groups were to report their agreements at the plenary session of CODESA II scheduled for
15 and 16 May (Cachalia, 1992:249). Initially signiﬁcant progress was made, but varied
in the various working groups. Optimism was boosted by the outcome of the whites-only
referendum of 17 March 1992. Whites voted overwhelmingly (69%) in favour of continuing
on the path of constitutional and political negotiation and reform (Race Relations Survey,
1992/1993:418-419).
Though progress was made, it soon became obvious that profound diﬀerences complicated
and slowed down progress. Eventually the obstacles encountered would lead to the collapse
of CODESA. From its inception, the central diﬃculty, which CODESA had to address, was
the NP’s model of the way forward as opposed to the ANC’s model of the way forward.
Initially, the main diﬀerence was between the NP’s insistence on a multi-party conference,
as the appropriate forum for drawing up a new constitution, versus the ANC’s demand for
an interim government to rule the country while an elected constituent assembly drafted a
new constitution (De Villiers, 1993:351; Sarakinsky, 1995). These diﬀerences eventually led
to the collapse of CODESA.
A brief look at these working groups gives some clues with regard to the enormity of the
task the negotiators faced. Although the successes seemed small, it should be born in mind
that within the context of South Africa at the time, they were major steps in the process of
transition through negotiation.
25The principle was never satisfactorily deﬁned and created the impression that whatever the ANC and
the government agreed on implied suﬃcient consensus. This created the impression of an elite pact, i.e. if
the ANC and government did not agree there was not progress (Friedman, 1993:39).
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PROGRESS: WORKING GROUP 1
The terms of reference of this working group included a variety of issues, which it allocated to
three subgroups (Friedman, 1993:36). Firstly, a subgroup that had to “ﬁnalise reconciliation”
and had to pay attention to political prisoners, the return of exiles and remaining laws that
were discriminatory and/or preventing free political activity. Secondly, a subgroup that
was tasked with “continuing the security and socio-economic process”, and had to focus on
political intimidation, the promotion of political tolerance, the implementation of the Accord,
the prevention of violence, the role and future of the security forces, and improving the socio-
economic conditions. Thirdly, a subgroup tasked with the creation of a climate conducive to
free political participation, particularly the state-controlled media,26 issues relating to the
free ﬂow of information, particularly the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC),
and the funding of political parties (Friedman, 1993:36; Cachalia, 1992:249).
The dynamics during negotiations were often complex and there were often agreement
on the problems they faced and the virtues of solving those problems, but agreement on
what had to be done was not always that easy (Friedman, 1993:37). The issues of politi-
cal prisoners and exiles, as well as the future of MK, remained unresolved until well after
CODESA collapsed. Thus, little progress was made on the issues pertaining to violence
and intimidation (Marais, 1994:18). Personalities also played an important role and there
was often a deadlock between the ANC and government delegates. WG1 in essence lacked
someone that could take the process forward by playing a mediating role, as was often the
case in some of the other working groups (Friedman, 1993:37).
Agreements were, however, reached on some points, particularly, with regard to the
liberalisation of security laws, the institutionalisation of democratic politics, and the trans-
formation of signiﬁcant state institutions. Particular attention was paid to the Accord and
recommendations were made with regard to its funding and the organisation of the conﬂict
resolution structures (Friedman, 1993:53). Thus, WG1 agreed on a number of mechanisms
to ensure the eﬀective implementation of the Accord, including the imposition of harsh sen-
tences for the possession of illegal arms or public display of dangerous weapons (Marais,
26The argument was that there could not be free and fair political activity for as long as the state
(controlled by the NP-government) controlled radio and television.
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1994:17-18). In short, the agreements reached in WG1 made the reorganisation of both
state and society possible. Although the working group agreed to place controls over the
declaration and implementation of states of emergency, it was agreed that special measures
were necessary to deal with the threats to public peace and order during the process of
transition (Devenish, 1997:618). Its understanding of the role news reporting should play in
the creation of a climate of free political participation, was reﬂected in the agreement on the
establishment of an independent body to regulate the broadcasting media.
On the issue of the funding of political parties, WG1 agreed to the suspension of the
Prohibition of Foreign Financing of Political Parties Act No. 51 of 1968, until six months
after the ﬁrst non-racial election. Finally, the working group agreed that during the transition
period the security forces should be placed under the control of a transitional executive
authority (Devenish, 1997:618).
This group dealt with very important and even foundational problems and the strategies
followed by the main negotiators were important. Both the ANC and the government tried
to maximise their gains on the issues they deemed vital for their own interests. The gov-
ernment therefore favoured the retention of security legislation and was clearly in no hurry
to reach agreement in this regard. On the other hand, the ANC favoured the normalisation
of an environment conducive to free and fair political participation. “The ANC’s chief goal
appeared to be to sweep aside the restrictions - security laws, control of broadcasting - which
in its view gave the NP an unfair advantage” (Friedman, 1993:57).
PROGRESS: WORKING GROUP 2
Working Group 2 was tasked with ﬁnding agreement on acceptable proposals for the political
and constitutional transformation of South Africa. These included the central issues on which
a settlement depended and, not surprisingly, it was responsible for the fate of CODESA
(Friedman, 1993:61). Initially this working group sought to establish a set of constitutional
principles, which would be binding on a future elected constitution-making body. Secondly,




The various parties sent their most senior negotiators to WG2 and thus, strong diﬀerences
of opinion were to emerge (Friedman, 1993:60).27 The government and its allies argued for
a broad deﬁnition of constitutional principles to ensure that the substance of the future
constitution would be negotiated within CODESA. On the other hand, the ANC and its
allies argued equally convincingly for a separate and elected constitution-making body. They
thus favoured a more limited conception of constitutional principles in order not to encroach
upon the jurisdiction of such an elected constituent assembly (Devenish, 1997:618).
It was the very issue of where, how and by whom a new constitution should be written
- a constituent assembly versus a multi-party forum - that was fundamental to the prob-
lems encountered in WG2 (see Friedman, 1993:61-65). On the one hand, the ANC and its
allies considered an elected constituent assembly as the only politically legitimate means
of producing a new and credible constitution, that is, the representatives of the majority
should mould it. On the other hand, the government and the IFP, wished to resolve all
uncertainty about a future constitutional order at CODESA, that is, a multi-party forum
(Devenish, 1997:618). The government was however prepared to agree on the establishment
of an interim constitution and a seventy-ﬁve per cent threshold for the adoption of a new
constitution in an elected constituent assembly, but the ANC was not willing to agree to a
threshold exceeding two-thirds (De Villiers, 1993:352). The government rejected a late oﬀer
by the ANC to compromise on seventy per cent (Friedman, 1993:80)
The IFP went even further, objected in principle to an elected body, and insisted that
federalism be constitutionally guaranteed prior to any election. Throughout the period of
deliberations in WG2, the IFP indicated its deep concern and rejection of a constituent
assembly. It wanted a ﬁnal constitution to be drawn up by CODESA itself on the basis of
consensus and then approved by a referendum (Devenish, 1997:619).
Although CODESA was closer to an agreement than is often admitted, WG2 unfortu-
nately failed to reach an overall agreement and this was to precipitate CODESA’s deadlock
(see Cachalia, 1992:259). There was a lack of debate on principles and the procedures fol-
lowed were time-consuming and ineﬃcient (Friedman, 1993:63). A lack of trust further
27The government later withdrew some of its senior members who were replaced by juniors that had to
negotiate with seniors from the other parties (Friedman, 1993:80-82).
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hampered progress and it was this lack of trust, as well as the hardening of attitudes and
the inability and maladroitness of the negotiators that led to the collapse of CODESA (De-
venish, 1997:619). It was also here that the government’s strategy of a piecemeal and lengthy
transition clashed with the ANC’s desire for a speedy transition (Friedman, 1993:83-84).
However, successes were achieved on proposals for a bill of rights, the role of traditional
leaders, economic freedom and cultural diversity (Friedman, 1993:65). Thus, there seems
to have been an agreement on the inclusion of principles guaranteeing individual rights and
democratic processes, but there were diﬀerences in opinion on principles relating to the com-
position of the government, the distribution of power between central regional and local
government, as well as meaningful participation by minorities. Furthermore, the ANC re-
quired a speedy replacement of the existing parliament, while the government required the
tricameral parliament to remain the ﬁnal authority in order to provide for the continuation of
“constitutional government” (Friedman, 1993:65, 71). These diﬀerences proved to be irrec-
oncilable and resulted in a deadlock on the opening day of the plenary session of CODESA
II. The latter’s management committee tried to resolve the deadlock, but was unable to do
so and the ANC and its allies withdrew on 2 June 1992 (Marais, 1994:22).
PROGRESS: WORKING GROUP 3
Working Group 3 was tasked with transitional arrangements until a new constitution was
in place. The main debates concerned the form of the interim structures, the relationship
between them and the existing state, and their relationship to a constitution-making struc-
ture (Friedman, 1993:90). Due to streamlined procedures and the co-opting of experts, it
achieved a considerable measure of consensus on how South Africa should be governed during
the transition to democracy (Friedman, 1993:86-88). The agreement on a two-phase process
was largely a compromise between the ideas of the ANC and those of the government. The
ﬁrst phase concerned the establishment of a multi-party transitional executive authority, to
be called the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), and which would function in conjunc-
tion with existing legislative and executive structures (Cachalia, 1992:259). The TEC would
facilitate the transition to a democratic constitution and preparations for a free and fair
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election (Marais, 1994:38). However, provision was made for the possible consolidation of
the tricameral parliament into a single chamber and the scrapping of the distinction between
own and general aﬀairs (Cachalia, 1992:259).28
The second stage was the period from the holding of elections for a “national assembly”
to the adoption of a new democratic constitution and the instatement of a new government
in accordance with its provisions (Devenish, 1997:619). During this stage, the national
assembly would combine the functions of “ordinary” law making and a “higher” form of law
making, namely constitution-making (Cachalia, 1992:259). In addition, it was agreed that
an “independent electoral commission” would be established to ensure a free and fair election
and that there should be an “independent media commission”.29 Working Group 3 therefore
made good progress on the issue of an interim government (Devenish, 1997:619). However,
not everybody was happy and the IFP in particular felt that it was being “steamrollered”
and accused the ANC and the government of behind the scenes caucusing and behaving as
if CODESA was a “two-sided table” (Friedman, 1993:100-101). However, in its negotiating
strategy, the ANC optimised the use of its allies for testing the position of the government,
while it often played the role of conciliator between extreme positions (Friedman, 1993:102).
PROGRESS: WORKING GROUP 4
Working Group 4 concentrated on the future of the nominally independent black states
namely the TBVC-states. However, its brief was formulated in such a way that reincorpora-
tion was not a necessary outcome. Thus, the issue was whether they should be incorporated,
and if so, when and how. After lengthy deliberations, their reincorporation was agreed to in
principle (Devenish, 1997:619). There was agreement on the principle of reincorporation, but
some delegations reserved their position or proposed certain conditions. The South African
government, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana insisted that reincorporation should be with the
consent of the people within these states. However, the ANC and its allies on the other
hand, would not agree to any procedure, which would in eﬀect amount to recognition of
28By 1993 the latter was implemented but not the former (Friedman, 1993: 95).




the sovereignty of the TBVC states or allow small sections of the population to determine
national options (Cachalia, 1992:261).
Except for the Bophuthatswana administration, which reserved its position, WG4 agreed
that the TBVC-states would ﬁrst take part in transitional arrangements as well as in con-
stitution making. Then their participation in a national election would be arranged in such
a way that their votes would signify support for, or rejection of reincorporation, followed
by the restoration of citizenship (Marais, 1994:19). It was agreed that the results of such
an election would constitute a suﬃcient test of the will of the people in those territories30
(Cachalia, 1992:261). Furthermore, it was agreed that no additional land would be allocated
for incorporation into the homelands (Marais, 1994:19).
It was agreed that the transition should occur with the minimum of disruption. Existing
structures in education, health, employment insurance would continue functioning in the
transition period. It was also agreed that the TBVC administrations should come under the
supervision of the TEC during the ﬁrst phase of transition and that the existing adminis-
trations should continue to function until they were absorbed into new non-racial national
and regional administrations. Civil servants would retain their existing salaries, beneﬁts,
and conditions of service and would not be retrenched as a result of reincorporation (Marais,
1994:19).
There were clearly sharp diﬀerences among the delegates, but again the government and
the ANC dominated the negotiations. Although, agreements were reached, several issues
were referred to two expert commissions (Friedman, 1993:127).
PROGRESS: WORKING GROUP 5
Working Group 5, was tasked to determine the time frame for the implementation of the
CODESA agreements, but was dependent on the progress in the other groups (Devenish,
1997:619). As a result it failed to function eﬀectively and the agreements reached in the
other working groups arrived too late for WG5 (Marais, 1994:20). However, it scrutinised
a list of sixty-eight acts for gender and racially discriminatory provisions. Furthermore, it
30Ciskei later disputed its recorded agreement on this issue (Cachalia, 1992:261).
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examined the electoral acts of several other countries (Cachalia, 1992:262).
In summary, the various working groups had to submit their reports to a second plenary at
CODESA II scheduled for 15-16 May 1992. In retrospect, commendable progress was made
but WG 2 was unable to make signiﬁcant progress and there were important outstanding
issues and an impasse was reached (Sisk, 1995:210). Of particular importance was the lack of
agreement on the mechanism for adopting the ﬁnal constitution (Sarakinsky, 1995:73). The
government rejected any “monopoly of power” and insisted on an “entrenched constitution
which can only be amended by a special majority in parliament” (Friedman, 1993:81).
CODESA demonstrated the “fundamental discord over the nature of the new South
African state, with the three paradigms of majority rule, minority power, and federal de-
volution competing for predominance” (Waldmeir, 1997:194). On the eve of CODESA II,
Mandela and De Klerk tried to resolve the impasse, but were unable to do so (Sisk, 1995:211).
Nevertheless, they managed to save the discussions temporarily. Regrettably, the apparent
progress of the working groups and the achievement of substantial agreement on a series of is-
sues central to the important process of transition to democracy, failed to avert the deadlock
and the eventual breakdown of the negotiations at CODESA II (Devenish, 1997:620).
Various reasons are provided for the breakdown. One of these is the replacement of
the South African government’s chief negotiator, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, by an inexperienced
and junior Dr Tertius Delport. Furthermore, unrealistic expectations; trying to achieve
the impossible in too short a time; unnecessary delays that caused frustration; internal
and external pressures; attempts by the ANC and the government to out manoeuvre the
other; overestimation of their power bases; the side-lining of other parties by the two main
players; bad strategies and procedures; and the parties rethinking their position. However,
there is agreement that the lack of trust between the two dominant players and the often
polarised positions during “negotiations” were of particular importance (Sisk, 1995:211-
212; Ottaway, 1993:175-178; Welsh, 1994:92-87-93; Friedman, 1993; Guise, 1993:553-557;
Devenish, 1997:620; Sarakinsky, 1995:71-74). On many issues, the divide remained wide.
Although negotiations were interrupted as a result of the impasse, CODESA was, in
retrospect, not a complete failure and signiﬁcant compromises were indeed reached, compro-
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mises that would prove valuable in further negotiations. Although the ANC was planning
mass action, it nevertheless welcomed the progress made at CODESA (Friedman, 1993:80).
Despite the unfortunate collapse of CODESA, the parties involved acknowledged that
negotiations remained the only viable option for political transformation and change; pub-
lic debates relating to crucial issues pertaining to South Africa’s transition, were opened
(Welsh, 1994:93). The relationship between Mandela and De Klerk was acrimonious at this
time, but the ANC and government’s main negotiators, Ramaphosa and Meyer respectively,
maintained a personal relationship that was to become important (Welsh, 1994:93).
Thus, the formal and informal negotiations that took place formed an important basis
for subsequent constitutional discussions and political development. Although important
groundwork was done at CODESA, this could not be brought to completion, but through the
intervention of civil society and international actors, the process would continue (Devenish,
1997:620; Welsh, 1994:90).
6.3.2 THE RECORD OF UNDERSTANDING OF 26 SEPTEMBER
1992
Even prior to the breakdown of CODESA, the ANC and its partners decided on the mobil-
isation of popular power and a campaign of mass action was started (Friedman, 1993:139).
The dismantling of international sanctions against South Africa and the suspension of the
armed struggle left the ANC with popular power as its only strategic weapon to apply pres-
sure on the government (Du Pisani, 1994:28; Waldmeir, 1997:197). The ANC’s participation
in CODESA caused suspicion among their followers that an elitist pact was being negotiated
and it was decided at a summit meeting on 13 May 1992 to launch a joint mass action cam-
paign as a means to reassure their followers of their continued commitment to the people
(Du Pisani, 1994:28).
Thus, the impasse reached provided additional motivation for a campaign of mass action
and after the collapse of CODESA, the ANC engaged the government in a test of strength
with its campaign of mass action spearheaded by COSATU. The campaign, which oﬃcially
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commenced on 16 June 1992,31 included strikes, stay-aways, sit-ins, protest marches, and
rent and consumer boycotts. At an ANC policy-conference, the proposed campaign was
approved as the most eﬀective strategy available to break the deadlock in the negotiating
process (Financial Mall, 5 June 1992 in Du Pisani, 1994:29). Mass action was seen as a
middle ground between armed action and negotiation (Waldmeir, 1997:207). It was code-
named Operation Exit, because of its objective to force the NP-government to hand over
power to a joint interim government and calling elections for a constituent assembly before
the end of that year.32 The intention was to maintain mass action until democracy was won
(Sunday Times, 14 June 1992; Du Pisani, 1994:29; Devenish, 1997:620). The suspension of
the ongoing negotiations with the government and the adoption of mass action represented
a temporary victory for the radicals in the ranks of the ANC alliance (Du Pisani, 1994:30).
The campaign of mass mobilisation, however, was soon overshadowed by the massacre
of several people at Boipatong, an ANC stronghold in the south of Johannesburg, by IFP-
aligned hostel dwellers, on the night of 17 June 1992 (Ottaway, 1993:177-178). There were
allegations in the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance of police complicity, or at best that the
police had deliberately failed to prevent the massacre despite early warnings. The IFP lead-
ership and the government, however, dissociated themselves from the massacre, condemned
the attack and President de Klerk promised that everything possible would be done to trace
the perpetrators and prosecute them (Du Pisani, 1994:31).33
A few days later on 23 June, the ANC announced its withdrawal from CODESA and
stipulated fourteen conditions that the government has to meet, if it wishes for the ANC to
return to negotiations. These included steps to end the violence, an interim constitution, an
elected constituent assembly, an interim government of national unity, the release of politi-
cal prisoners and the phasing out of the hostel system (Ottaway, 1993:177-178; Du Pisani,
1994:33). Furthermore, the ANC called for international intervention, an international in-
quiry into Boipatong and vowed to continue with its campaign of mass mobilisation (Sisk,
31The anniversary of the Soweto uprising in 1976.
32This was often referred to as the “Leipzig option”, referring to the sudden collapse of the East German
government in response to mass protest (Sarakinsky, 1994:74; Adam and Moodley, 1993:101-103).
33Investigations by the police and the Goldstone Commission into the massacre and the allegations of
police complicity were launched, which conﬁrmed that Zulu-speaking migrant hostel dwellers were respon-
sible for the killings, but there was no proof of government or police complicity (Race Relations Survey




The campaign received mixed reaction. Mandela justiﬁed the campaign by arguing that,
in light of the government’s refusal to accept the ANC’s compromises, mass action was the
only option left (Du Pisani, 1994:30). It was condemned by the government and business
circles and white-dominated political parties had serious misgivings about the expected neg-
ative economic consequences, as well as the possibility of an escalation in violence and a
culture of intolerance. It was also referred to, by Adam and Moodley (1993:101-103), as
the “fallacy of the Leipzig option”. In the latter case, the capitalist West supported anti-
communist demonstrators, but in the case of South Africa the government was capitalist
and the demonstrators were communist - thus there was no reason why radical mass mo-
bilisation would receive any support from the West. The government vowed resistance to
what it regarded as blackmail and an economic civil war orchestrated by the radicals who
had succeeded in forcing their will upon the moderates. The IFP, in turn, warned of the
possibility of bloodshed and called upon their supporters not to participate in any mass
action activities (Du Pisani, 1994:30). The IFP and its supporters also harboured feelings
of being marginalised during negotiations and the competition between IFP and ANC sup-
porters were intensifying in the townships as was demonstrated by the Boipatong incident
(Sisk, 1995:213).
The government reaﬃrmed its commitment to the negotiation process and following a
cabinet meeting on 24 June De Klerk, oﬀered the ANC a two-day summit to deal with the
impasse, but these attempts were unsuccessful (Sunday Times, 28 June 1992 in Du Pisani,
1994:33).
The ANC’s mass action programme continued in July and August 1992, but did not
have the collective impact anticipated by the ANC alliance. More than half of Cosatu’s 1,3
million members participated in diﬀerent forms of mass action, but marches through major
cities succeeded in drawing the support of no more than 30,000 people and the occupation
of government oﬃces was unsuccessful. The lack of enthusiasm was blamed on weak co-
ordination and the failure of the civic, education and youth structures to mobilise their
34An independent enquiry into the massacre was headed by a British police expert, who found no evidence
of police complicity (Waldmeir, 1997:206).
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constituencies (Du Pisani, 1994:34).
In addition, a school boycott supported by ANC aﬃliated bodies was opposed by teacher,
student and parent organisations aﬃliated to the PAC, AZAPO and the IFP. Complaints
were raised about the detrimental eﬀect of the loss of school days on students (Du Pisani,
1994:34). Likewise, the PAC and the IFP opposed the week-long strike planned for the climax
of the mass action campaign in early August. Negotiations between COSATU and the South
African Employers Consultative Committee on Labour Aﬀairs (SACCOLA) resulted in a
downscaling of the strike to a two-day national stay-away (Du Pisani, 1994:34). COSATU’s
claim that 4 million workers observed the stay-away, was disputed by organised industry
(Race Relations Survey 1992/1993:342-343).
Involvement by the international community became important and ongoing in easing the
impasse after the breakdown of CODESA (Sarakinsky, 1995:75). The UN Security Council
convened a two-day special meeting on 15 July 1992 to discuss the continuing violence
and the breakdown of negotiations in South Africa. The minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, Pik
Botha, Mr Mandela and Dr Buthelezi were among the South Africans that addressed the
UN Security Council. A resolution was adopted expressing concern at the breakdown and
calling on the ANC to resume negotiations and on the government to accept an appointed
UN special representative to investigate the violence (Friedman, 1993:157). The UN sent,
Cyrus Vance, a former American secretary of state, as its special envoy. He was mandated
to recommend measures to end the violence and to promote negotiations (Race Relations
Survey 1992/1993:25-26). Following his wide consultations, several UN oﬃcials were sent to
monitor the mass action campaign (Sisk, 1996:216).
There were already as early as July 1992 indications that the ANC leaders were preparing
to return to the negotiating table. Its National Working Committee recognised negotiations
as the preferred route to the democratisation of South African society. In a conciliatory
address during the ANC’s week of action at the Union Buildings on 5 August 1992, Nelson
Mandela said he would like to heal wounds. De Klerk responded positively and invited the
ANC leaders to a private bilateral summit. Thus, the stage was set for the resumption of
bilateral talks and both sides expressed a willingness to make concessions in order to resume
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negotiations (Du Pisani, 1994:35). However, the old issues, such as the release of political
prisoners remained an obstacle. The ANC insisted on the unconditional release of political
prisoners, but the government sought a package deal that would provide for a general amnesty
for all political oﬀenders, including state oﬃcials and SAP and SADF members (Du Pisani,
1994:35).
The Bisho incident in the “independent state” of Ciskei became a turning point for a
commitment to a negotiated transition. On 7 September 1992, South Africans and the world
were again shocked by yet another incident that led to a large scale loss of life. The ANC
lost control of a march on Bisho, capital of the Ciskei, which it organised as part of its mass
action campaign.35 Twenty-nine people were killed when the Ciskeian police opened ﬁre on
the marchers. The ANC and the government of Ciskei held each other responsible for the
massacre (Race Relations Survey 1992/1993:29-30). Locally and internationally, the ANC’s
image was tarnished by the Bisho incident and the organisation’s revolutionary agenda was
criticised. In a bid to restore its image as a peaceful organisation, the ANC reconﬁrmed its
commitment to the Accord and the Goldstone guidelines for demonstrations. The various
political leaders were more aware than ever that, the resumption of negotiations was urgently
needed to address the problem of violence (Du Pisani, 1994:36; Sisk, 1995:218-219). The
Bisho incident ﬁnally brought the message home that the ANC would not succeed in a
transition from below (see Friedman, 1993:154).
Table 4.1 (chapter 4) gives an indication of the unacceptable high number of fatalities
that resulted from political violence. After the Bisho incident, De Klerk called for a summit
on violence, to which Mandela responded positively, but later set the release of three political
prisoners as a precondition. After some discussions, these prisoners were released. Arrange-
ments for the proposed summit were made at meetings between Roelf Meyer and Cyril
Ramaphosa.36 The summit, which was attended by high level delegations of the government
and the ANC, was headed by De Klerk and Mandela and took place at the World Trade
Centre in Kempton Park on 26 September 1992. The agenda included violence, free political
participation, mass action, security legislation, secret operations, amnesty, reconciliation and
35There were claims that the strategy of the march was aimed at toppling the Ciskeian government -
which was an ally of the government (see Sisk, 1995:218).
36They have met regularly in secret (see Sisk, 1995:219).
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the forthcoming parliamentary session (Du Pisani, 1994:36). Thus, three weeks after Bisho,
the government and the ANC signed the Record of Understanding at the conclusion of the
summit (Sarakinsky, 1995:75).
The four-page document included the following important agreements (Record of Under-
standing, 26 September1992; Du Pisani, 1994:37; Sisk, 1995:219; Sarakinsky, 1995:75):
∙ A democratically-elected constituent assembly with a ﬁxed time frame and which would
also serve as an interim parliament.
∙ The constituent assembly would draft a new constitution and special majorities would
apply to decisions.
∙ An interim constitution, which would include a bill of human rights, would guide an
interim Government of National Unity (GNU).
∙ The constituent assembly would be bound by those principles agreed upon in the
negotiated interim constitution.
∙ There would be adequate deadlock-breaking mechanisms.
∙ There would be legal continuity.
The Record also dealt with the phased release of political prisoners,37 the problems
concerning hostels and restrictions on the carrying and display of dangerous weapons. Gov-
ernment acknowledgement of the right to participate in mass action in accordance with the
provisions of the Accord and the Goldstone guidelines was noted. Furthermore, the ANC
reconﬁrmed its commitment to the code of conduct for political parties (Record of Under-
standing, 26 September1992; Du Pisani, 1994:37).
37In a press statement after the meeting Mandela declared that 150 political prisoners had already been
released in September, including Robert McBride of MK and Barend Strydom of the Wit Wolwe (White
Wolves), who had both been convicted for the killing of several people in politically inspired attacks (Race
Relations Survey 1992/1993:36). However, despite ﬁerce opposition, the Further Indemnity Act No. 151 of
1992 was passed in October. It made provision for the release of prisoners who had committed politically
motivated oﬀences and whose release could promote reconciliation and peace. A National Council on Indem-
nity was established for this purpose to consider each individual application for indemnity on merit. Between
February 1992 and May 1993, 1477 prisoners who were deemed to have committed political oﬀences, were
released (Race Relations Survey 1993/1994:616-617).
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These broad principles at once removed most of the obstacles, which caused CODESA to
fail. In addition it was agreed that the details of the agreement would be the subject of fur-
ther negotiations (Record of Understanding, 26 September 1992; Du Pisani, 1994:37). The
agreement was a turning point in the struggle between the two sides (Waldmeir, 1997:216-
217). It is important to note the compromise nature of the agreements in the Record of
Understanding, particularly, concerning the elected constituent assembly and the drafting
of a new constitution. The compromise met the ANC’s demand for such an elected con-
stituent assembly, but at the same time, it would be bound by “constitutional principles”
which would be negotiated at a negotiating forum. Thus, the interests of minorities would
be safeguarded against dominant majoritarianism, through these negotiated constitutional
principles (Sarakinsky, 1995:75). However, some perceived the compromise as a desperate
measure by the government to resume negotiations (see Waldmeir, 1997:216).
The nature of the Record of Understanding as a bilateral agreement between the gov-
ernment and the ANC (more speciﬁc a De Klerk/Mandela agreement) was problematic. Dr
Buthelezi was furious, felt that there was a conspiracy against him, objected and stated that
the Record of Understanding would not bind the IFP and the KwaZulu government. He
subsequently announced the IFP’s withdrawal from the negotiations (Race Relations Sur-
vey, 1992/1993:36; Waldmeir, 1997:218). Subsequently, Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana,
Gqozo of the Ciskei and Buthelezi of Kwazulu convened a conference in October 1992 as a
counter to the bilateral, Record of Understanding. Among the delegates were representa-
tives of the Afrikaner Freedom Foundation, the Afrikaner Volksunie, the CP and the IFP
(Du Pisani, 1994:38).38 The conference called for a halt to the implementation of the Record
of Understanding, the disbandment of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the replacement of CODESA
by a more representative forum. They persistently refused to rejoin negotiations until their
demands on federalism were met. Although the Record of Understanding was an impor-
tant step towards a settlement, its overall success in bridging divides was questioned by, for
example Friedman, (1993:166-167).
Both the government and the ANC were eager to speed up the process towards the




in previous months and De Klerk realised that he could not dictate to Parliament. In
October, he had to use the President’s Council to force the enactment of the unpopular
Further Indemnity Bill, after it had been rejected by Parliament. Furthermore, government
negotiators failed to bring the IFP and the right wing into the negotiation fold (Negotiation
News, 23 November 1992 in Du Pisani, 1994:39). Most problematic was the conﬁrmation
in the report of the Goldstone Commission that the security forces supported a third force
responsible for the fomenting of violence (Ebrahim, 1998:144).
The ANC also encountered problems. Diﬀerences over strategies surfaced in its ranks and
it experienced the erosion of its four pillars of struggle - mass action, international support,
underground structures and the armed struggle. Fear was expressed that an alignment of the
security forces with the reactionary right wing might pose a threat to hopes of a negotiated
settlement (Du Pisani, 1994:39). However, the major concessions made by the government in
the Record of Understanding gave the ANC a vital psychological boost. However, it was not
a victory for the ANC, but “a triumph of negotiation over conﬂict” (Waldmeir, 1997:218).
In October 1992, President de Klerk “promised”, universal franchise and an election for
all South Africans before his mandate came to an end within two years. However, before such
an election could take place, a transitional constitution would have to be negotiated. Thus,
a timetable was proposed for bilateral discussions on the resumption of negotiations. This
was to be followed by the reconvening of such a multi-lateral negotiating forum before the
end of March 1993. Furthermore, the establishment of a transitional executive council and
an election commission before the end of June 1993 was proposed, as well as the enactment
of a transitional constitution by the end of September 1993 and elections for a democratic
government of national unity by March or April 1994 (Du Pisani, 1994:39).
6.3.3 THE FEBRUARY 1993 “AGREEMENT”
To prepare for the resumption of negotiations, a series of bilateral talks between the govern-
ment and the ANC took place in December 1992, January 1993 and February 1993 (Ebrahim,
1998:145-147). Despite criticism from the IFP in particular, as well as from the international
community, the government and the ANC continued with their bilateral discussions in an at-
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tempt to approach new multi-party negotiations with as few diﬀerences as possible (Ebrahim,
1998:149-150).
These bilateral meetings dealt with the status of bilateral discussions, multi-lateral ne-
gotiations, time-frames, elections, an independent media commission, transitional arrange-
ments, drafting of a constitution, free political activity and violence (Ebrahim, 1998:145).
The issue of power-sharing was also raised (Friedman, 1993:161). De Klerk used this term to
pacify his constituency by implying that power-sharing was a form of coalition rule in which
minorities would continue to have control over their own destinies. However, for Mandela
power-sharing implied that he had to settle for something less than majority rule in which
the white minority might be able to block real change (The Star, 17 February 1993 in Du
Pisani, 1994:40). Thus, both were walking a tightrope because a mutually acceptable pact
might lead to the loss of support among their followers (Du Pisani, 1994:40).
The “agreement” reached in the February 1993 discussions were particularly signiﬁcant
because it represented a pledge, by the two major contending protagonists of a negotiated
settlement, on the essential path of the transition (Sisk, 1995:223-224). The following were
of particular importance (Sisk, 1995:223-224):
∙ The existing parliament would enact an interim constitution and bill of rights, to be
drafted by a new multi-party forum.
∙ A multi-party cabinet (TEC) would be responsible for governing and would oversee
broadcasting, ﬁnance and the security forces until a constituent assembly has been
elected.
∙ An independent electoral commission would be established.
∙ A multi-party demarcation commission would be established to make recommendations
on regions (“provinces”).
∙ Elections to a constituent assembly would make use of the system of proportional
representation.
∙ A multi-party interim government based on the results of the elections.
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∙ A two-thirds decision-rule would apply to the constituent assembly.
∙ The bicameral constituent assembly would function as an interim parliament.
∙ A ﬁve-year sunset clause for a government of national unity would apply.
∙ There will be new elections no later than ﬁve years after the elections for a constituent
assembly.
This was not a formal agreement, but it would be an important point of departure, since
the two parties pledged that its contents would be binding. Again, concern was expressed
over the bilateral nature of agreement. The IFP, AZAPO and the CP were particularly
upset by the “package deal”, but both De Klerk and Mandela assured them that no ﬁnal
agreements had been reached and that ﬁnal agreements would be left to a multi-party con-
ference (Du Pisani, 1994:40). However, the international community closely monitored these
bilateral negotiations and they were concerned about the marginalisation of the other actors,
particularly, the IFP (Ebrahim, 1998:146). Thus, both the government and the ANC held
bilateral talks with some of the other actors and most notably the PAC, IFP, CP and other
members of COSAG in general (Ebrahim, 1998:149-150).
Thus, South Africa has reached the stage where most parties either regarded multi-party
negotiations as inevitable or as necessary. The government had realised that it would not be
able to impose its will on the other parties, particularly the ANC, while the ANC realised
that it will not be able to force the government to capitulate. The playing ﬁeld was levelled,
but the ANC was clearly in an ascending position. It was more successful than the NP
to mobilise its constituents behind its actions. In this way, South Africa entered the ﬁnal
rounds of its transition.
6.3.4 COMPROMISE AND REOPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH
THE MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATING PROCESS
Important groundwork was done at CODESA, and important common ground reached be-
tween the two main contenders, namely the government and the ANC, in the Record of
Understanding and in the February agreement. However, the negotiations could not be
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brought to completion there and this goal was only achieved during the Multi-Party Nego-
tiating Process (MPNP)39 at the World Trade Centre, Kempton Park (Devenish, 1997:620;
Welsh, 1994:90).
The planning conference for a new multi-party negotiating forum took place on 5-6 March
1993 and was attended by representatives of twenty-six organisations and observers of eleven
other organisations. Thus, it was more inclusive than CODESA and included the CP, the
KwaZulu administration, the PAC and delegations of traditional leaders. AZAPO decided
not to attend (Du Pisani, 1994:44).40
The dissimilar goals of the main parties threatened the success of the planning conference.
The NP wanted a date for a new “CODESA”, the ANC a commitment to an election date,
the PAC a commitment to a constituent assembly, the IFP a commitment to a federal system
and the CP a commitment to cultural self-determination. Some parties even participated
to slow the negotiating process (Du Pisani, 1994:44). Nevertheless, the planning conference
was successful and delegates agreed to resume multi-party negotiations by April 1993. It was
resolved that decisions in the proposed multi-party forum would be taken by, the mentioned,
controversial principle of suﬃcient consensus (see Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:549).
This would prevent smaller parties from obstructing the negotiating process and would thus
ensure progress in the absence of unanimity. All participants committed themselves to work
towards the termination of violence. Mechanisms and procedures to be used, were left to
the multi-party forum (Du Pisani, 1994:44-45).
Multi-party negotiations resumed on 1 April 1993, when the MPNP met for the ﬁrst time
at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park. The planning committees had not been able
to agree on another name for the forum (Sisk, 1995:225).41 The dynamics at MPNP were
39It also became known as the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) with reference to its negotiating
forum, (see Du Pisani, 1994; Sarakinsky, 1994).
40CODESA parties that participated were: the ANC, the Ciskei administration, the DP, the Dikwankwetla
Party, the IFP, the Inyando ye Sizwe Party, the Inyandza National Movement, the Labour Party, the Natal
and Transvaal Indian Congresses, the NP, the National People’s Party, Solidarity, the SACP, the South
African government, the Transkei administration,, the United People’s Front, the Venda administration
and Ximoko xa Rixaka. New participants were: the AVU, CP, PAC, a delegation of traditional leaders
and a separate delegation from KwaZulu administration - thus solving the problem of representation of the
Zulu-monarch (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:543).




complex and comprehensive decisions had to be taken on a wide range of issues. In this
section attention will be paid to those most relevant to South Africa’s transition.
Unlike CODESA, the MPNP ultimately proved to be a success. Miraculously it survived
the political crises caused by the assassination of Chris Hani of the SACP,42 as well as
a SADF raid on a PAC house in Umtata. It also survived the storming of the World
Trade Centre by members of the AWB and their occupation of the Negotiating Council’s
chambers on 25 June 1993 (Devenish, 1997b:623; Sarakinsky, 1995:82). Furthermore, it
survived serious threats posed by continued township, and inter-party violence involving
ANC and IFP supporters, as well as allegations of police involvement in third force activities,
which caused tension between the three main political actors. Sporadic APLA attacks on
soft targets caused additional tensions (Du Pisani, 1994:46). Further threats were the IFP’s
unsuccessful challenge in the courts of the principle of “suﬃcient consensus”,43 as well as
walkouts staged by various members of COSAG (Sisk, 1995:230-232). Finally, the IFP only
participated in the elections through international mediation (Sarakinsky, 1995:81; Kotze,
1996:46-55).
Thus, the negotiation process had to overcome several diﬃculties and there were a variety
of factors which could have caused it to collapse. ANC negotiator, Vali Moosa, for example
said, “There are two aspects of negotiation - negotiating with the enemy, and negotiating
with ourselves. The latter is ten times more diﬃcult (Waldmeir, 1997:227).
STRUCTURES, PROCEDURES FOR, AND DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION
The structures for negotiations in the MPNP, was more eﬀective than at CODESA. A ﬁve-tier
structure for constitutional negotiations, was established. Instead of Working Committees,
a Negotiating Council became a vehicle for negotiations. The formal adoption of agreements
42His death led to violent demonstrations and a massive national stay-away. This threatened the new-
found sprit of co-operation at the MPNP, it also threatened the security of the country as emotions reached
fever pitch and negotiations were delayed for one week (Sarakinsky, 1995:79). In reaction to Hani’s death,
some ANC leaders proposed that negotiations should be suspended, but the oﬃcial view of the ANC-alliance
was that such a step would be a betrayal of what Hani had stood for and would play into the hands of the
murderers (Du Pisani, 1994:47). The ANC-alliance resolved that decisive action was needed to speed up a
political settlement (Race Relations Survey 1993/94, 1994:619-623, 626-632).




was the task of the plenary, which consisted of the party leader plus nine delegates (at least
one should be a woman),44 as well as two advisors per party. The Negotiating Forum, which
received and conﬁrmed, with or without amendments, reports from the Negotiating Council,
consisted of four delegates (at least one woman) plus two advisers per party. The Negotiating
Council was the most important structure for negotiations and decision-making. It consisted
of two delegates (at least one woman) and two advisers per party. The Planning Committee,
which set the agenda, consisted of ten members of the Negotiating Council, each appointed
in a personal capacity. The Technical Committees consisted of experts in particular ﬁelds,
appointed by the Negotiating Council. Furthermore, there were also two non-partisan com-
missions, which dealt with the demarcation of the regions (established on 28 May 1993)
and national symbols (August 1993).45 Administrative support was provided by the CBM
(Ebrahim, 1998:151-152, 158; Sisk, 1995:227; Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:545).
The MPNP picked up where CODESA and other talks left oﬀ and at its ﬁrst meeting,
the Negotiating Forum resolved that the Negotiating Council had to consider matters arising
from the CODESA negotiations (Sisk, 1995:226). The Negotiating Forum instructed the
Negotiating Council to consider and report on the consolidated report containing material
from CODESA (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:544). In addition, several constitutional
issues for transitional arrangements and a future political dispensation had to be considered.
These were the form of state and its basic constitutional principles, a transitional or interim
constitution, the form of transitional regional government, fundamental human rights during
the transition, a transitional executive council (TEC), an independent election committee, an
independent media committee and the future of the independent homelands (Race Relations
Survey, 1993/1994:544). The parties agreed to treat the agreements reached at CODESA as
points of reference and not as binding (Sisk, 1995:226).
At the end of April, the Negotiating Council established eight technical committees
to develop documentation on speciﬁed issues, which would be tabled at the Negotiating
Council, but no negotiations would take place in these committees (Race Relations Survey,
1993/1994:547). These committees were requested to investigate the following areas: the es-
44In March several women’s groups threatened to take action if women were not included (Race Relations
Survey, 1993/1994:544).
45The commission was mandated to submit designs for a new ﬂag and coat of arms to the Council.
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tablishment of a TEC; an independent media commission and telecommunications authority;
an independent electoral commission; an interim constitution and constitutional principles;
the repeal of legislation which inhibited free political activity or was racially discriminatory;
a bill of fundamental rights; violence; and the strengthening of the Accord (Sarakinsky,
1995:79-80; Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:547).
In spite of the multi-party forum, conﬁdential and bilateral negotiations at which diﬀer-
ences were bridged continued. In many instances, the compromises reached were presented
to the technical committee, which was instructed not to change any of the clauses or phrases
(Sarakinsky, 1995:84). Initially, progress was slow due to the delaying tactics of COSAG,
which demanded that debate around the future form of the state should precede debate on
all other matters (Du Pisani, 1994:47-48). A deadlock was reached at the end of June 1993,
because of the IFP and COSAG’s refusal to accept a proposal by the technical committee on
constitutional aﬀairs regarding the constitution-making procedure. The committee proposed
a two-phase process in which the Negotiating Council would draft an interim constitution,
after which an elected constitution-making body would write the ﬁnal constitution, based
on entrenched constitutional principles (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:547-548).
There were diﬀerences between the ANC and COSAG in general over the writing of
a “ﬁnal” constitution. The ANC was opposed to COSAG’s insistence that the Negotiating
Council, which was an unelected body, should draft the constitution in a single-phase process
(Du Pisani, 1994:49). The IFP wanted the MPNP to decide on a federal or unitary form
of state, after which a constitutional panel of experts could draft a constitution, submit it
to the multi-party forum for approval, after which the electorate had to decide its fate (Du
Pisani, 1994:52).
During August and September 1993, both the government and the ANC were involved in
a number of bilateral meetings with the IFP, after its withdrawal from the MPNP, to try to
resolve its criticisms and again involve it in the MPNP. However, the IFP refused to return to
negotiations until crucial decisions taken without its approval had been set aside. Buthelezi
proposed that a national convention of party leaders should review the constitutional chaos
in which the country found itself (Sarakinsky, 1995:81). Nevertheless, the negotiations went
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ahead in order to resolve, with or without “disgruntled” parties, outstanding issues.
The dynamics at the MPNP clearly demonstrated the domination of the negotiations by
the government and the ANC. Thus, other participants were often left with obstructive and
“blackmailing” tactics in order to feel that they had a contribution to make - this would
eventually lead to foreign “mediation” to resolve some issues, particularly on federalism.
Thus, the two dominant participants were in fact developing a middle ground in order to
take the transition forward.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR A FINAL CONSTITUTION
After numerous bilateral and multi-lateral meetings at the World Trade Centre, the Negotiat-
ing Council passed a resolution instructing the technical committee on constitutional aﬀairs
to draft a transitional, or interim, constitution. This was a compromise position between
the government and the ANC’s main position regarding a one- or a two-phase transition and
a constitution for a future political dispensation (Sarakinsky, 1995:82-90).
In order to accommodate the concerns of minority parties that a two-phase transition
would jeopardise their interests, the Negotiating Council approved on 1 July 1993, a set of
thirty-four constitutional principles on which a ﬁnal constitution was to be based. These
principles were fully entrenched, thus they could not be amended or repealed (Kotze, 1996:38;
Van Tonder, 1996:16-20; Du Pisani, 1994:50; Race Relations Survey 1993/1994:765-769).
Thus, the authors of the ﬁnal constitution in an elected constituent assembly were bound
by these principles and a constitutional court had to certify the compliance of the ﬁnal
constitution with these principles (Kotze, 1996:38).
Kotze (1996:39-40) groups the content of these principles into the following ﬁve categories:
∙ The transition period. Provision is made for an entrenched national executive. Unless
a vote of no conﬁdence in the cabinet was passed, no further national elections would
be held before 30 April 1999 and the transitional constitution would apply until that
date.
∙ The position of the constitution. It conﬁrmed the constitution as the supreme law of
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the land. This entails the establishment of constitutional sovereignty. Amendments to
the constitution would require special procedures and special majorities.
∙ Fundamental rights. The interim constitution introduced a bill of rights and a number
of constitutional principles entrenched, for example racial and gender equality, free-
doms and civil liberties, as well as equality of all before the law. Diversity of culture,
religion and language are also acknowledged and protected. Collective rights of self-
determination would be acknowledged and protected. Fair labour practises would be
protected.
∙ Democratic principles. These, inter alia, made provision for a democratic and repre-
sentative system of government on the national, provincial and local levels.
∙ The form of state and government. The principles provided for one sovereign state
in South Africa, a common South African citizenship and national unity. Legislative,
executive and judicial powers would be separated - the judiciary would be independent
- with the necessary checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power. The powers
of the national and provincial governments would be deﬁned and entrenched in the
constitution according to speciﬁed criteria. A framework for local government powers
would also be set out in the constitution. Traditional leadership and indigenous law
would be accommodated. State revenue would be equitably distributed among the
diﬀerent levels of government. Furthermore, the public service would be non-partisan
and broadly representative of the South African community. The security forces would
be utilised in the national interest and would not be allowed to get involved in party
politics. (Race Relations Survey 1993/1994:765-769).
The constitutional principles embodied the bridge, or compromise, between a one-phase
versus a two-phase transition - this divide was one of the reasons for the collapse of CODESA




DATE FOR INCLUSIVE ELECTIONS
Following the approval of the constitutional principles, the Negotiating Forum adopted on
2 July 1993 a recommendation by the Negotiating Council that an election for a transi-
tional parliament be held on 27 April 1994. The transitional parliament would also be a
constitution-making body responsible for drafting a “ﬁnal” constitution, but subject to the
abovementioned principles. However, before such an election could be held, a transitional
constitution would have to be ﬁnalised, as well as a number of other issues settled (Race
Relations Survey, 1993/1994:548).
COSAG argued against the adoption of the election date, because before an election
could be held, there should ﬁrst be agreement on the constitution. The PAC, though it
did not have a problem with the date, it also objected because it wanted the resolution to
stipulate explicitly that the election would be for a constituent assembly (Race Relations
Survey, 1993/1994:548).
Despite the opposition of seven of the twenty-six participants, the chair ruled that suf-
ﬁcient consensus existed for the adoption of the election date.46 In protest, the delegations
of the CP, and the governments of KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei claimed that the
ANC and the government had manipulated the talks and that Mandela and De Klerk had
agreed to the election date secretly. They subsequently walked out of the negotiating cham-
ber (Du Pisani, 1994:51).47 However, the withdrawal of some delegations did not stop the
negotiating process. The Negotiating Council continued with its work (Du Pisani, 1994:52).
The announcement of the election date saw an escalation in violence and in the four days
that followed, 130 died in violence between the IFP and the ANC (Sisk, 1995:232). This was
followed by a threat of secession by the Zulu-monarch and a warning by the CP that South
Africa could turn into another Bosnia. There was also an upsurge of violent attacks by the
PAC and its military wing (Sisk, 1995:232).
46This led to the IFP’s challenge in court of the principle of suﬃcient consensus (Race Relations Survey,
1993/1994:549).
47COSAG continued to exist despite the fact that from time to time some of its members found themselves
outside and others inside the Negotiating Council. Through ongoing bilateral talks with members of COSAG




The ﬁnalisation of the election date gave both direction and urgency to the negotiation
process. After all, before an election could take place, several outstanding issues had to be
dealt with satisfactorily. However, this would also be a major criticism against the workings
of the MPNP, for this created the context for hasty compromises and rushing decisions
through. The government in particular often gave in to deadlines in order not to loose face
(see Waldmeir, 1997:228-234).
REGIONS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA
The boundaries, functions and powers of the regions in a future South Africa was one of
the contentious issues to be addressed before elections could take place. This was not only
required to determine the nature and powers of the regions, but also for electoral purposes.
There were already calls for two ballot papers - one for national elections and another for
regional elections.
Already, steps were taken towards the reincorporation of the non-independent home-
lands. The six non-independent homelands and the four provinces had agreed in February
1993 on the amalgamation of their administrations and two acts, gazetted in July 1993,
were particularly important in providing for the joint administration of the homelands and
the adjoining provinces (Race Relations Survey 1993/1994:503-504).48 However, there were
diﬀerences among the stakeholders on how South Africa should be divided into regions.
The Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of States/Provinces/Regions, tabled
its ﬁrst report in the Negotiating Council in August 1993.49 It recommended a division
into nine regions, namely the Eastern Cape/Kei, the Eastern Transvaal, KwaZulu/Natal,
Northern Cape, Northern Transvaal, the Northwest Province, Orange Free State, Pretoria/
Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) and the Western Cape. Although there was remarkable
agreement, there was not consensus on the report. One member of the commission was
concerned that there was insuﬃcient consultation at grassroots level while another was of
48The Joint Administration of Certain Matters Act No. 99 of 1993 and the Revocation and Assignment
of Powers of Self-governing Territories Act No. 107 of 1993,
49The report stated that the most important concerns pertaining to the demarcation of regions were
the promotion of a democratic culture by bringing the government closer to the people, the creation of
an environment conducive to economic development and nation-building through the acknowledgement of
diversity and the reduction of conﬂict (Du Pisani, 1994:53).
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the opinion that the issue of a Volkstaat should also be addressed. The Negotiating Council
mandated the commission to consult further with interested parties and to submit another
report with further recommendations. The commission had to bear in mind the abovemen-
tioned constitutional principles, as well as oral and written submissions by interest groups
and the public (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:545-546).
A ﬁnal report was accepted and the interim constitution subsequently made provision for
nine provinces as proposed above and a schedule to the constitution deﬁned the boundaries
of each (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:553).50
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
During August and September 1993, the Negotiating Council approved a package of legis-
lation for the transitional period. These bills were enacted by the existing parliament51 in
September 1993 as the Independent Media Commission Act No. 148 of 1993, the Indepen-
dent Electoral Commission Act No. 150 of 1993, the Independent Broadcasting Authority
Act No. 153 of 1993 and the Transitional Executive Council Act No. 151 of 1993 (Race
Relations Survey, 1993/1994:497-498). These acts were aimed at giving statutory status to
power-sharing in the interim period before the elections set for April 1994.
The Independent Media Act52 provided for the establishment of an Independent Media
Commission (IMC). Its purpose was to promote and create a climate favourable to political
participation and free and fair elections by ensuring the equal treatment of all political
parties by the broadcasting services and that state ﬁnanced publications would not favour
any political party (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:510).
The Independent Electoral Commission Act established the Independent Electoral Com-
mission (IEC), which was to ensure free and fair elections for a transitional government. A
sub-council, the Election Administration Directorate was charged with arranging and over-
seeing the elections, provision of voter education and enforcing the electoral code of conduct
50Eastern Cape/Kei was to be Eastern Cape.
51Note, however, that the President’s Council was dissolved on 17 June 1993 (Race Relations Survey,
1993/1994:497).
52The CP voted against the bill in Parliament for it believed that it would provide control of the media
by the ANC (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:510).
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(Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:511).
The Independent Broadcasting Authority Act , established the Independent Broadcasting
Authority (IBA), was tasked with the regulating of broadcasting in the public interest (Race
Relations Survey, 1993/1994:512).
The purpose of the Transitional Executive Council Act (TEC)53 was to “facilitate, in
conjunction with all legislative and governmental structures at national, regional and local
levels the transition to and preparation for the implementation of a democratic order in
South Africa” (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:504). This was for the interim period un-
til free and fair elections were held. Each negotiating party, which renounced violence and
undertook in writing to be bound by TEC decisions would be entitled to one representa-
tive on the council. The TEC could include additional members from parties not involved
in the negotiations and from the administrations and political parties in the independent
homelands (Du Pisani, 1994:57-58). In the latter case subject to appropriate legislation in
the independent states (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:505). The legislation pertaining
to the TEC, was to apply to South Africa and the non-independent homelands (Du Pisani,
1994:58).
It was a statutory body with powers to keep the present and still ruling NP-government
in legal check, and was intended to level the playing ﬁeld in the run-up to the elections, by
ensuring an environment conducive to free and fair elections. On 26 November 1993, State
President de Klerk signed a proclamation establishing the TEC and its ﬁrst meeting was
held on 8 December 1993. Sixteen delegates attended, but the PAC, the AVF and the FA
did not participate (Du Pisani, 1994:67).54
The TEC would have several sub-councils. The following are important (Du Pisani,
1994:57-58; Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:505-508):
53The USA responded favourably to the passing of the act by lifting government sanctions against South
Africa (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:510).
54When the TEC Bill was tabled in Parliament in September 1993, the CP and the IFP opposed it. The
CP leader, Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg, viewed the legislation as the judicial transfer of power to the ANC/SACP
alliance. His party favoured elections among Afrikaners only and a separate government for Afrikaners. The
CP registered its disapproval of the bill by walking out of Parliament and giving notice that it would not
participate in proceedings for the rest of the parliamentary session (Du Pisani, 1994:60). Other COSAG
members also rejected the legislation. There were threats of a possible civil war in right-wing ranks (Du




∙ A sub-council on regional and local government and traditional authorities would mon-
itor and direct all developments pertaining to these authorities.
∙ A sub-council on law and order, stability and security would control policing. It had
to draw up and enforce a code of conduct applicable to policing agencies. It also had
to investigate all aspects of policing and complaints of police misconduct and evaluate
steps to prevent political violence.
∙ Military aﬀairs were to be regulated by a sub-council on defence. It was tasked to
monitor the activities of any military force likely to have an adverse eﬀect on the object
of the TEC. A national peacekeeping force, composed of members of all military forces
in South Africa, was to be established.
∙ A ﬁnance sub-council would have to monitor economic policy objectives and targets
for the 1994/1995 ﬁscal year and would have to be consulted on all budgetary aﬀairs.
This sub-council would be empowered to initiate disciplinary investigations into the
conduct of public servants.
∙ An intelligence sub-council would constitute a joint coordinating intelligence committee
to monitor and regulate intelligence matters.
∙ A sub-council on foreign aﬀairs would make recommendations on foreign policy. Its
objectives would be to achieve consensus on foreign policy, to promote international
relations and to secure international assistance and contributions to the peaceful tran-
sition to democracy in South Africa.
∙ A sub-council on the status of women would ensure the full participation of women in
the transitional phase.
The TEC was to be provided by copies of all proposed legislation and if it was of the
opinion that any legislation could have a negative eﬀect on the transition, request that it
not be implemented (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:508). Decisions of the TEC were to
be based on consensus, but in the absence of consensus the agreement of seventy-ﬁve per
cent of the members were suﬃcient for a decision. In the case of the other sub-councils, a
two-thirds majority was deemed suﬃcient (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:508).
403
Chapter 6
The establishment of the TEC signalled the loosening of the NP-government’s grip on
political power. Although the TEC was not an alternative government, it was perceived as
signalling the dawn of a new dispensation - “from this point onwards, the NP lost its sole
authority as the governing party” (Ebrahim, 1998:162).
Unfortunately, its rejection by several parties, such as the CP, IFP, PAC and the AVF,
indicated that South Africa had not yet solved all concerns pertaining to a future political
dispensation. The AVF and CP rejected the TEC and said that it would establish its own
transitional government to protect Afrikaner interests. After bilateral talks between the
AVF and the ANC, an agreement was drawn up, which provided for a joint working group
to investigate the feasibility of an Afrikaner volkstaat.
THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION
As mentioned the technical committee was instructed to draft an interim constitution, which
would make provision for (Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:548):
∙ The election of a constitution-making body, a legislature and a government for the
transitional phase and which would include national and regional components.
∙ The election of regional legislatures and the establishment of regional governments for
the transition period;
∙ The deﬁnition of the powers, functions and structures of regions for the transitional
period;
∙ The deﬁnition of fundamental human rights during the transition period; and
∙ The establishment of a constitutional court or tribunal to ensure the justiciability of
the constitutional principles, fundamental rights and the constitution itself.
During the ﬁnal weeks, the discussions in the Negotiating Council developed into a race
to ﬁnalise the constitutional package in time for ratiﬁcation by the plenary session before
the start of the parliamentary session. The decision-making style at these marathon sessions
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of the Negotiating Council and its technical committees was often referred to as “consensus
by exhaustion” (Du Pisani, 1994:63; Ebrahim, 1997:168)
On 17 November 1993, the plenary session of the multi-party negotiations began in order
to approve the transitional package negotiated over a period of eight months and after almost
two years of formal negotiations. The plenary session continued past midnight and endorsed
(without the presence of the FA) the complete transitional package, including the four acts
passed by Parliament in September and the draft transitional constitution, as well as other
agreements made in the Negotiating Council and the Negotiating Forum. The plenary
session mandated the Negotiating Council to make technical amendments to the transitional
legislation, to resolve outstanding issues in the interim constitution, to complete the work
of the multi-party negotiating process and to establish the TEC as its own successor (Du
Pisani, 1994:64-65; Ebrahim, 1997:171-172). The adoption of the transitional package was
hailed both nationally and internationally as a milestone on the way to democracy in South
Africa.
The ﬁnal interim constitution, which was passed in Parliament on 22 December 1993, by
273 votes to 45, as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 200 of 1993, was
the product of a complex and extensive negotiation process. Several drafts were tabled in the
Negotiating Council. The ﬁrst, as part of a progress report, was tabled on 23 July 1993, while
the ﬁnal text was produced on 18 November 1993 (Van Tonder, 1996:12; Du Pisani, 1994:56;
Ebrahim, 1998:170; Race Relations Survey, 1993/1994:551-560; Wessels, 1994:141).55 The
result was a cumbersome constitutional document that miraculously satisﬁed each of the
main parties at the MPNP (Sarakinsky, 1995:84). The inability of the main parties to reach
a settlement with the FA delayed the enactment of the interim constitution and during its
submission in Parliament the CP and the IFP voted against it (Du Pisani, 1994:68).
The TEC decided to extend the deadline for amendments to the constitution to 24
January 1994 in order to leave the door open for the FA to join the political process. Apart
from the TEC the other transitional structures also came into operation. Thus, by the end
of 1993 the bulk of the negotiating process to create a new non-racial democratic political
55It was promulgated in the Government Gazette No. 15466 of 28 January, 1994 (Wessels, 1994:141).
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dispensation in South Africa had been completed (Du Pisani, 1994:68).
The following are important stipulations and provisions of the constitution as approved
by Parliament (Act 200 of 1993).
∙ The constitution deﬁnes the Republic of South Africa as one sovereign state. It fur-
thermore made provision for national symbols, eleven oﬃcial languages, and for the
constitution as the supreme law of the Republic.
∙ The rights and duties of citizens are spelt out and the voting age is set at eighteen
years and older.
∙ A wide range of fundamental rights is dealt with. The principle of equality is of
particular importance and provides protection against discrimination. However, it
made provision for aﬃrmative action in order to address historic disadvantages.
∙ Provision is made for a bicameral parliament as the legislative authority, and it would
consist of the National Assembly (lower house) and the Senate (upper house). The
National Assembly would consist of 400 members elected by voters in accordance with
the system of proportional representation as provided for in the Electoral Act No.
202 of 1993. It furthermore speciﬁed the criteria for membership of Parliament. The
Senate would be composed of ten senators for each province, nominated by the par-
ties represented in a provincial legislature within ten days of the ﬁrst sitting of such
legislature after an election of a provincial legislature, or an election of the National
Assembly. Furthermore, each party represented in a provincial legislature shall be enti-
tled to nominate a senator or senators for the relevant province in accordance with the
principle of proportional representation. Provision was also made for joint sittings of
the National Assembly and the Senate and the President of the Republic may request,
by a message to the Speaker and the President of the Senate, that a joint sitting of
the National Assembly and the Senate be convened.
∙ It was speciﬁed that the National Assembly and the Senate, sitting jointly for the
purposes of drafting a new constitution, would be the Constitutional Assembly. It was
further speciﬁed that the text of the new constitution should comply with the constitu-
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tional principles contained in Schedule 4 of the constitution (as discussed above); and
the text of the new constitution should be passed by the Constitutional Assembly in
accordance with speciﬁed rules and procedures within two years of its ﬁrst sitting. A
two-thirds majority would apply. It was also speciﬁed that the new constitutional text
passed by the Constitutional Assembly, or any provision thereof, shall not be of any
force and eﬀect unless the Constitutional Court has certiﬁed that all the provisions of
such text comply with the said constitutional principles. Furthermore, the decision of
the Constitutional Court shall be ﬁnal and binding, and no court of law shall have ju-
risdiction to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of such text or any provision
thereof. During the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly, the Constitutional
Court may be approached for an opinion.
∙ Provision is made for an executive president indirectly elected by a majority vote in the
National Assembly; or the National Assembly and the Senate shall thereafter, as often
as it becomes necessary to elect a President, elect at a joint sitting one of the members
of the National Assembly as the President. Provision is also made for Executive Deputy
Presidents and each party that holds at least eighty seats in the National Assembly
shall be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President from among the members
of the National Assembly. If no party, or only one party hold eighty or more seats in
the National Assembly, the party holding the largest number of seats and the party
holding the second largest number of seats shall each be entitled to designate one
Executive Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly. The
Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Executive Deputy Presidents and not more
than twenty-seven Ministers who are members of Parliament. Not more than one
Minister who is not a member of Parliament can be appointed in consultation with the
Executive Deputy Presidents and the leaders of the participating parties. Furthermore,
a party holding at least twenty seats in the National Assembly and which has decided
to participate in the government of national unity, shall be entitled to be allocated
proportionally one or more of the Cabinet portfolios. Provision is also made for Deputy
Ministers on a similar basis.
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∙ Provision is made for an independent judiciary and the Constitutional Court and its
jurisdiction, as well as the appointment of judges to the court.
∙ Provision is also made for the public protector, human rights commission, commission
on gender issues and the restitution of land rights.
∙ The constitution makes provision for the abovementioned nine provinces, each with
its own legislative authority, premier, executive council and constitution. The size of
each legislature would vary with not less than thirty and not more than one hundred
members. The provincial premiers will be appointed by the provincial legislature from
its own ranks. Furthermore, a party holding at least ten per cent of the seats in a
provincial legislature and which has decided to participate in the Executive Council,
shall be entitled to be allocated one or more of the Executive Council portfolios on
a proportional basis. Provisions are also made for the ﬁnances of provinces. Each
province should also adopt its own constitution.
∙ Provision is also made for an elaborate system of local government.
∙ Chapter eleven of the constitution makes provision for the role of traditional leaders
and each province in which there are traditional authorities and communities, shall
establish a House of Traditional Leaders consisting of representatives elected or nom-
inated by such authorities in the province. Provision is also made for a Council of
Traditional Leaders. The same chapter also makes provision for a Volkstaat Council
consisting of twenty members elected by members of Parliament who support the es-
tablishment of a Volkstaat for those who want it. The Council will be a constitutional
mechanism to enable proponents of the idea of a Volkstaat to pursue constitutionally
the establishment of such a Volkstaat.
∙ Provision is also made for the ﬁnance, the public service and provincial public services,
police service and the establishment of a National Defence Force.
∙ Chapter ﬁfteen of the constitution deals with general and transitional arrangements
which provides for the continuation and repeal of laws and the rationalisation of the
public service as well as a quest for national unity.
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There are several characteristics to the interim constitution. Firstly, it entrenched the
principle of constitutional instead of parliamentary sovereignty, as was the case with the
previous constitutions in South Africa (Sarakinsky, 1995:84). Secondly, it complied with the
idea that a constitutional state was only possible if there was a clear separation of powers be-
tween the executive, legislature and judiciary (Sarakinsky, 1995:84). Thirdly, power-sharing
was made possible by the government of national unity as provided for by the principle of
“proportionality” in the various executives.56 Some were of the opinion that this was an at-
tempt to make provision for the NP leader, FW de Klerk, to hold a high-proﬁle position as it
was estimated by numerous opinion polls prior to the election that the NP would win around
twenty per cent of the vote (Sarakinsky, 1995:84). Providing for the old in the new, had the
added advantage of securing continuity in the administration of South Africa. However, the
ANC accepted the parameters of multi-party rule, but rejected provisions that might allow
smaller parties to obstruct the majority party from implementing its policies (Sarakinsky,
1995:86).
Fourthly, the ANC made signiﬁcant compromises to address the concerns of minorities
(contrary to IFP claims). As a result, elected provincial governments were created with
wide-ranging powers in speciﬁed areas, limited by the constraint of the national legislature
that had concurrent powers regarding certain matters (Sarakinsky, 1995:85). Provincial
interests were also protected in the Senate. The Council of Traditional Leaders, as well as
the Volkstaat Council, was of additional importance in this regard. Thus, to the ANC the
constitution was less unitary than it would have liked, while to others it was less federal
than what they would have liked. This is clearly an indication of the nature of compromises
that were made during negotiations. However, the controversy over provincial powers led to
the IFP walking out of the MPNP even though it is an area of ambiguity in most federal
constitutions walking (Sarakinsky, 1995:85). International mediation, however, managed to
secure the IFP’s participation in the elections at the very last moment.
56The PAC opposed the idea of power-sharing. This would however, be the situation until 1999.
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EVALUATION OF THE MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATION PROCESS
The legitimacy of the negotiating process was beyond doubt. It was accepted internationally,
it was backed by the media and it had the support of the majority of all South Africans.
According to estimates, the participating parties in the multi-party negotiations represented
more than eighty per cent of the electorate. These estimates were borne out by the election
results. Therefore, the negotiating process can be regarded as inclusive (Du Pisani, 1994:69).
It was also for all practical purposes an indigenous process, which led to an indigenous
constitution and set of transitional arrangements.
However, some criticism was levelled against the nature and outcomes of the negotiating
process. Firstly, the whole process was dominated from start to ﬁnish by the NP and
the ANC, thus making it a two-party aﬀair in which crucial decisions depended on secret
deals struck between a party with state power and one enjoying the legitimacy of mass
support (Du Pisani, 1994:68). The government and the ANC were often locked in intensive
bilateral talks to thrash out unresolved matters such as oﬃcial languages, local and regional
government, a future police force, the integration of the defence force, the constitutional
court, the protection of property rights, the right of employers to lock out striking workers,
deadlock-breaking mechanisms in the constitution-making process and executive decision-
making (Du Pisani, 1994:63). The ruling NP was, in fact, negotiating the conditions of its
surrender to its successor. The smaller parties’ primary role, with some exceptions, was
limited to giving the process legitimacy (Du Pisani, 1994:68).
Secondly, instrumental in the two-party aﬀair, was the principle of “suﬃcient consensus”.
Some of the important deals on the interim constitution were reached by means of suﬃcient
consensus or simply pushed through the Negotiating Council (Sarakinsky, 1995:86). One
example of this occurred when the issue of the powers and functions of central and regional
government were debated. The ANC/government deal on these matters was introduced min-
utes before the scheduled dinner break and the document was passed by suﬃcient consensus
just before the MPNP adjourned (Sarakinsky, 1995:86).
Thirdly, although progress was necessary, feelings by “lesser parties” of having been
marginalised, lingered on and could have had dire consequences for the rest of the transition.
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However, some of these demands were irreconcilable and a strategy for progress thus often
made it necessary to by-pass opposing views.
Fourthly, the process was basically elitist and undemocratic. Criticism came from radical
quarters regarding the fact that the general population of South Africa had elected none of
the delegates at the negotiations. Therefore, it was not a democratic expression of the
will of the people. However, given the deep divisions in the South African society, an
amicable settlement at grass roots level was impossible (Du Pisani, 1994:69). The two-
phase transition strategy addressed some of these issues in the sense that the Constitutional
Assembly responsible for the ﬁnal constitution was an elected body.
Fifthly, it was claimed that the negotiating process was not transparent enough. Major
decisions were made behind closed doors without the opportunity for wide-ranging public
debate (Du Pisani, 1994:69). In essence, most agreements were, as said, forged through
conﬁdential bilateral meetings between the ANC and the NP government, although smaller
parties clariﬁed some of the details, for example in the case on the procedure for appoint-
ing the Constitutional Court, the DP ensured that a Judicial Commission in addition to
the majority party would veto candidates (Sarakinsky, 1995:86). Observers were, however,
of the opinion that the process had been more transparent than other negotiations under
comparable circumstances (Du Pisani, 1994:69).
Sixthly, criticism against the negotiating process was that in the end it was concluded in
an unseemly rush to meet deadlines and later “consensus through exhaustion” (Du Pisani,
1994:63). The result was an untidy, inelegant and ﬂawed transitional package. In the
light of the ongoing violence and the impatience of the black majority this was, however,
unavoidable (Du Pisani, 1994:69-70). Again, the two-phase strategy, provided opportunities
for addressing some of the most serious concerns.
Seventhly, although the ANC and the South African government produced a constitu-
tional deal that guaranteed minority protection through constitutional rule, a multi-party
cabinet and the oﬃces of deputy presidents, there were no agreements on the procedures




Eighthly, although the interim constitution declared that the cabinet strove for consensus,
no conditions were stipulated to institutionalise this consensus. As a result, the conventions
that developed at the MPNP, coupled with the experience of the statutory provisions in the
TEC would allow cabinet members to settle matters of disagreement through conventions
and informal and personal relationships (Sarakinsky, 1995:86).
6.4 THE TRANSITION AND THE OUTCOME OF THE
1994-ELECTIONS
As mentioned transitions to democratic rule usually take place with the event of the ﬁrst
free, fair and competitive elections. Thus, the period being researched in this study, ends
with the ﬁrst democratic elections and the inauguration of a new set of incumbents and the
activation of the new democratic institutions. It is therefore necessary to have a look at this
ﬁnal stage of the transition process in South Africa.
The time that lapsed after the approval of the transition package and the elections, was
taken up by last attempts to involve the FA, particularly the IFP, and on election campaigns
(Ebrahim, 1997:175-176). Amendments were made to enhance the powers of the provinces
and the Electoral Act was amended to extend the deadline for the registration of political
parties. After successful mediation, the IFP decided to participate in the elections but the
CP did not. It was left to the newly founded Freedom Front to represent the interests of the
more conservative and traditional Afrikaners (Ebrahim, 1997:175-176).
The interim Constitution came into force on 27 April 1994 with voting taking place as
scheduled. However, a number of logistical diﬃculties (which were compounded by the IFP’s
late decision to contest the elections) and a shortage of voting materials were reported, and
widespread delays occurred. An estimated 22.7 million voters had the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the country’s ﬁrst-ever open and free election. The electoral system that applied
was proportional representation with party-lists. On 28 April, voting was extended by one
day in KwaZulu/Natal and other regions aﬀected by administrative problems. There were
reports of electoral malpractice, which were apparently due to the organisational diﬃculties.
Nevertheless, the IEC declared that the elections were free and fair (Europa, 1998:3067).
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The oﬃcial election results was delayed, owing, in part to disputed ballots in KwaZulu/Natal,
which necessitated negotiations between the IFP and the ANC. De Klerk conceded defeat,
on 2 May, after partial results indicated a substantial majority in favour of the ANC. Shortly
afterwards it was announced that the ANC had secured a majority of votes. The National
Assembly elected on 9 May 1994, Mr Nelson Mandela as President and he was inaugurated
on 10 May in a ceremony attended by several foreign dignitaries.
ELECTION RESULTS: PARLIAMENT
Table 6.1 provide a summary of the election results per party for both the National Assembly
and the Senate.
TABLE 6.1: Election Results National Assembly and Senate




ANC 122,376 62.6 252 60
NP 39,837 20.4 82 17
IFP 20,583 10.5 43 5
FF 424 600 2.2 9 5
DP 338 400 1.7 7 3
PAC 243 500 1.3 5 -
ACDP 88 100 0.5 2 -
Remaining 12 169 300 0.7 - -
Spoilt papers 147 800 0.7 - -
TOTAL 196,814 100 400 90
Note. Totals not exact due to rounding oﬀ.
Source: Faure, 1996:95.
RESULTS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
The National Assembly consisted of four hundred members, of which two hundred were
elected from a national list and two hundred from provincial lists by a system of proportional
representation. Each party thus had a number of seats based on the share of the votes gained
by that party in the elections.
Table 6.1 shows that the three largest parties netted more than ninety per cent of the
votes cast for the National Assembly. The ANC thus obtained 62.6 percent of the votes
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cast and 252 seats in the National Assembly and consequently, the ANC failed to obtain a
parliamentary majority of two-thirds, which, under the terms of the interim constitution,
would have allowed the ANC to draft and adopt the new constitution without consulting
other parties.
The Chief Justice swore in the members of the National Assembly on Monday 9 May at
the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town (Kotze H, 1996:254). A signiﬁcant number of seats
were ﬁlled by women.57 There were 101 women out of 400 in the National Assembly, partic-
ularly among ANC members. Dr Frene Ginwala, of the ANC (a woman) became the Speaker
of the National Assembly. Seventy-nine per cent of the members were new to Parliament
and this provides an indication of the challenges that transitions bring with them (see Kotze
H, 1996:255). It is not clear how representative the members of the National Assembly were
of the general population. This is particularly a problem that is encountered with party lists
where there often is little contact between the representatives and the electorate.
THE SENATE
The Senate consisted of ninety members, that is, ten senators for each of the nine provinces,
irrespective of diﬀerences in population, size and economic power. Thus, there is over repre-
sentation in the Senate of provinces with smaller populations, but the equal representation of
provinces in the Senate supposedly reﬂects a feature that is typical of federal arrangements
(Faure, 1996:96).
Each provincial legislature elected senators in proportion to the party’s support in that
province. The ANC again obtained a majority with sixty out of the ninety seats. Chief
Justice Corbet swore in the senators, of which sixteen were women, on 20 May 1994 in Cape
Town (Kotze, 1996:258).
Kobie Coetzee of the NP and a former Minister of Justice, was the presiding oﬃcer
(president) of the Senate and he was assisted by the deputy president of the Senate, Govan
57These ﬁgures placed South Africa seventh on the list of representativeness of women in Parliament -
exceptional in developing states (Davis, 1995:17 in Kotze H, 1996:255). It was the determination of the
ANC Women’s League, which had more than 700 branches countrywide, to ﬁll at least one-third of the
ANC election list with women that was to a large extent responsible for this high percentage of women in
Parliament (Kotze and Greyling, 1994:82-83; in Kotze H, 1996:255).
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Mbeki of the ANC. The members of Senate elected both oﬃcials unopposed, because the two
strongest parties, the ANC and the NP, concluded agreements in advance on the election of
oﬃce-bearers - this was also the case with the oﬃcials in the National Assembly (Kotze H,
1996:258).
THE EXECUTIVE
President Nelson Mandela’s ﬁrst cabinet put the principle of power-sharing enunciated by
South Africa’s interim Constitution into practice, namely the Government of National Unity
(GNU). The cabinet included ministers from three parties, namely the ANC, the NP and
IFP in accordance with the provisions of the interim Constitution, which entitled any party
with twenty or more of the four hundred seats in the National Assembly to a proportional
representation in the cabinet (Reynolds, 1999:3-4). A Cabinet of National Unity, comprising
eighteen representatives of the ANC, six of the NP and three of the IFP, was subsequently
formed (Kotze, 1995:262).
Three of the twenty-seven ministers were women. Joe Slovo was appointed Minister of
Housing and Welfare, while a former Commander of the MK, Joe Modise, became Minister
of Defence (Europa, 2000:1002). The NP retained a number of portfolios, including that
of ﬁnance. Despite speculation that he would refuse a cabinet post, Buthelezi accepted the
portfolio of home aﬀairs. The appointment of Winnie Mandela as a deputy minister was
widely interpreted as an attempt to prevent her from criticising the new administration
(Europa, 1998:3067).
In addition, the interim constitution also permitted the President to appoint one minister
from outside the membership of the National Assembly. As a gesture to the markets, and to
instill economic conﬁdence generally, the ANC agreed to the appointment of Derek Keyes,
who stepped aside not long afterwards to allow another banker, Chris Liebenberg, to take
over in October 199458 (Reynolds, 1999:4).
The NP, which secured a majority in the province of Western Cape, received the stipu-
58It was only in the cabinet reshuﬄe that followed the departure of the NP from the GNU in May 1996,




lated percentage of the national vote entitling it to nominate a Deputy President. Mandela
subsequently appointed a senior oﬃcial of the ANC, Thabo Mbeki, as the First Deputy Pres-
ident, while De Klerk, as expected, was nominated as the Second Deputy President (Europa,
1998:3067).
The GNU did not survive ﬁve years. In May 1996 De Klerk told a packed Good Hope
Chamber press conference at parliament that he was taking the NP out of cabinet. It was
clear that the NP, used to wielding power for almost ﬁve decades, found it diﬃcult to make
a transition to being minors in the executive. De Klerk had found this hardest of all, he was
still in cabinet, but no longer in power. It was not a unanimous decision because many NP
leaders would have preferred to remain in power, despite the diﬃculties that this presented
as far as electoral strategy was concerned (Reynolds, 1999:6).
Meanwhile, the IFP not only remained a part of the GNU but also played its part in the
growing sense of rapprochement between the two parties which shared such a bitter contested
past, especially in KwaZulu-Natal. This co-operation outlived the interim Constitution, after
the 1999 election, in the newly formed Mbeki government the IFP retained its three cabinet
seats even though the ﬁnal constitution brought an end to the power-sharing requirement
(Reynolds, 1999:6).
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY
The National Assembly and the Senate jointly constituted the Constitutional Assembly. The
ANC consequently held a slightly higher majority in the Constitutional Assembly (312 out
of 490) than in the National Assembly, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain a majority of two-
thirds. The Secretary-General of the ANC and chief negotiators during CODESA and the
MPNP, Cyril Ramaphosa, was subsequently elected chair of the Constitutional Assembly
(Europa, 1998:3067).
In drafting the constitution the Constitutional Assembly had to take note of the consti-
tutional principles and other stipulations in the interim constitution, thus it was tasked to
produce a constitution that would be both legitimate and enduring (Ebrahim, 1997:177).
Thus, it would function under diﬀerent conditions than the MPNP.
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Negotiations within the Constitutional Assembly intensiﬁed in late April 1996, prior to
the adoption of the new Constitution in early May. There were major disagreements between
the ANC and the NP in the areas of labour relations, because of the NP’s wish to enshrine
the right of employers to exclude striking workers from their premises. There were also
diﬀerences with regard to language and education because the NP advocated that Afrikaans
should be protected as a principal language used in some schools and universities. Prop-
erty rights, cultural rights and self-determination were further issues. At the end of April,
COSATU organised a general strike to demonstrate its opposition to any ANC compromise
on these issues (Ebrahim, 1997:203-212). The IFP, in turn, argued for a greater role for
traditional leaders in regional and local government than the other parties would accept
(Europa, 2000:1004).
On 8 May 1996, Parliament approved the ﬁnal version of the Constitution, with the NP
voting in favour in spite of its reservations over some provisions, including those on labour
relations, which omitted the clause permitting employers to exclude striking workers from
their premises. It was reported that the NP decided to endorse the constitution’s adoption
in order to avoid a referendum in which a version of the constitution excluding concessions
made by the ANC might have been presented to the electorate (Europa, 2000:1004).
The new constitution incorporated an extensive Bill of Rights and provided for the es-
tablishment of a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural,
Religious and Linguistic Communities, which was in part intended to guarantee the rights
of the white minority. A National Council of Provinces was to replace the existing Senate,
and was designed to increase the inﬂuence of the provinces on the policy of the central gov-
ernment, but it still fell short of the provincial powers demanded by the IFP (Reynolds,
1999:8-9).
On 6 September 1996, the Constitutional Court ruled that the new constitution, which
had been approved in May, failed to comply with the constitutional principles entrenched in
the interim constitution in eight respects, notably with regard to the powers of the provinces,
which the Court deemed insuﬃcient (Ebrahim,1997:225, 229). The Constitutional Assembly
was to amend the document accordingly within a period of ninety days.59
59In a separate ruling, the Court rejected an alternative constitution that had been drafted by Buthelezi,
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The amended Constitution was approved by both chambers of Parliament on 11 Octo-
ber, with the ANC and the NP having negotiated a slight increase in the powers of the
provinces. The new Constitution was returned to the Constitutional Court for ﬁnal endorse-
ment, and was promulgated by the President at a ceremony in Sharpeville on 10 December
1996 (Ebrahim, 1997:236).
The adoption of the ﬁnal constitution was signiﬁcant in the sense that it signalled the
continuation of the democratic principles negotiated and adopted as a pact at the MPNP.
However, it did not yet imply the end of the transitional period. Nevertheless, this was a
milestone in the democratisation of South Africa.
PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS
Table 6.2 provides an indication of the electoral support of the ﬁrst four parties in each of
the provinces.
TABLE 6.2: First Four Parties per Province
Province Parties and Ballot Percentage
1 2 3 4
Western Cape NP (53.2) ANC (33.0) DP( 6.6) FF (2.1)
Eastern Cape ANC (84.8) NP ( 9.8) DP( 2.1) PAC(2.0)
Northern Cape ANC (49.7) NP (40.5) FF( 6.0) DP (1.9)
KwaZulu-Natal IFP (50.3) ANC(32.2) NP(11.2) DP (2.2)
Orange Free State ANC (76.6) NP (12.6) FF( 6.0) PAC(1.8)
North West ANC (83.3) NP ( 8.8) FF( 4.6) PAC(1.7)
Northern Transvaal ANC (91.6) NP ( 3.3) FF( 2.1) PAC(1.3)
Eastern Transvaal ANC (80.7) NP( 9.0) FF( 5.7) PAC(1.6)
Gauteng ANC (57.6) NP(23.8) FF( 6.2) DP (5.3)
Source: Faure, 1996:96
The ANC had the majority support in all the provinces except for the Western Cape
and KwaZulu-Natal. In the latter, there was a dispute with regard to the results, but it was
ﬁnally agreed that the IFP would be allocated 50.3% of the vote in the province, thereby
allowing it a majority of one seat in the regional legislature (Europa, 1998:3067).




There was a measure of over representation in the sparsely populated provinces, partic-
ularly the Northern Cape, where the minimum size of provincial legislatures is set at thirty
members (Faure, 1996:96).
An interesting point that is reﬂected by Table 6.3, is the measure of diﬀerentiation in
the ballot for the national and the provincial levels. Larger parties drew more votes at the
central level, while smaller parties drew signiﬁcantly more votes at the regional level.
TABLE 6.3: National versus Provincial Votes
Party National Totals Provincial Totals Diﬀerence
ANC 12,237,655 12,137,307 -100,348
NP 3,983,690 3,492,467 -491,223
IFP 2,058,294 2,047,083 -11,211
FF 424,555 639,643 215,088
DP 338,426 386,55 200,229
Source: Faure, 1996:96.
At a provincial level, the principle of GNU was sometimes extended further, with some
premiers oﬀering posts to members of parties that did not get even the minimum portion of
votes.
INTERPRETATION OF ELECTION RESULTS
A more detailed analysis of voting in South Africa could give some indication of the role
identities such as race and ethnicity plays in a divided society like South Africa, particu-
larly, because the very essence of apartheid meant that life chances diﬀered fundamentally
according to race and ethnicity (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:129-130).
Coloured and Indian voters stood to gain considerably from the removal of apartheid,
they also perceived a signiﬁcant political and economic threat from the numerically much
larger black majority represented mainly by the ANC (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:129-130).
Five of the parties that eventually won parliamentary seats could be labeled “racial
parties” because more than two-thirds of their support base is from a particular racial group.
In this sense, the ANC, the IFP, and the PAC were “black” parties, while the FF and the DP
were “white”. Ironically, only the NP, the progenitor of apartheid, had a non-racial support
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base nationally. As indicated by Table 6.4 just over one-half of its identiﬁers were white,
forty percent were coloured and Indian, and 8.7 percent were black.
TABLE 6.4: Racial Breakdown of Party Support Bases
ANC NP IFP FF DP PAC Independent Total
Black 94.3 7.8 88.1 - 3.1 93 68.7 72.2
White 0.2 52.2 11.8 100 87.5 - 24.1 16.2
Coloured 4.3 31.1 0.3 - 9.4 6.1 6 8.8
Indian 1 8.9 - - - - 1.2 2.8
Source: Mattes and Gouws, 1998:132.
A good indicator of ethnicity, as distinct from race, is home language. The most eth-
nically based parties were the IFP, the FF, and, perhaps surprisingly, the liberal DP. The
IFP derived 85.7 per cent of its support from Zulu-speakers. Also of interest, it received
three quarters of its white support from English-speakers as opposed to Afrikaans-speakers.
Hundred per cent of the FF support came from whites - 82.9 per cent from white Afrikaans
as opposed to English-speakers. In contrast, 68.8 per cent of the DP’s support base was
English-speaking (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:131,133).
TABLE 6.5: Ethnic Breakdown of Party Support Bases (Home Language)
ANC NP IFP FF DP PAC Independent Total
Zulu 22.4 1.4 85.7 - 3.1 25 26 23
Afrikaans 3.8 59.9 3 82.9 28.7 4.3 14.4 16.6
Xhosa 24.1 0.8 0.8 - - 28.1 1.2 15.4
English 1.7 32 8.7 17 68.8 - 18.7 10.8
Tswana 13.1 1.7 - - 14.2 - 1.2 8.4
Sepedi 10.1 1.4 - - - 12.5 4.7 7.5
Seswati 4 1.1 0.8 - - 9.4 9.4 3.3
Venda 3.6 0.6 - - - 6.3 - 3.1
Shangaan 4.1 - - - - - - 3
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Mattes and Gouws, 1998:132.
The ANC drew support from across a range of language groups. The NP came close to
qualifying as an ethnic party. Just fewer than sixty per cent of its supporters were Afrikaans-
speaking people - both white and coloured. Parties that had explicitly parochial, ethnic, or
racial programmes, such as the FF, the IFP and the PAC, as well as other very small parties
such as the African Muslim Party, the Islamic Party, the Minority Front, and the Luso-South
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African Party, did not do well in their intended “target” groups or constituencies (Mattes
and Gouws, 1998:133).
Thus, the above could hold some clues to the prospect for the consolidation of South
Africa’s democracy. Deep racial and ethnic divides could become a source of future conﬂict
and instability. However, there are good signs that South Africans may be able to bridge
historic divides in this regard.
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
The pact negotiated at the MPNP is not complete unless note is taken of attempts at
reconciliation. Part of South Africa’s transition was to deal with human rights violations of
the past. For this purpose the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established
in 1995 in terms of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995,
and was based in Cape Town. The mandate of the TRC was to bear witness to, record
and in some cases grant amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes relating to human rights
violations, reparation and rehabilitation. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former head of the
Anglican Church in South Africa, was one of several high proﬁle members.
The TRC, sitting in Cape Town from 21-22 August 1996, heard statements from ex-
president FW de Klerk and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. De Klerk refused to accept
personal blame for human rights abuses under white rule but expressed his regret at the
suﬀering inﬂicted by apartheid on the non-white population. He said, “We have gone on our
knees before God Almighty for His forgiveness.” Another white leader, General Constant
Viljoen, former chief of the defence force, accepted that there had been a “gross violation of
human rights” (Ingram, 1996:411).
Mbeki, in turn, apologised for atrocities committed during the struggle, but defended the
ANC’s “just war” against apartheid. ANC documents named thirty-four people who were
executed on the orders of an ANC tribunal in Angola between 1980 and 1989. Details of
torture methods used in a detention camp were also provided. Mbeki acknowledged that the
ANC could have acted more ﬁrmly to stop abuses. The ANC documents contrasted with
the NP’s evidence by giving details of individual incidents (Ingram, 1996:411).
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The work of the TRC was complex, long drawn out and controversial. Nevertheless it
served an important purpose in trying to bring closure on many dark parts of South African
history.
6.5 THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
As indicated, this research does not include the consolidation of democracy. However, there
are aspects to the transition that could be of importance for the consolidation of democracy
in general, but within South Africa in particular.60
The ﬁrst of these is the advantages of negotiated transitions, or pacts, over both tran-
sitions from above and transitions from below. Negotiated transitions to democracy are
characterised by compromises reached between the authoritarian incumbents and the chal-
lengers. As indicated negotiated transitions are usually characterised by a “power deadlock”
where neither party is able to force its will on the other - thus levelling the playing ﬁeld.
This implies that a transition will depend on both crafting skills as well as the mutual will-
ingness to accept the terms laid down by each of the dominant contenders. Thus, negotiated
settlements are furthermore dependent on the mutual acceptance of accepting others as le-
gitimate negotiating partners, as well as tolerance of the views held by others, as well as
a willingness to compromise. The similarities negotiated transitions share with democratic
processes, thus, could lay the groundwork for the consolidation of democracy.
Therefore, transitions through negotiations need to be contrasted with negotiations where
the will of the one is imposed on the other, which is the case in both transitions from above
and from below. Both these modes of transition imply a lack of tolerance for other parties
involved in the transition.
Negotiated transitions usually imply greater inclusiveness, which is vital in securing le-
gitimacy for the process as well as the negotiated pact. However, it is necessary for the
process to be as inclusive as possible. Part of the negotiations is about which parties should
60For purposes of this discussion consolidation of democracy basically refers to the eﬀective functioning
of democracy (Valenzuela, 1992:58). He further stresses that the modalities assumed by the transition, the
institutions that emerge could make a diﬀerence to the long-term viability of newly democratised regimes
(1992:57). Samuel Huntington (1968:34) points out that, to develop a consolidated democracy the rational-
isation of authority, the diﬀerentiation of new political functions, the development of specialised structures
to perform these functions, and the increased participation in politics by social groups are required.
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be included and which not, as well as what to do with those that could derail the negotia-
tion process or the outcomes - for example explicitly undemocratic actors. Although South
Africa’s transition was inclusive, the manner in which compromises were forged, often led to
complaints that the two main contenders, namely the NP-government and the ANC, were
imposing their will on the others and in this regard the transition process displayed some
shortcomings. Thus, securing further legitimacy during democratisation is critically depen-
dent on the nature of the process, which is followed (see Slabbert, 1992a:61; De Villiers,
1993:280).
During negotiations, concessions are usually “extracted”, particularly with regard to the
granting of amnesty and speciﬁcally securing the positions of security forces and other public
employees (see O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:58-59). This could facilitate acceptance of
the transition among hardliners and radicals who opposed the transition because they feared
retaliation and/or loosing their positions. In a newly established democracy, pacts thus
provide additional guarantees for various elite groups and their interests, both during and
after the transition to democracy. If this was not the case, they might have been unwilling
to concede to democracy (Karl and Schmitter, 1991:274). It is these types of concessions
that could provide greater legitimacy to the process, but at the same time care should be
taken to prevent a perception among supporters of capitulation.
This was also the case with the pact negotiated during the MPNP. The position of public
servants and their beneﬁts were secured and in the event of them loosing their positions
because of planned rationalisation, they would receive the necessary compensation. The
amalgamation of the formal military force with the various military units of the liberation
movements, were of similar importance. Thus, the threat of the continuing role of the
formal military institutions as a guarantor of elite interests, as well as the threat of the
liberation militaries as guardians of popular revolutionary ideas, was addressed. Even more
signiﬁcant was the establishment of the mentioned Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
which functioned in the spirit of restorative justice.61 Thus, “winning over” opposition to
61South Africa had to decide how to address past human rights abuses while facilitating national rec-
onciliation. South Africans spent more than a year studying the experiences of nations in Latin America
and Europe, particularly Chile and Germany after reuniﬁcation. Parliament subsequently and only after




transition could remove important obstacles in the way of democratic consolidation.
According to Rustow (1970) an important precondition for successful democratic consol-
idation is the existence of a national identity amongst the vast majority of citizens. Rustow
argues that the consolidation of democracy, what he terms habituation, is facilitated by the
success of the “ﬁrst grand compromise (which should demonstrate) the eﬃcacy of the princi-
ple of conciliation and accommodation” (Habib, 1995:66). Within the South African context,
the emergence of a national political consciousness in which the majority of citizens perceive
their overall political identity in South African terms, which subsumes narrower ethnic and
racial identities, is important (Habib, 1995:66-68). Thus, this also implies a need to address
the racial character of ownership relations in the South African economy (Habib, 1995:68).
The mentioned concessions, as well as the GNU were important steps in this regard.
Negotiated transitions are characterised by controlled mass mobilisation. Thus, the con-
sensual nature of negotiated transitions negates the use of violence. Huntington (1991) is
of the opinion that opposition parties need to mobilise their supporters in demonstrations,
but their leaders need to appear moderate and statesmanlike in order to secure a pact. This
means compromising and making concessions on all issues except the holding of free and fair
elections. Thus, in this way, democratic culture could be promoted, which in turn, might
facilitate democratic consolidation. This is in line with what Dahl (1971:126-155) referred to
as the “beliefs of political activists”. In this instance, it is important to take note that Mat-
tes, Davids and Africa, (2000:1) also asserts that political institutions are the “hardware”
of a democratic system, while what people think about democracy and those institutions,
constitute the “software” of that system. Thus, a constitution, relatively well run elections,
and stable elected representative institutions do not complete the democratic picture and a
sustainable and consolidated democracy requires people who are willing to support, defend
and sustain democratic practices (Mattes, Davids and Africa, 2000:1).
Transition through compromise, therefore, provides a means of change which is peaceful
and often rapid. A signiﬁcant achievement of the transition from apartheid has been the
dramatic drop in political violence except for the KwaZulu-Natal Province. In the Gaut-
eng Province (which includes both Johannesburg and Pretoria), politically related homicides
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dropped nearly ninety percent in the ﬁrst year after the election. More than half of the “po-
litical” violence that continued after the elections related to rivalries among taxi associations
and not to political parties (Princeton, 1996:109). Thus, the signiﬁcant drop in violence also
provided a positive indication for the prospects of consolidation.
The outcome of negotiated transitions to democracy may vary, but often is a liberal
democracy, in which procedural aspects of democracy are emphasised. In the case of South
Africa’s transition, there were clear liberal characteristics. Transitions through compromise
indicate that when a liberal democracy is founded, there is a trade-oﬀ between the economic
policies of the left and the extension of political rights. The left receives political rights only
if it moderates its socio-economic demands. For example, in South Africa the ANC, particu-
larly, the SACP as its alliance partner, have moderated their preference for socialist policies.
However, ignoring severe inequalities particularly, in a material sense, could be problematic
because of implications for the consolidation of democracy. Robert Dahl (1976:81) and Adam
Habib (1995:68) also stress the issues of inequality and socio-economic development. Dahl
is of the opinion that the chances of a stable system of public contestation developing, is
reduced in a context of extreme inequality. Thus, there is a need for an expanding economic
system within which resources are made available for redistribution. Huntington also points
to the fact that democratic consolidation is facilitated under conditions of an expanding
economic system (Habib, 1995:67).
In the case of South Africa, the transition pact made provision for aﬃrmative action and
the restoration of land rights in which the focus was on establishing racial representativeness
in the work place or land ownership, but not primarily through economic development.
These appeared as concessions by the incumbents to enhance the legitimacy of a process
that often appeared elitist. Thus, these provisions would not necessarily address inequalities
per se, although they could imply changing the face, or racial proﬁle, of inequalities. Hence,
continued poverty, particularly among the new poor may be a source of future challenges
against the new democratic order and thus democratic consolidation.
It is also important to take note of Tatu Vanhanen’s (1990:50) ideas on “power resources”
in this regard. He deﬁnes the concept of “power resources,” as any resource that could be used
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to change and aﬀect others’ behaviour. An even distribution of power resources would result
in a democracy, whereas, a concentration of power resources would lead to an authoritarian
regime. Thus, democracy is consolidated under the condition of a wide distribution of power
resources among various political actors. This is also in line with Dahl’s notion on the
importance of a pluralistic social order (Dahl, 1971:48). The question arises whether this
would be the case in future in South Africa.
The party system, which emerges, could be of importance in this regard and could fa-
cilitate the dispersion of power within society. The holding of elections usually encourages
the establishment of political parties, which was also the case during the run-up to South
Africa’s ﬁrst elections. However, it is important for the party system, which emerges, to be
competitive and stable if democracy is to be consolidated. A multiparty system is preferable
in this regard, provided that centrist parties hold the balance of power. In cases of negotiated
transition, the left must moderate itself and transform itself into a social democratic party.
An incremental process of democratisation could follow. As the democratic government be-
gins to address socioeconomic issues, new political parties may emerge and the party system
may become more competitive. The successful consolidation of democracy is suggested when
the alternation of power becomes a characteristic of the political dispensation.
The nature of the party system that emerged after the transitional elections in South
Africa, is somewhat complex. On the one hand, the ANC received an overwhelming majority
and, on the other hand, it was in a formal alliance with the SACP and COSATU. Thus,
the concentration of power under the umbrella “ANC” was diluted because of the dispersion
of power among the Alliance partners. The compromise on a GNU provided additional
avenues for the dispersion of socio-political power, which could be beneﬁcial to the long-
term prospects for the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
Related to the above is the phenomenon of subcultural pluralism, which is extremely
complex. In studies of democratisation it has often been argued that among the impedi-
ments to democratic consolidation, is a high degree of subcultural pluralism (see Dahl 1989;
Bollen and Jackman 1985). As extensively discussed, South Africa is deeply divided along
a variety of racial, ethnic, and linguistic lines and thus is an extreme example of such plu-
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ralism (Smooha and Hanf 1992; Horowitz, 1991). Race is certainly central to South African
politics, but intra-racial (or ethnic) divisions are extremely signiﬁcant as well. However,
“subcultural pluralism”, as suggested by the Indian experience, may provide the sources for
multi-partyism, and may not necessarily be an impediment to successful democratisation.
According to both Lijphart (1977; 1985) and Dahl (1971; 1989) such cleavages need not be
impediments. Both imply that it is important not to exclude any subculture indeﬁnitely
from participation in government and political parties should play an integrating instead
of a dividing role in society. Thus, the rules should favour the democratic settlement of
disputes.
To Linz and Stepan (1996:14) the existence of a functioning state is of vital importance
for the consolidation of democracy, “In some parts of the world, conﬂicts about the authority
and domain of the polis and the identities and loyalties of the demos are so intense that no
state exists. No state, no democracy”. They (1996:15-16; 22-23) identify, in addition to a
functioning state, ﬁve other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions that must
be present, or established, in order for a democracy to be consolidated. These ﬁve conditions
provide a systematic measurement of the degree of democratic consolidation and help us to
project the prospects for democratisation (Linz and Stepan, 1996:23).
Firstly, the conditions necessary for the development of a free and lively civil society must
exist (Linz and Stepan, 1996:17). Various groups, such as trade unions, professional organi-
sations, business chambers, religious groups, and neighbourhood associations, can be formed
freely and become engaged in articulating their interests actively with minimal constraints.
A robust civil society should therefore have the capacity to generate political alternatives
and to monitor the government. In that case, civil society can help to consolidate and deepen
democracy. As discussed, South Africa was fortunate in having a vibrant and home-grown
civil society that in fact played a very important role in the transition and could in future
play a similar role in the consolidation of democracy.
Secondly, there must be a relatively autonomous political society, “Civil society by itself
can destroy a nondemocratic regime, but democratic consolidation must involve political so-
ciety” (Linz and Stepan, 1996:18). Democratic consolidation requires that political actors,
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including political leaders and citizens, develop a democratic political society with a repre-
sentative legislature, open and fair elections, and an eﬀective party system. A primary task
of political parties is precisely to aggregate and represent diﬀerences between democrats,
consolidation thus requires that habituation to the norms, and procedures of democratic
conﬂict regulation are developed (Linz and Stepan, 1996:18).
Furthermore, there should be political rules for acquiring, distributing, and exercising
power in a democratic manner. Otherwise, consolidation of democracy will not be possible.
South Africa was particularly fortunate concerning the existence of a functional political soci-
ety. It should be noted that during the mature phase of the transition, negotiations mainly in-
volved on the one hand, state structures, such as the government and homeland-governments,
and political parties on the other hand. There was also some overlap between state struc-
tures and political society, for example government/NP and the KwaZulu-government/IFP.
The main political parties involved in the negotiations among the incumbents, as well as the
challengers had long histories dating back to the early twentieth century. Notable in this
regard was the ANC, NP and the SACP. This is a feature that should be considered when
applying the South African experience to other contexts.
Thirdly, all major political actors, especially the government and the state apparatus,
must be eﬀectively subjected to a rule of law that protects individual freedoms and as-
sociational life. The incorporation of these principles in the interim, as well as the ﬁnal
constitution is important within the South African transition. The establishment of the
Constitutional Court and an independent judiciary are particularly important.
Fourthly, a functioning state bureaucracy that can be utilised by the new democratic
government must be present. In addition to providing greater legitimacy to the new dispen-
sation, as discussed above, the retention of former bureaucrats and security personnel could
provide the core of a functioning bureaucracy. In many parts of the world, particularly in
parts of the former Soviet Union, there is insuﬃcient taxing capacity and a weak bureau-
cratic “presence”. Thus, citizens are unable to eﬀectively demand their rights or receive
basic entitlements (Linz and Stepan, 1996:20-21). At the same time, depending on their
attitudes, the “old” bureaucrats, used to the authoritarian way of doing things might place
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limitations or restraints on the policies of a new democratic government, but the retention of
useful skills could provide continuity, which could in turn, assist “delivery” of democratically
determined goods and services. Thus, transitions to, and consolidation of democracy would
largely depend on the professionalism of an eﬀective bureaucracy.
It is in this regard that many transitions experience diﬃculties, and South Africa was
no exception. At the time of its elections, South Africa moved from four provinces and ten
homelands (the latter with varying degrees of autonomy) to nine provinces, of which only
two had more or less the same boundaries as before, namely the Free State and KwaZulu-
Natal. At national level, due to the concessions made with regard to the public service,
services continued more or less normal after the elections. The new provinces, however,
faced enormous diﬃculties. They had to consolidate the remnants of provincial and homeland
structures into new structures. In addition, they had to confront vast redundancy, corruption
(especially in the former homelands), and bureaucratic resistance. Not surprisingly, the
provinces had diﬃculty furthering the new developmental policies and even administering
those programmes that already existed (Princeton, 1996: 110).
At the national level, other problems slowed progress. Ministers of education, health,
and welfare had to integrate numerous race-based ministries and policies. The new minister
of education inherited nineteen previous ministries of education. The minister of health,
faced similar challenges.
Another signiﬁcant problem was establishing trust between the new ministers and new
public servants, on the one hand, with members of the “old” bureaucracy on the other
hand. Ministers therefore, brought in many political appointees as advisers and consultants,
aggravating tensions between the new leaders and the bureaucrats.
Fifthly, there must be an institutionalised economic society, based on the principles of
the free-market and private ownership. However, Linz and Stepan (1996:20-22) are also of
the opinion that the state has an important role to play in such an economy:
If a democracy never produced policies that generated government-mandated
public goods in the areas of education, health, and transportation, and never pro-
vided some economic safety net for its citizens and some alleviation of gross eco-
nomic inequality, democracy would not be sustainable (Linz and Stepan, 1996:22)
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Most discussions on the consolidation of democracy do not delve into the appropriateness
of any particular constitutional design, particularly because this debate has not proved
conclusively that any of the options is more appropriate for the consolidation of democracy
(Habib, 1995:65). A number of states, with diﬀering constitutional designs, have consolidated
democracy successfully. It thus seems that the particular constitutional design adopted is
less relevant to the issue of consolidating democracy, than it is for facilitating compromise
between the major political players in the negotiation forums (Habib, 1995:66). There is
also not consensus on which institutions are best for what circumstances.
However, several aspects are important with regard to the institutions included in the
pact. The principle of proportional representation would help to increase the inclusiveness of
the dispensation. However, party-list systems are inclined to promote elitism, but this would
depend on the procedures that particular political parties follow in drawing-up their party
lists. The initial GNU was also important, but no formal provision for power-sharing was
made in the ﬁnal constitution. Bicameral legislative authorities usually provide additional
points of power and could thus promote the dispersion of power. Though federal charac-
teristics are present, these are not well developed. This may in future become a source of
diﬀerences, if not conﬂict. Whether a parliamentary system of the executive is preferable
to a presidential system of the executive is highly controversial. Likewise, whether the head
of the executive should be directly elected or indirectly elected, or obtain his/her position
by virtue of being the leader of the political party that has a majority in parliament - as is
this case in the Westminster system. What is important though is that the success of these
institutional choices need to be monitored in order to determine what role they played in
the consolidation, or non-consolidation of South Africa’s democracy.
South Africa is still at the beginning stages of its transition, thus, care must; be taken
not to insinuate the inevitability of an outcome in this regard. Arguments that conclude
that the consolidation of democracy is doomed or realisable because of the absence or pres-
ence of one or other cultural or socio-economic structural condition are extremely unhelpful




It should be noted that the success would only be determined in the medium term. Often,
newly established democracies are granted a honeymoon period during which the populace
waits to see whether the new political system delivers on its promises. Thus, powerful
social forces in civil society, like the unemployed, organised workers, or a combination of
these and others, may conclude that the “ﬁrst compromise” did not facilitate the delivery of
promises made to the wider populace (Habib, 1995:66). Such social forces may then embark
on widespread extra-institutional action that could, but need not, lead elements within the
GNU and ANC to adopt an authoritarian, repressive response that would ultimately threaten
the fragile foundations of the democratic order (Habib, 1995:66).
Thus, the key question for the consolidation of South Africa’s young democracy is,
whether the country possesses a suﬃciently critical mass of citizens suﬃcient to support,
sustain, and defend the institutions of democracyt. However, it should be borne in mind
that democratisation is an ongoing process. After an initial transition to limited democracy,
further incremental democratisation usually takes place. If a stable party system emerges,
this would enable the consolidation of democracy.
6.6 CONCLUSION
In chapter six, the theoretical analysis of South Africa’s negotiated transition is concluded.
It was argued that a transition is eﬀected with the election of a new democratic government,
which was the case in April-May 1994.
Several aspects of this phase are important, particularly the role of macro-structural
factors, as well as the role of political society in the negotiations, which culminated in the
pact that signalled South Africa’s transition.
The role of international actors and the escalating violence were of particular importance
with regard to the macro-structural context of this last phase of the transition. International
actors played mainly a mediating role in bringing parties together, as well as to provide
support in forging agreement on various issues. Most notable was the last minute mediation
in order to bring the IFP into the elections of April 1994. International society however
continued exercising pressure on both the incumbents and the challengers to work out a
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negotiated settlement, but rewards were also provided for the successes achieved. Notable
in this regard was (to the incumbents) the readmission of South Africa into the world of
international sport, as well as (to the challengers) of support to the new dispensation - it
should be noted that the ANC was funded mainly from abroad.
The need to settle the violence, together with the international condemnation of those
fomenting violence put additional pressure on the various parties to reach a settlement. The
Bisho-incident as well as allegations of government-IFP collusions in fomenting violence, led
to the realisation that hidden agendas, which involve violence, could derail the negotiation
process. Thus, there was a need to come in the open and negotiate in good faith.
The second important aspect was the role of political society in the negotiations. Political
society was suﬃciently strong to eﬀect the settlement without the direct intervention of
external forces, which is often the case in other transitions. Three of the most important
organisations of political society, namely the NP, the ANC and the SACP have histories
dating back to the early twentieth century. Furthermore, the PAC had a history spanning
three decades, while the DP and the IFP had antecedents which provided it with experience
of several decades.
Of signiﬁcance was the fact that political society was supported by civil society as is
preferred by Linz and Stepan (1996). Facilitators and technical support often came from
civil society. Thus, the “organisational” conditions existed for a negotiated transition.
Furthermore, the state was suﬃciently developed in order to provide the necessary infras-
tructure for transition, once control of the state was placed in the hands of a democratically
elected government. Debates about the legitimacy of the state was, fortunately, limited
to the inclusion/exclusion of the independent homelands, the possibility of a Volkstaat for
Afrikaners and the distribution of power between the national government and the regions.
Fortunately all of these were successfully negotiated with acceptable outcomes reached -
although in the case of KwaZulu at the last moment.
Concessions and compromises were made by all the major parties but notably the govern-
ment/NP, the ANC and its partners and the IFP. Although other parties often felt excluded,
these parties had insuﬃcient inﬂuence to derail the negotiations.
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An aspect that needs to be noted is the quality of leadership that made the settlement
possible. Although it would not be defendable to limit the negotiated settlement to a number
of individuals, note should be taken of the role that was played by individuals from the
government, NP, ANC and IFP, in addition to the role of individuals from civil society.
Although the behaviour of some was sometimes labelled as obstructionist, it was also part
of a process through which acceptance of the pact could be cemented at grassroots level.
Without the willingness of ordinary citizens to accept the outcome of the negotiations, a
peaceful transition to democracy was unlikely.
South Africa was fortunate in having talented and charismatic leaders in the major
political parties who were committed to human rights, democracy and a peaceful settlement.
Mandela, De Klerk and Buthelezi contributed largely towards the success of the negotiations,
keeping it on track and in securing the environment for elections. De Klerk and Mandela in
particular kept the process of negotiations on track through their complementary roles.
Former President de Klerk made a valuable contribution to the process of transition as a
reformer, knowing that he would not retain his position. He was willing to curb the role of
the security establishment in decision-making and to eventually place checks on their actions.
He particularly set a good example in the spirit of democracy by stepping down gracefully
and allowing Mr Mandela to take over the reins of government.
The leadership qualities that Mr Mandela displayed, were vital in the democratic tran-
sition and the realisation of human rights in South Africa. He proved himself a man of
vision, charismatic with strong leadership abilities with a willingness to compromise and
reconcile in the interests of all citizens of South Africa. Of particular importance was his
ability to be both pragmatic and moral in his approach. Internationally, he enjoyed respect
and esteem and his moral and political stature was often likened to that of the legendary
Mahatma Gandhi. He was likewise, universally revered for his wisdom, humility and the
personal sacriﬁces he had made in the cause of both liberation and reconciliation.
Dr Buthelezi of the IFP played an important, albeit controversial, yet successful role in
bringing about the democratic transition. Likewise, the appearance at the last moment of
Constand Viljoen to organise the more conservative whites and lead them into the elections,
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should also not be underestimated.
However, the mutual respect that these leaders were able to command, as well as among
their supporters, was commendable and played an important role in the successful and peace-
ful outcome of South Africa’s transition. This was also applicable to the main negotiators
such as Mr Roelf Meyer and Mr Cyril Ramaphosa. Thus, the role these leaders played is
important, and the question arises whether a successful transition would have been possible
without them.
A transition through compromise, therefore, provides a means for change, which is both
peaceful and rapid. The interim constitution, which was the outcome of a comprehensive
process of political negotiation and compromise, was a historic political settlement. The
interim constitution provided an important basis for future political and constitutional de-
velopment.
South Africa’s negotiated political dispensation qualiﬁes as a democracy. However, the
end of the crucial phase of the transition has ushered in the phase for the consolidation of
democracy in South Africa. From the brief analysis that was provided on the implications
of the mode of transition, as well as the contents of the pact and the institutional frame-
work chosen, on the prospects for consolidation, the indications are that the prospects for
consolidation are good.
In the next and ﬁnal chapter, attention will be paid to conclusions on a framework for





CONCLUSION: THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THIS THESIS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
As stated in chapter one, the objectives of this study are twofold, namely to analyse the
dynamics of the transition to democracy in South Africa during the period 1978-1994, as
well as to establish a more integrative theoretical approach that could provide a framework
for a better understanding of liberalisation processes and transitions to democracy.
The focus in this chapter, therefore, is on the ﬁndings and implications of the analysis
of South Africa’s transition to democracy and on the theoretical framework developed in
this regard. Although alternative theoretical approaches could be used to explain the dy-
namics of the transition in South Africa, the interactive approach to democratisation, which
provides a synthesis of the macro-structural and the micro-behavioural approaches, is used.
The interactive approach could contribute towards an understanding of South Africa’s tran-
sition in particular and transitions to democracy in general. Thus, theoretically generated
propositions about transitions through compromise could be further extended in ways that
enhance their theoretical importance and comparative value.
Furthermore, the external validity, or transferability, of the research results - that is
whether the conclusions would hold in explanations of other transitions - will receive atten-
tion. This is important bearing in mind that inferences based on the ﬁndings of a single case
are often problematic. However, valuable information could be obtained that could guide
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research in other cases.
Lastly, additional ﬁndings that are not directly linked to the main objectives of the
thesis, as well as areas for future research that could improve the proposed framework, will
be identiﬁed.
7.2 A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
The analysis of the transition has been guided by the hypothesis that the democratisation
of South Africa was accomplished through a compromise that was negotiated between the
major political actors and which reﬂected the intra-, as well as the inter-dynamics in the
domains of, state - political society - civil society.
Thus, for analytical purposes a basic framework was developed in which the domains
of, state - political society - civil society are the areas where structural variables (such as
culture, economic development, class structures, increased education and the international
environment) and behavioural variables (such as major political actors, elite factions, or-
ganisations from civil society) interact - thus the interactive approach (see also Giliomee
and Schlemmer, 1994). At the same time, the framework makes provision for the process of
compromise by strategic interaction and negotiation between the major political actors, as
well as for a new “institutional alternative” which is the outcome of the negotiation process.
7.2.1 PHASES IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION
The process of transition in South Africa unfolded chronologically and the following three
phases can be identiﬁed in this regard: The “initial phase of transition” (1978-1989)→ the
“crucial phase of transition” (1989-1991)→ the “maturity phase of transition” (1991-1994).1
The nature of each phase was determined by the presence of various macro-structural factors
as well as complex and continuous interactions among a variety of actors in and among the
domains of, state - political society - civil society.
1Thus, the analysis ends with the transition to democracy (democratisation) - that is prior to the




THE INTITIAL PHASE OF TRANSITION
This phase was characterised by liberalisation measures undertaken by the reformists among
the ruling elite. The space or “opening” that resulted from these measures typically pro-
vided the incentives for the rise (or resurrection in O’Donnel and Schmitter’s (1986) words)
and mobilisation of the anti-regime civil society. This led to a mutually hostile phase of
confrontation that ended in a mutually hurting stalemate. As is often the situation, the
stalemate set the stage for the negotiation of a transition to democracy.
THE CRUSCIAL PHASE OF TRANSITION
Through further liberalisation, the threshold of democratisation was crossed and through a
process of pre-negotiation the environment for negotiation was prepared. It was during this
phase that the government knew that neither maintaining the status quo, nor a reversion
of the liberalisation process, was any longer an option and that there would have to be a
clear break with the past (see Schrire, 1991:141, Davenport, 1998:51). Likewise, the ANC
as a prominent actor among the challengers realised that, even though a clear break with
the past was required, it would be neither possible nor wise to overthrow the government
(see Davenport, 1998:51). In an attempt to retain control of the transition process, the
incumbents took the initiative and liberalised the political landscape further by announcing
several changes in February 1990. Thus, both sides were unable to impose their will on the
other and it would have been too costly for the incumbents to retreat from its liberalisation
measures. Thus, the stalemate and the mutually antagonistic confrontation, was transformed
into a mutually beneﬁcial phase through a process of pre-negotiation.
THE MATURITY PHASE OF TRANSITION
This phase was characterised by the process of democratisation. An agreement on regime
transition was concluded during multi-party negotiations over the choice of alternative insti-
tutions for a new political dispensation including the enactment of a new constitution and
the formation of a transitional government. The transition to a democratic dispensation
was eﬀected after elections based on universal franchise were held during April 1994 and a
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new President,2 Mr Nelson Mandela, which enjoyed the support of the majority of South
Africans, was inaugurated on 10 May 1994. As mentioned, the compromises made during
this phase also laid the groundwork for the consolidation of democracy.
7.2.2 STRUCTURAL FACTORS IN THE INTERACTIVE APPROACH
As discussed in chapters one and two, the proponents of the macro-structural approach focus
on the presence of particular macro-structural conditions that could facilitate or obstruct a
transition to democracy. However, theories on transition in this approach are criticised for
underplaying the importance of human agency in a transition to democracy. On the other
hand, proponents of the micro-behavioural approach, in turn, downplay the macro-structural
conditions in which human agents eﬀect a transition to democracy.3
How do structural factors interact with the various actors (human agents) in order to
shape their actions that would eﬀect a transition to democracy? From the analysis of the
interaction between macro-structural variables and micro-behavioural variables within the
South African context, the following have been found to be important in this regard:
∙ Firstly, political actors have goals they wish to realise. These goals, as well as their
realisation, are partly shaped by the macro-structural conditions that prevail in a
particular society. For example within the South African context, the segregated nature
of the political dispensation, as well as of society and economic life, made it very
diﬃcult for non-white actors to realise their goals. Likewise, the limitations placed on
economic development seriously aﬀected the ability of white entrepreneurs to realise
their economic goals - which were partly determined by the opportunities provided by
economic development.
∙ Secondly, macro-structural factors may determine the relative power of the various
actors and in particular the incumbents versus the challengers, as well as the stand-
patters versus the reformers among the regime bloc and the moderates versus the
2First non-white in control of the state.
3One of the problems of the micro-behavioural approach is that a change in regime eﬀected by human
agency may not necessarily be a democratic dispensation. However, for purposes of this discussion attention
will only be paid to a transition to democracy as an outcome.
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radicals among the anti-regime bloc. Transitions from above usually take place when
the incumbents are more powerful than the challengers are, and the reformers are more
powerful than the standpatters. On the other hand, transitions from below can only
take place when the challengers are more powerful than the incumbents and usually
when radicals are more powerful than moderates are. Transitions through negotiations
are more likely to take place within the context of a stalemate where neither the in-
cumbents, nor the challengers can on their own eﬀect a transition to democracy - or
consider it wise to do so.
∙ Thirdly, macro-structural factors may inﬂuence the options that are available to the
various actors. In this regard, such factors may have a push, pull or status quo eﬀect
on the actions of the actors. A push eﬀect is where conditions within the environment
make certain actions necessary - thus may force the actors to take certain actions. A
pull eﬀect is the result of conditions in the environment that have a more persuasive
eﬀect considering the advantages of certain actions - for example the snowball eﬀect of
transitions to democracy. If conditions within the environment make the continuation
of the status quo possible or in some situations preferable, it is called a status quo
eﬀect.
∙ Fourthly, within the context of negotiated transitions macro-structural factors may
determine the deterioration of the regime and even regime breakdown, as well as the
ascendency of the challengers. However, complete regime breakdown would probably
result in a transition from below. In South Africa, the authoritarian regime deterio-
rated because of both internal and external factors, but it remained in a position to play
an inﬂuential role in the eventual transaction that was reached through negotiation.
Macro-structural factors played an important role in the position of the authoritarian
regime and both internal and external factors played an important role in the follow-
ing: economic crisis, legitimacy crisis, divisions among the incumbents, mobilisation
against the regime, and increasing costs of repression. On the other hand economic
development, social structures and international sympathy led to the ascendency of the
challengers. Together, these factors contributed towards a sense of stalemate between
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the incumbents and the main challengers.
The research conﬁrms that the macro-structural “environment of transition” facilitated and
even “forced” democratic transition in South Africa. It is however important to provide
more detail on the eﬀects of structural variables on the actions of political actors within the
South African context.
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY
As discussed, and particularly in chapter three, the policy of apartheid shaped an extremely
complex societal and political landscape based on statutory dividing lines among the various
races. Under apartheid, the state was controlled only by the whites; albeit with a complex
set of state institutions that were supposed to, at least nominally, provide access to political
power to the other race groups. Instead, the perception among the challengers was that
these institutions merely provided the mechanisms through which whites, particularly, the
NP government sought to perpetuate control of the state - hence the label of a racial oligarchy.
Furthermore, South African society was since an early stage characterised by a home-
grown and expanding civil society and political society, but these were also characterised by
divisions along racial lines. Only the white political society4 had suﬃcient access to political
power to mediate its political interests. As a result, the majority non-white sub-society, with-
out being able to secure an institutional path to mediate its political interests, was isolated
from legitimate access to state power. This was further exacerbated by the proscriptions
placed on organisations of a signiﬁcant segment of the non-white political society. Thus, the
non-white political society channelled their interests through civil society. This was initially
done through mainly the non-white civil society, but as pressure began to mount, white civil
society became involved - this was in particular the situation during the crucial and maturity
phases of the transition.
Unlike the white civil society, that was able to channel its interests to the state area
through the medium of a white political society, the non-white civil society directly con-
4As indicated civil society support for the government came mainly from the white civil society. How-
ever, there were white organizations that opposed the government and the political dispensation and some
organisations such as the SACC were multi-racial.
440
Chapter 7
fronted the state that deprived it of its freedom, political participation and competition.
This resulted in the building of a broad anti-regime resistance bloc with the goal of disman-
tling the racial oligarchy.
Racial divisions and the allocation, on the basis of race, of privileges, such as economic
and employment activity, the right to urbanisation and the possession of property provided
important fault lines along which an extremely complex, enduring and escalating conﬂict was
fomented. The conﬂict particularly involved the domains of, state - political society - civil
society. Internal pressure exerted by the challengers, often through the means of violence,
together with the pressure from the international society, led to crises of legitimacy and
eﬃciency for the incumbents. However, the state’s ability to clampdown on activism was
important in facilitating a negotiated settlement instead of a transition from below -which
research has shown has a greater chance of failure.
Throughout the abovementioned phases of the transition, conﬂict remained important
and there were allegations by most actors that the other actors were fomenting violence in
order to improve their standing during negotiations and in order to extract concessions from
the others. Thus, South Africa’s transition was particularly violent, but various negotiated
peace structures such as the Accord, as well as the societal cost of violence, were important
in facilitating an eventual peaceful transition.
There were also important unifying forces that cut across cleavage lines and of partic-
ular importance were a shared economy and shared religions. Following industrialisation,
racial interdependence in the economic sphere deepened and this highlighted the inner con-
tradictions of the apartheid system. These contradictions would eventually be important in
providing the incentives for moving away from the apartheid ideology and the quest for a
race based political dispensation.
Originally, the presence of various races provided the NP and eventually the NP govern-
ment in control of the state, with the incentive to devise a race based political dispensation,
namely apartheid. The position of non-whites within society and particularly as prescribed
by the apartheid dispensation provided the incentives to those excluded, to develop political
and civil organisations that could channel their interests. This led to pressures emanating
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from the non-white civil and political society that forced the incumbents to reconsider their
position. However, the presence of moderating forces among the non-white civil and political
society, together with a declining demographic base of the whites, provided the incentives
for the incumbents to provide concessions and eventually to attempt to reform the political
dispensation. Ironically, these, in turn, provided the necessary “opening” and incentives
for exerting increased pressure on the state, particularly through the mobilisation of civil
society. The state’s ability to clampdown on those exerting pressure, as well as support
from the pro-government civil and political society, and from moderates among the other
races, together with the lack of suﬃcient power by the challengers, initially provided the
incumbents with the option to retain the status quo or to delay a transition.
Thus, societal structures were important in shaping the actions, strategies and decisions
of both the incumbents and the challengers that manifested in the inter- and intra-actions
within the domains of, state - political society - civil society.
POLITICAL CULTURE
As was discussed in chapter two, the presence of cultural traits and values supportive of
democracy is important and is often considered a precondition for democratisation. In
the history of South Africa, its people had a long history and tradition of exposure to
democratic values. Though not equally applicable to all individuals and races, freedom of
the press, representative and later participatory government, and the rule of law developed
and survived throughout the history of South Africa and through the transition. These
values were also adopted by the ANC (e.g. in the Freedom Charter). It was often the threats
posed to these values by the escalating conﬂict, hardening of attitudes, intolerance and ideas
about exclusion among both the hardliners and the radicals that motivated reformers and
moderates to take pro-active action to protect these values.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that one of the goals of the moderates among
the challengers was to extend democratic practices, such as the franchise, participation in
decision-making and the right to property to those excluded from these “rights” which are
normally associated with liberal democracy and which whites often took for granted.
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Civil society and political society also provided fertile training ground in democratic
values. The organisations involved usually functioned in terms of a constitution, elected
their leaders and had some form of accountability for leaders and members.
Thus, the presence of these values among the challengers made it easier for the incumbents
to move away from apartheid and it provided important common ground - as highlighted
by the various manifestos of political parties - for negotiation. It is interesting to note that
compromises were mainly reached among those who subscribed to these values. Within the
international context, subscribing to democratic values by the challengers was regarded in a
positive light, while the incumbents were often accused of not holding these values - as was
evident in the reaction of the UN on the Harare Declaration.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Economic development, and its societal and cultural spin-oﬀs, is probably the most re-
searched of the preconditions for democracy, but also probably the most controversial. While
advocates of the macro-structural approach regard economic development as a precondition
for democracy, proponents of the micro-behavioural approach propose that, for a transition
to democracy, an economic crisis should preferably follow an extended period of economic
development (see Gill, 2000).
Economic growth and development to a large extend provide a pull eﬀect, while an eco-
nomic crisis provide a push eﬀect. However research, on for example the oil rich states,
has indicated that a narrow base for economic growth and the concentration of the fruits
of economic growth in the hands of a few and, particularly those in charge of an authori-
tarian dispensation, will act to maintain the status quo (see Landman, 2003; Giliomee and
Schlemmer, 1994:175). This was also an acquisition made by the challengers, particularly
concerning education for blacks. It was alleged that the ruling elite wished to maintain the
status quo in order to further enrich themselves and that non-whites were merely seen as
sources of labour.
South Africa experienced a long history of economic growth, particularly after the dis-
covery of diamonds and gold. There is little evidence that the democratisation of “white
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society” was accompanied by extensive economic growth and development. However, eco-
nomic growth and development together with discriminatory measures based on race, such
as job reservation and allocation, inﬂux control, limitations on property rights and the con-
centration of economic power in the hands of whites, contributed to the political awareness
of the non-white population. These restrictions provided ample ground for the mobilisation
of the non-white population. Newspapers, interest organisations such as workers groups and
later trade unions, as well as political organisations such as the ANC were established.
The economic environment and the limitations it placed on the self-realisation of non-
whites provided important motivation for action by the politically excluded majority. Though
economic crisis was important in the pro-reform actions of the incumbents, it was largely the
racially integrated economy, the inability of the whites to provide suﬃcient skilled labour
for an expanding economy, as well as the limitations that apartheid placed on the economic
activities of white entrepreneurs that motivated the latter to exert pressure for change on
the incumbents. Thus, business (together with religious organisations) played a vital role in
the transition and particularly during the crucial phase of transition.
Except for the economic crisis, most economic conditions had a pull eﬀect on the actions of
both the incumbents and the challengers. However, Marxist interpretations of the situation
and a quest for a political dispensation reﬂecting Marxist values, were important deterrents
of change and liberalisation among the incumbents, particularly within a Cold War context,
and in the end helped to prolong the status quo.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The international environment was important in both pressurising as well as persuading the
incumbents to reform the political dispensation, and to convince the challengers to negotiate
a settlement. However, the incumbents claimed that international pressure made it diﬃcult
to make political changes because of allegations by the white population that they were
capitulating to international demands - thus promoting the status quo. The collapse of com-
munism and the end of the Cold War, which were accompanied by a wave of democratisation
in Eastern Europe had important pull eﬀects and prompted the incumbents to seize the new
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opportunities provided by the international environment. Likewise, it had a push eﬀect on
the challengers who faced the possibility, however remote, of being marginalised within a
changed international environment.
In summary, macro-structural factors was thus important in forcing the ruling elite to lib-
eralise and reform the political dispensation and eventually to accelerate the democratic
transition of South Africa through negotiated compromise. Macro-structural factors also
aﬀected the position and role of the challengers in the transition process and were important
in persuading the challengers to opt for a negotiated transition.
7.2.3 BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS IN THE INTERACTIVE APPROACH
The inner dynamics and mutual dynamic relations in the domains of, state - political society
- civil society and which involved both structure and behaviour provide a good basis for
the analysis of the actions, strategies and decisions of the main actors and particularly
concerning decisions pertaining to the replacement, or substitution, of existing institutions.
At the same time, the chronological phases discussed above are useful for the analysis of how
the transition to democracy evolved.
The existence of a political society as a mediator between the domains of the state and
of civil society is important in analysing the dynamics of a transition to democracy through
compromise. The structure of political confrontation between the state and civil society is
important in the political strategies and changes involved in a transition. On the one hand,
the actors from the state prefer to stay in command and eﬀect a transition on their terms
or even decide to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, civil society (or a signiﬁcant
section thereof) and the population could be mobilised to eﬀect a transition from below.
Both these outcomes result in a zero-sum confrontational outcome. However, in the case
of a negotiated transition through compromise, the zero-sum confrontational nature of the
interactions between the state and civil society is rearranged to a non-zero-sum (or win-win)
outcome. It is in this regard that political society plays an important role. Thus, political
society as a mediator provides a buﬀer zone between the state and civil society and has, as
a result, considerable advantages for analytical purposes.
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In the analysis of the South African transition, it is important to take note of the most
important actors, as well as their position with regard to changing the political dispensation.
As indicated of particular importance are the state, political society and civil society.
STATE
The government was the face of the state and signiﬁcantly overlapped with the NP (from
political society), but during De Klerk’s tenure actions that were less dependent on NP ap-
proval, were undertaken. The government was thus able to separate increasingly the interests
of the state from those of the NP and its constituency. Other events that played a role in
the government’s actions were the declining number of hardliners in the NP constituency
and the mobilisation of support across traditional party lines. After a signiﬁcant section
of the hardliners left to form and later join the CP, it was easier for the reformers to set
an agenda for change - the softliners and reformers among the incumbents thus gained the
upper hand over the hardliners and standpatters. The 1992 whites’ only referendum that
gave an overwhelming mandate for change across traditional party lines, further boosted the
endeavours of the government to facilitate political change.
Another aspect that was important was the role accorded to the security forces during the
initial phase of the transition. However, the crucial and maturity phases were characterised
by, oﬃcially, a diminishing role for the security forces in policy-making, but to this day
there are diﬀerences in opinion whether the security forces were mandated to continue their
actions covertly and whether there were members who were involved in fomenting political
violence - particularly among blacks and white right-wingers.
Throughout the three phases of the transition, the ruling elite remained powerful enough
to avert a transition from below, but its power eroded to such an extent that it was unable
to force a transition from above.
POLITICAL SOCIETY
White political society enjoyed the upper hand over most other political formations for the
greater part of South Africa’s history. During the maturity phase of the transition, with the
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consent of at least the ANC, the existing parliament and other legislatures continued to exist
and indeed helped to formalise the transition by passing the necessary legislation for change.
Examples of important legislation in this regard are the Independent Media Commission Act,
No. 148 of 1993, Internal Peace Institutions Act, No. 149 of 1993, Independent Electoral
Commission Act, No.150 of 1993, and Transitional Executive Council Act, No. 151 of 1993.
The “white” parliament also remained responsible for legislation pertaining to the day to
day administration of South Africa and in total 210 acts were passed during 1993 for this
purpose as well as to eﬀect a transition - thus parliament acted as an important stabilising
force.
Among non-whites, as discussed, civil society played an important role in channelling the
interests of those excluded from the political dispensation. After the unbanning of various
important political organisations such as the ANC, PAC and SACP, during the crucial phase
of the transition, the playing ﬁelds became more equal and political society thus became
more inclusive. Through the more accommodating attitude of the government, non-white
political society was able to resume its normal role within society and particularly without
racial restrictions.
Thus, the maturity phase of the transition mainly involved organisations from political
society and the state, while civil society mainly played a supportive and mediating role. It
would therefore be possible to speak of the “rise or resurrection” of political society during the
third or maturity phase of the transition. There were those organisations, such as AZAPO
that excluded themselves from the new role entrusted to organisations from political society
by refusing to participate in the negotiation process.
Overall, political society was divided between those who were associated with the in-
cumbents (often referred to as the regime camp and which included those favouring the
continuation of the apartheid dispensation, such as the CP and the white right-wing) and
the challengers (anti-regime camp that included various organisations such as the ANC,
SACP, PAC and AZAPO).5 Neither the regime camp nor the anti-regime camp was homo-
geneous in ideas, positions, strategies and support bases. Among the regime camp, there
5As indicated in chapter 6 the position of the IFP was somewhat problematic.
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were clear divisions between the hardliners, standpatters, softliners and reformers. On the
other hand, the anti-regime camp displayed typical divisions between radicals and reformers.
The transition through negotiation was accomplished due to the strength of the reformers
and moderates over the standpatters and radicals respectively.
The NP and ANC, together with their respective leaders and chief negotiators, emerged
as the dominant forces of political society during the maturity phase of the transition -
though, as indicated above, in the case of the NP the dividing lines between state and
party were blurred. The dominant role of the NP and ANC was probably a consequence
of strategic calculations by them, but it was a source of unhappiness among other actors
and particularly the IFP. This posed a threat to the transition, but fortunately, this was
averted and often through the intervention of international actors as well as prominent
individuals and organisations from civil society. Nevertheless, even those who participated
in the negotiations were often marginalised through the principle of “suﬃcient consensus”.
In the short term, it was probably unavoidable in order to be able to move forward in the
negotiation and transition process, but in the long term, it could still have an eﬀect on the
consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
CIVIL SOCIETY
South Africa was fortunate to have a vibrant civil society that had exercised pressure on
various governments even prior to the creation of the Union of South Africa. As discussed in
chapters ﬁve and six, civil society played a vital role during the crucial phase of the transition
and an important supportive role during the maturity phase. However, particularly at grass-
roots level, there were “civil society organisations” that were obstructionist and even objected
to the role of the government in the transition process. These organisations often fuelled
violence that resulted in further counter-action from the state.
STATE - POLITICAL SOCIETY - CIVIL SOCIETY INTERACTIONS
A transition through compromise is the outcome of successful negotiations and it is necessary
to pay attention to the characteristics and key events of the transition, as well as the role of
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the main political actors in this regard.
The liberalisation measures introduced by the government of PW Botha during the initial
phase of the transition, led to the deepening of divisions between hardliners and reformers
and at the same time it created the opening or space for increased threats and demands
from the anti-regime civil society directed at the state. This led to an increase in the power
of the radicals.
During the initial phase of the transition, the anti-regime civil society, in order to foil
what it perceived as the power bloc’s strategy to maintain the status quo, commanded a
non-compromising strategy demanding nothing but the end to the racial oligarchy. Under
the leadership of the exiled ANC, the anti-regime civil society centred on the UDF and
other civil organisations from predominantly the non-white population. Its rapid growth
was enough to make the challengers think in terms of an overthrow of the racial oligarchy.
However, the power bloc was not going to capitulate and announced a nationwide state of
emergency. Its ability to resist the rise of civil society posed a threat to the continuation
of the process of liberalisation. As a result, the confrontational standoﬀ between the two
camps resulted in a tight balance of power and a mutually hardening of hostilities - thus at
that time a zero-sum situation.
There were fortunately important changes in the political landscape during the crucial
and maturity phases of the transition that would take South Africa over the threshold of a
democratic transition.
During the “crucial phase of transition” the interaction between the incumbents and the
challengers in the domains of, state - political society - civil society was transformed from
a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum confrontation. Several characteristics of the transition and
events were important in this regard. Firstly, the covert negotiations (e.g. the Dakar meeting,
1987) between the reform faction of the white civil society and the moderates among the
ANC - the latter being important in the anti-regime camp (see Marais, 1994). The Harare
declaration led by the ANC, paved the way by setting preconditions for negotiation and
stipulating basic requirements for a new political dispensation. However, a decisive watershed
in the transition was the actions of 2 February 1990 by the reform orientated faction among
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the incumbents. The incumbents, faced with a stalemate but a favourable international
environment, chose to launch the transition through De Klerk’s unilateral announcement of
the liberalisation measures on that day. With these, and subsequent liberalisation measures,
as well as repeated commitments to a democratic outcome, the incumbents demonstrated
their willingness to initiate the transition. This provided an opening of political space to the
challengers and the mutually hostile phase of confrontation was as a result transformed into
a mutually beneﬁcial phase of negotiation.
Secondly, the incumbents and particularly De Klerk illustrated considerable skill in craft-
ing the transition by establishing trust in the process, and by facilitating progress often under
dire circumstances.
Thirdly, South Africa’s transition was, as already said, exceptionally violent for a ne-
gotiated transition. The incumbents had to deal with this problematic aspect during the
transition process. Thus, ending political violence was an important dimension of the tran-
sition. The need to address the social cost of the conﬂict was important in the establishment
of common ground among some of the incumbents and the challengers. The conﬂict was,
however, complex and there were various allegations that some actors were not acting in
good faith. Not only was there a split between the radicals and the moderates concerning
the negotiations, but ethnic conﬂict among blacks erupted in full force. The phenomenon
of so-called black-on-black violence was an obstacle in the democratic transition. Moreover,
the incumbents had to deal with allegations that the state was manipulating such black-on-
black violence. It was alleged that the government followed a two-pronged strategy, namely
while engaging in preliminary talks with its main challenger the ANC, it was also covertly
supporting the IFP.6 The IFP caused a tentative stalemate by deserting the process of pre-
negotiation which was regarded by some as a strategy (perhaps even with the blessing of
the state) to weaken the ANC. In order to safeguard their ethnic interests in the changing
political arena, black and white organisations based on ethnic ideology tried to maximise
their position - even through cross-racial co-operation in for example COSAG. Thus, eth-
6As noted the position of the IFP with its support mainly from Zulus from northern Natal and some
townships in the PWV-region, was rather complex. Though historically favouring a transition to democracy
through negotiation, its playing of the ethnic card and co-operation with the hardliners among the regime
camp (such as in COSAG ) often gave it a label of being part of the hardliners.
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nic conﬂict became an important structural variable that would aﬀect the strategies of the
actors.
Fourthly, the willingness of the challengers to accept the position and role of the in-
cumbents varied. Some challengers, such as the ANC accorded the incumbents considerable
authority while others, such as AZAPO and the PAC repeatedly questioned the incumbents’
control over the process of transition. Likewise, actors such as the white right wing criticised
the incumbents for entering into negotiations with the challengers. The reformers of the
regime camp (particularly the NP government) and the moderates of the anti-regime camp
(particularly the ANC) were able to check the hardliners and the radicals among the regime
and anti-regime camps respectively. This was important in moving forward in the transi-
tion process and in preventing a return to racial oligarchy or its demise through an armed
uprising. Thus, the favourable position of the reformers, together with the moderates, was
important in facilitating the necessary pre-negotiations to bring the much needed political
shift that would take South Africa over the threshold of democratisation.
Fifthly, civil society played a particularly important role during the transition and apart
from its role in extensive mass mobilisation during the initial phase of transition, it was im-
portant in resolving stalemates. Stalemates were often brokered by the exemplary mediation
of civil society and particularly the SACC and the business sector. Civil society played an
important role in facilitating joint control of the conﬂict by adopting procedures that would
curtail the actions of the state security agencies.
On the other hand, when the transition entered the maturity phase, political society
played a dominant role and the politics of compromise was of particular importance in the
political shift that was achieved during this phase. Political society, as the buﬀer zone
between the domains of state and civil society, now moved into the stage where a positive
outcome seemed possible, because of the successes achieved in the process of negotiation.
7.2.4 THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
Because of the successes achieved in the negotiations during the maturity phase, the major
political actors of South Africa recognised the inevitability of a changed political dispensa-
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tion. However, there are many institutional options for a democratic dispensation and the
process of negotiation at the time revolved around choices concerning such institutions that
would replace the racial oligarchy with democracy, as well as how to implement a transition
to democracy.
Political actors from the state and political society thus considered the institutional
alternatives for the new dispensation that would best reﬂect their political ideologies and best
serve the interests of their support base. The position of most political parties concerning a
democratic political dispensation was known at the start of the negotiation process.
The reformists among the regime camp, particularly the government, NP and DP favoured
some form of power-sharing model to provide statutory guarantees for the rights of minori-
ties, while the hardliners in the regime camp such as the IFP and CP favoured federalism
and some form of self-determination respectively in order to protect the interests of at least
some cultural groups. Moderates in the anti-regime camp, such as the ANC favoured ma-
jority rule as the best model, but the anti-regime radicals such as the PAC favoured black
domination. These were the ﬁrst preferences of the various actors, which, at the time, had
not been exposed to the dynamics of negotiation.
Multi-party negotiation at CODESA and the MPNP moved the process to the stage where
the various political actors were engaged in serious strategic interaction pertaining to the new
political dispensation, its rules and institutions. The reformers and moderates of the regime
and anti-regime camps respectively, formed a centre on the political spectrum that appeared
to represent the majority and they therefore led and dominated the negotiation process. They
succeeded in transcending the partisan interests of tribe and race by mobilising broad based
political support. They combined soft tactics aimed at mutual beneﬁts, with hard tactics that
involved threats in order to further their respective goals and interests. On the other hand,
the power bases of the CP and IFP were mainly concentrated in particular cultural groups.
They often resorted to tactics that tried to prolong the negotiation process and did not
participate in all negotiations. The PAC as radicals in the anti-regime camp had a relatively
weak power base and therefore repeatedly joined and left the negotiation structure as a
tactic to limit the inﬂuence of the moderates and increase its own impact on the transition
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process. Thus, the hardliners and the radicals were largely of secondary importance as the
more “centrist” reformers and moderates with larger support bases, succeeded in dominating
the negotiations.
However, it was neither the hardliners, nor the radicals that were responsible for the
breakdown of CODESA. The reason was the deadlock between the two dominant actors,
namely the government and the ANC, over transitional arrangements and the basic principles
of a new constitutional dispensation. In addition to the two centrist actors’ inability to
reach a compromise on how the transition should be eﬀected, that is a single stage versus
a two-stage transition; there were also uncompromising positions with regard to the basic
principles underpinning any new political institutions and in particular “power-sharing”
versus “majoritarianism”.
The strategies of the two thus revolved around two conﬂicting aims, namely the NP’s
preference for a form of power-sharing, and the ANC’s preference for majoritarianism. The
uncompromising strategies of the two main actors, at that stage, actually displayed on the
one hand an over-estimation of their relative power and on the other hand, a deep mistrust
of each other for both regarded the preferences and strategies of the other as attempts to
obstruct the aims of the other party and to maximise control over, and even seize power.
There was a need for intervention to break the deadlock in negotiations and the international
community stepped up its mediation eﬀorts. However, to preserve the ensuing multi-party
negotiations and to prevent the further escalation of violence, the reformers and moderates
demonstrated considerable commitment against the threat posed by the hardliners and the
radicals, particularly after the events in Bisho of September 1992. The NP and the ANC,
reached an accord termed the “Record of Understanding”, characterised by compromises in
which both made concessions. Important was the agreement on a two-stage transition and
an interim government of national unity. These successes led to renewed negotiations that
involved more actors.
The reformers and moderates’ strategy of transition was successful during the second
stage of multi-party negotiation at the MPNP. The compromise between the reformers of
the NP and the moderates of the ANC at the MPNP was swiftly reached but excluded the
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far-right conservative COSAG camp. It was agreed that a transitional government would be
based on the model of temporary power-sharing and it was decided that an independent in-
stitution, the TEC was to manage the transition. A compromise between consociationalism
and majoritarianism was thus reached. At this stage, the hard line tactics of the conserva-
tives in the regime camp and the radicals in the anti-regime camp were not powerful enough
to derail the transition process and they were either incorporated into the multi-party ne-
gotiations, or isolated. The formal ratiﬁcation of the transitional constitution eﬀected an
important shift in the political dispensation and through temporary power-sharing it also
provided an accommodating response to some of the concerns of some members of COSAG
and particularly the IFP. The transition to the new institutions came into eﬀect with the
inauguration of the ﬁrst non-white head of government and head of state after successful
elections based on the principle of universal franchise.
Whether the new political system, which emerged from the negotiations, was the best
alternative for South African society was a debatable issue at the time and remains an is-
sue in theories on democracy. Crucial in this regard is the debate whether the principle
of power-sharing is in fact conducive of democracy. Adherents of majoritarianism and the
Westminster system argue that true democracy depends on rule by the majority and on a vi-
able, institutionalised opposition. According to them, power-sharing systems of government
do not allow for such an opposition.
Jung and Shapiro (1995: 269-308) for example argue that South Africa’s interim con-
stitution was a serious impediment to any progress towards a true democracy. They are of
the opinion that the hard-won compromise on power-sharing between the ANC and the NP
and to some extent the IFP, was the feature of the interim constitution which was the most
worrisome. The authors feared that opposition forces would be marginalised and eventu-
ally completely displaced from political discourse and participation. However, advocates of
power-sharing, in turn, argue that majoritarianism could lead to the permanent marginal-
isation of minorities and tyranny of the majority. With hindsight, it could be argued that
power-sharing was not a fundamental principle of the ﬁnal constitution adopted for South
Africa, but it would be diﬃcult to determine how the transition would have been made
without some form of power-sharing. The hegemonic strategies employed by the contenders
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exacerbated tensions, increased violence and made a constitutional settlement more diﬃcult
to reach. The violence, the lack of toleration, and hegemonic strategies all pointed to a need
for a power-sharing pact between the main contenders. One way - if not the only way - of
achieving this was through an interim government of national unity.
The South African case clearly demonstrates that institutions decided on need not be
permanent. Thus, an assessment of the suitability of institutions for a transition to democ-
racy should take into consideration the immediate “institutional needs” of the transition as
well as the long-term consolidation of democracy.
7.3 EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE FINDINGS
An important question is to what extent can the ﬁndings, as well as the framework for South
Africa’s transition, be applied to analyses of other transitions or potential transitions to
democracy. It is important to note that the theories in the macro-structural approach largely
are concerned with establishing almost law-like generalisations that identify prerequisites
(necessary and suﬃcient conditions) and thresholds for democracy. On the other hand,
proponents of the micro-behavioural approach are inclined to accept the possibility that
each transition is a unique event and that even though patterns may be identiﬁed there may
indeed “be many roads to democracy” (see Rustow, 1970:345). As can be deduced from the
discussion above, even within a particular transition, attitudes among the key actors will
diﬀer and diﬀerent groups may propel the transition at diﬀerent times and under diﬀerent
conditions. For example, the relative power of hardliners and radicals versus reformers and
moderates, as well as of the incumbents versus the challengers is important in this regard.
Thus, it is important to take into account the unique characteristics of a particular transition.
Even though transitions may be unique, it is still possible to identify trends that could be
relevant to other transitions or to the understanding of transitions in general. It is therefore
important to pay attention to the unique features of the South African transition as well as
the “conclusions” that could be useful in other settings.
There are various characteristics of the South African case that need to be considered.
South Africa is a heterogeneous society and was at the time of the transition characterised
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by a unique set of divisions of which the statutory based racial divisions was of particular
importance. Two aspects are of particular importance in this regard. The transition may
not be comparable to transitions in homogeneous societies that experience national unity.7
Furthermore, the transition was characterised by an enduring conﬂict between the mutually
exclusive sub-societies that gave a particular dynamic to the transition. South Africa, in
fact, experienced an extremely violent negotiated transition. The transition, as a result,
may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from transitions that are without violent conﬂict. As was indicated,
the need to end the conﬂict was a factor in the compromises that were reached, but the
conﬂict was also exploited to further particular goals. Thus, an important consequence of
these divisions has been the increase in violence which followed liberalisation. Accepting
that South Africa was a deeply divided society meant that constitutional choices had to
be made, which would help overcome these divisions along which violence was fomented.
In these contexts, this thesis bears the character of an “experimental theory” in which the
political change in a society without national unity and homogeneity, but with high levels
of violent conﬂict is analysed.
The structure of South African society is thus a characteristic that should be taken into
account and particularly the nature of the societal divisions. A notable point in the case of
South Africa is the fact that racial cleavages, particularly between white and non-white rather
than class cleavages between capital and labour were of particular importance. There was
a signiﬁcant overlap between these two divisions and even though Marxist interpretations
tried to emphasise the importance of class, race and ethnicity were more important and
were important socio-economic variables of political change. Thus, there is a possibility
that culturally homogeneous societies undergoing a transition may have to deal with class
divisions to a greater extent than culturally (and racially where applicable) heterogeneous
societies like South Africa. Given this fact, the class oriented methodology focussing on the
dynamic relations between state, capital and labour provides a relatively weak framework
for the analysis of political change in South Africa as a deeply divided society. In fact,
the class-oriented methodology, by restricting its analysis of political change to the question
7It should be noted that some proponents of the micro-behavioural approach, such as Rustow emphasise
the importance of national unity in a transition.
456
Chapter 7
of class politics, has the risk of over-simplifying the political change in a society deeply
divided along various dividing lines that could nurture conﬂict. In order to attain a more
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of political change in a deeply divided
society, it is important to take into account not only power relations between classes, but
also non-class power relations spread in the domains of, state - political society - civil society.
Furthermore, the nature and presence of various structural factors, which are often re-
garded as preconditions for democracy, need to be assessed for each transition. In the case
of South Africa, these factors - as were discussed at length in the thesis - need to be con-
sidered in conclusions pertaining to transitions. It is doubtful whether any two transitions
will experience an identical set of macro-structural conditions and therefore care should be
taken when “transferring” ﬁndings of the South Africa case to other cases of transitions. Of
particular importance in the South African context is the already mentioned structure of
society, but note should also be taken of the declining demographic base of the ruling elite
which was an important factor in the actions of the incumbents. Other macro-structural
conditions are the long exposure to democratic values (though not enjoyed by all) and the
development of a home-grown civil society and political society with a long history of in-
teracting with the state - though often in a conﬂicting nature. The two dominant actors in
political society, namely the NP and the ANC could both draw on experiences and loyalties
accumulated over a period of eighty years. The absence of such actors in other transitions
needs to be considered.
Furthermore, the shared economy and shared religions that gave birth to a number of
important civil society organisations is an important factor within the South African context.
These organisations played a very important role in breaking deadlocks during the crucial
phase of the transition and played a supportive role in reaching compromises during the
maturity phase. Unfortunately, authoritarian regimes and particularly totalitarian regimes
are often characterised by the absence of a functioning civil society. Transitions in such
cases, for example in other developing countries, are often characterised by attempts to
establish such organisations from “outside” by for example foreign-based non-governmental
organisations. Again, great care should be taken in transferring ﬁndings from the South
African experience to cases where these organisations were not present.
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As was discussed the international environment was important within the South African
context. The breakthrough in the transition came at the end of the Cold War and at a
time when East European states democratised. Thus, the international environment was
conducive to democracy. International actors also played an important mediating role in the
transition. It would be risky to generalise the ﬁndings on South Africa’s transition without
considering the international context. The changing international environment also brought
an element of uncertainty as both the incumbents and the challengers had to realign them-
selves internationally. Uncertainty, together with the possibility of a weakening position,
could prompt the actors to favour a compromise sooner rather than later.
A further characteristic that deserves attention is the quality of leadership that prevailed
in South Africa during the transition. The micro-behavioural approach emphasises the role
of human actors in a transition. South Africa was blessed with a number of exemplary leaders
on both sides (incumbents and challengers), as well as from civil society. South Africa’s long
history of political and civil activism probably played a role in the quality of its leaders.
The transition in South Africa also raises a number of dilemmas. To start with, the deeply
divided nature of South African society raises questions, which are not as salient in other
cases of negotiated transitions. One dilemma that the negotiators faced in this regard is the
constitutional choices that had to be made in order to overcome the mentioned divisions.
There were various options that could be considered for the choices in this regard and
which needed to form part of the democratic bargain. These included: consociational-type
power-sharing; federalism (regional autonomy); an electoral system based on proportional
representation; and a bill of rights.
A second characteristic dilemma of South Africa’s transition stems from the way in which
political contenders advanced their sectional interests at the expense of the overall political
and economic systems. The main problem here is that at the time of the transition, South
Africa had been in a long-term economic decline. The accompanying problems such as the
scarcity of resources, unemployment and inequality, raised the stakes of the conﬂict. It
should in particular be noted that the business community felt conﬁdent about its ability
within the global economic environment and desired to pursue the opportunities oﬀered in
458
Chapter 7
this regard and thus pressured for a bigger picture featuring “overall” interests. Again, other
cases may substantially diﬀer in this regard.
However, the study has theoretical implications that are relevant to other transitions to
democracy. Firstly, in the analysis of transitions to democracy, or potential transitions to
democracy, it is not valid to make an either/or choice between structural and behavioural
theories. This thesis has clearly demonstrated that there is a need to integrate, for analytic
purposes, structural and behavioural variables in an analysis of transitions to democracy.
It is argued that a synthesis of the two approaches, in an interactive approach, provides a
more reliable theoretical framework that could consistently be used to analyse the dynamic
process of a transition to democracy. Although this alternative theoretical approach has
been used in this thesis to explain the case of the democratic transition in South Africa, the
interactive approach, which combines macro-structural conditions with micro-behavioural
factors, contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of the
process of transition to democracy and the relevant theories involved. Democracies are
complex phenomena, and they are caused by many diﬀerent forces and synthesising these
two theoretical approaches to political change provides a more cogent and comprehensive
explanation of democratic transition.
Secondly, when considering the macro-structural factors it is important to pay attention
to all factors and not to reduce the explanation of the actions of the various actors to a single
factor. There is a tendency to focus on a particular set of structural preconditions and not
to consider a synthesis of the various structural factors in theories on democratisation in the
macro-structural approach. Thus, culture, economic development, societal structures and
the international environment, has to be included in an analysis of transitions to democracy.
Thirdly, in the interactive approach to democratisation an analysis making use of the do-
mains of, state - political society - civil society is useful to synthesise structural variables and
behavioural variables. The inner dynamics and mutual dynamic relations in the domains of,
state - political society - civil society, together with the chronologically sequential dynamics
(initial phase, crucial phase and maturity phase) of a transition, provide a good point of de-
parture for the analysis of choices with regard to strategies and alternative institutions that
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need to be developed for a new political dispensation. Thus, in this thesis it is argued that
the dynamics of democratic transition cannot be explained fully by focussing on the strategic
choices of the political actors only. The micro-behavioural approach is useful in determining
and predicting the transition strategy and tactics chosen by the political actors at a speciﬁc
point in the chronological sequence, but has diﬃculty in explaining the background that
enforced the choice and the character of political change calculated as the outcome of such
choice. Thus, at various points in the unfolding transition, the active variables are limited
by the structural variables. In order to analyse the dynamics of a transition eﬀectively, the
deﬁning force of the structural variables working in the domains of, state - political society
- civil society, as well as the transition strategy of the political actors selected under such
limitations, must be considered simultaneously.
Fourthly, the importance of political society has to be considered in transitions to democ-
racy. By establishing a middle category of political society as a buﬀer zone between the state
and civil society, the unique dynamics of a transition through compromise, could be high-
lighted. Even though the structure of political confrontation between the domains of state
and civil society is important in a transition, it should be noted that political society plays an
important role in transitions through compromise, particularly in rearranging the zero-sum
confrontational structure between the state and civil society to a non-zero-sum situation.
Thus, in transitions through compromise, both the confrontational structure between the
state and civil society, as well as the political society mediating between them, should be
considered. Furthermore, political society has considerable advantages for analytic purposes
and, as indicated, the question arises whether a long term transition to democracy can be
made in the absence of a well developed political society.
Fourthly, the importance of civil society in transitions to democracy has already been
alluded to above. It should however be noted that the existence, nature and role of civil
society need to be systematically considered in the analysis of actual and potential transitions
to democracy.
Fifthly, as already indicated above, it is important to make an analytical distinction be-
tween the various phases of the transition process. Particularly, in the case of a democratic
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transition through compromise, the crucial phase and the maturity phase each has unique
principles at work. It is during these phases that the threshold of democratisation is crossed.
Prior to reaching the threshold, the “crucial phase of transition”, is the period of preliminary
negotiation, where the mutually hostile stage of confrontation turns to a mutually beneﬁcial
stage of negotiation. On the other hand, after the crossing of the threshold, the “maturity
phase of transition”, involves the dynamics of a transition during the period of grand com-
promise where the institutional alternatives for a new political dispensation are worked out.
Thus, it seems that in the context of a democratic transition by compromise, the various
phases in the process of transition are required for analytical purposes.
Sixthly, it is important to pay attention to the correct institutional alternatives for a
new democratic political dispensation. Thus, the analysis of a negotiated transition should
not stop at the compromises reached, but should examine the “institutional alternatives”
for the newborn political system. It is argued that the strategy for transition, as well as the
new political dispensation favoured as the most suitable by the individual political actors
during the “maturity phase of transition”, is moulded by structural factors that determine
the relative power between the incumbents and the challengers - thus limiting the actions
of the key actors. Thus, there should be an attempt to avoid the propensity of the micro-
behavioural approach to emphasise only the analysis of the chronologically sequential game
of negotiation, while ignoring the structural context of the actors’ choices that may aﬀect
their original intensions.
In conclusion, all of the above ﬁndings imply that, in spite of several unique characteristics
of the South African transition to democracy, the basic analytic framework discussed above
would be suitable for the analysis of other actual and potential transitions to democracy.
The unique characteristics mainly involve variations in the structural conditions present
during transitions. By providing for variations in this regard, the framework could be used
for analytical purposes in other contexts.
461
Chapter 7
7.4 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUR-
THER RESEARCH
There were a number of additional ﬁndings that do not form part of the objectives of this
study, but that could be considered for future research.
A problem that was encountered in the research is the fact that many of the key concepts
are in fact contested concepts within the political sciences. Most notable with regard to this
research are the concepts of democracy, regime, state, transition, civil society (even political
society) and consolidation. The concept of democracy was particularly problematic because
transitions to democracy is often minimally interpreted as the adoption of some procedural
dimensions associated with democracy. On the other hand, as was indicated, the choice
of institutional alternatives are often determined by a particular interpretation of what the
concept of democracy entails. This is most notable in the debates between consociationalists
and majoritarianists. Thus, there is a deﬁnite need for greater consensus on some of the key
concepts involved in studies of transitions to democracy. At least, attempts should be made
to analyse how various interpretations of these concepts aﬀect research on democratisation
and particularly with regard to institutional alternatives favoured, or even concerning the
actions of various actors. A related problem, partially addressed in chapter two, is the fact
that a number of diﬀerent terms are used to refer to the same concept and that the same
term is used to refer to diﬀerent concepts. Of particular importance are the terms such
as transformation, replacement, and transplacement versus reforma, reptura and reptforma
(see section 2.3); and the various terms used to refer to the position of various actors during
the transition process, such as hardliners, standpatters, reformers and liberalisers. Though
individual authors usually try to explain their use of these terms, there is a need for a more
structured convention on the use of all these terms.
Though the interactive approach was used to establish a framework in which structural
conditions and behavioural factors were combined, there is a deﬁnite need for further research
to determine in more accurate terms the symbiotic relationship that exist between, on the
one hand particular structural conditions and the actions of particular actors, and on the
other hand the outcome of the process of transition. The outcome could refer to whether
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it is a transition from above, a transition from below or a negotiated transition, but it
should also pay attention to the institutional outcomes. The presence of violence and how
its exploitation could be avoided, is of particular importance in this regard.
The problem of causality within the social and political sciences is another issue that
requires further attention. The issue of causality is hotly debated in most sciences and even
though it is often referred to in studies on democratisation, a systematic account of precisely
how causality is understood in the ﬁeld, is lacking. Various theories are often criticised for,
on the one hand jumping prematurely to causal conclusions and, on the other hand, avoiding
decisions on causality. Even though advocates of the micro-behavioural approach claim that
they have restored causality to its rightful position (see Rustow, 1970), there is in fact very
little evidence as to precisely how causality is determined or manifests itself in these studies.
These studies concentrate on the “mechanistic rituals” of decision-making by the key actors.
Micro-behaviouralists thus fail to address the issue of why diﬀerent actors pursue diﬀerent
goals, or why even within the same camp they may follow diﬀerent ideologies and strategies.
Thus, why do the goals of the incumbents diﬀer from those of the challengers, and why
do the strategies of for example the moderates diﬀer from those of the radicals within the
same camp. In contemporary studies, there is a preference for the principles of causality
developed by Hume, but during the research it was found that pre-Humeian causality could
in fact be relevant within the context of studies of democratisation, particularly, regarding
the behaviour of the various actors. For example, the actions of various actors are often
caused by the positions they occupy within society as well as the goals they pursue. Thus,
a deﬁnite need for more systematic research on the issue of causality within the context of
studies on democratisation has been identiﬁed.
The problem of consolidation is another issue that requires further research and particu-
larly how it could be aﬀected by the mode of transition or the outcome of the choices made
by the key actors and particularly with regard to the best institutional alternatives within
the prevailing conditions. Though the ﬁnal phase of consolidation was not part of this study,
some comments have been made in chapter six. However, a number of observations were
made in this regard. The macro-structural approach, in setting its preconditions for democ-
racy, is more inclined to address “indirectly” the issue of consolidation. That is precisely
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the source of a criticism levelled against it, namely that it determines factors that would
contribute to the maintenance of democracy and then regard it as a precondition for democ-
racy. On the other hand, the micro-behavioural approach is more concerned with the rituals
of the transition process and largely ignores whether the transition will be successful in the
sense that it would become consolidated and would thus survive in the long term. Thus, in
the choices and strategies of the various actors the eﬀect of the structural conditions on the
possible consolidation of democracy should be considered more systematically. Transitions
to democracy are therefore too often regarded as an end in itself (often merely to replace
a regime) and not as a means to an end - that is the consolidation of democracy and its
long-term survival. Of particular importance in this regard is the suitability, as well as the
correct combination, of the institutions for the new dispensation. With hindsight it should
be noted that even though the NP was a staunch advocate of power-sharing it was unable
to function in such an environment and decided to quit the government of national unity.
Various reasons could be provided for the actions of the NP, but it is precisely these issues
that require more systematic research.
7.5 IN CONCLUSION
Transitions to democracy are complex phenomena that require continued systematic re-
search. The South African transition was likewise complex, but a framework that makes use
of an interactive approach that deals with both structural and behavioural variables within
the domains of state - political society - civil society, which makes provision for the various
phases, as well as the choices of actors and the institutional outcomes, was found to be useful
in the analysis of South Africa’s transition. It was also found that there are suﬃcient reasons
why this framework could also be used in other transitions.
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